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Boon or Boondoggle?
The Debate Over State and Local 
Economic Development Policies
Over the past 20 years, governors and mayors have assumed respon 
sibility for economic development. While many regions have experienced 
high unemployment and declining real wages, federal action to deal with 
these economic problems has been constrained by budget deficits and 
a conservative political philosophy, and state and local governments 
have had to act. Almost every state and metropolitan area has expand 
ed the size and scope of economic development programs. More money 
is being spent on subsidies to new branch plants than ever before, and 
even conservative states have intervened in the private market by sub 
sidizing business research and industrial modernization, and by pro 
viding capital and business training to small business and entrepreneurs.
To most politicians, economic development means more jobs. More 
jobs are expected to bring many benefits: lower unemployment, higher 
wages, greater property values, increased profits for local businesses, 
more tax revenues, and reelection for the politician who can take credit 
for these boons. Politicians usually emphasize most the benefit of pro 
viding jobs for the unemployed.
But critics argue persuasively that state and local economic develop 
ment policies cannot achieve these benefits. According to the critics, 
economic development policies do not help the unemployed and the poor, 
but mostly benefit capitalists and the propertied. The indictment against 
state and local economic development policies has three parts. First, 
the policies are argued to have little effect on the growth of a small 
region such as a state or metropolitan area. Second, even if these policies 
could affect job growth, so many in-migrants would be attracted that 
the local unemployment rate would quickly return to its original level.
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Third, even if local growth lowered unemployment in one area, from 
a national perspective these benefits would be offset by increased 
unemployment in other areas.
This book presents evidence to counter these criticisms of state and 
local economic development policies. It argues that economic develop 
ment policies can significantly affect the growth of a state or metropolitan 
area, that increases in the growth of a local economy can benefit its 
unemployed, and that state and local economic development policies 
can benefit the overall national economy.
While the argument relies, in part, on my interpretation of previous 
research, I also present new empirical research on how metropolitan 
growth affects the unemployed, workers, and property owners. That 
research shows that faster growth of a metropolitan area has signifi 
cant long-run effects on its unemployment rate. Furthermore, faster 
growth leads to significant occupational upgrading to better jobs, par 
ticularly for minority and less-educated persons. Growth of a 
metropolitan area also increases its property values. But overall, the 
benefits of faster growth are probably distributed in a progressive man 
ner, that is, the real incomes of low-income persons increase by a greater 
percentage than those of upper-income persons.
This is not to imply that cutting business taxes to spur economic 
development is always the right policy. Public services to business also 
affect the economic growth of a local area. Depending on the cir 
cumstances, the labor market benefits of local economic growth may 
be outweighed by the costs of environmental damage due to growth 
and the costs of government resources devoted to economic develop 
ment programs.
Focus on Local Economies
To avoid confusion at the outset, my arguments for the potential 
benefits of state and local economic development programs are meant 
to be applied to programs that seek to affect growth for an entire small 
economic region, such as a state or a metropolitan area. l Programs aimed 
at individual towns or suburbs within a metropolitan area raise
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different issues. Metropolitan areas, or states, can legitimately be thought 
of as economic regions, because they have quasi-independent labor and 
housing markets. The trend in local economic development policy is 
towards metropolitan cooperation. In addition, states are increasingly 
prominent in organizing and financing economic development policy 
at all levels of government. Thus, the book addresses the types of state 
and local economic development policy that dominate the scene today 
and are likely to be even more important in the future.
What is Economic Development Policy?
Another source of confusion could be what is meant by "economic 
development policy." Growth and structural change in the economy 
of a state or local area are arguably affected by every government ac 
tion, from the quality of public schools to the regulation of optometrists. 
Economic development policies discussed here, however, are those that 
provide direct assistance to businesses. Direct economic development 
policies assist businesses with cash, such as tax subsidies, for exam 
ple, or with services, such as training individuals in how to develop 
a business plan for a new enterprise. Policies such as those related to 
public schools that indirectly affect economic development have broader 
purposes and are best evaluated from a broader perspective. This book 
focuses on direct economic development policies because their claim 
ed success in promoting economic growth is their main rationale. Fur 
thermore, economic development policies that assist businesses direct 
ly are politically controversial. Liberals are concerned that these policies 
give too much profit to business, while conservatives are concerned 
that these policies give too much power to government.
Table 1.1 lists the main types of direct economic development policies 
being pursued by state and local governments. These policies can be 
grouped into two types. Traditional economic development policies seek 
to provide financial and other incentives for businesses to locate and 
expand in an area. Most incentives are provided through the area's tax 
system and are targeted at attracting new manufacturing branch plants.
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Table 1.1
A Typology of State and Local Economic Development Policies 
that Directly Aid Businesses
Traditional Economic Development Policies 
(Primarily Targeted at Branch Plant Recruitment)
Marketing Area As Branch Plant Location
Industrial development advertising 
Marketing trips to corporate headquarters 
Provision of site information to prospects
Financial Incentives
Industrial revenue bonds
Property tax abatements
Other tax relief
Provision of land at below-market prices
Direct state loans
Nonflnancial Incentives to Branch Plants
Customized industrial training
Expedited provision of site-specific infrastructure
Help with regulatory problems
"New Wave" Economic Development Policies 
(Primarily Targeted at Small or Existing Businesses)
Capital Market Programs
Predominantly government-financed loan or equity programs 
Government support for predominantly privately financed loan or 
equity programs
Information/Education for Small Business
Small business ombudsman/information office 
Community college classes in starting a business 
Small business development centers 
Entrepreneurial training programs 
Small business incubators
Research and High Technology
Centers of excellence in business-related research at public universities
Research-oriented industrial parks
Applied research grants
Technology transfer programs/industrial extension services
Export Assistance
Information/training in how to export 
Trade missions 
Export financing
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What I call "new wave" economic development policies are an eclec 
tic group of policies that became popular in many states during the late 
1970s and early 1980s. These policies encourage various forms of in 
novation, such as applied research, industrial modernization, en- 
trepreneurship, and business expansion into export markets. They also 
have in common a willingness to involve government much more with 
business decisions. Rather than just providing cash, they would have 
government provide services to businesses to help them determine their 
best market or technology.
Several prominent books on state and local economic development 
policies describe the many new wave policies and debate whether the 
new wave approach or the traditional approach is better. 2 While that 
debate is important, my focus in this book is on whether the general 
approach of assisting business for economic development purposes is 
likely to cause changes in business behavior that benefit other groups 
in society, and if so, who those groups are. All of the direct economic 
development policies have in common an attempt to reduce some sort 
of business costs, broadly defined. This even is true for new wave 
policies. For example, export information programs reduce the cost to 
businesses of acquiring information on markets in other countries; en 
trepreneurial training programs reduce the costs to potential entre 
preneurs of developing a business and financing plan; applied research 
grants reduce the costs to high technology companies of developing an 
innovative product. Furthermore, the issue of the overall desirability 
of business assistance for economic development logically needs to be 
resolved before the issue of which type of business assistance is most 
effective. If the entire philosophy behind direct economic development 
policies is flawed if these policies can only benefit the assisted 
businesses, or can only benefit property owners then the debate over 
different types of policies is pointless.
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Jobs Versus Other Goals 
of Economic Development Policies
The analysis of this study emphasizes one particular goal of direct 
economic development policies, the goal of more jobs for the state or 
local area. Some direct economic development policies have additional 
goals as well. For example, many of the new wave economic develop 
ment policies also aim at encouraging innovation.
Job creation is the primary goal for all direct economic development 
policies, traditional or new wave, from the perspective of politicians 
and voters. Governor Mario Cuomo of New York expressed the opin 
ion of many state and local political leaders and voters when he said 
that "while there are no panaceas, nothing comes closer than one sim 
ple word: jobs." 3 Advocates of new wave economic development 
policies may tout their innovation benefits, but the policies will face 
political death if they fail to increase job growth. 4
Despite all the publicity given new wave economic development 
policies, the evidence suggests that more resources are devoted to tradi 
tional policies whose primary goal is more jobs for the state or local 
area. Data from the National Association of State Development Agen 
cies indicate that expenditures by state development agencies totaled 
about $1.5 billion in 1990 (National Association of State Development 
Agencies, 1990). Much of this agency spending is devoted to traditional 
rather than new wave programs. A State of Minnesota survey suggests 
that state spending on high technology economic development totaled 
$550 million in 1988 (Minnesota Office of Science and Technology, 
1988). Some of this spending appears to be for university basic research, 
and there is overlap between the NASD A and Minnesota figures. But 
even if there were no overlap, and all of this $2 billion was devoted 
to new wave programs, these expenditures are dwarfed by the various 
tax subsidies, or "tax expenditures," that state and local governments 
give to business for economic development purposes. For example, in 
the State of Michigan alone, over $150 million annually is foregone 
from property tax abatements granted to businesses. 5 For just one 
manufacturing branch plant (albeit a large one), the General Motors
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Saturn plant, Tennessee state and local governments provided subsidies 
with a net present value of $144 million, mostly in the form of proper 
ty tax abatements. 6 Furthermore, in addition to these tax expenditures 
that are clearly linked to specific economic development projects, many 
of the recent tax reforms in the states have reduced business tax rates 
and provided business tax credits and deductions, largely on the rationale 
that these changes would help the business climate and promote economic 
development. 7 The "tax expenditures" caused by these development- 
oriented tax reforms vastly exceed what states spend on venture capital, 
entrepreneurial training, or other new wave economic development 
policies.
Do State and Local 
Economic Development Policies Affect Growth?
Financial subsidies ... are rarely a significant concern in wise 
business-location decisions and usually amount to little more than 
a government giveaway and burden on taxpayers, including cor 
porate taxpayers forced to subsidize their competitors. (Page 36 
in Leadership for Dynamic State Economics, Committee for 
Economic Development, 1986)
The first issue in analyzing state and local economic development 
policies is whether these policies have any significant effect on the job 
growth of an area. If they fail to increase job growth in the areas that 
adopt them, they cannot help the unemployed.
Many policy researchers have denounced the traditional economic 
development policies of tax and financial subsidies as ineffective in pro 
moting state or metropolitan area job growth. The usual theoretical argu 
ment for this position is that state and local taxes are too small a percent 
age of business costs to affect business growth decisions. The usual em 
pirical argument for this position relies on both surveys of business firms 
and econometric studies of the determinants of state or metropolitan 
area job growth. Surveys of business firms often show a low ranking 
of state and local taxes as a location determinant. Furthermore, until
8 Boon or Boondoggle?
recent years, the overwhelming majority of econometric studies could 
find no significant statistical relationship between state and local business 
growth and state and local business taxes.
The theoretical argument that state and local business taxes are too 
small to affect business location is unpersuasive. Many states and 
metropolitan areas will be close substitutes from a business perspec 
tive, offering similar access to markets and supplies. Even small pro 
duction cost differentials could prove decisive for a particular business 
location decision.
The problem with surveys of location determinants is that the ques 
tions asked are difficult to interpret. These surveys ask the business 
to list the most important, or essential, or crucial determinants of its 
current location choice. What "important" means in this context is dif 
ficult to define. What we really want to know is whether a different 
location would have been chosen if state and local business taxes had 
been 5 percent higher, or 10 percent higher. Answering this question 
requires a quantitative weighing of this site's advantages versus alter 
native sites, and most businesses would be unable or unwilling to pro 
vide such precise answers to a survey.
Recent econometric evidence indicates that variations in state and local 
business taxes do have effects on state or metropolitan area growth that 
are likely to be considered significant by most policy makers. Difficult 
methodological problems plague the estimation of how taxes affect state 
and metropolitan area growth. No existing study escapes all these prob 
lems. But compared to earlier studies in this area, recent studies generally 
use better data and methodologies. Recent studies mostly agree that state 
and local business taxes affect the growth of an area, and even agree 
on the approximate magnitude of the effect.
Major public services that benefit business, such as improvement in 
public infrastructure, are also estimated to spur state or metropolitan 
area growth in many of the newer studies of business location. An 
economic development policy of business tax cuts may fail to increase 
jobs in a state or metropolitan area if it leads to a deterioration of public 
services to business. An economic development policy of tax increases 
may succeed in increasing jobs if it significantly improves public ser 
vices to business. Policymakers must consider both tax and public
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service effects on business if they are to successfully increase their area's 
job growth.
New wave regional economic development policies go beyond pro 
viding financial subsidies or general public services to providing specific 
services to small business and entrepreneurs. Many policy researchers 
who denounce state and local tax breaks are much more hopeful about 
these types of policies. At present, there is no good evidence on whether 
new wave economic development policies are effective. If new wave 
services have a higher value to business than their cost, they could have 
a greater effect on the growth of a state or metropolitan area, per dollar 
of government effort, than the more traditional business tax breaks. The 
cost effectiveness of state and local economic development policies is 
crucial to whether the policies make sense for a particular state or locality.
Does Local Growth Help the Unemployed 
and Lower-Income Households?
When jobs develop in a fast growing area, workers from other 
areas are attracted to fill the developing vacancies, thus preserv 
ing the same unemployment rate as before the growth surge. (John 
Logan and Harvey Molotch, Professors of Sociology at State 
University of New York at Albany and University of California- 
Santa Barbara, respectively, p. 89 in Urban Fortunes: The Political 
Economy of Place, 1987)
. . . the fortunes of numerous poor and unskilled urban residents 
of cities are often largely unaffected by even healthy expansion 
within local economies. (Page 5 in Urban America in the Eighties, 
Report of the Panel on Policies and Prospects for Metropolitan 
and Nonmetropolitan America, President's Commission for a Na 
tional Agenda for the Eighties, 1980)
The next issue is whether the ability of state and local economic 
development policy to affect local growth makes any difference. Sup 
pose some policy does increase job growth for a local economic region, 
such as a metropolitan area. The increase in local labor demand would
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be expected to lead to some short-term reduction in local unemploy 
ment and upward pressure on real wages. But if labor mobility is rapid 
enough, the increase in local labor demand will be quickly matched 
by an increase in local labor supply. The unemployment rate will in 
crease back to its original level, and the real wage will drop back to 
its original level.
Migration statistics indicate that the United States is a mobile enough 
society that labor market effects of faster local job growth could plausibly 
be very short-lived. For example, during a typical four-year period, 
over 13 percent of the population moves between metropolitan areas 
(Marston 1985). This mobility rate far exceeds the likely unemploy 
ment rate differentials across metropolitan areas. Only a small portion 
of this normal flow of migrants needs to respond to changes in relative 
job growth rates across metropolitan areas for the labor supply change 
to be well-matched to the labor demand change.
Even if local labor supply quickly responds to labor demand shifts, 
economic development policies would still provide the benefit of higher 
land values. Increased local demand and supply of labor would increase 
both business and residential demand for land. The price of existing 
houses and buildings would increase. Land would be bid away from 
other uses (e.g., agriculture or speculation) and devoted to new residen 
tial and commercial development to accommodate the new businesses 
and residents. Even with this increase in developed land supply, the 
price of existing land would remain at a permanently higher level, as 
existing land presumably has some locational advantages over the newly 
developed land. Unlike the case of labor, sufficient land cannot "migrate 
in" to a local area to force land prices back down to their original level.
The benefits of higher land values lack the political or ethical appeal 
of the benefits of lower unemployment. Land is disproportionately owned 
by upper-income groups, so land value benefits would be distributed 
"regressively": the percentage increase in real income would be greater 
for upper-income groups than for lower-income groups. If land value 
increases are the only benefits of state and local economic development 
policies, it is questionable whether anyone other than property owners 
should be required to pay for these policies. Furthermore, in this case 
economic development policies would be unable to help solve the social
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problems of unemployment and poverty among minorities and other 
disadvantaged groups.
My argument for long-run labor market effects of local job growth 
is that what happens to people in the short run affects their long-run 
prospects. Suppose that an increase in local job growth leads, in the 
short run, to some currently unemployed residents getting jobs that they 
otherwise would not have obtained. These currently unemployed 
residents have a short-run advantage over potential in-migrants because 
in-migration does take some time to respond to shifts in labor demand. 
Because these current residents obtain jobs in the short run, they ac 
quire skills that increase their employability and real wages in the long 
run, even after migration has had a chance to fully respond to the in 
creased labor demand.
This dependence of a long-run equilibrium in this case, the long- 
run equilibrium unemployment rate of individuals on past history has 
been labeled hysteresis. Hysteresis was originally used in physics to 
describe how the electromagnetic characteristics of certain metals are 
permanently affected by the temporary application of certain magnetic 
forces. 8 More recently, some economists have suggested that an 
economy's equilibrium unemployment rate may be permanently increas 
ed by a temporary recession, or lowered by a temporary boom. If this 
is true, then macroeconomic policies that affect the short-run perfor 
mance of an economy may also affect its long-run performance. The 
issue of whether equilibrium unemployment exhibits hysteresis has im 
plications much broader than simply who benefits from state and local 
economic development policies.
The new empirical results of this book support the hypothesis that 
labor markets are subject to hysteresis effects. The results are based 
on analysis of average unemployment rates, occupational wage rates, 
and housing and other prices for 25 metropolitan areas from 1972 to 
1986, and on analysis of the labor market success of 44,000 adult males 
in 89 metropolitan areas from 1979 to 1986. The results, extensively 
presented in four chapters of the book, can be briefly summarized here. 
The data suggest that a once-and-for-all shock to a metropolitan area's 
employment that is, a shock that temporarily affects the employment 
growth rate but permanently affects the employment level lowers the
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area's unemployment rate and raises labor force participation rates for 
at least eight years after the shock. Holding occupation constant, real 
wages are unchanged. Individuals with given education and experience 
are more likely to be promoted to higher-paying occupations in 
metropolitan economies that experience higher growth, however, and 
this upgrading in occupational status persists well after the temporary 
shock to growth has subsided. The effects of local growth on real earn 
ings are highest for blacks and for less-educated workers. Local growth 
also raises property values; overall, however, it appears that faster local 
growth is likely to have a progressive impact on the income distribu 
tion. The percentage increase in real income is greatest for low-income 
groups, even accounting for the regressive distribution of the benefits 
from increased property values.
Can State and Local Economic Development Policies 
Benefit the National Economy?
I firmly believe that state government must resist the temptation 
to intervene directly in economic decisions of the marketplace. It 
is certainly true that the combination of reduced federal support 
for state and local programs and the devastating impact of our re 
cent recessions has put enormous pressure on state governments 
to "do something." The reality, however, is that state actions have 
not always increased the country's net investment. On a national 
scale, the impact of state economic development initiatives on U.S. 
economic activity is dominated by monetary, fiscal, and trade deci 
sions at the federal level. States, therefore, are merely competing 
at the margins with one another for their share of new investment. 
Little or no net gain for the United States as a whole is attained 
from these programs. (Ralph E. Bailey, chairman and chief ex 
ecutive officer, Conoco, Inc., memorandum of dissent on pages 
88-89 of Leadership for Dynamic State Economies, Committee for 
Economic Development, 1986)
The argument is often made, as Bailey does in the above quotation, 
that state and local economic development policies are, even at best, 
a zero-sum game from a national perspective. It is argued that even if
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economic development policies succeed in increasing growth in one area, 
this growth is merely transferred from some other area, and overall 
national growth is unaffected. The lower unemployment and higher 
wages in one area are offset by the higher unemployment and lower 
wages in other areas.
My argument against this "zero-sum" game position is twofold. First, 
even if it were true that state and local economic development policies 
just reshuffled jobs among geographic areas, such reshuffling may benefit 
the nation. Individuals vary in the dollar value they place on getting 
a job, which determines how high a wage they will require in order 
to accept a job. For example, individuals may place a higher value on 
obtaining a job that is, are willing to accept a very low wage if they 
have few other income sources. Individuals may place a lower value 
on obtaining a job if they feel they make good use of their time outside 
the wage labor market, such as taking care of children. In low- 
unemployment areas, most individuals who place a high value on get 
ting a job will get one fairly quickly. In high-unemployment areas, many 
individuals who place a high value on getting a job will remain 
unemployed for a long time. As a result, the average unemployed in 
dividual in high-unemployment areas will "need" a job more in the 
sense of placing a higher dollar value on getting one than the average 
unemployed individual in low-unemployment areas. High-unemployment 
areas will benefit more from an additional job than low-unemployment 
areas, as the social benefits from hiring the average unemployed per 
son are higher.
The vigor with which states and governments pursue economic 
development probably reflects these differences in the social benefits 
of reducing unemployment. Common sense suggests that high- 
unemployment states and localities will face greater political pressures 
to expand economic development policies. The scanty empirical evidence 
suggests that high-unemployment areas respond to these pressures by 
more aggressively pursuing economic development. The competitive 
game of state and local economic development probably helps redistribute 
jobs to the most needy areas.
Second, state and local competition for jobs may increase national 
growth. Higher subsidies in many local areas for expanded business
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output and employment may reduce the average national unemployment 
rate and increase output. In addition, the transfer of jobs from low- 
unemployment regions to high-unemployment regions may reduce in 
flationary pressures and allow national policymakers to achieve lower 
national unemployment and higher output without increasing inflation. 
One potential negative effect of state and local competition for jobs 
is that the national distribution of income may become more regressive, 
that is, more income may go to the rich instead of the poor. Competi 
tion for jobs may lead to reduced taxes on business owners. Wealthy 
business owners may benefit. But policymakers should offset these 
benefits for the rich by making the federal tax system more progressive, 
rather than by attempting to eliminate competition for jobs.
Is the Glass Half-Full or Half-Empty?
The focus of this book is on how state and local economic develop 
ment policies can potentially provide benefits. This focus is necessary 
because the prevailing intellectual assessment of these policies is too 
negative. It should not, however, be interpreted as a blanket endorse 
ment of all state and local economic development policies.
Empirical evidence presented here suggests that the benefits and costs 
of state and local economic development policies will often be close. 
Net benefits of economic development policies are most likely to be 
positive in areas of high unemployment and for programs that have large 
effects on business location, expansion, and start-up decisions per dollar 
of government spending.
Organization of the Book
The remainder of the book presents these arguments in more detail. 
Chapter 2 reviews what previous research shows about how state and 
local public policies affect business growth.
Chapters 3 through 7 develop the broad theme of the book: how 
metropolitan growth affects different groups in the population. Chapter
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3 presents the theory of likely distributional effects of local growth. 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 present empirical estimates of the effects of 
metropolitan growth on unemployment rates and other measures of labor 
market activities, prices, and wages. Chapter 7 examines the overall 
effect of growth on real earnings, and uses these results to simulate 
the likely quantitative magnitude of the distributional and efficiency ef 
fects of local growth.
Chapter 8 considers whether state and local economic development 
efforts help the national economy. Chapter 9 concludes with a discus 
sion of the broader implications of these results for macroeconomic 
policy, antipoverty policy, and the role of local areas in national policy.
NOTES
1. The theoretical analysis of the book may also apply to groupings of counties in nonmetropolitan 
areas that constitute true regional labor and housing markets. Virtually none of the empirical work 
of the book deals with these nonmetropolitan economic regions, however, so extrapolation of 
the findings to nonmetropolitan areas is more uncertain.
2.1 refer here to such recent books as Laboratories of Democracy, by journalist David Osborne 
(1988), or The Wealth of States, by several policy analysts associated with the Council of State 
Planning and Policy Agencies (Vaughan, Pollard, and Dyer 1985). Both these books argue against 
traditional economic development policies and in favor of some new wave economic develop 
ment policies. A more scholarly account of this debate is provided by political scientist Peter 
Eisinger, in his comprehensive book on state and local economic development, The Rise of the 
Entrepreneurial State (Eisinger 1988). Case studies of how this debate has been resolved so far 
in various states are provided in The New Economic Role of American States, edited by Scott 
Fosler of the Committee for Economic Development, a national business think tank (Fosler 1988).
3. Eisinger (1988), p. 10.
4. Vaughan, Pollard, and Dyer, in their book The Wealth of States, are certainly aware of the 
political importance of creating jobs. One of their arguments for a greater focus on new wave 
economic development policies is that such policies are more effective than traditional economic 
development policies in creating jobs in the long run: ". . . in the long run, employment oppor 
tunities and wealth will be greater under an entrepreneurial strategy than under any alternative 
approach to development" (Vaughan, Pollard, and Dyer 1985, p. 128). Osborne also makes similar 
arguments in his book: "Businesses that fail to innovate do not last long; regional economies 
in which innovation does not flourish quickly stagnate." (Osborne 1988, p. 252).
5. These Michigan figures come from a report by the Citizens Research Council of Michigan 
(1986). Michigan is the only state I know of that keeps track of the volume of property tax abatements 
throughout the state.
6. These Tennessee figures come from a paper by Bartik, Becker, Lake, and Bush (1987). The 
figures are based on the in lieu of tax agreement between Maury County and Saturn, and on in 
formation from the Tennessee Department of Economic and Community Development on state 
expenditures on roads and job training for the Saturn plant. Stating the subsidy in present value 
terms is an appropriate way of emphasizing the large size of traditional economic development
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subsidies. The present value of some flow over time of subsidies tells us what one-time subsidy, 
given today, would have the same value as that flow of subsidies. If all new manufacturing in 
vestment received the same present value subsidy as Saturn, the resulting flow of subsidies would 
be equivalent to spending $3.4 billion annually on subsidies. Total manufacturing gross invest 
ment in 1985 was $81.8 billion; $144 million times 81.8/3.5 would yield a total present value 
of new subsidy commitments of $3.4 billion. I should note that the Saturn subsidy was not par 
ticularly large for an auto plant; for example, the Kentucky subsidy to its Toyota plant was ap 
parently much greater (Milward and Newman 1989).
7. Hal Hovey, editor of State Policy Reports, has stated that "state tax systems are evolving in 
the direction of [development-oriented] tax policies," which would eventually imply "eliminating 
all state and local taxes paid in operations, such as manufacturing, that have choices of where 
they locate and expand." (Hovey 1986, pp. 94-95). According to Steve Gold, former Director 
of Fiscal Studies of the National Conference of State Legislatures, "Interstate tax competition 
not only remains, but may intensify." (Gold 1988, p. 27).
8. Cross and Allan (1988) discuss the history of the hysteresis concept.
_ 2 _
Can State and Local Policies 
Affect Economic Development?
Business incentive policies, including tax credits and writedowns, 
loans, guarantees, subsidies (and even conditioning plant closures 
and relocations with an "exit" notice) are assumed to influence 
the cost-sensitive locational behavior of firms if they are large 
enough. . . . [This] widespread belief in the potency of incen 
tives ... is unsubstantiated by empirical evidence. (P. 43 in Ur 
ban America in the Eighties, Report of the Panel on Policies and 
Prospects for Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan America, Presi 
dent's Commission for a National Agenda for the Eighties, 1980)
Critics of state and local economic development policies claim that 
these policies have little effect on employment growth of a local economy 
such as a metropolitan area or state. This chapter disagrees with that 
claim, and argues that state and local policies can significantly affect 
local growth. It analyzes four types of evidence on whether the policies 
of a state or local area affect its growth:
  evaluations of specific state or local economic development 
programs;
  surveys of businesses about the influence of state and local policies 
on their investment decisions;
  case studies of how changes in state and local policies might in 
fluence the behavior of an actual firm; and
  econometric studies of how state and local policies influence state and 
local growth, branch plant location decisions, and new firm start-up 
decisions.
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Evaluations of Specific Programs
Relatively few studies have examined the effects of specific state or 
local economic development programs. Table 2.1 describes recent studies 
of specific programs. As shown in the table, there is evidence that enter 
prise zones, research parks, location incentives such as property tax 
abatements, and export promotion programs, make some difference to 
state or local economic growth. But not all studies find positive or 
statistically significant effects of these programs, and in one case, the 
study by James Papke of the Indiana enterprise zone program, the policy 
is associated with economic decline in the targeted regions.
These studies of specific economic development programs suffer from 
two major limitations. First, in some cases the programs are small 
compared to the areas whose growth they are supposed to affect 
(Luger 1987; McHone 1984; Coughlin and Cartwright 1987; 
O'hUallachain and Satterthwaite 1990; Ambrosius 1989; and Feiock 
1987). l For example, in Coughlin and Cartwright's study, state export 
promotion programs are minuscule compared to the size of any state's 
economy. Small programs could have effects that are large relative to 
program size. But relative to the size of the affected local economy, 
program effects are probably small enough to be overwhelmed by 
unobserved or random factors that alter the growth of that local area. 
Estimated program effects will either be statistically insignificant in this 
case, or will reflect the influence of unobserved local characteristics. 
Any statistically significant effects of the program are likely to be 
spurious. 2
This mismatch of program size and local economy size is less im 
portant for studies of enterprise zones, a program designed to amass 
sufficient incentives to noticeably affect a small area. 3 But studies of 
enterprise zones and other relatively "large" economic development 
programs suffer from a second problem: it is difficult to determine what 
would have happened to the local area without the program. Enterprise 
zones are chosen in part because they are zones of low economic growth. 
Hence, their growth even after zone designation would be expected to 
be poor. Comparison of predesignation and postdesignation growth of the
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zone, as was done in the study by Jones and others (1985), may pro 
vide a better evaluation of program effects, but changes in zone growth 
could be due to more general economic forces, such as national booms 
or recessions, or changes in the overall national performance of specific 
industries. An even better approach is to compare changes in the growth 
of local areas targeted by an economic development program with 
changes in growth in control areas, as was done in the studies by Papke 
(1991), Luger and Goldstein (1990), Papke (1990), and Rubin and 
Wilder (1989). But choosing control areas which ideally would be iden 
tical in all observed and unobserved characteristics to the targeted local 
areas is difficult. Existing studies generally provide only brief discus 
sions of how control areas were chosen, and only estimate effects 
using one set of control areas.
Three research strategies offer promise for better evaluations of the 
effects of specific economic development programs. First, for a pro 
gram large enough to have a detectable effect on overall local growth, 
better methods for choosing control areas are needed. 4 For each targeted 
local area, researchers should select several alternative sets of control 
areas, based on different criteria for choosing characteristics on which 
to match controls to the targeted areas. The sensitivity of estimated pro 
gram effects to the choice of different sets of control areas should be 
reported by researchers. 5
For economic development programs that are too small to have an 
aggregate effect on the growth of a local economy, a promising research 
strategy for program evaluation is to collect micro-level data on 
businesses assisted under the economic development program, and on 
a control group of unassisted businesses. 6 The performance of the ex 
perimental group (the assisted businesses) and the control group would 
be compared on some measure of goals that is relevant to that particular 
program. For example, a technology transfer program might be evaluated 
based on the differences in productivity gains, technology adoption, or 
job gains, between the experimental and control groups of businesses.
Ideally, the experimental group of businesses and the control group 
of businesses would be randomly chosen. Random assignment ensures
Table 2.1 
Studies of Specific Economic Development Policies
Author
L. Papke 
(1991)
Luger & 
Goldstein 
(1990)
O'hUallachain 
& Satterthwaite 
(1990)
J. Papke 
(1990)
Program Studied
Indiana enterprise zone
Research parks
Enterprise zones, 
research partks 
industrial revenue 
bonds (IRBs)
Indiana 
enterprise zone
Methodology
Regression analysis of effects of EZ 
on inventories, machinery and 
equipment, and unemployment 
claims, using pre-and post-zone 
designation data on jurisdictions 
surrounding EZ, and control 
jurisdictions
Comparison of changes in employ 
ment growth rates, before and after 
research park established in 
research park counties, to changes 
in growth rates in "control" 
counties; both comparisons of 
means and regression analysis
Regression analysis of 
determinants of MSA 
growth by industry
Regression analysis 
examining pre- and post- 
zone designation level 
of capital in zones, 
compared to a control set 
of Indiana townships
Findings
Enterprise zones increase inven 
tories and reduce unemployment 
claims, but also reduce 
machinery and equipment 
investment
58% of parks "succeed" in 
that their counties have 
greater increase in growth 
than controls; older parks 
and parks with better 
university ties are more 
successful
Enterprise zones and 
research parks had 
positive effects in 
many industries, although 
seldom significant; IRBs 
did not have positive effect.
Enterprise zones had 
significantly less capital 
(7%) after designation 
than before, compared 
to control townships.
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Woodward 
(1990)
Ambrosius 
(1989)
Coughlin, Terza 
& Arromdee 
(1989)
Erickson & 
Friedman 
(1989)
State offices in 
Japan and promotion 
efforts as recruit 
ment tool for 
Japanese plants
State revenue bond 
financing, public 
works, accelerated 
depreciation, various 
tax breaks, enterprise 
zones, job training
State expenditures to 
attract foreign direct 
investment
Enterprise zones
Statistical analysis of 
whether state office or 
state industrial 
development index 
(Source: Luger (1987)) 
affects probability of 
Japanese plant choosing 
state
Regression analysis of 
whether level or trend 
in state manufacturing 
value-added per capita 
or state unemployment 
rate changed after 
adoption of particular 
incentive
Regression-style analysis 
of whether state spending 
affected probability of 
being chosen for FDI
Regression analysis of 
number of zone investments 
and jobs created as 
function of zone charac 
teristics, zone incentives 
and MSA characteristics
Presence of office in 
Japan was associated 
with close to double 
probability of plant 
choosing state; effect of 
industrial development 
index insignificant
Generally, insignificant 
effects, except tax 
break for land and 
capital improvements 
significantly associated 
with declining trend in 
unemployment rate
Large effect, usually 
significantly positive
Number of incentives often 
positively associated with 
better zone performance, 
although not significant 
in all specifications; 
number of zones in state often 
negatively associated with zone 
performance, although not always 
significant
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Author
Rubin & 
Wilder 
(1989)
Walker & 
Greenstreet 
(1989)
U.S. General 
Accounting 
Office 
(1988)
Coughlin & 
Cartwright 
(1987)
Program Studied
Evansville, Indiana 
enterprise zone
Wide variety of 
incentives, such as 
site-specific infra- 
strucutre, tax breaks, 
job training, etc.
Enterprise zone program 
in Maryland in first 
4 years of operation
State foreign export 
promotion programs
Methodology
Shift-share comparison of 
growth of enterprise zone 
industries with overall 
Evansville MSA
Survey asking whether 
incentives were decisive 
in final location choice 
of firms looking for new 
site; logit analysis of 
which of two finalists 
chosen; regression 
analysis of in-situ 
expansion
Time series analysis of breaks in 
trend of employment growth in EZ 
businesses that received 
EZ subsidies, and inter 
views with large employers 
responsible for breaks in 
aggregate trend
Regression analysis of 
dollars of state manufac 
turing exports as fundtion 
of state export promotion spending 
and other state characteristics
Findings
Enterprise zone gained 
significantly more jobs than 
MSA in warehousing, wholesale 
trade, retail trade, and services
Of plants offered incentives, 
37% claimed were decisive; 
logit analysis showed 
significant effect of 
incentives on final site 
choice, holding other site 
characteristics constant; 
insignificant effect of 
incentives on in-situ expansion
Although there were some 
increases in growth in zones, the 
large employers mainly responsible 
for those breaks in trend stated 
that factors other than EZ had 
influenced their decisions
$1 of extra state promo 
tion spending increases 
state exports by $432
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Feiock 
(1987)
Luger 
(1987)
Jones, et al. 
(1985)
McHone 
(1984)
Counts of number of 
business incentive 
programs, special 
business services, 
promotional ads
Financial/tax 
subsidies, recruitment 
efforts, R&D support 
capital provision, 
state-funded job training
Enterprise zones
Special tax and financial 
incentives
Regression analysis of 
employment growth, new 
investment, and change 
in number of business 
establishments, for 92 
cities
Regression analysis of 
effects on state wage and 
unemployment levels and 
changes
Comparison of zone 
employment growth before 
(1980-82) and after (1982-84) 
zone designation, using Dun and 
Bradstreet data
Regression comparison of 
growth rates of counties 
in different states but 
same MSA
Generally positive effects 
of a city having larger 
number of economic 
development programs, 
particularly business 
services and ads
State job training reduces 
wages and reduces unemploy 
ment; other estimates very 
imprecise
6 of 8 zones did better 
in after period
MSA counties in states with 
property tax abatements, 
accelerated depreciation, or 
state-run development bond pro 
grams tended to grow faster than 
rest of MSA
n
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that any difference in performance of the two groups can only be due 
to the program. The random assignment approach is a feasible way to 
study entrepreneurial training programs that seek to develop business 
management skills; the use of the experimental method is well-established 
in the closely related area of job training, and the potential clients for 
entrepreneurial training are not likely to have the political clout to com 
plain about being experimented upon. As of 1991, the States of 
Washington and Massachusetts were conducting experiment-based 
evaluations of entrepreneurial training programs for unemployment in 
surance (UI) recipients. Results from these experiments are expected 
in 1993.
Most economic development programs for existing businesses, 
however, would find it politically infeasible to randomly exclude some 
established business from the benefits of a government program. 7 This 
increases the difficulty of estimating program effects, but good estimates 
can still be obtained if the control group is carefully chosen to match 
the experimental group, and if the empirical research controls for other 
factors affecting business performance. 8 Finally, in some cases a valid 
control group is unobtainable. For example, grants to one firm for ap 
plied research may provide "spillover benefits" such as encouraging 
other firms to adopt these technological innovations for all firms in 
a specific industry in that geographic area. But some insights into pro 
gram effects could still be obtained through case study interviews or 
surveys that asked businesses to identify program effects, in this case 
the spillover effects of government-sponsored research.
The key advantage of micro studies of economic development pro 
grams and specific firms is that these studies match the scale of the 
program and the measures of program effects. Small-scale programs  
and programs in an ideal world should be experimented with on a small 
scale before full implementation are more likely to have detectable 
effects upon specific firms than upon the overall economy of a state 
or metropolitan area.
A third strategy for evaluating the effects of specific economic develop 
ment programs is to infer their effects from estimates of how more ma 
jor cost factors affect state and local business growth. If state and local
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business growth is based on overall profitability offered by the area's 
economy, the percentage effects on business growth of a percentage 
change in some cost factor should be roughly proportional to that fac 
tor's share in total costs (see appendix 2.1). If one factor is 1 percent of 
business costs, and another factor is 20 percent of business costs, a per 
centage change in the second factor should have 20 times the effect on 
business growth of the same percentage change in the first factor.
The advantage of this research strategy is that it is easier to accurate 
ly detect the effects on business growth of major cost factors relevant 
to many firms in many local areas than of minor cost factors relevant 
to a few firms in a few areas. The disadvantage is that these inferences 
are only as valid as the theory underlying them, namely, that the dollar 
effect on profits determines business decisions. If business location and 
growth are strongly influenced by more subjective features of state and 
local economic development programs (for example, what these pro 
grams convey about the "business climate" of an area), then inferences 
about program effects on growth based on program effects on business 
costs will be imprecise.
The rest of this chapter focuses on whether significant state and local 
business cost factors such as state and local business tax costs can 
affect an area's business growth. Interpreted narrowly, much of the 
evidence considered only suggests whether overall business taxes, or 
public services, or other major policies, have effects on an area's business 
growth. But significant effects of state and local tax costs on area business 
growth can also be interpreted as implying that other policies affecting 
business costs can also significantly affect area growth. Even new wave 
policies such as subsidies for business applied research, training for 
small business and entrepreneurs, and information on how to export can 
be viewed as helping reduce business costs of acquiring information, 
as discussed in chapter 1. If tax costs and other business costs have 
minuscule effect on an area's business growth, then it is hard to see 
how new wave programs that reduce business costs could much affect 
area growth, unless these programs have very high ratios of business 
cost reduction per dollar of government spending, and are vastly ex 
panded beyond their current small scale. 9
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Of course, ideally we would like to know more about the relative 
effectiveness of new wave economic development programs versus more 
traditional economic development programs of tax breaks and finan 
cial subsidies for business. We need to know whether new wave pro 
grams are more cost-effective than traditional economic development 
programs: per dollar of government expenditure or foregone tax revenue, 
which programs provide the largest real cost savings to business and 
greatest incentives for business growth? 10 With current data, we can 
only get good estimates of the effects of traditional economic develop 
ment policies. Traditional policies receive most of the resources state 
and local governments currently devote to economic development, as 
noted in chapter 1, so estimates of the effects of these policies are of 
independent interest. Furthermore, as discussed above, whether tradi 
tional economic development policies have much effect may have general 
implications for whether any kind of state and local economic develop 
ment policy has the potential of affecting an area's growth.
Survey Evidence on the Influence 
of State and Local Policies
Surveys of firms are often used to determine how taxes and other 
major public policies affected a particular business location decision. 
The surveys differ greatly in design. Sometimes firms are asked to list 
"must" factors; other times, firms are asked to list "desirable" or 
"significant" factors. Some surveys ask about the decision to choose 
a particular metropolitan area or state; other surveys ask about the deci 
sion to choose a particular site within a metropolitan area or state.
The best recent studies suggest that taxes loom larger in location deci 
sions as survey questions turn from "must" factors to "desirable" or 
"significant" factors, and as survey questions turn from the choice of 
a state location to the choice of a specific community within a 
metropolitan area. For example, Schmenner's (1982) survey of For 
tune 500 companies found that only 1 percent listed taxes as a "must" 
factor in a firm selecting a particular broad region and state for a new
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branch plant, but 35 percent listed low taxes as "desirable if available 
and helped to tip scales in favor of this site." Premus's (1982) survey 
of high-tech companies found that 67 percent listed taxes as "signifi 
cant" or "very significant" in influencing state growth decisions. Walker 
and Greenstreet's (1989) survey of new Appalachian manufacturing 
plants found that of plants offered tax and other financial incentives, 
37 percent stated that these incentives were decisive in their final loca 
tion decision. Finally, Rubin's (1991) survey of New Jersey firms receiv 
ing enterprise zone tax incentives found that 32 percent reported that 
these incentives were their primary or only reason to locate or expand 
their business in the zone.
In addition, some highly ranked factors in business location decisions 
are partly influenced by state and local public policy. For example, 
Schmenner (1982) found that the most frequently mentioned "must" 
for firms in choosing a particular region or state was a "favorable labor 
climate." "Labor climate" may be affected by state policy decisions 
on unemployment insurance, workers' compensation, minimum wages, 
and labor relations laws.
Although surveys provide useful information, their information on 
policy effects is too vague. Policymakers might want to know the growth 
effect of a 10 percent cut in taxes. Existing surveys cannot answer that 
question. Whether a firm lists low taxes as influencing a particular site 
choice does not help in answering the question. A particular firm may 
not see low taxes as influential, because all the site finalists had low 
taxes, but a 10 percent increase in taxes could still have altered the 
decision.
Another problem with surveys is that businessmen have political in 
centives to exaggerate the effects of taxes and other economic develop 
ment incentives upon their location choices. A business executive who 
admits that the incentive received by his/her firm had no effect might 
cause political problems for the firm if specific survey responses became 
known. Furthermore, even if there is little risk of specific survey 
responses being released, executives responding to the survey might 
feel enough solidarity with business political interests to want the general 
findings of the study to indicate that tax and other incentives for business 
are needed.
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The Case Study Approach
An alternative approach to examining how taxes and other major 
policies affect business location is case studies of actual firms. The pur 
pose of such case studies would be to determine how much of a policy 
change would be needed for a firm to change its location decision. If 
the studied firm is "average," its responses give a rough idea of how 
policy changes affect overall business growth. Only one study (Bartik 
et al. 1987) has used the case study approach.
The study I did with my colleagues reconstructed the location deci 
sion of the General Motors Saturn plant. Using information on car de 
mand by state and transport costs, we identified Terre Haute, Indiana 
as the site that would minimize the costs of transporting the Saturn car 
to market. We then examined more closely all sites in Indiana and nearby 
states that were near the intersection of two or more interstates. For 
each site, we looked at wage and tax costs. (The Saturn plant was to 
be unionized, but Saturn suppliers, many of whom were expected to 
locate near the plant, would pay regionally varying wages, and we 
calculated how these wage variations would affect the cost to Saturn 
of supplies.) Tax costs reflected all normal state and local taxes (before 
abatements), and were calculated by James Papke of Purdue using his 
"TAXSIM" model, which incorporates the known factor mix of a firm 
and detailed information on state tax laws. Summing these three costs 
(transportation, supplier wages, taxes) showed that the Nashville area 
was the lowest cost site for Saturn of the sites analyzed. Since the site 
actually chosen (Spring Hill, Tennessee) is 35 miles from Nashville, 
we have some confidence that the model captures the major quantitative 
factors considered by General Motors in siting the Saturn plant. 11
Table 2.2 compares the estimated costs per car of the Nashville area 
to other possible sites for the Saturn plant. This table shows that political 
ly plausible changes in state and local taxes could have altered the Saturn 
location decision. For example, if Lexington, Kentucky had lowered 
its taxes by 12 percent, its measured costs would have been lower than 
I Jashville's. Tennessee offered Saturn subsidies, mostly in the form of 
property tax abatements, that reduced Saturn costs by $34/car from the
Table 2.2 
Estimated Saturn Costs Per Car
Location
Nashville, TN
Lexington, KY
St. Louis, MO
Bloomington, IL
Kalamazoo, MI 
Terre Haute, IN
Marysville, OH
Average Cost
of Transport 
to Market
$426
423
419
417
430 
413
427
Local
Supplier 
Labor Cost
$159
186
172
202
244 
209
219
State
and 
Local Taxes
$118
106
134
162
116 
168
169
Total
Measured 
Costs
$703
715
725
781
790 
790
815
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costs listed in the table. It appears from table 2.2 that subsidies of this 
size could have determined which site was chosen for the Saturn plant.
Econometric Studies of State and Local Policies 
and Business Growth
The many econometric studies of business activity explain statistically 
how state and local business growth is affected by a variety of state 
and local characteristics. The "better" econometric studies appear to 
have reached some consensus about the effects of policies on a local 
economy. Judging some studies to be better than others implies criteria 
for a good local growth study. Hence, before summarizing the results 
from different studies, I will discuss some of the difficult methodological 
and data problems in estimating local growth models. I then summarize 
econometric studies on the effects on state and local business activity 
of taxes, public services, wages, unions, environmental regulations, and 
capital market imperfections all potentially major location determinants 
that state and local governments can influence. 12
Methodological and Data Issues 
in Business Location Modeling
The problems that must be dealt with by econometric models of the 
growth of a local economy include:
1. Complexity of business location decision. Most business location 
studies use aggregate data on state or local business activity levels or 
growth (e.g., aggregate employment). Modeling the determination of 
aggregate business activity is difficult. The aggregate level of business 
activity in an area is an amalgam of diverse decisions: new branch plant 
location decisions, small business start-up decisions, plant expansion 
or contraction decisions, and plant closing decisions. Because these deci 
sions are so diverse, researchers examining aggregate state or local 
growth find it difficult to decide on the "specification" of estimating 
equations: what variables should help explain the aggregate level of 
business activity, how the effects of a change in a variable should
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differ with the level of a variable, 13 and whether we might theoretical 
ly expect the estimated effects of different variables to be equal.
One solution to this problem is to pretend that decisions about ag 
gregate state or local business activity are made by one decisionmaker 
seeking to maximize profits. This simplification helps in specifying an 
estimating equation. But the assumption of one decisionmaker might 
miss some crucial aspect of business location decisions.
Problems with modeling aggregate business location patterns increase 
the attractiveness of focusing on particular types of business location 
decisions, such as branch plant or small business starts. For a specific 
type of business location decision, the appropriate specification of an 
estimating equation may be more apparent to the intuition of the 
researcher.
2. Durability of capital and agglomeration economies. Because capital 
is durable, today's business activity will depend on yesterday's business 
activity. Furthermore, agglomeration economies cost reductions due 
to having a greater concentration of a particular type of business ac 
tivity in a local area will also lead to some positive association of yester 
day's business activity with today's business activity. 14
Because of capital durability and agglomeration economies, equations 
explaining state and local business activity or growth should include 
some measures of lagged business activity. Including lagged business 
activity as a control variable helps avoid bias in estimating how state 
and local characteristics affect current business activity. But the im 
portance of capital durability and agglomeration economies also im 
plies that current economic characteristics will generally only explain 
a portion of a local area's current business activity. This makes it more 
difficult to precisely measure the effects of current economic 
characteristics on business activity.
3. Problems in measuring many key location factors. Many key 
economic characteristics of state and local areas are difficult to measure, 
or are inadequately measured for political reasons. These problems seem 
most acute for wages, public services, and taxes.
The ideal local wage measure holds labor quality constant. This re 
quires preliminary estimation of how wages vary in different local
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economies, holding education, experience, and other labor quality 
measures constant. To avoid time-consuming preliminary estimations, 
most studies use rough measures of the cost of labor, such as the average 
manufacturing wage. The average manufacturing wage does not hold 
constant the quality of the local labor force, however.
An alternative to preliminary equations estimating the quality-adjusted 
price of labor is to include measures of labor quality in the equation 
explaining business activity or business growth. For example, the average 
educational level of the local area's population might be included as 
a rough measure of labor skill.
The effective quantity and quality of public services in a local area 
is also difficult to measure. Data are readily available on state and local 
public spending for different public services. But using current public 
spending data as a business location determinant has two deficiencies. 
First, many public services to business depend on public capital stocks, 
such as the amount of road, rail, and air transportation infrastructure, 
or the amount of water and sewer lines. Current public spending is on 
ly slightly correlated with the amount of these capital stocks. Unfor 
tunately, data on state and local public capital stocks are difficult to 
obtain. 15
Second, current spending does not control for the quality of public 
services. We want measures of public service output: the effectiveness 
of the state and local educational system, the impact of the local police 
force on crime, etc. Such output measures are difficult to find.
Finally, data on state and local business taxes are difficult to obtain. 
No federal statistical agency collects comparable data across states and 
local areas on business tax rates. Federal statistical agencies prefer 
avoiding controversies over which state and local areas have high 
business tax rates. Some research groups do publish data on business 
tax rates, but in many cases these are nominal tax rates and fail to con 
trol for differences across state and local areas in how the tax base is 
defined. Even when data are provided on effective business tax rates, 
these data are usually average effective business tax rates for business 
as a whole or for manufacturing in general. We know that effective 
business tax rates vary a great deal across different industries. Further-
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more, the tax rates that would apply to one more dollar of investment 
by a new or existing firm what economists would call "marginal" 
tax rates may vary a great deal from average effective tax rates, as 
new investments are frequently granted property tax relief and state cor 
porate income tax investment credits. Only one state (Michigan) 
systematically collects data on the magnitude of property tax abatements 
to businesses, and no state systematically collects data on the magnitude 
of other special tax incentives to new business investment. State and 
local policymakers may be concerned that publicizing the dollar amount 
of these tax breaks would lead to voter opposition.
Problems in measuring potential determinants of state and local 
business growth will tend to bias estimates of their effects towards zero. 
The more a variable we measure is meaningless "noise," the less it 
will appear to affect state and local growth. 16
4. Unobservable characteristics of regions, states, and local areas. 
No matter how thorough the research, any empirical investigation will 
omit many potential location determinants. This omission causes "omit 
ted variable bias": the estimated effects of variables included in the 
study will in part reflect the effects of these omitted variables.
For example, absent special controls, any variable that tends to be 
higher in the fast-growing South and West will appear to positively af 
fect growth. Such variables as percentage of state land in national parks 
and average family consumption of iced tea will appear to be powerful 
growth determinants.
In a cross-section study, in which data on various local economies 
(e.g., states, metropolitan areas) are only available for one time period, 
the researcher can control for omitted effects of large regions (e.g., 
the Northeast, the South) by including dummy variables for these large 
regions in the estimating equation. Including regional dummies is 
equivalent to focusing on why business growth differs among the local 
economies within the larger regions; the regional dummies explain the 
differences in average growth rates among the larger regions. 17
With panel data, cross-section data from more than one time period, 
the researcher can control for omitted characteristics of state and local 
areas. The researcher can include a dummy variable for each state or
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local area represented in the data. An equivalent procedure is to dif 
ference all variables from their means for that state or local area, or 
from last period's level for that state or local area. 18
5. Endogeneity of many crucial explanatory variables. One problem 
of business location research is that many potentially important loca 
tion determinants, such as wages, land prices, and taxes, may be en- 
dogenously determined by business growth. By this I mean that any 
omitted variable that changes business growth will thereby change these 
location determinants. This endogeneity problem is a more far-reaching 
criticism of state and local growth models than saying that some omit 
ted variables may lead to biased estimates.
Higher state and local business growth from any source probably in 
creases wages and land prices. If we do not hold constant the events 
that really caused the growth and it is not possible to control for all 
variables that might affect local growth then business growth, and local 
wages and prices, will have some tendency to be positively correlated. 
Unless statistical procedures are adopted to deal with the endogeneity 
problem, the estimated effects of wages and prices on growth will be 
less negative than the "true" effect of wages and prices, holding cons 
tant all other growth determinants.
For example, suppose that unbeknownst to the researcher, the growth 
of some local economy increases due to the location of a new defense 
base. The wages and land prices of the local area go up as a result of 
the faster local employment growth that results from the new base. But 
as the researcher tries to statistically explain why this area has grown 
faster than other areas, it will appear that higher wages and land prices 
have "caused" higher local growth.
Policy variables such as taxes may also be endogenous. This en 
dogeneity is most likely when the researcher uses rough measures of 
business taxes such as total state and local taxes per dollar of personal 
income. An increase in business activity will increase the denominator 
of this expression, and decrease this measure of tax rates. In this case, 
higher local growth is causing state and local tax rates to be lower, but 
it may appear that lower tax rates are causing local growth to be higher. 
State and local growth models will tend to exaggerate the negative ef 
fects of taxes on growth.
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This endogeneity problem may be less severe when more accurate 
measures of business taxes are used, but it can still lead to biases. Local 
economies that are particularly unattractive to business will tend to have 
lower tax bases per capita. Policy makers in this situation may attempt 
to maintain per capita service levels by increasing tax rates. In this case, 
lower state and local growth is causing state and local tax rates to be 
higher, but it may appear that higher tax rates are causing growth to be 
lower. Of course, policymakers in a slow growth area could also decide 
to lower business tax rates in an attempt to spark business growth. In 
this case, lower local growth is causing local tax rates to be lower, but it 
may appear that lower taxes are causing growth to be lower. In sum, the 
endogeneity of state and local taxes may cause growth models to either 
exaggerate or understate the negative effects of taxes on growth, de 
pending on what one assumes about how growth usually affects tax rates.
The endogeneity of wages, land prices, taxes, and many other 
characteristics of local economies is difficult to deal with in business 
location studies. The needed statistical procedure is well known to 
econometricians. The researcher should find "instrumental variables" 
that are correlated with the endogenous explanatory variables but un- 
correlated with unobserved factors affecting the dependent variable (e.g., 
business growth). The statistical estimation will then proceed by only 
examining shifts in the explanatory variables due to these "instrumen 
tal variables." These shifts in explanatory variables are, by construc 
tion, uncorrelated with omitted variables. The practical problem is that 
convincing instruments are hard to find. A critic could usually suggest 
some reason why an instrument shifting local taxes, or local wages or 
land prices, would also be correlated with unobserved variables affect 
ing local growth. It is difficult to disprove a criticism involving unobserv 
ed variables.
For example, one could argue that some political events, such as court 
orders to improve state prison conditions or equalize school spending 
across jurisdictions in the state, are "exogenous" determinants of state 
and local tax rates: these court orders could be argued to be not strong 
ly correlated with business growth trends. The instrumental variable 
procedure is to examine tax effects on business growth by only con 
sidering tax changes caused by these court orders, ignoring evidence
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from all other tax changes. This procedure throws away a great deal 
of information. In addition, perhaps court orders are correlated with 
business growth trends. States whose economic prospects are worsen 
ing over time may be more prone to underfund their prisons and schools, 
leading to court intervention.
Taxes
[CJhanges in business taxes cannot be viewed as an effective 
means of influencing business locational decisions. . . . The 
reasons why changes in the state's business taxes are unlikely to 
be a successful policy can be summarized as follows. First, in 
numerable factors are important to a business in its decision about 
where to locate. . . . Second, taxes are one of the many costs of 
doing business and the magnitude of these other costs may easily 
swamp the amount of state taxes involved. . . . Third, state and 
local tax payments are deductible for purposes of the federal cor 
porate income tax. ... Fourth, differences in state and local taxes 
may reflect differences in the level and quality of state and local 
public goods and services, and these goods and services also af 
fect business locational decisions. . . . Fifth, to the extent that tax 
rate differentials are capitalized, their impact will be reduc 
ed. ... Sixth, most relocating companies plan to stay at their new 
site years longer than any group of elected officials is likely to 
be in office. Consequently, current tax levels, special concessions, 
or special features of the tax law may not be a reliable basis upon 
which to make a multi-million dollar investment. . . . Seventh, a 
state tax incentive that is granted by way of incorporating a similar 
federal provision may have no impact on a firm's decision mak 
ing if the future of the federal provision itself is in jeopar 
dy. . . . Eighth, . . . [i]f incentives are effective at all, a state will 
gain only a short-lived advantage over other states because the latter 
can be expected to adopt similar ones. . . . Ninth, some executives 
charged with the locational decision may be uninformed about the 
existence of tax incentives. . . . Finally, there are relatively few 
footloose firms that can be affected by tax incentives. (Richard 
Pomp, Professor of Law, University of Connecticut Law School, 
and former director, New York State Legislative Commission on 
the Modernization and Simplification of Tax Administration and 
Tax Law, in Tax Notes, November 1, 1985 issue)
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The effect of taxes on state and local business growth is the most 
controversial issue in economic development policy. As pointed out in 
chapter 1, the resolution of this issue can affect the entire design of 
state and local tax systems.
The usual theoretical arguments against a large effect of state and 
local taxes on business growth are unpersuasive. The above quote from 
Richard Pomp summarizes the most common arguments. Some of these 
arguments only apply to special cases. The hypothesized ineffectiveness 
of tax incentives that are temporary or poorly publicized is irrelevant 
for well-designed state or local business tax policies.
Other arguments against significant effects of state and local business 
taxes rely on implicit assumptions about business behavior that need 
to be empirically tested. No doubt few firms are completely "footloose," 
that is lacking in any locational requirements. Also, many nontax 
characteristics of areas affect business costs, and taxes are only a small 
proportion of business costs. But this still leaves open the question of 
how responsive businesses are to variations in costs across areas.
There are strong theoretical arguments that many firms today may 
be quite sensitive to production cost differentials across different states 
or metropolitan areas, including the relatively small production cost dif 
ferentials that can be brought about by state and local taxes. Over time, 
the costs of transporting finished products and supplies have declined 
relative to production costs, due to improved technology for transport 
ing goods, and production innovations that reduce the weight of sup 
plies needed to produce a given quantity of many products. For many 
firms, at least several metropolitan areas and states may provide similar 
access to markets and supplies. Even small differences in production 
costs among these several competing metropolitan areas or states may 
be enough to determine the firm's location decision.
The argument that public service cuts and tax responses from other 
states will offset any business tax cuts by one state also requires empir 
ical investigation before being accepted. We can imagine circumstances 
in which these offsets will not occur at all: for example, a state business 
tax cut financed by cutting welfare payments, at a time when nearby 
states are facing budgetary problems. Thus, it is a policy-relevant
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issue what the effects of state business tax cuts are, holding business 
public services constant, and holding the tax policies of other states con 
stant. We can then consider the effects of the tax cuts if accompanied 
by public service cuts or tax cuts by other states.
The "capitalization" argument is that cuts in state and local taxes 
will lead to offsetting increases in land prices. But even if land prices 
increase enough to keep profits constant, lower business taxes which 
are mostly taxes on capital and higher land prices will tend to attract 
land users who use a high ratio of capital to land ("capital-intensive" 
land users), and will give an incentive for any particular land user to 
substitute capital for land. The ratio of capital to land, and hence the 
total amount of capital, will increase in the jurisdiction. Because 
businesses are relatively capital-intensive land users, business capital 
per acre will increase even more.
Finally, because all costs are deductible from business revenue under 
the federal income tax, the deductibility of state and local business taxes 
does not reduce the effects of taxes versus other characteristics of state 
and local areas.
Thus the effect of state and local business taxes on economic growth 
can only be ascertained through empirical research. Table 2.3 sum 
marizes the estimated effects of taxes on business location from a number 
of empirical studies. I attempted to summarize all empirical studies, 
published and unpublished, that have been done since Carlton's seminal 
research on business location decisions in 1979. 19 Appendix 2.2 pro 
vides a separate summary of each individual study.
Table 2.3 describes, for various categories of studies of taxes and 
business location, the percentage of studies that found at least one 
negative and statistically significant effect of state and local taxes on 
business locations. Table 2.3 also provides, for each category, the 
average long-run percentage effect on local business activity of a 1 per 
cent across-the-board increase in all state and local taxes (the "elasticity" 
of business activity with respect to state and local taxes). Several possible 
measures of "average" elasticities are reported.
The most important conclusion from this table is that most recent 
business location studies have found some evidence of significant
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negative effects of state and local taxes on regional business growth. 
The findings of recent studies differ from those of studies in the 1950s, 
1960s, and early and mid-1970s, which generally did not find statistically 
significant and negative effects of taxes on state and local growth. 20 
Any individual study summarized in table 2.3 and appendix 2.2 can 
be criticized for some defect in methodology or data. But the consen 
sus from so many studies limits the force of such criticism. If the con 
sensus of significant negative tax effects is incorrect, the problem must 
lie in some systematic flaw that cuts across many studies.
Further support for significant tax effects on business location deci 
sions is provided by the patterns revealed in table 2.3 in how estimated 
tax effects vary across different types of studies. Three important pat 
terns can be noted in the table. First, tax effects on business location 
decisions are generally much larger for intrametropolitan business loca 
tion decisions than for intermetropolitan or interstate business location 
decisions. We would expect this pattern because a potential business 
site is likely to have closer substitutes, offering very similar profits, 
within that same metropolitan area than in some other state or 
metropolitan area. 21
Second, studies that control for fixed effects unobserved state or 
local characteristics that affect growth more consistently indicate tax 
effects on location and tend to indicate larger effects. The finding that 
tax effects persist even with controls for fixed effects suggests that these 
estimated tax effects are real. In addition, this pattern of results sug 
gests that the lack of tax effects in some studies without fixed-effect 
controls may be due to omitted variable bias.
Third, controls for the levels of public services make a difference. 
Studies that include some measure of state and local public services are 
more likely to find tax effects on business location. We would expect 
the omission of public service measures to bias estimates of tax effects 
on business location towards zero. The pattern of results is consistent 
with the existence of this bias. 22
In addition, some specific studies suggest patterns of tax effects that 
are consistent with our expectations based on simple economic prin 
ciples. Table 2.4 shows three interesting patterns of results.
Table 2.3 
Summary of Econometric Studies of Tax Effects on Business Location
Inter-area studies
Inter-area studies 
with controls for 
"fixed effects"
Inter-area studies
with public
service controls 
Intra-area studies
Intra-area studies
using specific
community data
Percentage of Studies 
With At Least One 
Statistically 
Significant 
Negative Tax Effect
(1)
70%
(57 studies)
92% 
(12 studies)
80%
(30 studies)
57%
(14 studies)
70%
(10 studies)
Mean Elasticity of 
Business Activity 
With Respect 
to Taxes [Range]
(2)
-.25 (s.e. = .05)
[-1.40 to .76]
(48 studies)
-.44 (s.e. = .11) 
[-1.02 toO] 
(11 studies)
-.33 (s.e. = .09)
[-1.40 to .76]
(25 studies) 
-1.48 (s.e. = .54)
[-4.43 to .62]
(9 studies)
-1.91 (s.e. = .60)
[-4.43 to .62]
(7 studies)
Trimmed 
Mean 
Elasticity
(3)
-.22
[-.73 to .04]
(38 studies)
-.43 
[-.88 to -.07] 
(7 studies)
-.33
[-.77 to 0]
(19 studies) 
-1.36
[-2.70 to 0]
(7 studies)
-1.91
[-2.70 to -.79]
(5 studies)
Median 
Elasticity
(4)
-.15
-.35
-.27
-1.59
-1.95
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NOTES: See appendix 2.2 for details on the studies summarized in this table. Inter-area studies look at what affects differences across states or MSAs 
in business activity or business growth. Intra-area studies look at differences within MSAs in business growth. Studies are considered to control for 
fixed effects by including area dummy variables or first-differencing all variables. Studies are considered to control for public services if they include 
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Table 2.4 
Selected Studies with Particularly Interesting Patterns of Tax Effects on Business Location
Study
Schmenner, Huber & Cook 
(1987)
Wasylenko & McGuire 
(1985)
Testa 
(1989)
Gyourko 
(1987)
Newman 
(1983)
Finding of Interest
New branch plants who say in a survey that they want low taxes are estimated to 
have significantly greater response to state and local taxes in making location decisions 
than other plants who do not state a desire for low taxes (-3.09 vs. -.50 elasticity).
Long-run elasticity with respect to taxes is -1.54 for manufacturing employment, -.85 
for total employment.
Long-run elasticity with respect to taxes is -.93 for manufacturing employment, -.02 for 
nonmanufacturing.
Higher property taxes tend to increase labor intensity of an MSA's manufacturing base.
Negative effect of corporate tax on employment growth is greater for more capital- 
intensive industries.
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First, Schmenner and his colleagues (1987) find that corporations that 
say taxes are important to their locational decisionmaking appear to 
behave consistently with that stated preference. In their study, "tax- 
sensitive" corporations are estimated to place a much greater weight 
on state and local taxes in deciding where to locate their new branch 
plants.
Second, both the Wasylenko-McGuire (1985) and Testa (1989) studies 
find that manufacturing location decisions appear to be more sensitive 
to taxes than nonmanufacturing location decisions. We would expect 
this pattern for two reasons: (1) manufacturers are more oriented to 
a national market, and hence local costs are a more important com 
petitive consideration; and (2) manufacturing firms tend to be more 
capital-intensive, and most state and local business taxes are taxes on 
capital.
Third, both the Gyourko (1987) and Newman (1983) studies find that 
capital-intensive industries are more sensitive to business taxes on capital 
than other industries. 23 For example, Gyourko finds that metropolitan 
areas with higher relative property taxes tend to attract more labor- 
intensive industries.
The existence of these sensible patterns of results in tables 2.3 and 
2.4 supports the conclusion that business taxes actually do affect loca 
tion decisions. A critic of these findings must not only suggest some 
systematic flaw that is biasing the overall consensus of recent studies, 
but must also explain why this bias is varying the tax effects in reasonable 
patterns.
This recent research suggests a consensus on the likely magnitude 
of tax effects on business location decisions. The long-run elasticity 
of business activity with respect to state and local taxes appears to lie 
in the range of -0.1 to -0.6 for intermetropolitan or interstate business 
location decisions, and -1.0 to -3.0 for intrametropolitan business loca 
tion decisions. That is, if a given small suburban jurisdiction within 
a metropolitan area raises its taxes by 10 percent, it can expect in the 
long-run a reduction in its business activity by from 10 to 30 percent. 
If an entire metropolitan area or state raises its taxes by 10 percent, 
the estimated long-run effect would be a reduction of business activity 
between 1 percent and 6 percent. These estimated tax effects assume
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public services are held constant as taxes change. Tax increases would 
have a less negative effect on an area's business activity or even a 
positive effect if public services were simultaneously changed in the 
same direction.
Most policymakers would interpret tax effects on state or local growth 
of this magnitude to be important. Political leaders are often eager to 
claim credit for attracting new industrial plants that add considerably 
less than 1 percent to the employment of a metropolitan area. A 10 per 
cent tax reduction for a metropolitan area or state clearly will not pro 
duce an economic growth miracle. But if such a tax reduction actually 
would increase jobs in an area by between 1 percent and 6 percent, 
many political leaders might find this policy option attractive. Chapters 
4 to 7 will estimate what economic benefits actually would occur due 
to this job growth, allowing a more objective perspective on whether 
the benefits are worth the costs to an area of lowering its business taxes.
The conclusion that state and local taxes affect business growth 
remains controversial among researchers, but the weight of academic 
opinion is shifting away from the old consensus that state and local taxes 
are irrelevant to business location. For example, Wasylenko's (1991) 
recent survey of the literature on interregional business location deci 
sions states that "given [recent empirical evidence], it is increasingly 
difficult to argue that business climate, however broadly defined, does 
not influence interregional firm locations (pp. 27-8)." Another recent 
review of the empirical literature, by Blair and Premus (1987), states 
that "until recently, the conventional wisdom has been that taxes  
and, by implication, other fiscal variables do not deter industrial loca 
tions or economic growth. . . . However, most recent studies show tax- 
expenditure variables to be important" (p. 82).
Public Services
Why should public services matter to state and local business growth? 
A public service might be estimated to affect state and local business 
growth for at least four reasons: because the public service provides 
an unpriced input to production; because, although the public service 
to business is priced, the price is not known, and greater quantities
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of the public service are associated with lower prices for that service; 
because, although the public service is not directly used by business, 
greater quantities of the public service are associated with a lower price 
for some input that is used by business, and that lower price is not directly 
measured by the research; and because business growth causes produc 
tion of the public service to change.
Examples of unpriced public service inputs include highways, police 
and fire services, and research and development (R&D) information 
obtained from higher education services. Such public services would 
increase productivity and reduce costs, thereby increasing business 
growth.
Examples of priced public service inputs include water and sewer 
services, energy utility services, and air transportation services. What 
really should affect business profitability and growth is the price of such 
services. However, such prices may be difficult to measure. It is dif 
ficult to control for implicit prices, such as the time cost in obtaining 
the services: the amount of time needed to wait for a utility hook-up, 
for example, or the average waiting time to get a flight to New York. 
Greater public spending on such services or greater capital stock 
associated with such services may, however, be correlated with lower 
prices. For example, the marginal cost of air travel, including waiting 
time, may drop as airports get larger and have more flights per day.
Public services such as education and welfare are not directly used 
by business. 24 They may affect business profitability, however, by af 
fecting the real, skill-adjusted wage rate of labor. Education services 
may affect the skill-adjusted real wage in two ways. First, the addi 
tional supplies of skilled workers produced by educational institutions 
may cause the real wages of skilled workers to be lower. Second, bet 
ter educational services may attract workers to a local economy and 
lower local real wages. Welfare may increase the skill-adjusted real 
wage for lower-skill workers by causing some to withdraw from the 
local labor market.
In theory, if skill-adjusted real wages could be perfectly measured, 
and businesses had perfect information on skill-adjusted real wages, 
education and welfare services would not be expected to directly affect
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an area's business growth, holding constant wages. But researchers lack 
perfect measures of skill-adjusted real wages. Furthermore, business 
information on real wages is also imperfect, and businesses may use 
educational and welfare services as an indicator of likely skill-adjusted 
real wages in a local area.
Finally, estimated effects of public services upon local growth may 
be biased if changes in local growth cause change in local public ser 
vices. Growth clearly lowers welfare services, which will bias research 
ers towards finding that lower welfare services "cause" higher growth. 
For other public services, the situation is more complicated. If business 
growth produces fiscal benefits that is, if business growth results in 
tax revenue in excess of the public expenditures required to service the 
businesses then we would expect public spending on most services 
to increase. In this case, studies will be biased towards finding that higher 
levels of public services "cause" higher growth. But some measures 
of public services may lag behind growth trends. For example, it takes 
time to adjust the public capital stock. The state and local public capital 
stock per capita will be lower in areas that have recently been growing 
fast. In this case, studies will be biased towards finding that higher per 
capita public capital stock "causes" lower growth.
What do recent studies show about the effects of state and local public 
services on business growth? Table 2.5 and appendix 2.3 summarize 
the results from business location studies since 1979 that have included 
some measure of public services. Because the studies use such widely 
varying measures, I did not attempt to calculate comparable elasticities 
for the different studies. Instead, table 2.5 lists the percentage of studies 
that found some positive and significant coefficient on a public service 
variable, and some negative and significant coefficient on a welfare 
variable.
Table 2.5 provides some evidence that more public services are 
associated with faster state and local business growth, while welfare 
is associated with slower state and local business growth. Appendix 2.3 
suggests that education and infrastructure variables have the most con 
sistently positive relationship to local business activity and growth.
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Table 2.5
Summary of Results from Various Studies 
on Effects of Public Services on State and Local Business Growth
Percentage Percentage
of Studies With At of Studies
Least One Positive With At Least One
and Statistically Negative and
Significant Statistically
Public Service Significant Welfare
Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient
All inter-area 60% 58% 
studies (30 studies) (12 studies)
NOTES: Results for individual studies and specific public service variables are summarized in 
appendix 2.3. This table, as well as appendix 2.3, focuses only on specifications for either total 
business activity, manufacturing activity, or closest dependent variable to those categories, and 
on model specification preferred by author of study. Study only needs one positive and signifi 
cant public service variable coefficient to be counted as showing positive results. Of six studies 
with public service variables and controls for fixed effects, four show positive and significant 
coefficients. Two studies with controls for fixed effects and welfare variables both show negative 
and significant coefficients.
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Studies use a wide variety of arbitrary definitions of public service 
quantities, so the exact magnitude of effects on state and local growth 
is difficult to calculate for most studies, and even more difficult to com 
pare across studies. Most studies provide insufficient information to 
determine what would happen if taxes were raised to finance the ex 
pansion of particular public services. In three cases, however, some 
information on the relative strength of public service and tax effects 
on business location is available. Helms (1985) estimates that increas 
ing state and local taxes, and using the revenue to finance anything ex 
cept expanded welfare spending, will increase state personal income. 
Bartik (1989a) estimates that an across-the-board increase in state and 
local business taxes, used to finance increased fire protection and local 
school spending, will increase the rate of small business starts. 25 Mun- 
nell's (1990) estimates of the determinants of state growth in the 1980s, 
when combined with reasonable assumptions about interest rates and 
other economic variables, suggest that state and local tax increases to 
finance increased public capital will increase the growth rate of private 
employment. In her estimates of the determinants of state growth in 
the 1970s, public capital's effects are weaker; the net effect of tax- 
financed increases in public capital is positive in one specification, 
negative in another. 26 Based on these three studies, it is quite conceivable 
that state and local business tax increases, if used for particular public 
services, will encourage more business activity. Furthermore, Mun- 
nell's results suggest that public capital's role in state business growth 
is increasing over time.
As pointed out above, these results could be wholly spurious. All 
of these estimated public service effects on business growth could real 
ly be caused by business growth. But two studies (Munnell 1990 and 
Duffy-Deno and Eberts 1989) estimate that greater per capita public 
capital stock increases an area's growth. As argued above, estimates 
of the effects of per capita public capital stock on state and local growth 
should be biased towards zero. Hence, the findings of these two studies 
provide some reassurance that public services can actually increase state 
and local growth.
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Wages
. . . Inter-area wage differentials in the United States have had 
a significant effect on the location and relocation of firms. (John 
M. Levy, Associate Professor at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and 
State University and former Director of Economic Development 
for Westchester County, p. 35 in Economic Development Programs 
for Cities, Counties, and Towns, 1981)
Local wages are sometimes thought of as outside the power of state 
and local governments. But state and local governments can increase 
private sector labor costs by increasing state minimum wages, enact 
ing labor relations laws that are more prounion than antiunion, increasing 
public sector wages, mandating particular fringe benefits in the private 
sector, increasing unemployment insurance or workers' compensation 
costs, or making welfare benefits more generous. 27 Hence, whether 
wages affect business location is relevant to the debate over whether 
state and local government policy can influence local economic growth. 
In addition, the effect of wages on state and local economic growth pro 
vides some evidence on the general effects of costs on growth.
Economic theory predicts that wages should have major effects on 
the growth of a local economy, as labor costs are a major share of 
business costs. Economic theory even leads to some predictions about 
the size of the business location effect of wages versus other cost fac 
tors. As discussed above, if business growth depends on the overall 
profitability and business costs of the area, then the effect on business 
location of a 1 percent change in the price of any cost factor should 
be roughly proportional to that cost factor's share in total business costs. 
The costs of locally supplied labor probably are about 14 times state 
and local business tax costs. 28 Thus, the elasticity of business activity 
with respect to wages (the percentage change in business activity for 
a 1 percent change in wages) should be roughly 14 times the elasticity 
of business activity with respect to state and local taxes. If the elastici 
ty of business activity with respect to inter-area tax differentials is be 
tween -0.1 and -0.6, then the elasticity of business activity with respect 
to local wages should be between -1.4 and -8.4. 29
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Table 2.6 summarizes various studies that examine the effects of wages 
on business location. More details on particular studies are provided 
in appendix 2.4. Table 2.6 indicates that there is significant evidence 
that local wages influence business location. However, the magnitude 
of this wage effect is much less than one would expect based on the 
typical size of tax effects. The table suggests that long-run elasticities 
of business activity with respect to wages probably fall in the range 
from -.2 to -1.0; that is a 10 percent decrease in regional wages will 
increase local business activity by between 2 percent and 10 percent 
in the long run. Long-run wage elasticities may be a bit higher when 
business activity is measured by employment rather than by the quanti 
ty of local capital or output. 30 However, it is surprising that wage 
elasticities are around twice the magnitude of tax elasticities, rather than 
being 14 times greater, as we might predict.
Thus, if we believe the predictions of economic theory, empirical 
estimates of wage elasticities of business location are inconsistent with 
empirical estimates of tax elasticities. It would seem that either tax 
elasticities are biased upward in absolute magnitude that is, away from 
zero or wage elasticities are biased downward in absolute magnitude  
that is, toward zero. 31
It is more likely that wage elasticities are biased downward than tax 
elasticities are biased upward. Two arguments can be offered for this 
position. First, the measures of wages used in most studies of business 
location are subject to substantial error. Most studies just use average 
manufacturing wages, occasionally with controls for the average educa 
tional quality of the local labor force. Such measures of wages will be 
in error because they do not control for variations across states and 
metropolitan areas in industry mix, or in factors affecting labor quali 
ty, such as workers' experience. Measurement error in a variable such 
as wages will tend to bias estimates of its coefficient towards zero.
Business taxes, of course, are also measured with error. But measure 
ment error for business taxes would cause a downward bias in measures 
of the absolute magnitude of tax elasticities, not an upward bias.
Second, wage elasticities may well be subject to substantial bias 
downward due to their endogenous determination by business growth.
Table 2.6 
Summary of Results from Studies of Wage Effects on Business Location
All inter-area studies
Inter-area studies with
fixed-effect controls
Inter-area studies with
employment dependent 
variable
Percentage 
With At 
Least One 
Negative and 
Statistically
Significant 
Wage Effect
(1)
62%
(42 studies)
71%
(7 studies)
60%
(15 studies)
Mean 
Long-Run
Wage 
Elasticity
(2) 
-.67 (s.e. = .24)
[-4.39 to 1.66]
(28 studies)
-.64 (s.e. = .43)
[-3.16 to -.27] 
(7 studies)
-.89 (s.e. = .35)
[-3.16to .18] 
(10 studies)
Trimmed
Mean 
Elasticity
(3) 
-.50
[-2.47 to .27]
(22 studies)
-.31
[-.58 to -.12] 
(5 studies)
-.74
[-2.47 to -.05] 
(8 studies)
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NOTES: This summary table is derived from appendix 2.4. In column (1),significance is judged based on a 5 percent, one-tail test. See table 2.4 for 
definition of trimmed mean and fixed-effect controls. In addition to mean elasticity across various studies, table 2.6 reports standard error of that mean 
and the range of estimated elasticities obtained in various studies.
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Local wages increase when business activity increases. This induced 
positive correlation that occurs because business growth causes higher 
wages will tend to obscure the negative correlation we expect to observe 
due to higher wages causing lower business growth.
As noted above, estimates of tax elasticities may also be subject to 
an endogeneity bias. However, the bias of estimated tax elasticities due 
to endogeneity is of an uncertain sign. Furthermore, wages may be even 
more endogenous than tax rates. Political inertia is likely to be greater 
than any market rigidities that might constrain wage rate adjustments 
in response to business growth.
Despite these arguments, the relatively modest magnitude of wage 
elasticities casts some doubt on the magnitude of tax effects on state 
and local growth reported in table 2.3. Perhaps a 10 percent business 
tax reduction will not hike state and local growth by 2.5 percent, as 
predicted in table 2.3. If we believe the mean wage elasticity results 
reported in table 2.6 (wage elasticity=-.67), economic theory suggests 
that the tax elasticities of state and local growth will be about I/14th 
as large as the wage elasticity, resulting in tax elasticities of only -.05 
(-.05 »-.67/14). A 10 percent business tax reduction would only in 
crease an area's business activity by .5 percent, or one-half of 1 per 
cent. Which tax elasticity figure is correct has major implications for 
how much it costs to create a given number of jobs using a business 
tax cut strategy.
A convincing reconciliation of our estimates of wage elasticities and 
tax elasticities of state and local growth can only be accomplished through 
better empirical research. As of yet, no study uses econometric tech 
niques to convincingly adjust for the probable endogeneity of both tax 
and wage variables.
Unionization
We would expect increases in the unionization of a local area's 
economy to have some negative effect on business activity, because in 
creased unionization would hike the local wage scale. However, in 
business location studies in which wages are included as a determinant of
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business activity, it is unclear whether unionization would be expected 
to have an independent negative effect on business activity. Several 
reasons why unionization might have an independent effect can be of 
fered, and they have different implications for how unionization should 
be measured and how unionization effects should be interpreted.
First, independent unionization effects may simply reflect business 
fear of unionization's influence on nonwage elements of labor costs, 
such as fringe benefits or labor productivity. In this case, the unioniza 
tion variable we would most like to measure would be the probability 
of a new or expanded establishment becoming unionized. This may only 
bear a loose resemblance to the average unionization percentage in the 
state. The percentage unionized in the state for that particular industry 
may be a better measure of the probability of a new firm becoming 
unionized in that industry. Smaller firms would be less affected by 
unionization in this case, as smaller firms are less likely to be unionized.
Second, unionization effects on state and local growth may really 
reflect the influence of the type of political and social climate associated 
with a high-unionization area. Some businesses may dislike the social 
climate that tends to accompany higher unionization. If state and local 
growth reflects these business preferences, then the average percent 
age unionized in the state may be as good a measure as any of this 
unionization influence.
Under the first interpretation of unionization effects, any estimated 
effect is one more cost of higher unionization. An opponent of unions 
would see this as another reason to limit their influence. A proponent 
of unions would see this business activity effect as one more reason 
for strong federal legislation promoting unionization, as state and local 
competition for new business will discourage state governments from 
any support for unions.
Under the second interpretation of unionization effects, unions are 
not really the issue. The real cause of lower business activity due to 
unionization is some element of the local social climate. Any policy 
response to this unionization effect must first discover what element 
of the social climate is actually discouraging business activity. Only 
then can a reasoned decision be made about possible policy changes.
54 Can State and Local Policies Affect Economic Development?
What does the empirical evidence show about unionization effects? 
Table 2.7 shows recent business location studies that include some 
measure of unionization. Most studies show a negative unionization ef 
fect, although its magnitude varies widely. Some studies estimate huge 
negative unionization effects, while other studies estimate positive ef 
fects of unions on business activity. 32 As a result, the "average" ef 
fect of unionization on business activity is sensitive to exactly what sub- 
category of studies is considered, and exactly what procedure is used 
for calculating an "average" effect. Furthermore, the estimates of dif 
ferent studies vary so much that the mean long-run effect of unioniza 
tion on state and local business activity, calculated over all studies, is 
always insignificantly different from zero, in a statistical sense: the true 
effect of unionization could be zero, and the mean results reported in 
table 2.7 could be due to chance. The mean effect of unionization is 
negative, but existing studies provide little basis for confidence that this 
finding will stand up as research progresses. 33
The evidence is contradictory on whether unionization is acting as 
a proxy for social climate. Hey wood and Deich (1987) found that 
industry-specific local unionization variables had much smaller effects 
on business growth than overall local unionization. This suggests a social 
climate interpretation. On the other hand, my research (Bartik 1989a) 
finds a greater effect of the average unionization of a state on branch 
plant location decisions than on small business start-up decisions. This 
finding suggests that the probability of being unionized may be influenc 
ing decisions about new business activity. A resolution of this debate 
awaits better measures of the marginal probability of different types 
of new business activity becoming unionized in a given state.
Environmental Regulations
Stricter state environmental regulations would generally be expected 
to discourage the location and growth of polluting firms. The belief 
that business location effects of environmental regulations would lead 
to excessively lax state environmental regulation has often been offered 
as a rationale for federal preemption of authority over environmental
Table 2.7
Summary of Studies of Effects of Unionization-Related Variables 
on State and Local Business Activity
All inter-area studies
Inter-area studies with
controls for fixed effects
Inter-area studies that
also include wage variables
Percentage 
of Studies With 
At Least One 
Unionization 
Related Coef 
ficient that is 
Statistically
Significant and
of Expected Sign
56%
(27 studies)
33%
(6 studies)
60%
(20 studies)
Mean Long-Run 
Effect of 
1% Increase In 
Unionization
Percentage on
Business Activity
-.86% (s.e. = .61)
[-8.67 to 3.3]
(19 studies)
-1.08% (s.e. = .99)
[-5.46 to 1.32]
(6 studies)
-.81% (s.e. = .80)
[-8.67 to 3.3]
(13 studies)
Trimmed
Mean
-.52%
[-3.28 to 1.32]
(15 studies)
-.58%
[-2.23 to .01]
(4 studies)
-.46%
[-3.28 to 2.4]
(11 studies)
Median
-.16%
-.05%
-.16%
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NOTES: More details on individual studies are in appendix 2.5. "1 percent increase in unionization" means increase as percentage of labor force; 
that is, an increase from 20 to 21 percent unionized is a 1 percent increase, not a 5 percent increase.
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regulation, For example, the House Committee Report on the 1970 Clean 
Air Act states that:
The promulgation of Federal emission standards for new 
sources . . . will preclude efforts on the part of States to compete 
with each other in trying to attract new plants and facilities without 
assuming adequate control of large scale emissions therefrom. 
(Page 3 in Legislative History of the Clean Air Act. U.S. Congress, 
Washington, DC, 1979)
Despite efforts toward a federally imposed uniformity in environmental 
regulations, state and local governments retain significant discretion over 
environmental regulation. States generally retain authority over enforce 
ment and over the regulation of existing plants; new plants are general 
ly only regulated by the federal government with respect to a few ma 
jor pollutants. Hence, the issue of whether geographic variation in en 
vironmental regulation affects business location patterns remains current.
Only three studies have estimated the effects of state and local en 
vironmental regulation on business growth, one by McConnell and 
Schwab (1990), and two by Bartik (1988b, 1989a). On the whole, there 
is little evidence that environmental regulation has much effect on 
business location patterns. McConnell and Schwab find that state en 
vironmental regulation of the automobile industry has little effect on 
the choice of county for a branch plant unless the county is very far 
out of compliance with air quality regulations. My 1988(b) study of 
branch plant location decisions finds that the effects on state growth 
of a wide variety of variables measuring state environmental regula 
tion are always statistically insignificant and usually can be shown to 
be substantively small; the exception is highly polluting industries, for 
which I cannot reject the possibility of a substantively large effect of 
environmental regulation, even though the estimated effect is statistically 
no different from zero. My 1989(a) study finds a negative and statistically 
significant effect of state environmental regulations on the state small 
business start-up rate. But the effect is small. 34
The major limitation of all these studies is that environmental regula 
tions are extremely hard to measure. Still, the weight of evidence shows 
that in our current regulatory structure, with federal constraints on the 
degree of geographic variation in environmental regulation, most
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business location decisions are little affected by environmental 
regulations.
Capital Market Imperfections
Only two studies have examined the effects of capital market imperfec 
tions on state and local business activity. My study of small business 
starts (1989a) found that states that relaxed their constraints on the open 
ing of new branch banks between 1976 and 1982 had a greater increase 
in the small business start rate than states that did not relax regulations 
restricting branch banking. Bauer and Cromwell (1989) find that a variety 
of banking market structure variables affect the rate at which new 
establishments (both branch and independent) are formed in metropolitan 
areas. In particular, establishment formations are greater in metropolitan 
areas where banks are more profitable, where smaller banks are more 
prominent, and where more banks have recently entered the market.
Little can be concluded on the basis of two studies. Because many 
states have in recent years sought to intervene in capital markets to spur 
their economic development, more empirical studies of the effects of 
capital markets on business location patterns would seem to be warranted.
Conclusion
The most important conclusion from this chapter is that a wide variety 
of state and local policies can significantly affect the long-run level of 
business activity in a local economy. Business tax reductions may in 
crease an area's business activity. But so may tax increases, if they are 
used to finance infrastructure and public services used by business.
We know much more about the effects on state and local growth of 
general state and local tax and public service policies than we do about 
the effects of specific economic development programs. No current 
research convincingly addresses the crucial question of whether new 
wave economic development programs, which offer specialized services 
to new and existing businesses, are more cost-effective in spurring state
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and local growth than traditional economic development policies of tax 
and financial incentives for business. Current research does suggest that 
state and local policies can change the local economic climate enough 
to make a difference to an area's growth. This suggests that new wave 
programs also have the potential of affecting area growth, but better 
empirical studies are needed to determine whether these new wave pro 
grams are succeeding in realizing that potential.
Given that state and local economic development policies can affect 
an area's growth, what then? The next chapters turn to analyzing what 
effects an increase in local growth will have on different groups par 
ticipating in the local economy.
NOTES
1. The same point could also be argued for the state office in Japan variable in Woodward's study, 
even though his dependent variable is Japanese plants choosing the state rather than overall state 
economic growth. It is difficult to believe that state offices in Japan have enough of an effect 
to be detectable. Cause and effect may be reversed here; states that attract Japanese plants may 
open offices in Japan.
2. Other economists have also brought up this problem of the small size of many economic develop 
ment programs, e.g., Netzer (1990); Hatry, Fall, Singer, and Liner (1990); and James (1991).
3. This may, in part, explain why enterprise zones have been evaluated much more than other 
specific economic development programs.
4. The ideal evaluation would randomly choose the targeted local areas from among candidate 
areas that satisfy whatever criteria policymakers wish to set for eligibility for the program. But 
it is probably not politically feasible to adopt this geographic experimentation approach on a large 
enough scale to yield meaningful results. At least 10 or 15 "treatment" areas and 20 or 30 "con 
trol" areas would probably be needed to have any chance of detecting statistically meaningful 
differences between the treatment and control regions. This scale of experimentation is not likely 
to be acceptable to the legislative representatives of the control areas.
5. An excellent recent review on the choice of control regions to analyze local economic change 
is provided by Isserman and Beaumont (1989).
An alternative to choosing different control regions is to keep the same control regions in the 
regression, but consider a variety of control variables that might affect both regional growth, 
and the selection of the region for inclusion in the economic development program. We should 
have more confidence in the results if they are not too sensitive to the choice of control variables. 
This strategy of considering different sets of control variables was essentially followed by Leslie 
Papke in her recent paper on the Indiana enterprise zone program (Papke 1991), and her results 
appear robust to different control variables.
This discussion of the choice of control areas is closely related to the discussion later in the 
text of how econometric models of state and local growth and business location may be biased
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due to the endogeneity of taxes and other policy variables. The distinction is that in the case of 
large-scale economic development programs targeted at particular small areas, the choice of the 
target area is clearly endogenous, while the endogeneity of state and local taxes and other policy 
variables is a more questionable hypothesis.
6. One study that moved in this direction was by Reynolds and Freeman (1987). This survey 
of Pennsylvania firms compared the size, growth, and export activity of firms that reported receiving 
assistance from the State of Pennsylvania with firms that did not report assistance. But, as the 
authors emphasize, this comparison by itself does not allow these state programs to be evaluated. 
As mentioned in the chapter text, at the very least we would want to add control variables for 
other factors affecting firm size, growth, or export performance. Reynolds and Freeman's survey 
did find that assisted firms were larger, had grown faster since start-up, and exported more, but 
this does not mean that the assistance caused these effects.
A recent Urban Institute manual by Hatry, Fall, Singer, and Liner (1990) on how to monitor 
economic development programs also suggests comparing the performance of assisted and unassisted 
firms. The authors point out that many states may be able to use their already existing "ES-202 
data" data from state unemployment insurance files to make these comparisons of various firms.
Hatry and his co-authors also suggest extensive use of client surveys by economic development 
program managers. While client surveys are an invaluable tool for improving management and 
providing ongoing program evaluation, survey data are unlikely to convince skeptics that these 
programs work.
7. Perhaps random assignment of which businesses were most aggressively pursued as program 
clients would be politically feasible. For example, a sample of small and medium-sized manufac 
turing firms could be divided into a treatment group that would receive frequent requests to par 
ticipate in a training program to increase exports, and a control group that would not be so ag 
gressively targeted as clients of the program. The treatment group assignment variable could be 
used as an instrumental variable that would exogenously shift the probability of the business par 
ticipating in the export promotion program.
8. In addition, if the variables determining the selection of program clients is well-understood, 
there are well-known econometric techniques that can be used to correct for "selection bias" 
and obtain consistent estimates of the effects of the program.
9. There must be some reasonable limit to the ratio of business cost reduction to dollar of govern 
ment spending for new wave programs. If a program provided information that reduced business 
costs by $10 for every $1 spent on the program, one would expect private entrepreneurs to pro 
vide this service, given the huge potential profit margins. Of course, various "market failures" 
in information markets inhibit the development of such private services for example, potential 
clients may distrust the sellers who claim to be able to provide valuable information. But are private 
markets so imperfect that profit margins of 90 percent are foregone?
10. Rasmussen, Bendick, and Ledebur have written several useful articles comparing the ratios 
of business cost reductions to government expenditures for a variety of traditional economic develop 
ment incentives. See, for example, Rasmussen, Bendick, and Ledebur (1984). However, we have 
no equivalent information on the cost-effectiveness of new wave economic development programs.
11. One of the sites compared with Nashville was Kalamazoo, Michigan. Our model estimated 
that the Nashville site for Saturn would save General Motors at least $42 million per year over 
the Kalamazoo site. Our confidence in our crude model (only three cost factors considered) is 
increased by a Nashville Banner article that cited a "reliable source" as estimating that "General 
Motors saved more than $100 million annually by locating its Saturn plant in Tennessee instead 
of Michigan. . . . Taxes, wages, transportation costs, and workers' compensation premiums are 
all lower in Tennessee, accounting for much of the savings." (Nashville Banner, September 11, 
1985).
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12. The text does not explicitly discuss the empirical evidence on the influence of agglomeration 
economies business cost savings that result from greater concentrations of particular industries, 
or business activity in general, in some local area on subsequent business growth. Agglomera 
tion economies may result in a type of multiplier effect of state and local economic development 
policies that may enhance their effectiveness. If an area succeeds, through tax reduction, service 
enhancements, or other policies, in increasing growth in some industry, agglomeration economies 
may attract additional growth in that industry.
13. That is, given that certain variables are in the estimating equation, what should the estimating 
equation's functional form be.
14. Agglomeration economy cost reductions are usually attributed to the development of specialized 
supplier markets for an industry, made possible by a greater concentration of the industry.
15. Some recent innovative studies have attempted to create such public infrastructure measures. 
Both Eberts (1991) and Munnell (1990) have used public investment data to estimate the magnitude 
of the public capital stocks in different metropolitan areas (Eberts) and states (Munnell).
16. Strictly speaking, this bias towards zero only holds if only one variable is mismeasured. The 
bias when a number of variables are mismeasured will depend in a complex way on the intercor- 
relations among the different variables. However, in practice one would expect any grossly 
mismeasured variable to have a coefficient estimate that is biased towards zero.
17. This restriction in the scope of the empirical examination throws away some of the informa 
tion the data might contain on why state and local growth rates differ, but provides more assurance 
that the results are not simply due to omitted regional effects. With just one cross-section, omit 
ted jurisdiction effects cannot be controlled for, as there is only one observation for each jurisdiction.
18. Some of these specification and functional form issues are discussed in more detail in an ap 
pendix available from the author.
19. I would certainly admit that I have probably inadvertently omitted some studies, particularly 
unpublished studies. But I have made no attempt to select studies whose findings match my own 
beliefs. Hence, the studies summarized can be considered at least a roughly random sample of 
recent studies on taxes and regional business growth.
20. John Due's (1961) study is the most commonly cited review of this early business location 
literature.
21. This negative tax effect appears to be greater for intrametropolitan studies that use data for 
specific individual communities rather than aggregating all suburban communities into one general 
suburban category. The two studies that aggregate all suburban communities into one suburb yield 
tax effects that are insignificant, and that are assumed to be zero in constructing the table. We 
would expect this pattern of results because aggregating all suburban communities ignores the 
possibility of a business locating in an individual suburban community with low taxes, even if 
average suburban taxes are high; hence, aggregating all suburban communities will tend to understate 
the effects on an individual community of raising its tax rates. In addition, while individual suburbs 
may be close substitutes for one another from a business perspective, city business sites may not 
be close substitutes for suburban sites.
22. A regression, using each inter-area study as an observation, of the estimated tax elasticity 
on a constant, and dummies for whether the study controls for fixed effects or public services, 
yields the following results:
Tax elasticity = -.11 - .24*Fixed dummy - .16*Pub dummy. 
(.08) (.12) (.10)
Standard errors are in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. This regression provides some 
evidence that the inclusion of both fixed-effect controls and public service controls matters to 
the magnitude of the tax coefficient estimated in a business location study.
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23. In the case of the Newman study, the estimated difference across industries is not statistically 
significant.
24. Economists would generally refer to welfare as a transfer program rather than a public ser 
vice. In this discussion, I simply use "public services" as a generic term for all publicly sup 
ported programs.
25. One might ask why fire protection spending and local school spending should be particularly 
beneficial to small business starts, compared to police spending or higher education spending, 
two of the other categories of public spending included in my 1989 paper. The effects of police 
spending may be biased by a positive correlation with crime, which will tend to discourage business 
growth. Furthermore, perhaps small businesses care more about the availability of moderately 
skilled workers than about the availability of college-educated workers. Finally, higher fire pro 
tection spending, in addition to reducing business insurance costs and fire damage costs, may 
reflect a general orientation of the area's government towards focusing on providing good basic 
services to business and households, rather than on attempting to redistribute income.
26. Munnell's tax variable is state and local taxes as a percent of personal income, while her 
public capital variable is in dollars per capita. The present value per capita of changing taxes 
by 1 percent of personal income is .Ol*Y/(r-g), where Y is per capita personal income, r is the 
real interest rate, and g is the annual rate of growth of real per capita personal income. This pres 
ent value can finance an annual per capita payment stream of r times that present value. The 
annual cost per capita of K dollars per capita of public capital is(r+d)K, where d is the deprecia 
tion rate of public capital. Munnell's figures indicate that d is about .02. A reasonable figure 
for r is .03, while a conservative figure for average annual growth in real per capita personal 
income is 1.5 percent (g = .015). Under these assumptions, a change in state and local taxes of 
1 percent of personal income can finance an increase in public capital per capita equal to 
.Q\*Y*r*(l/(r-g))*(l/(r+d))=mY, where m is .4 under these assumed values for r, d, and g. 
Using observed values for Y, and Munnell's parameters in her table 12, the estimated net effect 
of tax-financed increases in state and local public capital is strongly positive in Munnell's two 
sets of results for the 1980-88 time period, slightly positive for the 1970-80 time period, and 
negative for the 1970-88 time period. Different assumptions about r, g, or d would yield different 
results; the higher the value of m, the more public capital can be financed with a given tax in 
crease. The minimum critical value of m to yield a net positive effect of tax-financed increases 
in public capital is .06 for the 1980-88 "changes" regression, .20 for the 1980-88 "levels" regres 
sion, .36 for the 1970-80 regression, and .63 for the 1970-88 regression. I thank Alicia Munnell 
and Leah Cook for providing me with additional background information on their parameter 
estimates and data, allowing me to make these calculations.
27. One additional state and local government policy that I omit is economic development policy 
towards what types of employers to attract to the area. There is certainly much anecdotal evidence 
that southern economic developers have sometimes attempted to avoid bringing in high-wage, 
unionized employers.
28. According to the July 1990 issue of Survey of Current Business, total U.S. employee com 
pensation in 1989 was $3,079 billion. (Table 1.14, p. 45.) Total state and local receipts, excluding 
federal grants in aid, were $632 billion. According to a 1981 report by the Advisory Commission 
on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR 1981), the business share of state and local taxes is around 
33.9 percent. Applying this percentage to 1989 state and local receipts, total state and local business 
tax costs in 1989 would be estimated to be $214 billion. The ratio of employee compensation 
to state and local business tax costs is 14.4; the ratio of employee compensation to all state and 
local nongrant receipts is 4.9. Hence, if we believe that business taxes but not personal taxes 
affect business location, a 1 percent increase in labor costs would have around 14.4 times the
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effect on regional growth of a 1 percent across-the-board increase in all state and local taxes. 
If all state and local personal taxes are shifted into higher business costs (which seems unlikely), 
a 1 percent increase in labor costs would have about 4.9 times the effect on regional growth of 
a 1 percent across-the-board increase in all state and local taxes. I regard the first calculation 
as somewhat more plausible, as I would expect only a small proportion of personal state and local 
taxes to be shifted to business.
The assumptions behind these calculations could be challenged. But I believe that any recalculation 
would still show that wage effects on an area's growth should vastly exceed tax effects on growth.
29. As mentioned in appendix 2.1, substitution effects may imply that elasticities of local employment 
with respect to various cost variables will not be exactly proportional to cost shares. But substitu 
tion effects should tend to increase the absolute magnitude of wage effects on local employment 
relative to the effects of capital taxes on local employment.
30. However, the wage elasticity is not significantly lower when employment is used as a depen 
dent variable. A regression of each study's estimated wage elasticity on a dummy for the inclu 
sion of fixed effects, and a dummy for an employment dependent variable, yields the following 
results:
Wage Elasticity = -.55 + .02 * (Fixed-Effect Control) - .34 
(.34) (.57) (.51) 
* Employment Dependent Variable 
(standard errors in parentheses; 28 observations).
31. One could instead conclude that economic theory is wrong and business activity elasticities 
with respect to different variables have nothing to do with cost shares. But the general idea that 
relative effects on costs matter seems intuitively plausible, even if one does not accept many of 
the assumptions made by economists.
32. As can be seen in appendix 2.5, a very few studies, notably Bartik (1985), Woodward (1990), 
Newman (1983), and Helms (1985), account for the negative mean effects of unionization that 
are evident in table 2.7.
33. Regression analysis of the pattern of results does not help clarify matters. A regression of 
the unionization elasticity on dummies for fixed effect controls, wage controls, and on whether 
the study focuses on branch plants of large companies, yields the following results (standard er 
rors in parentheses; number of observations is 19):
Union Elasticity = -.66 - .92*(Fixed) + .76*(Wage Control) - 1.61*Branch 
(1.27)(1.56) (1.56) (1.80)
The pattern is sensible, but all coefficients are statistically insignificant.
34. A 1-standard deviation change in the environmental variable, the Conservation Foundation 
rating of the stringency of the state's environmental regulation, causes only a .01 standard devia 
tion change in the small business start-up rate.
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Theoretical Analysis
of the Distributional Effects
of Local Job Growth
Local policy will not determine the level of economic well-being. 
Because people and resources are mobile, all areas tend to share 
similar general levels of economic well-being. (Thomas Michael 
Power, Chairman, Department of Economics, University of Mon 
tana, page 43 in "Broader Vision, Narrower Focus in Local 
Economic Development," Forum for Applied Research and Public 
Policy, Fall 1989)
For those who count, the city is a growth machine, one that can 
increase aggregate rents and trap related wealth for those in the 
right position to benefit. (Pages 50-51 in Urban Fortunes: The 
Political Economy of Place, John Logan and Harvey Molotch, 
1987)
In this chapter, I analyze the likely distributional effects of state and 
local economic development policies. The analysis is theoretical; subse 
quent chapters present empirical estimates of distributional effects.
The focus of the chapter is not on national income distribution but 
on local income distribution on how the growth of a small economic 
region such as a metropolitan area affects the relative incomes and wealth 
of the different households and businesses within that local area. Chapter 
8 considers how the competition of all states and local areas for jobs 
affects the national distribution of income.
In the short run, households are very immobile. As a result, the jobs 
attracted to a metropolitan area or other local economic area by economic 
development policy exceed the increase in labor supply due to in- 
migration in the short run. Labor markets become tighter: unemploy 
ment drops and wages increase.
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In the long run, however, many households are mobile. As implied 
by Power in the above quotation, we would expect households to be 
attracted to a local area with tight labor markets, forcing unemploy 
ment up and wages down. In-migration would continue until unemploy 
ment and wages in the area were restored to their original level.
The long-run beneficiaries of growth would be expected to be land 
owners. State and local economic development policies attract businesses 
and households, increasing the overall demand for land. Since the supply 
of land does not increase due to in-migration, the price of land will 
go up. This leads to a natural suspicion, expressed by Logan and Molotch 
above, that political rhetoric about economic development masks its real 
purpose: using government to increase the wealth of a land-owning elite.
In this chapter, I counter this conventional view of the long-run ef 
fects of local growth with the argument that the short-run labor market 
experiences of individuals affect their long-run labor market success. 
Local economic growth helps individuals get better jobs today; because 
individuals get better jobs today, they can get better jobs tomorrow, 
next year, or indeed in the long run.
Immobility of Labor
The immobility of most households is widely accepted, but its full 
extent is not recognized. Some evidence for labor immobility is anec 
dotal. Journalists frequently describe families with poor economic pros 
pects who refuse to leave such economically depressed regions of the 
United States as West Virginia and inner-city Detroit.
Survey evidence is also available on labor immobility. One of the 
best surveys on labor immobility is analyzed by Dunn (1979). The re 
searchers surveyed 200 workers in a rural southern town who had recent 
ly been laid off due to the permanent closing of a textile mill. The 
workers were asked how much lower a wage they would accept in order 
to stay in their hometown; they were asked to assume that if they mov 
ed elsewhere they could obtain a job similar to their old job. The average
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worker said that he or she would accept 14 percent lower wages to re 
main in the hometown. Blacks, females, and older workers were the 
most reluctant to move. Follow-up interviews three years later found 
that workers who initially claimed a greater willingness to accept wage 
reductions were significantly more likely to actually stay in the town. 
Because the subsequent behavior of workers is consistent with their 
responses to the survey, it is reasonable to assume that the survey 
reflected the true feelings of the workers.
Econometric studies also indicate that households are extremely im 
mobile. Venti and Wise (1984) and Bartik, Butler, and Liu (forthcom 
ing) used information on household moving behavior from the Demand 
Experiment of the Experimental Housing Allowance Program to estimate 
how reluctant households are to move. The Demand Experiment, con 
ducted by the federal government between 1973 and 1975 in Pittsburgh 
and Phoenix, examined how low-income renter households would change 
housing consumption in response to large, randomly assigned income 
and housing price subsidies. 1
These two mobility studies with Demand Experiment data use dif 
ferent econometric techniques, but reach similar conclusions about 
household immobility. Venti and Wise observed housing choices of 
households that move, to infer the potential gains that "stayer" 
households are willing to forego. They estimate that the average stayer 
household is willing to forego gains from moving to a new house that 
are equivalent to 14 percent of household income.
The study I conducted with my colleagues estimated the increase in 
rent needed to increase the probability of moving of the median household 
to 50 percent. The required rent increase to reach the 50 percent prob 
ability was considered to be the household's "moving cost," where 
moving costs include financial costs and the psychological costs of leav 
ing a familiar dwelling unit. We estimated that this moving cost averaged 
10 percent of income in Pittsburgh and 17 percent in Phoenix. Higher 
moving costs were found for minority households, older households, 
and households with a longer tenure at their current dwelling.
Both studies focus on households' reluctance to move out of their 
current dwelling unit, regardless of whether the household stays in the
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same metropolitan area. The large moving costs found in these studies 
probably underestimate the resistance of the typical household to mov 
ing to a new metropolitan area.
Why households are so immobile is a difficult question. Moving costs 
of this magnitude are not likely to be due only to financial costs. 
Geographers, planners, and regional scientists talk about the importance 
to households of a "sense of place." Roger Bolton has recently writ 
ten an intriguing essay analyzing a "sense of place" from the perspec 
tive of an economist (Bolton 1989a). He argues that a "sense of place" 
is a complex of familiar buildings, natural features, people, businesses, 
and social relationships that are valuable to residents because, among 
other things, they encourage trust in market and nonmarket relation 
ships and save time in making decisions. 2
A strong sense of place would make households uniquely attached 
to communities in which they had long resided. This attachment is a 
"psychological moving cost" which affects behavior as much as more 
tangible monetary costs of moving.
Short-Run Effects of Local Job Growth
The relative immobility of most households implies that local economic 
development policies will have short-run effects. Even with many im 
mobile households, local job growth would lead to some in-migration 
of households and firms, and land values will go up. But this mobility 
is not extensive enough to eliminate all labor market benefits to 
households from the policy.
Table 3.1 summarizes the likely short-run effects of local develop 
ment policies on different groups. The groups affected by the policy 
include households and firms that stay in the local area, landowners, 
local governments, out-migrants, and in-migrants.
The effects of direct development policies on households depend on 
whether they originally have a job, how wages are determined on their 
job, and whether they are renters or homeowners. Households with a job,
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Table 3.1
Short-Run Distributional Effects of State and Local 
Economic Development Policies
Group Effect
Stayer Households
Employed homeowners
Employed renters in labor 
submarkets whose workers 
are relatively immobile
Employed renters in labor 
submarkets with inflexible 
wages
Gain due to wage and property value 
increase
Gain because real wage increases
Lose because real wage drops
Unemployed who get jobs Gain employment benefits
Unemployed homeowners 
who don't get jobs
Unemployed renters who 
don't get jobs
Stayer Firms
Subsidized firms
National market-oriented 
firms
Local market-oriented firms 
Landowners 
Local Government
Out-Migrants 
In-Migrants
Gain in property values, but lose due to 
increase in local prices
Lose due to increase in local prices
Gain due to subsidy 
Lose due to cost increase
Gain due to larger market 
Gain increased land values
Gain if business in-migration 
predominates or excess capacity of 
public infrastructure; lose otherwise
Lose utility or profits before consider 
ing capital gains on land ownership
Unaffected because other similar com 
munities were already available
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and whose wages are not determined by formal or informal contracts, 
probably benefit from a real wage increase. Real wages increase because 
labor demand probably increases faster than labor supply, given the 
greater short-run mobility of capital compared to labor. Households in 
this group who are homeowners also gain from the increase in their 
home values.
Households with a job, and whose wages are fixed by explicit or im 
plicit contract, will suffer a real wage decrease as local prices increase. 
For members of this group who are homeowners, any adverse effect 
will be minimized because of the increase in their home's value.
Households who get a job because of the growth are probably net 
winners. Their benefit equals the wage on their newly acquired job minus 
the lowest wage at which they would have accepted a job. 3 Homeowners 
in this category also benefit from a capital gain on their home.
Unemployed or retired households who do not get a job are probably 
net losers. Their costs go up as local prices increase, and their incomes 
(Social Security, unemployment compensation, interest earnings) are 
not tied to the increases in local prices. This is probably true even for 
members of this group who are homeowners. Their capital gain on their 
home reflects an increase in the rent they are implicitly paying for that 
housing. As long as the household stays in its dwelling, the increase 
in implicit rents received just equals the increase in implicit rents paid. 
Only for households who want to move can the capital gain yield a tangi 
ble increase in wealth, and only then if the household is willing to move 
to a smaller dwelling.
Effects on local firms depend on whether they receive funds from 
these policies, and on whether they serve national or local markets. Firms 
that receive direct assistance from these policies can be presumed to, 
on net, gain because subsequent changes in prices and wages are prob 
ably of secondary magnitude.
Firms that do not receive direct assistance but that serve national 
markets probably, on net, lose. Their costs go up as local wages and 
prices increase. But because their prices are set in national markets, 
there is no compensating increase in revenues.
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Firms that do not receive assistance but serve local markets probably 
gain, on net. While their costs go up, so do their revenues. The latter 
effect on profits will probably dominate, because a larger city will need 
greater supplies of local goods, and some increase in profitability will 
be required to elicit a greater supply.
Absentee landowners gain due to the increase in land values from 
the development.
Industries that serve local markets and are likely to benefit include 
development companies, banks, newspapers, retailers, and business ser 
vice companies. Industries that serve national markets and are likely 
to lose include most of manufacturing. Within any given industry, small 
businesses, on average, are more likely to serve a local market than 
large businesses, so the small business share of employment in a given 
industry is likely to increase somewhat. In addition, small businesses 
may be able to more quickly respond to expanding market opportunities, 
which would also indicate greater benefits for small business. Finally, 
businesses with large land holdings, such as large developers, are like 
ly to gain more than other businesses.
Local governments pay for the subsidy or service provided to 
businesses under the development policy. In addition, the policy has 
indirect fiscal effects: increased service demand and tax collections due 
to the increased numbers of households and businesses. Increasing 
numbers of households, particularly households with children, probably 
result in a net fiscal loss for local governments. Businesses with relatively 
low traffic demands, which would include most businesses except for 
retailers, probably pay more in taxes than they require in services. The 
net fiscal impacts of households without children, or commercial 
retailers, could be positive or negative. Whatever the mix of businesses 
or households attracted by the policy, the fiscal benefit is likely to be 
greater if the local public "infrastructure" (roads, schools, water and 
sewers, etc.) has substantial unused capacity. If there is little unused 
capacity and the local job growth will attract households with children, 
substantial fiscal benefits are unlikely.
Households moving away because of the policy presumably did so 
because the negative effects on their well-being outweighed any special
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attachment to the local area. Possible capital gains from selling their 
home may make such out-migrant households net winners, but this capital 
gain overstates the benefits.
Firms moving away presumably left because the changes in costs or 
character of the local market reduced their profits below an acceptable 
level, despite the "good will" they had acquired from their business 
experience. Capital gains on the sale of property may make business 
out-migrants into net winners from the policy, but the capital gain 
overstates the benefits.
In contrast to out-migrants, in-migrating firms and households will 
not be significantly affected by the direct development policy pursued 
by this community. From the perspective of outsiders, the community 
is just one of many that is attracting business and growing; it is im 
possible for changes in the rate of growth in this one community to 
have significant effects on the well-being of outsiders. If the communi 
ty had grown more slowly, in-migrant firms and households could have 
moved to a similar rapidly growing community.
This asymmetry between in-migrants and out-migrants may seem sur 
prising. The asymmetry occurs because the community is unique to out- 
migrants, but not to in-migrants. To out-migrants, the community is 
unique as their home community, and what happens to it can affect their 
well-being. To in-migrants, the community is just one of many similar 
communities.
This discussion does not imply that all job growth would be expected 
to have identical distributional effects. Low-skill workers are general 
ly thought to be less geographically mobile than high-skill workers. Some 
types of economic development policies (such as branch plant recruit 
ment and small business assistance) may particularly encourage 
businesses that use low-skill labor. If low-skill workers are less mobile, 
these types of policies will lead to relatively little in-migration and 
relatively large unemployment reductions. The employment benefits of 
this policy will be large, and the benefits to landowners and homeowners 
small. In contrast, consider policies that encourage high-technology 
businesses using high-skill labor. Such policies may lead to considerable 
in-migration, even in the short run. The benefits primarily go to land 
owners, rather than to workers or the unemployed.
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Long-Run Effects of Growth
A more controversial issue is whether a once-and-for-all shock to an 
area's labor demand has long-run effects on local labor markets. By 
"long-run," I mean a period of 10 years or more. Many economists 
would argue that enough people move during 10 years that any increase 
in local labor demand will be offset.
The position that local labor demand shocks have no long-run effects 
has been most forcefully presented by Marston (1985) in an article 
analyzing differences in unemployment among U.S. metropolitan areas. 
Marston points out that "the movement toward equilibrium merely re 
quires that a small part of the labor force be mobile. The fact that some 
workers are immobile may merely determine who will leave, but have 
little effect on unemployment differentials" (p. 66).
Marston argues that a labor demand shock to a metropolitan area will 
be completely offset over some time period if the normal migration flows 
between metropolitan areas over that time period greatly exceed the 
size of the demand shock. In that case, the shock can be offset by relative 
ly small changes in normal migration patterns. Marston presents 
estimates indicating that normal migration flows between metropolitan 
areas are quite large. During a four-year period, 13.9 percent of the 
metropolitan population moves between areas; during an eight-year 
period, 25.9 percent of the metropolitan population moves between 
areas. 4 Economic development policies would be extraordinarily suc 
cessful if they raised the employment of a metro area by even 1 percent 
during a year, compared to what employment would otherwise have 
been. Hence, over a four- or eight-year period, small increases in the 
normal volume of migration would completely offset a successful 
economic development policy. Also, even an extraordinarily large 
negative shock to an area's economy, such as several plant closings 
that reduced area employment by several percent, would be complete 
ly offset over a four- or eight-year period if a minority of the area's 
normal in-migrants chose other metropolitan areas. Marston concludes 
that' 'both the four-year and eight-year periods should be long enough 
that a shock at the beginning of the period could not cause a dis 
equilibrium that would persist through the entire period" (p. 65).
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Based on this reasoning, we might expect all of the benefits of state 
and local economic development policy to be reflected in higher land 
values after four years. Consider the likely long-run effects of an area's 
economic development policy on three different groups of area 
"stakeholders": households, firms, and landowners. Assume that all 
households and firms rent land from landowners; households and firms 
who own land can be viewed as renting it to themselves, and may benefit 
from local economic growth in their role as landowner as well as in 
their role as a household or firm. Assume also that the local area is 
in "equilibrium" before the economic development policy is im 
plemented. Equilibrium means that the area, given its amenities, wages, 
prices, unemployment rate, and other characteristics, is able to attract 
a sufficient number of in-migrating households and firms, and new firms 
to at least keep population and employment stable, but does not attract 
so many as to cause explosive local growth. If an area could attract 
no new households or firms, it would quickly descend to ghost town 
status, since any area will lose some households and firms over time.
An economic development policy is implemented in the local area 
that provides direct assistance to business. Local job growth increases 
because the area is now more profitable to business. In-migration of 
households increases because the lower unemployment rate and higher 
real wages make the area more attractive to households. But as in- 
migration of households increases, unemployment rates go up and wage 
increases fall behind price increases, reducing the attractiveness of the 
area to households. Furthermore, as in-migration of firms and new firm 
births increase, local costs of land and labor go up, reducing the attrac 
tiveness of the area to business. A new equilibrium is reached when 
the local area's attractiveness to in-migrating households and firms is 
the same as it was before the policy was implemented just attractive 
enough to prevent decline, but not attractive enough to cause explosive 
growth.
Landowners in the local area clearly gain from the growth of the area 
in the long run. But without further assumptions, it is difficult to deter 
mine the long-run effects of this economic development policy on the 
households and firms originally located in the area. A natural simplifying
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assumption is that households and firms originally located in the local 
area are similar enough, on average, to new and in-migrant households 
and firms that they are similarly affected by the growth policy. In that 
case, the development policy will not affect the original households and 
firms in the long run. Wages, prices, and unemployment rates adjust 
so that new and in-migrant households and firms find the attractiveness 
of the area unchanged in the long run; these same wage, price, and 
unemployment rate adjustments should leave the attractiveness of the 
area unchanged from the perspective of the original households and firms 
in the long run.
Of course, in the real world we would expect some differences be 
tween the original households and firms and new and in-migrant 
households and firms. But without some argument for systematic large 
differences, there is no basis for suggesting that the original households 
and firms systematically gain or lose from development policy in the 
long run. The only expected long-run beneficiaries are landowners.
In a simple version of this model, the development policy will have 
no effects on long-run unemployment, and will raise wages and prices 
(including land prices) by the same percentage in the long run. Assume 
that growth in and of itself holding wages, prices, and unemployment 
rates constant does not change the attractiveness of a local area. That 
is, firms and households are not greatly concerned over congestion, 
pollution, or other local characteristics that may change as an area grows. 
Then the simplest way to keep household well-being and firm profits 
unchanged is to keep the unemployment rate unchanged and increase 
wages and prices by the same percentage. The equal percentage increase 
in wages and prices must be just great enough to offset the initial spur 
to profits from the development policy. 5
Long-Run Costs of Growth
One possible systematic difference between the original households 
and firms and those who move in is their attitude toward the 
characteristics that make a local area special. Households and firms
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originally choose a location because they find its amenities any 
qualitative characteristics that affect household well-being or firm 
profits particularly attractive. Over time, households and firms become 
accustomed to their home area. Households develop attachments to par 
ticular places and people. Firms develop linkages to customers and 
suppliers.
Growth changes many qualitative features of a local area. Conges 
tion, crime, and air pollution may increase. Larger markets may at 
tract more large-scale retailers and a greater number of specialized 
retailers and industrial suppliers.
Different households and firms will have different perceptions of the 
desirability of these changes. The in-migrants attracted will be those 
that find the changes most attractive or least unattractive. Wages, prices, 
and unemployment rate adjustments must only be sufficient to attract 
households and firms whose view of the qualitative changes caused by 
growth is relatively favorable.
But the original households and firms are likely to view these 
qualitative changes relatively unfavorably. They are accustomed to the 
local area as it originally was, and may even have chosen it for its par 
ticular qualitative features. As a result, the wage, price, and unemploy 
ment adjustments that are sufficient to attract new and in-migrant 
households and firms to the area are insufficient to compensate the 
original households and firms for the qualitative changes in the area.
For example, suppose that congestion increases as a city grows. The 
real wage must go up by some amount, or unemployment must go down, 
to enable the city to continue to attract in-migrant households. The in- 
migrants attracted will be those who best tolerate congestion, so the 
required upward adjustment in the real wage (or downward adjustment 
in unemployment) is modest. The original residents, on average, have 
a much greater preference for keeping their home city free of conges 
tion. Some of them may have chosen to live in the city because it was 
not congested, while others may have become accustomed to lack of 
congestion. The real wage increase will not adequately compensate the 
original residents for the congestion increase.
If there were no costs of moving to a new city, the original residents' 
unhappiness with their changing city would be irrelevant because they
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could easily move to an uncongested city. But because of high mobility 
costs, the original residents will not move unless they perceive a sizable 
decline in their well-being at their original home city. Even if they move, 
their well-being is lower than if they had been able to stay in a home 
city that had not undergone change. 6
A good example of losses due to growth is the effect on Spring Hill, 
Tennessee, a small rural community 30 miles south of Nashville, of 
the 1985 announcement that General Motors would locate its giant Saturn 
plant there. The announcement was welcomed by most Spring Hill 
residents, but some resented the threat posed by the plant to their way 
of life. For example, the Wall Street Journal reported an interview with 
one Spring Hill resident who said he "came here seven years ago because 
he wanted to live in 'a little one horse town.' Now, he says it's just 
a matter of time before he will have to move again. 'The people here 
have dollar signs in their eyes,' he complains" (WSJ, p. 1, 7/28/85, 
reported by Ed Bean and Damon Darlin).
Similar types of losses from growth can be experienced by businesses 
with strong ties to a community, either because the owner prefers liv 
ing in the community, or because of built-up, firm-specific tangible and 
intangible capital (local reputation, unique plant and equipment that can 
not be sold, etc.). Some types of businesses may have production 
technologies especially suited to smaller communities. As growth oc 
curs, these businesses are replaced by new businesses whose technologies 
are better suited to large communities. For example, small grocery stores 
may be replaced by large supermarkets. In a world of zero mobility 
costs, these businesses could just move on to similar small areas. But 
because of the particular ties of these businesses to their home com 
munity, a move could have large costs.
Spring Hill also provides an example of long-run costs of growth to 
resident businesses. A number of local farmers felt that the Saturn 
development threatened their way of life. One farmer complained that 
Saturn "will ruin farming in Spring Hill and have a negative effect on 
fanning in all of Maury County." After the Saturn announcement, the 
town's farm implement dealership closed. 7
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Of course, if these original residents and businesses own land, their 
losses from the change in character of a community may be more than 
offset by the increase in the value of their land. But the increase in the 
value of land in a local area will overstate the benefits of an increase 
in local jobs, even in the long run.
The possible loss of the special characteristics of a unique place is 
an argument for economic development policies that only prevent decline 
of a local area, and against economic development policies that cause 
rapid growth. Preventing the loss of a sense of place is a possible benefit 
of only preventing the decline of an area. The loss of a sense of place 
is a possible cost of encouraging rapid job growth in an area. Although 
these benefits and costs may be important, measuring their dollar value 
or comparing them with other effects of state and local economic 
development policy is difficult. While this study does not attempt to 
estimate the value of a sense of place, this value should play some role 
in political decisions.
Hysteresis Effects of Local Job Growth
Faster job growth in a local area also causes systematic differences 
between the labor market experiences of persons who have lived in the 
area since before the job growth started and persons who move in after 
wards. Due to faster growth, in the short run some persons in the area 
will obtain jobs who otherwise would be unemployed. In addition, some 
will move up to better jobs. The short-run experiences of these persons 
change their values, skills, self-confidence, and reputation. In economic 
jargon, these short-run experiences increase their human capital, as well 
as their human capital as perceived by employers. As a result, these 
persons are more likely to be employed in the long run, and more like 
ly to be employed in a better job. Even though others will move in to 
this growing local area, many of the original residents will be better 
prepared to compete in the labor market. Even with new in-migrant 
workers available, employers will, in the long run, be willing to hire 
and keep the original residents in better jobs because of their improved 
human capital.
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Long-run effects of one-time labor market shocks are referred to in 
economics as "hysteresis effects." Hysteresis is a term borrowed from 
physics and engineering. A system is said to exhibit hysteresis, or to 
be hysteretic, if its equilibrium is determined not only by current 
variables, but also by the history of the system. In other words, hysteresis 
signifies that history matters.
In physics and engineering, the hysteresis concept has been used to 
describe the behavior of magnetic fields in metals. Even upon removal 
of a magnetizing force, the electromagnetic properties of metals do not 
return to their original state.
In economics, the hysteresis concept has not been commonly used. 
Occasionally, economists have suggested that booms and recessions may 
have long-run effects on the equilibrium unemployment and wages of 
the nation. This theory has been most eloquently advanced by Phelps, 
in the following quotation from his 1972 book on Inflation Policy and 
Unemployment Theory:
Of [the changes caused by a boom], job experience, with its op 
portunities for learning by doing and on-the-job training, is possibly 
the most important. When people are engaged in sustained work 
of a kind with which they have not had any similar experience, 
they become different for it in a number of ways that are relevant 
for the equilibrium unemployment rate. Getting to work on time 
is just about the most important habit a worker can have in nearly 
every kind of job. . . . For many of the people who comprise the 
hard-core, most frequently unemployed group, getting to be 
"reliable" and learning to work with other people are necessary 
attributes for continuation in the job.
For other people, the opportunity to acquire skills at more de 
manding jobs in the skill hierarchy than they could ordinarily 
qualify for under normal always-equilibrium aggregate demand 
behavior may be the more important aspect. . . . The upgrading 
of many workers that results from a disequilibrating rise of ag 
gregate demand may gradually lead to a true upgrading in the 
average quality of the labor force, (p. 79)
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More recently, a few economists have suggested that hysteresis ef 
fects may explain why high unemployment was so persistent in the United 
States during the 1930s, and in many European countries in the 1980s. 
These unemployment rates vastly exceeded the prevailing national 
unemployment rates of previous decades. Furthermore, they showed 
little tendency to revert to their level of previous decades. This behavior 
of unemployment rates appears inconsistent with usual economic theories 
of the aggregate labor market, which assume that an economy experienc 
ing a shock to labor demand will return to the previous equilibrium 
unemployment rate. 8
Hysteresis theories of the labor market have not been subjected to 
many empirical tests. Observing one national economy over time does 
not provide sufficient information to tell whether changes in average 
unemployment rates are due to hysteresis effects or other factors. 
Equilibrium unemployment rates could change over time due to shifts 
in demographics, industrial structure, or technology.
Conclusion
This chapter has given theoretical reasons why local economic growth 
might affect more than land prices. The hysteresis argument for long- 
run labor market effects of local job growth goes as follows: households 
are immobile in the short run; as a result, local job growth has short- 
run effects on the labor market; these effects lead to long-run changes 
in households' human capital; these long-run changes affect unemploy 
ment and other labor market variables.
The next four chapters consider what the empirical evidence shows 
about the effects of local growth on local labor and housing markets, 
in both the short run and the long run.
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NOTES
1. The random assignment of large income and housing price changes makes it much easier to 
uncover households' true mobility response to different opportunities. The random assignment 
implies that unobserved variables will not bias estimation of the effects of income and price changes. 
The large size of the changes means that observed responses would be expected to be large enough 
to allow for accurate estimation.
2. This sentence oversimplifies Bolton's essay, which discusses with some depth and subtlety 
what might be meant by a "sense of place," how it is created, and possible policy implications.
3. We should not assume that workers would be willing to work for nothing, and that the dollars 
gained by exchanging labor for wages measure the benefit from work over nonwork. Work has 
some cost to individuals over nonwork: less leisure, less time to deal with home and family respon 
sibilities, less time to look for a better job.
4. Some readers of initial drafts of this book have wondered whether Marston's estimates of mobility 
rates across local labor markets are too high. I doubt whether any reasonable downward revision 
to Marston's estimates would appreciably affect the basic argument: gross migration flows are 
large enough that moderate changes in these flows could reasonably be expected to offset local 
labor demand shocks brought about by economic development policy.
The most recent published evidence from the Current Population Survey (Current Population 
Reports, Series P-20, No. 430, April 1989) indicate that MSA annual migration rates are quite 
high. Average annual MSA gross in-migration rates are around 6.56 percent, only slightly less 
than average annual county gross in-migration rates of 7.02 percent, and considerably greater 
than average annual state in-migration rates of 3.29 percent.
One cannot, of course, simply extrapolate annual migration rates to longer time intervals; among 
other factors, individuals who move once are most likely to move again. But migration rates do 
increase greatly as we extend the time interval considered. The most recent published informa 
tion from the CPS on long-term migration, covering the period from 1980 to 1985 (Current Popula 
tion Reports, Series P-20, No. 420, December 1987), shows average five-year county gross in- 
migration rates of 19.56 percent, and average five-year state gross in-migration rates of 10.48 
percent. Average five-year MSA gross in-migration rates are not reported, but it would certainly 
be reasonable to assume that such rates would be 10 percent or greater.
One could question whether all migration in or out of MSAs really reflects movement across 
different local labor markets. Some of this migration may be to or from nearby counties or MSAs 
without the need for a job change. But mobility rates are surprisingly high, even if we restrict 
attention only to moves that almost surely are across different local labor markets. For example, 
the average five-year (1980-85) gross in-migration rate to states, from noncontiguous states or 
abroad, was 7.82 percent. Even this volume of gross migration which almost surely understates 
gross migration rates across local labor markets greatly exceeds the size of the employment in 
creases that could plausibly be brought about over a five-year period by economic development 
policy. For example, based on chapter 2, a 50 percent cut in all state and local business taxes, 
holding public services to business constant, might in the long run hike local area business activi 
ty by around 12.5 percent. Helms' (1985) paper, discussed in appendix 2.2, suggests that business 
activity adjusts towards its long-run level by 8.96 percent per year. Hence, over a five-year period, 
a 50 percent business tax cut which represents a huge policy change might hike a local area's 
employment by 4.7 percent (= [1-(.9104)5]*12.5%), much less than normal gross migration flows 
in or out of the area over that time period.
5. This will hold true in the following simple model. Suppose that all households and firms are 
identical. In long-run equilibrium, utility (V) and profits (IT) of a representative household and 
firm in the local area must equal the national equilibrium utility (V*) and profits (IT*). Utility
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in the local area can be assumed to depend upon local real wages (w), local unemployment (I/), 
and local amenities that are relevant to households (Sw), while profits in the local area depend 
on local unemployment, local real wages, local land prices (r), and local amenities that are rele 
vant to businesses (D). This gives rise to the following two conditions for a long-run regional 
equilibrium:
(1) K(w, U; Sw) = K* Vw > 0, VU <0,VS >0
(2) TT(W, r, U; D) = TT*. irw < 0, irr < 0, TTJ, > 0, TTD > 0
where subscripts indicate partial derivatives. These two equations have three endogenously deter 
mined unknowns: w, r, and U. To solve the system, we can suppose there is some type of normal 
relationship between the real wage rate and the unemployment rate. This relationship can be viewed 
as an ad hoc, intuitively plausible equation, or can be rationalized using efficiency wage theory 
(see appendix 4.1). The equation can be plausibly written as:
(3) w = fiU), fv < 0.
Under these assumptions, suppose a demand shock to growth increases the profitability of the 
region. This would be a shock to D. The only way to still satisfy simultaneously equations (1), 
(2), and (3) is for w (real wages) and U (unemployment) to stay the same, and for r (regional 
prices such as land) to increase enough to offset the positive shock to profits from an increase 
in D. w and U cannot change because w and U would have to both change in the same direction 
to continue satisfying equation (1), while w and U would have to change in opposite directions 
to continue satisfying equation (3).
6. A hedonic imperfect mobility model showing that original residents often lose due to com 
munity changes is presented in Bartik (1986). This paper considers an intracity hedonic housing 
price model, but the same arguments could be made in an intercity hedonic real wage model.
7. These anecdotes about the effect of Saturn on Spring Hill area farming, including the quote 
from the local farmer, are taken from Garber and Fausey (1986), p. 22.
8. Human capital theory is only one of the theories offered by economists to explain labor market 
hysteresis. Other theories include business capital theory and insider-outsider theory. Appendix 
3.1 discusses why these alternative theories do not explain hysteresis effects in local labor markets, 
but human capital theory does.
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Effects of Local Job Growth
on Unemployment,
Labor Force Participation,
and Weekly Hours
This is the first of four chapters reporting estimates of the effects 
of local growth on metropolitan areas. This chapter focuses on how 
local growth affects employment-related activities of individuals: whether 
they are unemployed, whether they choose to look for a job, and how 
many hours a week they typically work.
The initial focus on employment effects of growth rather than ef 
fects on prices or wages is because lowering unemployment is the key 
political rationale for state and local economic development policies. 
If unemployment is unaffected by state and local development efforts, 
politicians and voters are not likely to devote significant government 
resources to such programs.
Previous Research 
on Local Growth and Unemployment
Shocks that disturb the steady-state relationship among the 
unemployment rates of metropolitan areas tend to be eliminated 
by mobility within a year. (Stephen Marston, formerly Professor 
of Economics at Cornell University, p. 74 in "Two Views of the 
Geographic Distribution of Unemployment,'' Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, February 1985)
Previous research on local growth and unemployment is of three types. 
First, some research infers the unemployment effects of shocks to local 
growth by examining the correlation over time in metropolitan area
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unemployment rates. Second, some case studies of new branch plants 
seek to determine their effects on local unemployment. Third, a number 
of econometric studies estimate the effects of local growth by compar 
ing different states or metropolitan areas.
The first research approach, examining correlations over time in 
metropolitan area unemployment rates, has been most prominently used 
by Stephen Marston (1985). The basic idea is that if a demand shock 
has persistent effects on a metropolitan area's unemployment, then the 
area's unemployment rate today should be positively correlated with 
next year's unemployment rate. The problem is that it is difficult to 
disentangle this hypothesized effect from other possible causes of positive 
correlation over time in local unemployment rates. For example, the 
equilibrium unemployment rate for a metropolitan area may differ from 
the national unemployment rate due to differences in the area's 
demographic makeup, industrial mix, or wage rates. Permanent dif 
ferences in the unemployment rates of different metropolitan areas will 
also cause positive correlation over time in area unemployment rates.
Marston found an extremely low correlation over time in a 
metropolitan statistical area's (MSA's) unemployment rate, control 
ling for what he felt were permanent differences in metropolitan 
unemployment rates. l This finding was based on an examination of the 
unemployment rates of 30 MS As for each year from 1974 to 1978.
The major weakness in Marston's research is his implicit assump 
tion that over a four-year period there are no persistent effects of de 
mand shocks. Differences across MS As in average unemployment rates 
over the 1974-1978 period were assumed by Marston to be due to per 
manent "equilibrium" influences on unemployment, rather than de 
mand shocks. But the discussion in chapter 3 revealed that unemploy 
ment effects of a one-year demand shock could persist for much more 
than four years. The one-year demand shock may have persistent ef 
fects because of its effects on human capital. Furthermore, the likely 
correlation over time of local demand shocks would further increase 
the persistence of demand influences on local unemployment rates.
Gramlich's (1987) research indicates that Marston's findings are sen 
sitive to the assumption that demand shock effects persist less than four
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years. Gramlich estimates year-to-year correlations in metropolitan area 
unemployment rates over a 24-year time period. The implicit assump 
tion behind Gramlich's approach is that over a 24-year time period, 
average metropolitan area unemployment rate differentials are not due 
to demand shocks. But demand shocks are allowed by Gramlich's ap 
proach to have effects that persist for 10 or 15 years. Gramlich finds 
year-to-year correlations in area unemployment that are over 20 times 
as great as the correlations found by Marston. 2
A second approach to understanding how local growth affects 
unemployment is case studies of the unemployment effects of new branch 
plants. A book by Summers and his colleagues (1976) provides a com 
prehensive review and evaluation of case studies of the effects of new 
industrial plants in nonmetropolitan areas.
These case studies provide two types of evidence on the unemploy 
ment effects of new branch plants. First, many studies examine what 
percentage of the new plant's workforce were previously unemployed 
or out of the labor force. According to Summers and the others, case 
studies reach disparate findings: the percentage of previously "not 
employed" individuals (either unemployed or out of the labor force) 
hired by new branch plants varies from 2 percent to 43 percent in dif 
ferent studies. The average percentage of previously "not employed" 
workers hired by new branch plants is 15 percent. 3
The problem with this evidence is that who is hired by the new branch 
plant may have little to do with its impact on local unemployment. For 
example, a new branch plant could hire only already-employed residents, 
but still affect unemployment because this hiring creates vacancies in 
other firms that are filled by the unemployed. Furthermore, the new 
branch plant may lead to increased employment in local consumer and 
intermediate goods industries. These "multiplier" effects may affect 
unemployment.
Some case studies also consider evidence on how new branch plants 
affected average unemployment in the local economic region around 
the plant. According to Summers and others' review, 11 of 16 case 
studies that examined average local unemployment rates found that 
unemployment dropped after the new branch plant began production.
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But none of these studies appears to provide any standard to which to 
compare this drop in local unemployment. The drop in local unemploy 
ment should ideally be compared with some model estimating what would 
have happened to unemployment without the plant; failing that, the drop 
in local unemployment at least must be compared to national trends. 
Many of the studies reviewed were conducted in the early 1960s, when 
unemployment was dropping everywhere. Hence, a decline in unemploy 
ment in these local areas may be due to national trends, not the new 
plant's opening.
A third approach to researching how local growth affects unemploy 
ment relies on econometric analysis of growth and unemployment trends 
in different states and metropolitan areas. The basic idea is to examine 
whether faster growing states or metropolitan areas experience larger 
declines in unemployment and larger increases in labor force participa 
tion. Closely related research examines how local employment growth 
affects migration. This research is closely related because the jobs created 
by local employment growth can only be filled in three possible ways: 
an increase in the local labor force participation rate; a decrease in the 
local unemployment rate; an increase in net migration to the area. If 
few new local jobs are filled by net in-migration, then many of the new 
jobs must be filled by current residents who previously were unemployed 
or out of the labor force.
Table 4.1 summarizes the empirical results from previous econometric 
studies. 4 The studies suggest that many jobs from local growth go to 
in-migrants, but that local growth does affect the unemployment rate 
and labor force participation rate. 5 The studies disagree on what pro 
portion of the jobs generated by local growth go to in-migrants, the 
resident unemployed, or new labor market participants.
There are several problems with previous econometric studies. First, 
these studies are unable to distinguish between the short-run and long- 
run effects of employment growth. They usually examine how the change 
in unemployment or labor force participation over some arbitrarily 
chosen time period is related to one growth variable, the employment 
growth over that time period. Any study's estimated effect of growth, 
derived from the coefficient on the sole growth variable, represents some
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combination, in unknown proportions, of short-run and long-run ef 
fects of employment growth. 6
Second, previous studies generally fail to distinguish between the ef 
fects of different types of growth. 7 Successful state and local economic 
development policy increases labor demand in a local economic area. 
We would expect the following chain of causation: development policy 
increases the perceived profitability of a local area; local labor demand 
goes up; the increase in local labor demand reduces unemployment, 
increases labor force participation, and induces in-migration. The 
resulting correlation between local employment growth and unemploy 
ment would be expected to be negative. It is this negative effect of local 
employment growth on unemployment that we are trying to detect with 
our econometric estimation procedures.
Local growth can also be caused by a labor supply shock. Suppose 
an area for some reason becomes perceived as a more attractive place 
to live. The resulting in-migration increases unemployment and reduces 
wages. Either lower wages or greater availability of unemployed labor 
would encourage employment growth. The resulting correlation be 
tween changes in unemployment and employment growth would be ex 
pected to be positive. A simple statistical analysis might conclude that 
higher local employment growth was "causing" higher local unemploy 
ment rates.
In the real world, employment growth is caused by both labor de 
mand shocks and labor supply shocks. Hence, the correlation between 
changes in unemployment and employment growth will reflect both in 
fluences. Estimation procedures that fail to distinguish between demand 
and supply shocks such as those used by previous studies will estimate 
an "effect" of employment growth on unemployment that is less negative 
than the true effects of employment growth caused by labor demand 
shocks. 8
Third, previous econometric studies usually have not looked at how 
the effects of extra employment growth vary in slow-growth and fast- 
growth local areas. We might expect that a 1 percent differential in 
growth, in a metropolitan area already growing at 5 percent a year, 
would cause more migration response than a 1 percent growth differential
Table 4.1
Effects of Local Growth on Unemployment, Labor Force Participation, and Migration:
Estimates from Selected Studies
Study
Geographic 
Units Used in 
Growth Analysis
Growth 
Variable
Period Over 
Which Growth 
Calculated
Micro or 
Aggregate 
Data
Dependent 
Variable
Estimated % Effect 
of 1% Growth on 
Dependent Variable 
(Elasticity)
UNEMPLOYMENT STUDIES
Holzer 
(1991)
Houseman 
& Abraham 
(1990)
Moore & 
Laramore 
(1990)
Summers 
(1986)
Fleisher 
& Rhodes 
(1976)
Holzer 
(1991)
Houseman 
& Abraham 
(1990)
Moore & 
Laramore 
(1990)
MSAs, 
states
States
Cities
States
MSAs
States
States
Cities
Sales
Employment
Employment
Employment
Employment
LABOR
Sales
Employment
Employment
2 years 
5 years
1 year
10 years
1 year to 
15 years
2 years
Aggregate
Aggregate
Aggregate
Aggregate
Aggregate
Unemployment 
rate
Unemployment 
rate
Unemployment 
rate
Unemployment 
rate
Unemployment 
rate
-.09 to -.24
-.10 to -.43
0 to -.04
-.2 for 1-year growth, 
closer to zero for 
15-year growth
-.07
ffects ofGrowthhUnemployment
FORCE PARTICIPATION STUDIES
5 years
1 year
10 years
Aggregate
Aggregate
Aggregate
Employment to 
population ratio
LFP rate
LFP rate
.26 to .37
-.01 to .60
.03 to .08
Table 4.1 (continued)
Geographic 
Units Used in 
Study Growth Analysis
Fleisher 
& Rhodes 
(1976) MSAs
Houseman 
& Abraham 
(1990) States
Treyz & 
Stevens 
(1985) States
Greenwood 
& Hunt BEA 
(1984) areas
Bradbury, Downs 
& Small 
(1982) MSAs
Muth Urbanized 
(1971) areas
Growth 
Variable
Employment
Employment
Employment
Employment
Employment
Employment
Period Over Micro or 
Which Growth Aggregate 
Calculated Data
2 years Aggregate
MIGRATION STUDIES
1 year Aggregate
? Aggregate
1 year Aggregate
5 years Aggregate
10 years Aggregate
Dependent 
Variable
LFP rate
Population
Population
Employed 
net 
migrants
Population 
change
Net migrants in 
labor force
Estimated % Effect 
of 1% Growth on 
Dependent Variable 
(Elasticity)
.01 for married women, 
-.04 for married men
.09 to .83
.3
.5 increase as proportion 
of employment 
increase
.5
.6 to .7 increase as 
proportion of employment 
increase
NOTES: Bradbury, Downs and Small results are from their tables 5.4 and 5.6. Fleisher and Rhodes results come from reduced form equations in their 
appendix. Sources of the other results above should be apparent from studies. Similar results to Greenwood and Hunt (1984) are reported in Greenwood, 
Hunt and McDowell (1986), and Greenwood and Hunt (1989). All unemployment and labor force participation "elasticities" show change in number 
of percentage rate points. For example, the Houseman and Abraham (1990) unemployment results in the table show that a 1 percent increase in jobs 
would reduce the unemployment rate by. 10 percent up to .43 percent; for example, from 8 percent to 7.90 percent or 7.57 percent.
m
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in an area currently declining at -2 percent a year. Hence, we would 
expect the unemployment and labor force participation effects of changes 
in growth to be greater in slow-growth areas than in fast-growth areas.
Fourth, most previous studies do not examine how the effects of local 
growth on unemployment vary across different types of individuals. 9 
But how growth's effects vary with education, age, income, and race 
are important to voters and politicians.
Finally, some studies (Summers (1986); Treyz and Stevens (1985); 
Houseman and Abraham (1990)) use states as the unit of analysis. Yet 
metropolitan areas or other smaller areas are closer to our notion of 
a local labor market.
The new empirical work conducted for this book tries to overcome 
all these problems of previous studies.
New Estimates of the Effects of Local Job Growth
The new empirical work presented in this book uses both aggregate 
and micro data. Descriptive statistics on the data are given in appendix 
4.3. The estimating equations are briefly described in table 4.2. A more 
detailed discussion of the econometric methodology is presented in ap 
pendix 4.2.
The model using aggregate data examines changes in the average local 
unemployment rate from one year to the next for 25 large metropolitan 
statistical areas, from 1972-73 to 1985-86. 10 The statistical relation 
ship between these unemployment rate changes and the metropolitan 
area's employment growth is estimated. The estimation allows a time 
period effect for each yearly change in metropolitan area unemploy 
ment rates. Including time period effects means that the estimation is 
attempting to explain how variations in local job growth from the na 
tional average are related to variations in local unemployment changes 
from the national average. 11
The model using micro data includes information from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) on 44,015 adult males in 89 metropolitan 
areas. 12 The data come from the March CPS, which asks extensive
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Table 4.2
Brief Outline of Data and Methodology Used 
in Labor Market Activity Models
The aggregate model estimates equations of the following form:
(4.1) Wm = B0 + Nt + C(L)gmt + Vmt,
where AUmt is the change in the unemployment rate from year t-l to year 
t for MSA m, gmt is the growth rate of nonagricultural employment from year 
t-l to year t for MSA m, Nt is a dummy variable for the time period, BQ is 
the constant term, and Vmt is the disturbance term. The "C(L)" term means 
that a series of lagged values in gmt are also included in the estimation, with 
each lag allowed to have its own coefficient. 
The micro model estimates equations of the following form:
(4.2) Limt = BQ + Nt + Fm + B'Xfo,, + C(L)Emt + Vimt,
where Ljmt is either the labor force participation rate for individual i (defined 
as the number of weeks in the labor force during the previous year divided 
by 52), the employment rate (defined as the number of weeks employed divided 
by the number of weeks in the labor force), or the usual weekly hours the 
individual worked when working during the previous year. Fm is a dummy 
variable for the metropolitan area, X/m? is a vector of individual demographic 
characteristics, B is the estimated vector of coefficients on those characteristics, 
Emt is the natural log of the level of nonagricultural employment in MSA m 
in year ?, and C(L) again indicates that the equation includes lagged values 
ofEmt . It can be shown that the micro "levels" equation can be derived from 
the aggregate "changes" equation. The inclusion of the MSA fixed effect im 
plies that the model is examining how MSA job growth (not the MSA job level) 
affects labor market activities.
The estimation allows for up to eight lagged years in the employment terms. 
Reported results are based on the lag-length chosen based on the Akaike In 
formation Criterion, a standard model selection criterion (Amemiya 1985).
The aggregate unemployment data are official estimates from the Current 
Population Survey. The micro data come from the March Current Population 
Survey. Nonagricultural employment data come from official "BLS 790" pro 
gram estimates.
The years included are 1972 to 1986 for the aggregate model, 1979-1986 
for the micro model. Twenty-five large MS As are included in the aggregate 
model, 89 MS As in the micro model.
More information on data and methodology are in appendices 4.2 and 4.3.
90 Effects of Growth on Unemployment
questions about the individual's labor market-related activities during 
the previous year. I pooled data from eight March CPS computer tapes, 
from March 1980 to March 1987. These tapes contain information on 
eight calendar years, from 1979 to 1986.
The micro data models examined the effects of a metropolitan area's 
job growth on several different types of labor market activities of the 
area's residents. 13 The labor market activities examined included: 
number of weeks the individual was in the labor force during the previous 
year divided by 52 (the labor force participation rate); the number of 
weeks the individual was employed divided by the number of weeks 
in the labor force (the employment rate, equal to one minus the 
unemployment rate); and, the usual weekly hours that the individual 
worked during the previous year when he was employed. These depen 
dent variables were statistically related to the demographic characteristics 
of the individual and recent employment trends in the metropolitan area.
Both the micro data and aggregate data models allow for the effect 
of growth on labor market activities to vary freely over time for up 
to eight years after a growth shock. Statistical tests are used to deter 
mine how many years must pass after a one-time local job growth shock 
for the effect of that shock to stop changing, that is, to converge to 
some "equilibrium" long-run effect. These statistical tests always in 
dicated that this stable long-run effect was reached in less than eight 
years.
Both micro and aggregate data models also attempted to distinguish 
between demand-induced local growth and local growth in general. One 
version of the models examined the effects on labor market activities 
of all types of growth. The models were then re-estimated to examine 
only the effects of growth caused by increases in the demand for the 
metropolitan area's export industries (that is, industries exporting out 
side the metropolitan area to the national market).
Figures 4.1 through 4.4 report the estimated effects on local labor 
markets of all types of local job growth, whether caused by demand 
shocks or supply shocks. 14 The figures show the estimated labor market 
effects if metropolitan area employment was permanently increased by
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Figure 4.1
Estimated Cumulative Effects of a 1 Percent Shock to Local Employment 
on Average Local Unemployment Rate, Using Aggregate Data
0.60
0.50
|, 0.40
t
| °-30
§ 0.20
 o
£ 0.10
ta-3
1 0.00
-0.10
+/- 2 Std. Errors 
........
Best Point Estimate
2345
Number of Years After Shock
Estimates Underlying Figure
Cumulative Effect After:
Immediate 
effect =
0 years
.320
(.033)
1 year
.173
(.033)
2 years
.164
(.036)
3 years
.186
(.037)
4 years
.078
(.039)
5 years
.136
(.039)
Long-run 
effect =
6 years
.058
(.024)
NOTES: Standard errors of estimated cumulative effects are in parentheses. Bold line in figure 
shows best point estimate of cumulative effect of growth shock. Two dotted lines show two stan 
dard errors to either side of best point estimate; this interval has 95 percent probability of in 
cluding true effect. Reported estimates are for specification that minimizes AIC. Long-run effect 
in 8-lag specification is .054 (.026).
As mentioned in notes to chapter 4, the cumulative effect after the number of lags included 
in the optimal AIC specification is an implied long-run effect. Minimizing the AIC after k lags 
implies no significant change thereafter. The figures here only carry this long-run effect out to 
eight years after the shock, as the empirical work never tested whether this long-run effect might 
decay after eight years. For comparison, the notes at the bottom of each table also report the 
estimated long-run effect in a specification with eight lagged employment variables. These long- 
run effects, as one would expect, are always quite similar to the optimal AIC long-run effects.
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Figure 4.2
Estimated Cumulative Effects of a 1 Percent Shock
to Local Employment on Local Employment Rate,
Using Micro Data
0.60
+/- 2 Std. Errors 
.........
Best Point Estimate
-0.10
345 
Number of Years After Shock
Estimates Underlying Figure
Cumulative Effect After:
Immediate 
effect = 
0 years
.422 
(.066)
1 year
.254 
(.071)
2 years
.109 
(.068)
3 years
.269 
(.061)
Long-run 
effect = 
4 years
.066 
(.028)
NOTES: Standard errors of estimated cumulative effects are in parentheses. Bold line in figure 
shows best point estimate of cumulative effect of growth shock. Two dotted lines show two stan 
dard errors to either side of best point estimate; this interval has 95 percent probability of in 
cluding true effect. Reported estimates are for specification that minimizes AIC. Long-run effect 
in 8-lag specification is .064 (.030).
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Figure 4.3
Estimated Cumulative Effects of a 1 Percent Shock 
to Local Employment on Labor Force Participation Rate
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Number of Years After Shock
Estimates Underlying Figure
Cumulative Effect After:
Long-run 
effect = 
0 years
.137 
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NOTES: Standard errors of estimated cumulative effects are in parenthese. Bold line in figure 
shows best point estimate of cumulative effect of growth shock. Two dotted lines show two stan 
dard errors to either side of best point estimate; this interval has 95 percent probability of in 
cluding true effect. Reported estimates are for specification that minimizes AIC. Long-run effect 
in 8-lag specification is .148 (.053).
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Figure 4.4
Estimated Cumulative Effects of a 1 Percent Shock
to Local Employment on Usual Weekly Hours Worked
When Employed, as a Percentage of Average Hours Worked
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Number of Years After Shock
Estimates Underlying Figure
Cumulative Effect After:
Immediate
effect =
0 years
.096
(.089)
1 year
.248
(.089)
Long-run
effect =
2 years
.066
(.035)
NOTES: Standard errors of estimated cumulative effects are in parentheses. Bold line in figure 
shows best point estimate of cumulative effect of growth shock. Two dotted lines show two stan 
dard errors to either side of best point estimate; this interval has 95 percent probability of in 
cluding true effect. Reported estimates are for specification that minimizes AIC. Long-run effect 
in 8-lag specification is .047 (.042).
Effects of Growth on Unemployment 95
1 percent above what it otherwise would be. The effects on metropolitan 
area unemployment rates, labor force participation, and employment 
rates are reported as the change in "rate points": that is, a change in 
unemployment of 45/100ths of 1 percent—from 8 percent to 7.55 per 
cent, for example—is reported as .45 in the figure and table. The ef 
fects on weekly hours are reported as a percentage of the mean weekly 
hours worked by the sample.
The most important finding revealed by these figures is that local 
growth effects on unemployment and labor force participation are ex 
tremely persistent. A shock that permanently raises a metropolitan area's 
employment by 1 percent is estimated to reduce the area's long-run 
unemployment rate by 7/100ths of 1 percent (based on the micro data 
results) or 6/100ths of 1 percent (based on the aggregate data results). 
Long-run local labor force participation rates are estimated to increase 
by 14/100ths of 1 percent. While these growth effects may seem small, 
their persistence makes them important. The improvement in local 
unemployment and labor force participation due to the shock continues 
for many years. The long-run effects all seem very stable in the period 
from six to eight years after the shock. This stability suggests that the 
effects will not rapidly depreciate after eight years.
The estimated long-run effects can be restated to show who gets the 
new jobs from growth. Suppose some economic development policy 
creates 100 net new jobs for a metropolitan area. Based on these 
estimates, in the long run, 6 or 7 of the 100 jobs will go to local residents 
who otherwise would be unemployed, and 16 will go to local residents 
who otherwise would be out of the labor force. 15 The other 77 or 78 
jobs go to in-migrants. These effects of new jobs on local residents are 
smaller than claimed by politicians. But the effects on residents' employ 
ment prospects are much larger than would be expected by many 
economists. Whether these effects are large compared to other alter 
native policies for improving individuals' employment prospects is 
discussed later in this chapter.
The time pattern of short-term versus long-term effects of growth 
shown in the figures and tables is about what one might expect. The 
short-run effects of growth on unemployment and usual weekly hours
96 Effects of Growth on Unemployment
worked are greater than the long-run effects. Presumably, this difference 
reflects the greater migration response to growth as time goes by.
For labor force participation, the lack of any difference between short- 
run and long-run effects of growth is surprising. Perhaps labor force 
participation stays constant due to two offsetting effects. Lags in the 
labor force participation response to reduced local unemployment may 
increase the labor force participation effect over time. Some individuals 
take a while to decide to look for a job after the labor market has im 
proved. Due to in-migration, however, the unemployment rate, after 
initially declining, begins to come back up again. This partial deteriora 
tion of the unemployment situation may discourage other individuals 
from looking for work.
Appendix 4.4 reports some additional empirical results on growth 
effects on labor market activity. In particular, the appendix shows that 
growth due to greater demand for a metropolitan area's exports has very 
similar effects to those of general area growth. There are two possible 
explanations for this result. First, metropolitan area growth differences 
may mostly be due to demand shocks, with supply-side factors playing 
a minor role. Second, even if supply-side factors play some role in ex 
plaining metropolitan area growth, labor supply shocks may be reflected 
in wages rather than unemployment rates or labor force participation 
rates. In that case, labor supply shocks will not induce any positive cor 
relation between unemployment and local growth. This possible positive 
correlation was hypothesized above to bias estimates of the effects of 
local growth on unemployment.
The new results reported in this chapter are consistent with the 
hysteresis model of equilibrium unemployment discussed in chapter 3. 
In the short run, a shock increasing local growth allows some individuals 
to obtain jobs who otherwise would be unemployed or out of the labor 
force. This employment experience alters the "human capital" of these 
individuals: they obtain better job skills, or at least are perceived by 
employers as having better skills. As a result of improved human capital, 
they are more likely to be employed in the long run.
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Effects of Growth Shocks 
in Slow- and Fast-Growth Areas
People are much more mobile in the face of job opportunities 
than in the face of job losses. If a factory in a small town closes 
and 100 jobs are lost, the number of residents who move out may 
be extremely small. The job loss will manifest itself through some 
increase in unemployment and some decrease in participation 
rates. ... On the other hand, should a new factory open in a com 
parable small town, a very considerable number of people may 
come in to take the new jobs. The decrease in unemployment and 
increase in participation rates among the original population may 
thus be far smaller than a naive estimate would have indicated. 
(Page 4 in Economic Development Programs for Cities, Counties, 
and Towns, John M. Levy, 1981)
Many analysts believe that changes in growth will have much more 
effect on the employment climate in a slow-growing local area than in 
a fast-growing area. The hypothesis is that a declining area will have 
little in-migration, and that residents will remain attached to their homes, 
neighborhoods, or communities. Small negative or positive growth 
shocks will have little effect on out-migration, and in-migration will 
stay close to zero even if there are small positive growth shocks in the 
area. Hence, shocks to local employment can only affect unemploy 
ment rates and labor force participation.
In contrast, a fast-growing local area will have significant in-migration. 
Also, many of the residents will be relatively new and will not have 
developed strong attachments to the area. Negative or positive growth 
shocks may dramatically change the volume of in-migration, and many 
current residents will be willing to move out if the area becomes slight 
ly less attractive. Shocks to local employment will be mostly absorbed 
by changes in net migration rates, with little change in unemployment 
or labor force participation.
The research conducted for this book investigates this hypothesis. The 
approach was to allow the effect of 1 percent extra employment growth 
to vary with the initial level of growth in the metropolitan area. 16
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Table 4.3 reports the results from this investigation. There is no strong 
evidence that local growth shocks have greater effects on the employ 
ment climate in slow-growing metropolitan areas. Unemployment and 
hours worked respond more in the short run to growth shocks in slow- 
growing metropolitan areas, but the labor force participation rate 
responds less in the short run. Combining the results for the unemploy 
ment and labor force participation rates, the overall probability of 
employment is affected about the same amount by growth shocks, 
regardless of the initial growth rate of the metropolitan area. The im 
plication is that net migration responds similarly to growth shocks in 
slow-growing and fast-growing local areas.
Our intuition about the contribution of out-migration and in-migration 
to migration patterns in local areas with different growth rates appears 
to be incorrect. The empirical evidence from migration studies is that 
there is a great deal of out-migration and in-migration in all types of 
local areas. The relative volumes obviously vary between slow- and 
fast-growth areas, but gross flows in both directions are always sur 
prisingly large. Hence, even slow-growth areas have many potential 
in-migrants who can respond to employment growth shocks. Thus, the 
net migration response to growth shocks could plausibly be quite similar, 
regardless of the initial growth rate of a local area.
Effects of Local Job Growth on Different Groups
Given the severity of the employment problems facing urban 
disadvantaged populations ... it is at least arguable that many if 
not most of the jobs created by economic development programs 
will not materially ameliorate structural unemployment. (Franklin 
James, Professor of Public Policy, University of Colorado, and 
former Director of the Legislative and Urban Policy Staff, U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, during the Carter 
Administration, page 162 in "Urban Economic Development: A 
Zero-Sum Game?" in Urban Economic Development, Richard D. 
Bingham and John Blair, eds., 1984)
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I now turn to the crucial issue of how local economic growth affects 
the employment prospects of different types of individuals. I focus on 
how effects vary with race, education, and age.
Theoretically predicting how demand shock effects vary across groups 
is difficult, as several influences work in different directions. Suppose 
we visualize the labor market as being imperfectly segmented by race, 
education, and age. Employers perceive these different types of labor 
as being imperfect substitutes.
Several factors in such a theoretical model will determine how the 
effects of growth shocks differ across groups. First, the relative 
geographical mobility of each group will matter. Other things equal, 
one would expect growth shocks to have larger effects on the employ 
ment prospects of less mobile groups. Older workers and less-educated 
workers are less mobile, so these groups should be more affected by 
growth, all else equal. 17
Second, greater average growth may affect the relative demand for 
different types of labor. A 10 percent increase in local labor demand 
may not increase the demand for all types of labor by 10 percent. 
Franklin James, in the above quotation, is implicitly saying that labor 
demand expansion in metropolitan areas may not much increase the de 
mand for less-educated workers. In addition, if blacks are concentrated 
in the inner cities while the bulk of employment demand increases oc 
cur in the suburbs, then metropolitan area job growth will tend to help 
whites more than blacks.
Third, groups may differ in their behavioral responses to changes 
in their employment prospects, above and beyond differences in mobility 
behavior. For example, older workers may find it more socially accept 
able than younger workers to drop out of the labor force in response 
to poor economic prospects.
Considering all these influences, one could theoretically justify any 
observed pattern in how the effects of local growth vary with age, educa 
tion, and race. Hence, how the effects vary across groups can only be 
determined by empirical research, to which I now turn.
Table 4.4 presents estimates of how the long-run effects of demand 
shocks on labor market activity vary with education, age, and race. The
Table 4.3 
Nonlinearities in the Effects of Employment Shocks
8
Labor Force Participation
At mean growth rate
One standard deviation less 
than mean
0 years
.224% 
.249%
1 year
-.001% 
-.228%
2 years 3 years
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4 years g1
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Employment Rate, Micro Data
At mean growth rate .395% 
One deviation less than mean .475% 
Absolute f-statistic on difference 1.42
2.63
.228% 
.368% 
2.72
Unemployment Rate Reductions, Aggregate Data
At mean growth rate .30% .16% 
One deviation less than mean .38% .21% 
Absolute f-statistic on difference 3.92 1.67
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Table 4.4
Differences Across Households in the Long-Run Effects 
of Employment Shocks on Labor Market Activity
Labor force
participation
Employment 
rate
Weekly hours
Effect of 1% 
Employment 
Shock for 
Mean Household
.164%
(.050)
.060% 
(.028)
.089% 
(.033)
Impact on Effect of 
Standardized Change in:
Education
.006%
(.002)
-.004% 
(.001)
-.002% 
(.002)
Age
.013%
(.002)
-.001% 
(.001)
.003% 
(.002)
Black
-.007%
(.007)
-.012% 
(.004)
-.004% 
(.007)
NOTES: The table reports the effects of household characteristics on the long-run effect of growth 
for the lag-length chosen as "optimal" by the AIC for the interaction specification. This lag- 
length is four years for the employment rate, five years for labor force participation, and zero 
years for weekly hours. Household characteristic effects are reported for a one-unit change in 
race (from 0=white to 1 =black), and for one standard deviation change in education (3.0 years) 
and experience (11.8 years). The impacts are calculated directly from the coefficients on the in 
teraction terms in the regression (after multiplication by the "standardized change"). The labor 
force participation and employment rate results report effect in "rate units"; that is, for mean 
household, a 1 percent shock increases the labor force participation rate by . 164 percentage points 
(from 88 percent to 88.164 percent, for example). The effect as a percent of the mean labor force 
participation rate would be higher. The weekly hour results are expressed as a percent of average 
weekly hours for that type of household. The standard errors are in parentheses. The AIC clearly 
prefers interaction specification for the labor force participation rate and the employment rate, 
but prefers the no interaction specification for hours.
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table reports the mean long-run effect across all individuals for a 
specification that allows the effect to vary across groups. As one would 
expect, these mean long-run effects are similar, but not identical, to 
the long-run effects in the previously estimated specifications that do 
not allow effects to vary across groups. 18
The most important lesson from table 4.4 is that growth shock ef 
fects are fairly similar across different groups. Most of the group dif 
ferentials seem relatively small compared to the mean long-run effect 
for the sample. Thus, in this particular case it does seem that a "rising 
tide lifts all boats." The fears of some economists that metropolitan 
economic growth will fail to help less-educated workers and blacks are 
not supported by these estimates.
The largest differences across groups occur for older workers and 
blacks. 19 Labor force participation rates for older workers are significant 
ly more sensitive to metropolitan area job growth. This may reflect the 
greater problems of older workers in gaining reemployment after a 
layoff, or it may reflect the greater social acceptance of an older worker's 
decision to drop out of the labor force.
Black unemployment rates are less sensitive to metropolitan job growth 
than white unemployment rates, but blacks are still affected. A 1 per 
cent growth shock increases the black labor force participation rate by 
about 16/100ths of 1 percent, and reduces the black unemployment rate 
by about 5/100ths of 1 percent. 20
Job Growth Versus Other Policies
. . . [Promising strategies exist for addressing urban unemploy 
ment and poverty without recourse to economic development ef 
forts. For instance, as has been suggested, the federal government 
might choose to help workers move from distressed communities 
with weak economies to other places where jobs are plentiful, a 
so-called "people to jobs" strategy. ... A policy could include 
benefits like job training and wage subsidy vouchers for the 
disadvantaged.
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[AJdvocates and administrators of economic development pro 
grams have largely failed to make a convincing case that economic 
development programs are an effective or necessary element of 
an urban policy. In particular, next to no evidence is available to 
compare the impacts on urban poverty or unemployment of 
economic development investments [with mobility programs or pro 
grams fostering the productivity of individuals seeking work]. 
(Franklin James, p. 179 in "Federal Economic Development Pro 
grams and National Urban Policy," in Economic Development 
Quarterly, May 1988)
One practical question is whether encouraging state and local economic 
development is the most cost-effective policy for reducing unemploy 
ment. The micro data model used in this book estimates the effects of 
education as well as local growth on unemployment and labor force 
participation, which allows some comparison of these two types of 
policies. Examining the effectiveness of mobility subsidies would re 
quire a different kind of study.
Table 4.5 compares long-run growth and education effects on labor 
force participation and unemployment. The table includes comparisons 
of the effects of growth and education for different groups in the 
population.
Table 4.5 seems to imply that the improvement of employment pros 
pects is better achieved by increasing everyone's educational level than 
by increasing local job growth. This conclusion overlooks two crucial 
points: it is harder to change overall educational levels than overall local 
job growth; local growth and education have differential effects on dif 
ferent generations.
On the first point, the table compares increasing educational achieve 
ment by one year with increasing local job growth by 1 percent. It is 
probably harder to raise average local educational levels by one year 
than to increase local employment by 1 percent.
One way of determining the relative ease of policy-induced changes 
in local education and employment growth is to consider the maximum 
feasible effect of state and local policy. For example, even if state and 
local governments somehow got every current student in a metropolitan
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Table 4.5
Comparison of Long-Run Growth and Education Effects 
on Labor Force Participation and Employment Rates
Labor Force Employment 
Participation Rate Rate
Mean value of rates 87.5 94.6
Long-run effect of .137 (.042) .066 (.028) 
1 percent growth
Effect of 1 year of .391 (.063) .857 (.032) 
education, white with 
mean education and age
Change in effect of 
education, for standardized 
change in:
Education -.358 (.074) -.160 (.043)
Age -.766 (.070) -.277 (.040)
Black .486 (.255) .699 (.152)
NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses. Results come from specifications with uniform ef 
fect of growth. Mean education is 13.0 years; mean age is 22.3 years of experience (implied 
age is 22.3 + 13.0 + 6 = 41.3). Standardized change is 3 years for education and 11.8 years 
for age (= 1 standard deviation) and a change from Black = 0 to Black = 1. Standardized changes 
are meant to be added to mean white effect to get implied effect. That is, someone with 16 years 
of education will find that the marginal effect on the employment rate per year of education is 
.857 + (-.160) = .697.
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area to complete high school and college, it would take about 40 years 
(one generation) for average education to increase from current levels 
around 12 years to their final equilibrium level of 16 years, a rate of 
increase of 1 year per decade. A policy effect of this magnitude seems 
implausible. But perhaps better high schools, an increase in the school- 
leaving age, and more college financial aid could increase average educa 
tional levels at about half this rate, or about a one-half year increase 
in average educational levels per decade.
Consider for comparison the potential policy effects on local employ 
ment. State and local economic development policy, whether traditional 
or new wave, might have effects equivalent to removing half of all state 
and local business taxes, without reducing public services to businesses. 
Such a policy seems as feasible as increasing average educational levels 
by one-half year per decade through state and local policy. According 
to the empirical estimates of chapter 2, a 50 percent reduction in state 
and local business taxes (holding public services constant) would in 
crease local employment by at least 10 percent in the long run. If half 
this long-run effect is achieved within a decade, the policy would in 
crease local employment by 5 percent. Thus, from this thought experi 
ment, a one-half year increase in average local educational levels is about 
as hard to achieve through policy as a 5 percent increase in local 
employment.
These lines of reasoning suggest that, to make the two alternative 
policies in table 4.5 comparable in difficulty, either the growth effects 
should be multiplied by 10, or the education effects should be divided 
by 10. Either adjustment would suggest that local job growth and educa 
tion have effects on employment prospects that are of similar magnitude.
Turning to the second point, the education strategy and the job-growth 
strategy have different effects on the generations. An education and train 
ing strategy inevitably will find it easier to aid younger individuals. In 
contrast, increasing local job growth improves the employment pros 
pects of all age groups. From the viewpoint of older residents, the job- 
growth strategy has a larger payoff than the education strategy. Thus, 
educational policy and state and local economic development policy 
should properly be seen as complements rather than as mutually ex 
clusive alternatives.
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This same point probably holds in comparing state and local economic 
development and labor mobility policies as strategies for reducing 
unemployment. The promotion of labor mobility is most likely to be 
successful with younger workers. Again, state and local economic 
development policies can potentially play a unique role in helping older 
workers, who generally will not want to move or be retrained.
Some Speculative Extensions to the Research Findings
The empirical analysis of this chapter only examines the effects of 
aggregate metropolitan employment growth on individuals' unemploy 
ment, labor force participation, and work hours. This should not be 
interpreted as implying that only total metropolitan employment growth 
matters. If increases in total labor demand have long-run effects on in 
dividuals' ability to get a job, as the evidence in this chapter suggests, 
then it seems reasonable to assume that the composition of labor 
demand—its distribution across industries, occupations, or 
neighborhoods within the metropolitan area—would also have some long- 
run effects on individuals' employment success.
For example, it would be reasonable to assume that individuals with 
low levels of education would be most helped by metropolitan employ 
ment growth that shifted the composition of employment towards in 
dustries with relatively modest skill requirements. Residents of inner- 
city ghettos would be most helped by metropolitan employment growth 
that was concentrated in the city rather than the suburbs.
These assumptions must remain speculative. This book does not direct 
ly examine the hypotheses because of the lack of detailed data on em 
ployment growth by industry and neighborhood within metropolitan 
areas. Overcoming these data problems poses a difficult challenge for 
researchers.
Even in the absence of data on the industrial and neighborhood com 
position of MS A employment growth, estimates of the effects of ag 
gregate MSA employment growth are still important to policy. Estimated 
effects tell us the effects of job growth with a "typical" industrial and
108 Effects of Growth on Unemployment
geographic composition. In addition, the finding here that labor demand 
shocks have long-lasting effects seems likely to be generalizable to 
industry- or neighborhood-specific labor demand shocks. 21
Conclusion
This chapter has found effects of metropolitan area job growth on 
labor force participation and unemployment rates that are extremely 
persistent. These results are consistent with hysteresis theories of 
unemployment, which hold that short-run reductions in unemployment 
may lead to some long-run reductions in the equilibrium unemployment 
rate. The estimated long-run effects of local job growth on employ 
ment prospects are comparable to those of alternative policies, and they 
loom large for older workers.
NOTES
1. Specifically, Marston found a year-to-year correlation in metropolitan unemployment rates of 
only .02.
2. Gramlich finds year-to-year correlations in area unemployment rates that average .468 for all 
metropolitan areas in his sample, compared to Marston's finding of a .02 correlation.
3. Fifteen percent is a weighted average of the studies reviewed by Summers et al., using the 
number of branch plant workers included in each study as weights.
4. This table excludes the recent study by Browne (1990) of labor force participation rates in 
U.S. regions. Her study includes both employment growth and the unemployment rate as ex 
planatory variables. From the perspective of the present study, the unemployment rate is an en 
dogenous variable.
5. One study that does seem inconsistent with other studies is the research by Fleisher and Rhodes 
(1976). This study finds that areas with higher local employment growth from 1968 to 1970 had 
lower labor force participation rates for males in 1970. But this study differs from all the other 
studies in focusing on the absolute level of the area's employment climate—in this case, the level 
of the labor force participation rate—rather than on changes in the area's employment climate 
for individuals. But the level of the labor force participation rate, or the level of the local unemploy 
ment rate, is affected by so many unobserved attributes of local areas that it is very risky to rely 
on estimates of how growth is correlated with the level of an area's economic climate. It is possi 
ble that some of the unobserved demographic and industrial characteristics of an area that affect 
the level of the area's labor force participation rate also affect local growth. The resulting cor 
relations between local growth and the labor force participation rate level could be spurious rather 
than reflect causation. Examining changes in an area's labor force participation or unemploy 
ment eliminates the influence of unobserved area characteristics that have a fixed effect on these 
aspects of an area's economic climate for workers. Hence, estimated effects of local growth on 
changes in unemployment or labor force participation are more likely to reflect true patterns of 
causation.
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6. This proposition can be demonstrated formally, although it seems fairly intuitive. Consider 
the type of aggregate estimating equation used in this book (see appendix 4.2):
(D Ymt ~ Ymt-\ = BQ + B, + C(L)(Emt - EmM) + Umt,
where Ym{ is some measure of local economic conditions (the unemployment rate, etc.) in MSA 
m at time t, Emt is the natural logarithm of MSA employment, B( represents a time-period dum 
my, C(L) indicates an unrestricted polynomial in the lag operator, and Umt is the disturbance 
term. As discussed in appendix 4.2, the cumulative effect of a growth shock after s years is the 
sum of the "C" coefficients up to the 5th lag. Once the effect has reached its long-run level, 
coefficients on additional lag terms should be zero.
Consider now a different specification of the relationship:
(2) Ym, - Ymt-\ = B0 + C(Emt ~ Em, t-r> + Umr 
Emt - Em t_r is the percentage growth in employment since r years ago, where r is assumed
to be long enough for long-run effects to be realized. Em( - Em t_r is the sum of the various 
Em[ - Emt_\ and lagged Em( - Emt_i variables included in equation (1). Based on Lichtenberg's 
(1990) theoretical analysis of the effects in a regression of substituting a sum of independent variables 
for these independent variables, the coefficient C will be an average of all the coefficients em 
bodied in C(L). (Lichtenberg shows this will hold if the summed independent variables have the 
same variance; this seems likely here for the annual employment growth terms.) Hence equation 
(2) will estimate the long-run effect divided by r. 
But the type of equation actually estimated by most researchers is of the form:
(3) Ymt ~ Ym,t-r = B0 + <&„, ~ Em,t-r) + ^mf
Ymt ~ Ym t-r can ^e wr'tten as tne sum of annual changes in Y. Because the expectation of a 
sum conditional on some X variables is the sum of the expectation of each component conditional 
on those X variables, we know that regression (3), which estimates the conditional expectation 
of the sum, will yield an estimated C which is the sum of the coefficients that would result from 
r separate regressions of annual changes in Yon Emt - Em t_r Each of these separate regressions 
is of the following form:
<4> Yms ~ Yms-l = B0 + Cs(Emt ~ Em,t-r^ 
where s ranges from t-r+ 1 to t. Each Cs in these r separate regressions also equals the average
of the coefficients, D, from the following regression:
(5) Yms - Yms-l = B0 + D^Emt ~ Em,t-r^ 
But in this case, unlike equation (1), the sum of the D coefficients will not represent the long-run
effect if s is some years earlier than t. If s is enough years earlier than t, many of the D coeffi 
cients will be on employment growth in years after s, and should have coefficients of zero. Fur 
thermore, for many of the earlier years some lagged employment growth terms with significant 
coefficients will be omitted from the regression. If we let G^ equal the true cumulative effect 
of a growth shock after A: years, the estimated Cs in equation (4) will equal ((Gr_[+s)/r), assum 
ing there is no omitted variable bias from the omitted lagged growth terms. Hence, the estimated 
C in equation (3) sums r different C. coefficients, some of which are (1/r) times the long-run
effect, and some of which are (1/r) times the short-run effect, or
t t t
(6) C = £ Q = £ (Gr , ,-)/r = (1/r) E Gr , , . . s =,t-r+l s=t-r+l r~t+s s=t-r+l r~t+s
Thus, under these assumptions, the estimated C, from a regression of a change in Kover r years 
on the employment change over r years, is the average over r years of the cumulative effect after 
each of the r years.
This discussion assumes that the omission of some lagged growth terms will not change the 
coefficient on the remaining growth terms. But the reverse is quite possible. The coefficients on 
a typical included growth term will increase by DnA-n, where Dn is the true effect of the omitted 
growth term on the change in Y, and AJQ is the coefficient from an imaginary auxiliary regression 
of the omitted growth term on the included growth terms. We would expect the sum over
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all of the AJQ to generally be less than one, as we would expect a 1 percent increase in observed 
growth to be associated with less than a 1 percent increase in growth for other years, due to regression 
to the mean. Hence, the estimated Cs in equation (4) should be somewhat greater than (Gr_t+s)/r, 
where G^ is the cumulative effect after k years. However, the estimated Cg will not in general 
be as great as 1/r times the true long-run cumulative effect. As a result, the estimated C will 
still be a weighted average of short-run and long-run effects, with a somewhat greater weight 
on the long-run effects.
7. Two exceptions are the studies by Bradbury, Downs, and Small (1982), and Houseman and 
Abraham (1990), which use methods similar to my own to distinguish demand shock growth from 
growth in general.
8. Appendix 4.1 develops a simple theoretical model that shows different effects of demand and 
supply shocks on the labor market equilibrium.
9. Houseman and Abraham (1990) examine how the effects of growth vary between men and 
women. In the United States, the effect of growth on female labor force participation is somewhat 
higher, and on population somewhat lower, than is true for men. Effects on unemployment seem 
similar. Houseman and Abraham also look separately at effects on prime-age workers versus the 
general population. Migration effects seem somewhat greater for prime-age workers. I should 
note that Houseman and Abraham are examining effects of growth of employment for that par 
ticular type of worker (i.e., growth of employment of prime-age males in regressions examining 
unemployment, labor force participation, and population of that group) rather than effects of overall 
employment growth.
Moore and Laramore (1990) examine how the effects of growth vary across four groups: black 
men, black women, nonblack men, and nonblack women. Local employment growth affects the 
labor force participation of nonblack men by about half as much as the labor force participation 
of the other three groups. Effects of growth on unemployment are greater for black men and women 
than for nonblacks.
10. MSAs were the focus of all analysis in this book as the closest statistical equivalent of a theoretical 
local labor and housing market. Local growth effects obviously could be different for rural labor 
and housing markets, or for neighborhood submarkets within an MS A.
11. A standard result in econometrics is that a regression including dummy variables for group 
membership is equivalent to a regression with all variables differenced from group means. Hence, 
including time period dummies is equivalent to differencing all variables from the national average 
for that time period.
12. Restricting the micro data analysis to adult males is obviously a limitation of the empirical 
work. Ideally, one would also want to estimate effects on females, youths, and individuals over 
65. The restriction to adult males was adopted to save time. With limited resources, I decided 
to investigate effects of growth on adult males in depth rather than examine all groups more cur 
sorily. Examining only adult males does have the advantage that there is probably less need, given 
current social norms, to be concerned about how the labor market experiences of other members 
of the family affect adult males. For stay-at-home youth or married females, a negative growth 
shock that hurts adult males' economic outcomes could well lead to increased labor force par 
ticipation and earnings. For adult males, changes in individual earnings and labor force participa 
tion are probably more unambiguously linked to overall family well-being, at least on average. 
13. The micro data estimation procedure allows for a "fixed effect" on labor market activities 
for each MS A, reflecting possible unobserved attributes of the MS A that might affect employment- 
related activities of individuals. This fixed MSA effect implies that even though the estimation 
expresses the level of individuals' employment-related activities as a function of levels of MSA 
employment, the estimation is really attempting to explain how the variation in employment-related
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activities from their MSA average is related to variation in MSA employment from its average. 
See appendix 4.2 for more discussion of the specification.
14. Note that all the estimates in the figures and in the appendix tables report the usual OLS stan 
dard errors. As noted in appendix 4.2, the group structure of the micro data potentially implies 
that the true standard errors may be somewhat higher. However, as shown in appendix 4.2, table 
4A2.2, this bias is small. For the micro employment rate dependent variable, the true standard 
errors may be around 6.8 percent higher than those reported. If all standard errors in employ 
ment rate regressions were adjusted upwards by this amount, no changes in inferences would 
need to be made. For the labor force participation and weekly hours dependent variables, there 
does not appear, as shown in table 4A2.2, to be any significant group structure in the data.
15. The percentage change in MSA employment is approximately the sum of the percentage change 
in the employment to labor force ratio, plus the percentage change in the labor force to popula 
tion ratio, plus the percentage change in population. At the mean labor force participation prob 
ability of .875, the OLS estimated change in the labor force participation rate of. 137 is a percent 
age change of. 157 percent; at the mean employment probability of .946, the OLS estimated change 
in the rate of .066 is a percentage change of .070 percent.
These calculations assume that estimated effects for the adult male population can be generaliz 
ed to the overall population. In the case of unemployment, the effects on overall unemployment 
are quite similar to the effects on adult male unemployment. Research by Houseman and Abraham 
(1990) and Moore and Laramore (1990) suggests that female labor force participation is more 
sensitive to regional growth shocks than male labor force participation.
16. This was done by including squared terms in growth in the estimating equations.
17. Blacks are more mobile than whites on average, but their mobility options are restricted by 
housing market discrimination. Hence, it is unclear how the relative mobility of blacks and whites 
would alter the relative effects of labor demand shocks on the employment prospects of these 
two groups.
18. The differences across groups are reported by considering a "standardized" change in each 
individual characteristic: a one standard deviation change (based on the standard deviation in this 
sample of individuals) in education (3 years) and age (11.8 years), and a change from a white 
individual to a black individual. This procedure allows one to get some sense of how important 
these differences across groups are, in terms of how much the normal variations in the sample 
across groups affect the long-run impact of growth. The estimated effects of these changes in 
characteristics are to be interpreted as adding to or subtracting from the effect for the mean in 
dividual. Thus, the .006 coefficient for education in the labor force participation row means that 
individuals with three more years of education than the average would be expected to have their 
labor force participation increased by .170 rate points in response to a once-and-for-all 1 percent 
employment shock in their metropolitan area, .006 points higher than the mean effect of 164 
rate points.
19. Statistically significant differentials also occur with the individual's education, as shown in 
the table. However, while these differentials with education are statistically significant, they are 
substantively minuscule by any standard.
20. These figures differ from just adding the black differential effect to the effect for the mean 
individual. The mean individual in this sample is about 90 percent white and 10 percent black. 
Hence, the text calculates the black mean effect by adding 90 percent of the black differential 
to the effect for the mean individual.
21. Moore and Laramore (1990) do look at effects of changes in local industry mix as well as 
at effects of changes in overall local employment. They are able to get data to do this because 
they focus only on census years, and use relatively aggregated industry categories. They find
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the expected effects of changes in the share of manufacturing in the economy (i.e., reduced manufac 
turing share raises unemployment and lowers labor force participation). For labor force participation, 
overall employment growth is much more important than changes in industrial sector shares. For 
unemployment rates, changes in the manufacturing share are of greater importance than overall 
changes in local employment.
— 5 —
Effects of Local Job Growth 
on Housing Prices 
and Other Prices
Everybody is talkin' these days about Tammany men growin' 
rich on graft, but nobody thinks of drawin' the distinction between 
honest graft and dishonest graft.
There's an honest graft, and I'm an example of how it works. 
I might sum up the whole thing by sayin': "I seen my opportunities 
and I took 'em."
Just let me explain by examples. My party's in power in the ci 
ty, and it's goin' to undertake a lot of public improvements. Well, 
I'm tipped off, say, that they're going to lay out a new park at 
a certain place.
I see my opportunity and I take it. I go to that place and I buy 
up all the land I can in the neighborhood. Then the board of this 
or that makes its plan public, and there is a rush to get my land, 
which nobody cared particular for before.
Ain't it perfectly honest to charge a good price and make a prof 
it on my investment and foresight? Of course, it is. Well, that's 
honest graft. (George Washington Plunkitt, Tammany Hall ward 
boss speaking in 1905, as quoted in Plunkitt of Tammany Hall, 
William Riordan, 1963)
This chapter focuses on how the growth of a small local area, such 
as a metropolitan area, affects prices, particularly housing prices. The 
key issue is the benefit to property owners of state and local economic 
development policies. Are these policies a modern version of "honest 
graft," a way for persons of influence to use government to increase 
their property values?
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How Local Growth Affects Prices
Chapter 3 included an overview of how local job growth affects prices. 
Employment growth in a local economic region was argued to lead to 
in-migration, which raises land values, in turn raising the costs and prices 
of goods that use land as an input.
But economic theory provides further insights into the determinants 
of the price effects of local growth. The effect of local job growth on 
land prices increases with a greater in-migration response to employ 
ment growth. In addition, the land price response will be greater if the 
supply of developed land in an area does not increase much due to a 
given increase in prices. Finally, the land price response will be greater 
if local population density does not increase much due to an increase 
in land prices. The land price effect on density depends on households' 
demand for land, and on whether zoning rules and historical develop 
ment patterns in the area allow redevelopment at higher densities. 1
The prices of other goods and services will be directly affected by 
increases in the price of land. In addition, mutual interactions between 
overall local prices, local wages, and the prices of other goods will great 
ly augment the direct land price effect. Because land prices increase, 
the overall level of local prices will increase. This will tend to increase 
local wages, increasing the costs and prices of locally produced goods. 
The increase in the costs and prices of these local goods will increase 
the costs and prices of other local goods that use these goods as in 
termediate inputs. All of these augmenting effects will further increase 
overall local prices, hence local wages, and hence the prices of specific 
goods. The final equilibrium effects on local prices will reflect all these 
interactions. The price effect of local growth on local goods and ser 
vices will increase with a greater share of local inputs in production.
Review of Previous Empirical Research
Previous research on local growth and land or housing prices2 is of 
two types: case studies of a specific growth shock, and studies using 
econometric methods.
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Two recent case studies have examined specific growth shocks and 
local prices. Erickson and Syms (1986) studied a particular enterprise 
zone in England. They examined industrial rents inside and outside of 
this zone, both before and after zone designation, and concluded that 
zone industrial rents rose enough to capture 60 percent of the financial 
incentives offered to industrial firms locating there.
The second recent case study was Gardner and others' (1987) ex 
amination of the effects of Chrysler/Mitsubishi's decision to locate their 
Diamond Star joint venture automobile plant in Bloomington, Illinois. 
This location decision was announced in October 1985. The plant was 
to employ 2,900 workers and was expected to bring an additional 2,900 
supplier industry and retail jobs into Bloomington. The 5,800 jobs due 
to the plant are about 14 percent of the Bloomington metropolitan area's 
pre-Diamond Star employment level of 42,000.
Gardner and her colleagues used a "hedonic" housing price model 
to examine trends in housing prices in Bloomington before and after 
the Diamond Star announcement. Hedonic housing price models con 
trol for housing quality in measuring housing price trends. The study 
also used a hedonic model to ascertain housing price trends in 
Champaign-Urbana, a nearby metropolitan area of similar size to Bloom 
ington. Based on these models, the authors found that housing prices 
in Bloomington increased about 10 to 15 percent after the Diamond Star 
announcement. Housing prices in Bloomington increased about 5 to 10 
percent more than housing prices in Champaign-Urbana over this time 
period.
The second type of empirical research on housing prices and local 
growth uses econometric methods to determine whether metropolitan 
areas that grow faster have higher rates of housing or land price infla 
tion. Table 5.1 reviews these econometric studies. The studies have 
reached a general consensus that local growth positively affects land 
and housing prices, although the exact magnitude of the effects varies 
across the studies. 3
These econometric studies suffer from two statistical problems. Similar 
problems were analyzed in the chapter 4 review of studies on local 
growth and unemployment, so the discussion here can be brief. First, the
Table 5.1 
Econometric Studies of Growth Effects on Housing and Land Prices
Geographic Aggregate 
Units Used in Variable Used to or 
Study Growth Analysis Measure Growth Micro Data Dependent Variable
Treyz, Rickman 
& Shao (1990)
Manning 
(1988)
Thibodeau 
(1988)
Pollakowski 
(1988)
Case 
(1986)
Hamilton 
& Schwab 
(1985)
Roback 
(1982)
Witte 
(1975)
States
MSAs
MSAs
MSAs
MSAs
MSAs
MSAs
MSAs
Population
Population
No. of owner households, 
no. of renter households
Employment, 
population
Employment
Population
Population
Population
Agg.
Agg.
Agg.
Agg.
Agg.
Agg.
Agg.
Agg.
Housing price; exact 
definition unclear
Site prices per square 
foot for FHA home
Real rental and owner 
prices from hedonic
Real owner housing 
prices from hedonic 
price functions
Average selling price 
of existing single- 
family home
Price of quality 
constant FHA home
Site prices per sq. 
ft. for FHA home
Site prices per sq. 
ft. for FHA home
Estimated Percentage 
Effect of 1 Percent 
Growth on Dependent 
Variable (Elasticity)
.4
Statistically significant, 
elasticity unclear
-.35 to +.35, 
statistically significant
.8 for pop., 6 for 
employment
.8
.3 to .4
1.0
Statistically significant, 
elasticity unclear
NOTES: All studies either look at growth or implicitly examine growth by including MSA dummies. Witte (1975) and Manning (1988) studies report 
"beta coefficients" (= raw coefficient times standard deviation of independent variable divided by standard deviation of dependent variable) without 
reporting standard deviation units, so elasticities cannot be calculated. Plausible values of standard deviations suggest their elasticities would be of similar 
order of magnitude to other studies.
ao
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studies in table 5.1 are unable to distinguish between short-run and long- 
run effects of local growth. The studies only include one measure of 
growth. Typically, this growth variable is the percentage change in 
employment or population over some recent time period. The coeffi 
cient on this one growth variable reflects some unknown combination 
of short-run and long-run effects of growth.
Second, previous econometric studies fail to distinguish the price ef 
fects of local growth caused by shocks that increase firm profitability 
and labor and land demand from the price effects of local growth caus 
ed by labor or land supply shocks. State and local economic develop 
ment policies attempt to increase perceived profitability of a local area, 
and thus promote greater demand for the area's labor and land. Increased 
labor and land demand will raise land prices, and possibly wages; other 
prices go up due to the increase in land and labor prices; wages may 
further increase in an attempt to catch up with increases in the cost-of- 
living, putting some additional upward pressure on local prices; the final 
equilibrium effect of demand-induced growth on local prices and wages 
will reflect the interaction among all the various prices in a local 
economy.
Either land or labor supply shocks result in a different relationship 
between local growth and property prices. Consider a shock that in 
creases a local area's effective land supply, such as relaxation of zon 
ing constraints on new development, or the building of new roads that 
increase the accessibility of some land. Such supply shocks reduce the 
local area's land and housing prices. Lower housing prices attract labor, 
reducing nominal wages from what they otherwise would have been. 
The lower wages and land prices may attract additional industry. The 
resulting correlation between housing prices and local growth will be 
negative, the reverse of the correlation that results from a demand shock.
Labor supply shocks also lead to a growth and housing price rela 
tionship that differs from the relationship caused by a demand shock. 
Suppose amenities in a local area improve, attracting in-migrant 
households. Population and labor supply increase, raising land prices 
but lowering wages. The price-boosting effects of higher land prices 
are moderated by the lower wages. Thus, labor supply-induced increases
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in local employment will have a smaller effect on housing prices than 
demand-induced employment growth, as the supply shock will reduce 
wages of construction workers.
This chapter augments the existing research literature in two ways. 
First, results are presented from an additional case study, the land price 
impacts of the General Motors Saturn plant in Tennessee. 4 Second, em 
pirical results are presented for econometric research on growth and 
prices that avoids the statistical problems of previous studies.
Effects of GM's Announcement 
of the Saturn Plant on Land Prices
On July 30, 1985, General Motors announced its decision to locate 
the new Saturn manufacturing plant in Spring Hill, Tennessee, a small 
town in Maury County near Nashville. Before the announcement, fierce 
competition among states for the Saturn plant had occurred. This case 
study will try to determine what effects the Saturn plant announcement 
had on land prices in Middle Tennessee.
As originally announced, the Saturn plant promised a significant boost 
to employment demand in Maury County and the Nashville MS A. The 
plant itself was originally supposed to provide 6,000 jobs. (This was 
subsequently scaled back to 3,200 jobs, but the cutback occurred well 
after the initial announcement.) Saturn officials claimed the plant would 
also lead to 14,000-16,000 "support" jobs in Middle Tennessee, as 
GM's "just-in-time" system would encourage suppliers to locate nearby. 
Even ignoring support jobs, 6,000 jobs are a significant proportion of 
Maury County employment. In 1985, Maury County's total employ 
ment was only 22,000. Saturn's planned employment would add over 
27 percent to Maury County employment. Even compared to the 
Nashville MSA's employment of 489,000, Saturn jobs would add 1.2 
percent. 5
The case study analyzed land sales before and after the July 30, 1985 
announcement, ranging from January to November of 1985. Sales in 
the eight days before the announcement were excluded because of the 
possibility of news leaks. The study looked at all land sales in the county
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"map areas" adjacent to the Saturn plant site. The 77 observed land 
sales averaged a distance of 3.1 miles from the Saturn plant site. The 
farthest away was 7.8 miles, the closest only 100 feet away. Thirty- 
three of the observed sales took place before the Saturn plant announce 
ment and 44 afterwards.
Of the 77 land sales, 30 had some structure already present. Land 
values per acre for these parcels were calculated by subtracting the 
January 1, 1985 assessed value of the structures, adjusted to market 
prices using the average market value/assessed value ratio in Maury 
County.
Table 5.2 presents calculations based on these data. 6 An analysis that 
assumes all land within 7.8 miles of the site increased by the same amount 
indicates that land values went up by $408 million due to the announce 
ment. An analysis that allows land further from the plant to increase 
by less indicates that the announcement raised land values by $243 
million. 7
A $200-$400 million land value increase is 20-40 percent of total 
Maury County market property value of $1 billion. As mentioned above, 
the Saturn plant increased Maury County employment by about 27 per 
cent. The implied elasticity of property values with respect to employ 
ment growth—the percentage change in property values for a 1 percent 
change in employment—is close to 1.0, roughly consistent with the 
previous research summarized in table 5.1.
New Econometric Research 
on Local Growth and Housing Prices
This section presents new estimates of how local variations in economic 
growth are related to housing price inflation. The next section presents 
similar estimates for nonhousing prices. The underlying model used 
in both sections is presented in table 5.3.
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Table 5.2
Estimated Effect of the Saturn Plant Announcement 
on Land Values: Two Approaches
1. Comparison of means
$1,908 per acre average before announcement
$5,237 afterwards
Total of 122,326 acres within 7.8 miles of plant
Conclusion: Land values increased from $233 million to $641 million, an
increase of $408 million.
2. Estimation of land price gradient
In (Land Price/Acre) = 7.264 + 1.053 * (Dummy variable for sale
(4.01) after announcement)
-.148 x 10"4 * ([Distance to plant] * [Dummy for after announcement]) 
(-1.31)
+ .101 * (Ratio of Sales Value/Measured Land Value) 
(1.72)
(f-statistics in parentheses)
Conclusions:
• Based on this equation, land within 7.8 miles of the plant increased in 
value by $163 million
• Land within 13.5 miles (where density gradient implies zero effect) in 
creased in value by $243 million
NOTES: Both the comparison of means and the estimated density gradient are based on 77 observed 
land sales near the Saturn plant in 1985, both before and after the announcement. The maximum 
distance from the plant of any land sale in the sample is 7.8 miles.
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Table 5.3
Outline of Model Used to Estimate Effects 
of Local Economic Growth on Prices
The model estimates equations of the following form: 
*Pmt = BQ + Nt + C(L)gmt + Vmt
where ^Pmt *s m^ change in some particular price index in MSA m from year 
t-l to year t, Nt is a set of dummy variables for the time period, gmt is the 
percentage growth in nonagricultural employment in MSA m from year t-\ 
to year t, and Vmt is the disturbance term. The C(L) term indicates that a series 
of lagged values ofgmt are also included in the estimation, with each lag allowed 
to have its own coefficient.
The estimation allows for up to eight lags in employment growth. Reported 
results are based on the lag-length minimizing the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC), a standard model selection criterion. Minimization of the AIC ensures 
that the reported long-run growth effects do not change significantly after the 
chosen lag-length, up to eight lags.
All equations are initially estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS),which 
show the estimated average effects of all types of employment growth. These 
are the estimates reported in the chapter text and figures. Equations are then 
re-estimated to focus on the effects of employment growth due to demand 
shocks; these estimates are reported in the appendices. Demand shock estimates 
are obtained by using the "share effect" as an instrumental variable for "two- 
stage least squares" estimation. The share effect reflects predicted growth if 
all local industries had grown at the national growth rate for that industry, 
and thus reflects trends in national demand for the area's exports.
The local Consumer Price Index (CPI) data come from the official CPI. The 
aggregate employment data are official estimates from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics' "790" program survey.
Years included in the estimation are generally 1972-73 through 1985-86. 
For some price indices, data are only available for a shorter length of time. 
The 25 MSAs for which local CPI data are consistently available are all in 
cluded in the estimation.
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This chapter's model of how local growth affects prices is similar 
to the chapter 4 model of how local growth affects the average unemploy 
ment rate. The change in a metropolitan area's price index from last 
year to this year is statistically related to current and lagged values of 
employment growth for the metropolitan area. The estimation procedure 
allows statistical tests to determine when the price effect of an increase 
in employment "stabilizes" at some long-run effect, rather than arbitrari 
ly assuming the length of time needed to reach a new equilibrium.
The effects of demand-induced growth on prices are examined, as 
well as the effects of all types of growth on prices. As discussed above, 
we might expect local job growth due to demand shocks to have dif 
ferent effects on prices than local growth due to land or labor supply 
shocks.
The price data used come from the official Consumer Price Index 
(CPI). Four different measures of housing price inflation are used. The 
shelter price index, available throughout the 1972 to 1986 period of 
this study, is meant to reflect overall household spending on the physical 
aspects of housing. This index is calculated as a weighted average, us 
ing the consumer expenditure weights, of the price of rental housing 
and the price of owner-occupied housing.
The effects of growth on rental housing prices and owner-occupied 
housing prices are also separately examined in this study. The rental 
housing price index, available throughout the period of this study, is 
calculated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics by examining how rents 
change for specific rental housing units. Each rental housing unit in 
the sample is followed over time and excluded from the price index 
calculation if the unit is substantially rehabilitated. Hence, the CPI rental 
housing index probably does a good job of measuring the average price 
change in the city for rental housing, holding quality constant. Given 
the heterogeneity of housing, holding quality constant is crucial in 
measuring housing prices. 8
Measuring quality-constant prices of owner-occupied homes is more 
difficult. Homes are sold infrequently, which reduces direct informa 
tion on their price. Also, home purchase decisions represent investment 
as well as consumption; the true "price" of housing in the CPI is its 
cost as a consumption good, not its value as an investment.
Effects on Housing and Other Prices 123
The traditional CPI measure of owner-occupied housing prices had 
several problems. In particular, the traditional owner-occupied hous 
ing price index was unable to control well for quality. BLS data collec 
tors examined the average price per square foot, within classes of houses 
with different combinations of age and size, of FHA-insured homes. 
FHA-insured homes are a small and unrepresentative portion of the hous 
ing market. Furthermore, controlling for age-size class fails to control 
for many aspects of housing quality, such as the house's neighborhood. 9
In response to criticism of the homeownership component of the CPI, 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics began in 1983 to use a new measure of 
homeowner prices. This new measure calculates changes in owner- 
occupied housing prices by examining the change in the rental price 
of housing units similar to nearby owner-occupied housing units. The 
rationale for this procedure is that economic theory implies that the true 
annual cost of homeownership must be equal in equilibrium to the rent 
for obtaining a similar home. If rents were less than true homeowner 
ship costs for identical houses, then households would switch from owner 
status to renter status, forcing up rents and forcing down homeowner 
ship costs. A similar argument can be made for how the market would 
force down relative rents if rents were greater than true homeowner 
ship costs for identical homes. While this procedure better controls for 
housing quality than the old homeownership measure, the resulting price 
index never directly measures the price of a single owner-occupied home. 
The measured index depends greatly on theoretical arguments about 
what relationships among rental and owner-occupied housing prices must 
hold in equilibrium.
BLS assumptions about the relationships between rental and owner- 
occupied housing prices may be inaccurate in the case of housing price 
changes caused by growth. How much people are willing to pay to buy 
a house depends in part on prevailing rent levels; all else equal, a given 
percentage change in rent levels should be associated with the same 
percentage change in home purchase prices. But the willingness to pay 
to buy a home also depends on how much the prospective buyer ex 
pects homes to appreciate in the future. If an increase in local growth 
today leads people to expect faster home value appreciation in the future,
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this expectation will push up home values. Growth's effect on home 
sale prices will exceed its effect on rental prices. 10
This study examines the effects of growth on both the old and new 
homeownership measure; for our purposes, it is unclear which measure 
suffers from fewer defects.
Figures 5.1 through 5.4 present empirical estimates of the effects of 
overall local growth—whether due to demand shocks or supply shocks— 
on the various measures of housing prices. Several points stand out in 
these figures. Most important, there is clear evidence that housing prices 
are significantly affected by local growth in the long run. A 1 percent 
once-and-for-all shock to employment raises housing prices in the long 
run between .25 and .45 of 1 percent. The estimated magnitude of this 
effect is roughly similar to the estimates of previous studies reported 
in table 5.1.
A second point is that figure 5.2 implies that rental housing prices, 
in response to a positive growth shock, tend to overshoot their long- 
run equilibrium in the short run. This result makes intuitive sense. The 
increase in rental housing demand caused by the growth shock hikes 
rental housing prices of the relatively fixed short-run housing supply; 
builders respond after some lag to these higher prices, which brings 
prices down somewhat. However, long-run prices are still higher, despite 
this supply response, because land and construction labor costs are per 
manently higher due to growth.
Third, there is some evidence that local growth has somewhat higher 
percentage effects on home values than on rental prices. The original 
BLS homeownership price index is increased more in the long run by 
growth than either the price index for rental housing or the new "rental 
equivalent" measure of homeowner prices that looks at the rent charged 
for "comparable" houses to owner-occupied homes.
In addition to examining effects of all types of local growth on hous 
ing prices, effects of growth clearly due to demand shocks were also 
examined. While this examination revealed some statistically signifi 
cant differences in the pattern of effects, on the whole the conclusions 
are unchanged: a once-and-for-all shock to an area's employment per 
manently raises housing prices. Appendix 5.1 presents these demand 
shock results in more detail.
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Figure 5.1
Estimates of the Cumulative Percentage Effects of a 1 Percent
Once-and-for-AH Local Employment Shock
on the MSA Shelter Price Index
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.361
(-116)
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.528
(.123)
3 years
.554
(.119)
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.562
(.131)
Long-run
effect =
5 years
.340
(.092)
NOTES: Bold line in figure shows best point estimate; dotted lines show point estimate ± two 
standard errors, approximately a 95 percent confidence interval for the effect. (That is, prob 
ability = .95 that true effect is in that range.) Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates are 
for optimal AIC lag-length. Long-run effect in 8-lag specification is .312 (.097).
As mentioned in notes to chapter 4, the cumulative effect after the number of lags included 
in the optimal AIC specification is an implied "long-run" effect. Minimizing the AIC after k 
lags implies no significant change thereafter. The figures here only carry this long-run effect out 
to eight years after the shock, as the empirical work never tested whether this long-run effect 
might decay after eight years. For comparison, the notes at the bottom of each table also report 
the estimated long-run effect in a specification with eight lagged employment variables. These 
long-run effects, as one would expect, are always quite similar to the optimal AIC long-run effects.
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Figure 5.2
Estimates of the Cumulative Percentage Effects of a 1 Percent 
Once-and-for-AH Local Employment Shock 
on the MSA Rent of Dwelling Price Index
W
1.20
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
-0.20
-0.40
-0.60
+/- 2 Std. Errors ....•-...
Best Point Estimate
345 
Number of Years After Shock
Empirical Estimates on Which Figure is Based
Cumulative Effect After: 
Immediate
effect =
0
(
years
.180
.063)
1 year
.494
(.066)
2 years
.738
(.070)
3 years
.727
(.068)
4 years
.577
(.074)
5 years
.430
(.075)
Long-run
effect =
6 years
.252
(.053)
NOTES: Bold line in figure shows best point estimate; dotted lines show point estimate ± two 
standard errors, approximately a 95 percent confidence interval for the effect. (That is, prob 
ability = .95 that true effect is in that range.) Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates are 
for optimal AIC specification. Long-run effect in 8-lag specification is .238 (.055).
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Figure 5.3 
Estimates of the Cumulative Percentage Effects of a 1 Percent
Once-and-for-AIl Local Employment Shock on the 
MSA Homeownership Price Index (Original Version)
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range. Standard errors are in parentheses in table. Estimates are based on optimal AIC specifica 
tion. Long-run effect in 8-lag specification is .540 (.146).
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Figure 5.4
Estimates of the Cumulative Percentage Effects of a 1 Percent
Once-and-for-All Local Employment Shock on the
MSA "Owners' Equivalent Rent" Price Index
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NOTES: Best point estimates are shown by bold line in figure. Dotted lines show two standard 
errors to either side of best point estimate. Probability is .95 that true point estimate is in interval 
between two dotted lines. Standard errors are in parentheses in table. Estimates are based on op 
timal AIC specification. Long-run effect in 8-lag specification is .220 (.152).
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Effects of Local Growth on Nonhousing Prices
Similar econometric techniques were used to estimate the effects of 
local growth on nonhousing prices. Growth effects were estimated for 
all the major categories of the Consumer Price Index. Table 5.4 sum 
marizes the estimated average effects of growth—whether due to de 
mand shocks or supply shocks—on each major category of consumer 
prices, and on overall consumer prices. 11
The overall pattern of these estimated effects is as expected. Nonhous 
ing prices are less affected by growth in the long run than housing prices. 
Some categories of prices, such as household fuel and furniture prices, 
are apparently largely driven by national markets rather than local 
growth. This makes sense because relatively little of the value of these 
products is produced in the MS A where they are consumed.
But the magnitude of some of the nonhousing price effects is surpris 
ing. Prior to seeing these results, I expected the effects of local growth 
on such categories as food and apparel prices to be extremely small. 
But the estimated long-run effect of growth on food and apparel prices 
is almost half as large as the effect of growth on housing prices.
A closer examination of the U.S. product distribution system makes 
these results more understandable. Depending on the data source one 
uses, from 35 to 50 percent of the value of sales in the food and ap 
parel consumption categories appears to be absorbed by local distribu 
tion costs. 12 This local share is a bit more than one might anticipate. 
It is easy to make reasonably plausible assumptions about the share of 
local labor and real estate in these local distribution costs, along with 
assumptions about growth effects on overall prices (hence wages) and 
real estate prices, that will yield increases in costs in the food and ap 
parel sectors close to the estimated effects on food and apparel prices. 13
Effects of demand-induced growth on local prices in these consump 
tion categories were also examined. The results are reported in appen 
dix 5.1. None of the estimated effects of demand shocks substantially 
alters the conclusions from looking at the effects of overall growth.
Table 5.4 -
Estimated Percentage Effects of a 1 Percent Once-And-For-AII Shock to Local Employment   
on Different Categories of Consumer Prices
Percentage of Immediate 
Consumer Budget Effect
Shelter
Food
Transportation
Household fuel and utilities
Household furnishings
and operations
Apparel
Medical care
Entertainment
All other goods
and services
Overall Consumer
Price Index
27.7
17.8
17.2
7.9
7.2
6.3
5.7
4.4
5.8
100.0
.054
(.112)
.014
(.043)
.072
(.039)
.025
(.098)
.080
(.036)
.136
(.046)
-.092
(.056)
-.132
(.090)
.031
(.053)
.022
(.041)
1 year
.361
(.116)
-.001
(.043)
.006
(.057)
.060
(.092)
.044
(.054)
.118
(-042)
Cumulative Effect After: 
2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years . .
.528 .554 .562 .340
(.123) (.119) (.131) (.092)
.147
(.032)
.003 .139
(.060) (.044)
.129 -.119 -.069 .114
(.096) (.098) (.111) (.075)
.137
(.041)
.200
(.031)
Long-Run 
. . . Effect
.340
(.092)
.147
(.032)
.072
(.039)
.025
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.080
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.139
(.044)
.114
(.075)
.137
(.041)
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(.031)
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NOTES: Budget figures are from BLS Handbook of Methods, p. 187. Shelter index includes the residential rent (6.1 percent) and homeowners' equivalent 
rent (19.1 percent) indices examined in figures 5.2 and 5.4, as well as other housing costs. Estimated effects are for the lag-length for each category 
that minimized the AIC. This implies that the effect does not change significantly from that lag-length to the "long-run." As lag-lengths up to eight 
years were tested, this implies no significant change from that optimal lag-length up to eight years after the shock. Standard errors are in parentheses 
below estimated effects. Estimated effects are stated in percentage terms. For example, the .200 long-run effect for the overall CPI means that the CPI 
increa°as bv ?./5ths of 1 percent in response to a 1 percent shock to local employment.
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Are Effects on Housing and Land Prices Large?
A key policy question about these estimates is whether local growth 
has effects on land and housing prices that are large from a practical 
perspective. The "statistical significance" of the effects does not 
necessarily imply that they would be considered important by individuals 
or governments. I will argue in this section that the effects of growth 
on property value are large from the perspective of property owners, 
but in the aggregate are smaller than the employment benefits of growth.
On the first point, effects of local growth on housing prices can 
substantially influence the rate of return to owning housing. Consider 
the effects of an extra one-half percent per year employment growth 
over a decade, or a total of 5 percent extra employment over the decade. 
Based on the results, this might raise housing prices by about 2 percent 
over the decade, or about .2 percent per year. Suppose housing nor 
mally earns about a 3 percent real return per year to its owner. This 
return is an explicit financial return to the owner of rental housing; it 
is an implicit consumption return to the homeowner, in that he/she could 
have earned that real return on other assets, but chose to buy a home 
instead.
Assume that 80 percent of the value of the housing is financed by 
a mortgage. Then this one-half percent extra growth per year will in 
crease the annual return to equity investment in housing from 3 per 
cent to 4 percent, a 33 percent increase over the normal rate of return. 
(The overall increase in the total housing price per year by .2 percent 
increases the value of the owner's equity by 1 percent, as the equity 
is only 20 percent of the total housing price.)
With respect to the second point, the increased implicit income in 
the MSA resulting from property value effects of growth is likely to 
be smaller than the increased income resulting from the greater labor 
force participation and reduced unemployment caused by growth. Bas 
ed on the results in chapter 4, a 5 percent shock to employment will 
raise labor force participation by about .8 percent above its average 
value, and raise the employment rate (conditional on participation) by 
about .3 percent above its average value. 14 As a result, annual earn-
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ings will increase by 1.1 percent even if wage rates are unchanged. 15 
Because earnings average about 70 percent of income, total income will 
increase by (.7)(1.1 percent), or around .8 percent. 16
The 5 percent employment shock would cause a one-time increase 
of about 2 percent in property values. Total real estate value appears 
to be around 264 percent of income17 in the typical MS A, so the one- 
time property value increase is about 5.3 percent (= 2.64 times 2 per 
cent) of annual income. At a 3 percent real interest rate, this one-time 
increase is equivalent to a permanent increase of .2 percent in real in 
come. This effect is only one-fourth of the income effect due to increased 
employment caused by growth.
Chapter 7 will return to this topic of comparisons of the various types 
of effects of employment shocks. The reader should note here, however, 
that the actual "benefits" to a local area may not correspond to these 
income effects. For example, in a local area with low unemployment, 
many of those who receive jobs may place a high value on their foregone 
leisure time, so their benefit is less than the effect on their incomes. 
Also, some property owners may live outside the local area. These 
average income effects, furthermore, conceal differences across in 
dividuals. Some individuals get jobs, and others do not. Property owners 
with developable land gain more from growth than others.
Conclusion
This chapter showed that shocks to local employment permanently 
increase housing prices. These housing price effects are large enough 
to significantly affect the return to owning property. Measured by their 
impact on real income, property value effects of growth are about one- 
fourth as large as employment effects of growth.
Somewhat surprisingly, growth also appears to have relatively large 
effects on local nonhousing prices, although the effects are less than 
for housing prices. Higher costs for distributing goods in the local area 
provide an explanation for these effects on nonhousing prices.
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NOTES
1. An unpublished appendix available from the author shows that standard urban economics models 
imply that 10 percent more population increases land prices around 10 percent, but these models' 
assumptions may bias their conclusions. For example, the models assume all employment is in 
the central business district. In addition, the models assume that long-run development patterns 
are dictated by household demand rather than zoning or historical development patterns. 
2.1 have been unable to locate any previous studies that focus on how growth affects nonhousing 
prices, or overall prices.
3. The one exception is the study by Thibodeau (1988). His measure of growth, however, is quite 
different from the other studies. Rather than examining population or employment growth, 
Thibodeau examines the effects of the number of homeowner households on home prices, and 
the number of renter households on rental prices. But the number of households of a particular 
tenure type is a much more endogenous variable than total population or total employment. For 
a fixed population, the number of households will tend to decline as housing prices increase; for 
a fixed total number of households, the number of owner (renter) households will tend to decline 
as owner (renter) housing prices increase. Thibodeau tries to control for this endogeneity by in 
cluding a control for the number of persons per household, but this attempt may not be totally 
successful.
4. Preliminary versions of some of these case study findings were presented in Bartik, Becker, 
Lake, and Bush (1987).
5. Maury County was not officially part of the Nashville MSA in 1985. However, the Spring 
Hill site is just south of Maury County's border with Williamson County, which is part of the 
Nashville MSA.
6. The last term in the land price estimating equation, Ratio of Sales Value to Measured Land 
Value, is included to correct for possible underassessment of the market value of structures. For 
parcels with structures, the dependent variable (land value per acre) is measured as \n((T-s)/L), 
where T is the sales price of the parcel, s is the market value of the structure based on assessment 
records, and L is the number of acres involved in the sale. Suppose that s = aS, where 5 is the 
true market value of the structure, and a < 1 indicates underassessment. This results in the depen 
dent variable being subject to measurement error. The equation we want to estimate is 
\n((T-S)/L)=Bx. But we can only estimate \n((T-s)/L) =Bx+\n((T-s)/L) -\n((T-S)/L). A Taylor 
series expansion shows that \n((T-S)/L)=\n((T-~s)/L) + [l/((T-i;)/L)](-l/L)(S-s). The last term in 
this expansion can be rewritten as:
[ 1 /((T-s)/L)](- 1 /L)(S-3) = (s-S)/(T-s) = ((a- 1 )ld\[SI(T-s)].
Adding and subtracting (a-\)la »o this last term, we get ln((T-S)/L)-\n((T-~s)/L)=-(a-l)/a + 
[(a-l)/a][T/(T-s)]. Hence, ln((7-5)/L)«flx+[(l-a)/a][77(r-S)]. The estimated coefficient of .101 
on this ratio variable implies that [(\-a)ld\ =. 101, or a- .908. The implication is that the market 
value of structures is underassessed by about 9 percent.
7. The empirical analysis of this case study has several limitations. First, it does not hold the 
quality of the land constant, except for its proximity to the Saturn plant. The lack of controls 
for other qualitative features of the land may bias the results, but the bias is of unknown sign 
and magnitude. Second, it focuses on whether or not the date of sale is after the Saturn announce 
ment. If contracts were signed some time before the announcement but the sale was not com 
pleted until after the announcement, some of the postannouncement sale prices may reflect pre- 
announcement economic conditions. Thus, the land price effects estimated here may understate 
the true effects of the Saturn plant on land values. I thank Robert Schwab for pointing out these 
two limitations of the case study.
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8. The CPI rent index has been criticized for ignoring the depreciation of housing that inevitably 
occurs due to age (see Apgar 1987). Recently, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has begun correct 
ing for depreciation when calculating the rental housing price index, although the index is uncor- 
rected throughout the period of this study. This is not a problem because it is reasonable to assume 
that this depreciation rate is roughly constant across cities in the sample. Hence, the depreciation 
rate will be absorbed by the constant term in the regression. To put it another way, the results 
estimated here are based on observing how differences in metropolitan growth from the U.S. 
average are related to differences in housing inflation rates from the U.S. average. Adjusting 
the average housing inflation rate everywhere by the same amount will only affect the U.S. average, 
not the deviations of city inflation rates from the average.
9. There were other problems with traditional CPI measure of owner-occupied housing prices. 
These are reviewed by Gillingham (1980) and Gillingham and Lane (1982). While these prob 
lems are important in measuring the overall magnitude of housing price inflation, they seem less 
important for this study because many of the problems are unlikely to vary due to differences 
in city growth rates. For example, the use of nominal interest rates in calculating housing price 
indices will bias homeowner price indices by a similar amount in all cities.
10. The discussion here of the role of expected appreciation in determining the home value ef 
fects of growth is in response to some helpful comments by Robert Schwab on a first draft of 
this book. The role of expected appreciation in home value determination is discussed in a paper 
by Hamilton and Schwab (1985).
11. Table 5.4 shows effects for the optimal AIC specification. Long-run effects in the 8-lag specifica 
tion, and their standard errors, are: shelter, .312 (.097); food, .154 (.038); transportation, .072 
(.051); household utilities, .036 (.127); furnishings, .059 (.046); apparel, .164 (.059); medical 
care, .111 (.049); entertainment, .076 (.078); other goods and services, . 126 (.047); overall CPI, 
.178 (.036). These long-run effects are quite similar to those estimated in the optimal lag 
specification.
12. The Personal Consumption Expenditure Bridge Matrix developed by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics suggests a figure of around 50 percent for the local share. Forty-three percent of food 
and beverage consumption goes directly to the food products industry, and 7 percent is purchased 
indirectly (via the eating and drinking establishment sector) from the food products industry. (The 
PCE Bridge Matrix and BEA Input-Output tables count food dollars as going directly to the food 
products industry, rather than to retail trade, in cases, such as grocery stores, where the product 
is not altered by the store before sale. Purchases from eating and drinking establishments are 
considered to be purchased directly from the establishment, which in turn purchases food and 
beverage input which it alters.) According to the PCE Bridge Matrix, 44 percent of clothing and 
shoe expenditure goes to pay for retailers' margins, and 4 percent goes to pay for wholesalers' 
margins. The 1982 Census of Retail Trade suggests somewhat smaller local shares. Adding together 
food stores and eating and drinking places, 65 percent of the value of sales is accounted for by 
merchandise purchase, leaving 35 percent for a local share. In apparel trade, 60 percent of the 
value of sales is accounted for by the purchase of merchandise, leaving 40 percent for a local 
share. These figures can be reconciled if some of these merchandise purchases are in fact local 
merchandise considered by BLS to be part of the retailers' margin.
13. For example, suppose that local inputs are 50 percent of costs in the food and beverage category, 
local labor makes up 60 percent of local inputs, and local real estate makes up 20 percent of local 
inputs. Suppose further that local labor costs go up a bit faster than local prices, say by .25 per 
cent for every 1 percent shock to employment. This might occur if wages go up by about the 
same amount as prices, but productivity declines a bit as lower-skilled workers are hired (see 
chapter 6). Also suppose that local real estate costs for business go up by .50 percent for every
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1 percent employment shock; this is just a little more than the estimated price effect on homeowner- 
ship prices. Then costs in the food and beverage industry would increase, due to a 1 percent employ 
ment shock, by .50(.60)(.25) + .50(.20)(.50) = . 125 percent. This is just a bit below the estimated 
effect of growth on food and beverage prices. There is no need to drop the assumption that com 
petition will force prices in the long run in the various local industries to increase by no more 
than industry costs.
14. These figures are calculated by dividing the chapter 4 estimates of effects on labor participa 
tion and employment rates by the average rates in the sample, .875 for labor force participation, 
and .946 for employment.
15. That is, because Earnings = LFP * ER * H * W, where LFP — labor force participation, 
ER is the employment rate, H is usual weekly hours, and W is the wage rate, the percent change 
in earnings is the sum of the percentage change in these four components.
16. For sources of this information on the ratio of earnings to income, see table 7.6 in chapter 7.
17. Again, for sources of this information, see table 7.6.

- 6 -
Effects of Local Job Growth 
on Real Wages
Growth, almost any kind, tightens the local labor market and 
leads to overtime, second earners in the household, and rising wage 
rates. (Wilbur Thompson, Professor Emeritus of Economics at 
Wayne State University and one of the founding fathers of urban 
economics, p. 287 in Economic Development Quarterly, August 
1987)
Real Wage Definitions and Growth
Much of economics is concerned with the causes and effects of the 
prevailing market "real wage," by which economists mean the amount 
a worker is paid per some unit of time at work (e.g., dollars per hour), 
adjusted for the price of consumer goods. Based on the empirical find 
ings in chapter 4 that faster local growth lowers unemployment, one 
might expect local growth to increase real wages. Increased labor de 
mand, tight labor markets, and rising real wages would all seem to go 
together. But the situation is more complicated than that, in part because 
there are many possible definitions of what one might mean by the ' 'real 
wage."
The simplest definition of the real wage level in some local labor 
market, such as a metropolitan area, is the average real wage level. 
This definition would be relevant if a researcher were seeking a real 
wage measure whose increase would be most closely linked to consumer 
demand for goods and services in the local area. But the definition fails 
to control for the types of occupations or individuals in the local area. 
Hence, this measure does not capture what an individual with given 
skills and occupation might be paid in the local area compared to some
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national average, or what a firm with given labor requirements might 
need to pay in that area.
A second definition of the local real wage level is the real wage of 
a given occupation in the local area compared to the national average. 
Real wages of different occupations can be aggregated to some local 
average using occupational employment weights. This real wage defini 
tion measures the relative wage that an individual could expect in this 
local area if the individual is occupationally specialized. However, oc 
cupational advancement may be easier in some local areas than in others. 
The occupational real wage measure does not capture this dimension 
of the real wage opportunities offered by a particular area.
Finally, one can measure how real wages vary across local areas, 
holding individual skills constant, but not occupations. This measure 
allows for differences in occupational advancement possibilities across 
local areas, as well as differences in occupational rates of pay. While 
it captures the real wage differences between local areas for the average 
individual, it is less accurate for workers who are highly specialized 
in one particular occupation.
These diverse real wage measures would respond differently in the 
long run to an increase in local employment. Local employment shocks 
might permanently affect occupational advancement for the same reasons 
that they permanently affect local unemployment: hysteresis effects in 
local labor markets. As discussed in chapter 3, an increase in local 
employment may lead in the short run to some individuals getting jobs 
who otherwise would not be employed. This short-run effect increases 
these individuals' "human capital" (i.e., their job skills). Because human 
capital depreciates only slowly, the short-run effect on unemployment 
persists in the long run.
For similar reasons, employment shocks may have long-run effects 
on occupational advancement. In the short run, an increase in local 
employment allows some individuals to get promotions or to get a bet 
ter job at another employer that they otherwise would not have obtain 
ed. These individuals acquire additional human capital, which may help 
them retain their higher occupational status in the long run. The in 
crease in average human capital of the local labor force may lead to an
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average occupational upgrading of the local labor force in the long run. 
The long-run equilibrium of the local labor market will have been altered 
by its history, which is the essence of the hysteresis perspective on labor 
markets.
It is less likely, however, for a local employment shock to raise real 
wages for a given occupation. In response to an employment shock, 
employers are more likely to promote less-skilled individuals to avoid 
raising the occupation's real wage. An increase in occupational real 
wages would be needed to attract individuals of "normal" skill levels 
from outside the labor force or from other metropolitan areas. Raising 
the occupation's wage may be more costly than hiring less-skilled in 
dividuals, since employers would feel constrained by social norms to 
increase occupational wage rates for all employees, not just new hires. 
If the short-run response of employers to a tight local labor market is 
to hire less-skilled workers instead of increasing occupational real wages, 
there may even be some downward pressure on occupational real wages 
in the long run. The average long-run skill level of individuals in the 
occupation will be lower, and employers will have learned how to use 
a larger pool of individuals in that occupation.
Even if employers do raise real wages for a given occupation in 
response to an increase in local employment, the increase would not 
be expected to be permanent. The increase in occupational real wages 
would not be associated with any change in individuals' human capital, 
but would merely represent more wages for the same work. Hence, 
there would be no reason to expect this type of real wage change to 
persist once labor supply adjusts through in-migration to the higher labor 
demand.
These different types of real wage changes would have different 
distributional implications. A general increase in an occupation's real 
wages helps all workers in that occupation and hurts firms. An increase 
in average occupational advancement only helps the workers who ac 
tually receive promotions. Real wage increases associated with occupa 
tional advancement may not hurt firms if the promoted workers increase 
their productivity enough.
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Previous Studies of Growth and Wages
Table 6.1 summarizes local growth effects on wages from various 
studies. l The two studies using real wages as a dependent variable (Rosen 
1979; Gyourko and Tracy 1986) found that a 1 percent increase in local 
employment increases real wages by .2 to .5 of 1 percent. Most other 
studies use nominal wages as a dependent variable. Based on the chapter 
5 results, local prices probably increase by .2 of 1 percent in response 
to a 1 percent growth shock. Assuming this price effect, three of the 
studies (Browne 1987; Topel 1986; and Graves 1980) imply real wage 
elasticities with respect to local growth of .2 to .4, or a .2 to .4 of 1 
percent response to a 1 percent employment shock. The Roback (1982) 
and Treyz and Stevens (1985) studies imply real wage responses around 
zero. Both of these studies control for occupation, however, so their 
results may not be comparable to other studies.
The studies summarized suffer from five limitations. First, none 
simultaneously examines the effects of local growth on the different 
concepts of the local "real wage"—the real wage available to an in 
dividual in a given occupation, and the real wage available through oc 
cupational advancement for an individual with a given set of skills.
The other four limitations are similar to the limitations of the growth 
studies discussed in chapters 4 and 5, so the discussion in this chapter 
can be brief. The second limitation is the failure to clearly distinguish 
the short-run and long-run effects of growth. Each study includes but 
one growth variable. The coefficient on this variable is some unknown 
combination of short-run and long-run effects.
The third limitation is that the studies do not distinguish between 
growth due to demand shocks and growth in general. State and local 
economic development policies are presumed to increase business profit 
ability in a local area, leading to increases in local labor demand which 
in turn may increase local real wages. But supply shocks—such as im 
provements in local amenities—may increase an area's population, 
leading to lower real wages which in turn may attract additional employ 
ment to the area. Overall job growth is due to both demand shocks and 
supply shocks, and the estimated effect of local growth on real wages
Table 6.1 
Effects of Local Growth on Wages
Study
Browne 
(1987)
Topel 
(1986)
Gyourko 
& Tracy 
(1986)
Treyz & 
Stevens 
(1985)
Roback 
(1982)
Graves 
(1980)
Rosen 
(1979)
Population or Period Over 
Geographic Employment Which Growth 
Units Used Growth Calculated
3 years, 
States Employment 6 years
States Employment 1 year
MSAs Population ?
States Employment 1 year
MSAs Population 10 years
MSAs Population 10 years
MSAs Population 10 years
Micro or 
Aggregate Dependent 
Data Variable
Pay per 
Agg. worker
Avg. wkly. 
Micro earnings
Micro Real wages
Micro Wage rate
Avg. wkly. 
Micro earnings
Agg. Mfg. wages
Real avg. 
weekly 
Micro earnings
Estimated 
Controls for Percentage 
Individual Effect of 1 
Characteristics Percent Growth 
or Occupation3 on Wages
No .4
Indiv. .5 to .6
Indiv. .2
Indiv.; excludes 
occupation 
switchers .2
Indiv.; 
includes 4 occupa 
tion classes .2
No .4
Indiv.; 
includes 6 occupa 
tion classes .2 to .5
a. Reports whether study included as explanatory variables for wages, in addition to growth terms, some controls for individual characteristics or occupation.
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may be less positive for all growth than for growth due to labor de 
mand shocks.
The fourth limitation is that the studies do not examine how the ef 
fects of a growth shock vary with the initial level of growth. Phenomena 
such as downward wage rigidity imply that changes in annual employ 
ment growth from 2 percent to 3 percent would have a greater impact 
on local real wages than changes in growth from -3 percent to -2 percent.
Finally, most studies fail to examine how the real wage effects of 
growth vary across individuals. 2
Model and Data Used in this Chapter
The models and data used in this chapter to examine real wage ef 
fects of local growth are outlined in table 6.2. The aggregate model 
for real wages is similar to the aggregate model used to examine local 
growth effects on unemployment rates and inflation. It examines how 
the employment growth of a metropolitan area affects the average real 
wages of different occupations in that metropolitan area. The model 
allows for a national time period effect on year-to-year changes in real 
wages. Including a time period effect in the model means that the estima 
tion is focusing on how variations in a metropolitan area's growth from 
the U.S. average affect variations in a metropolitan area's occupational 
real wages from the U.S. trend in those wages.
The micro model for real wages is similar to the micro model used 
for unemployment and labor force participation in chapter 4. Several 
measures of an individual's real wages are assumed to depend on the 
individual's characteristics, general national trends, and shocks to the 
employment level of the metropolitan area in which the individual lives.
The real wage variables used capture several definitions of real wages. 
The aggregate real wage variables use data from the Area Wage Survey 
(AWS). These variables look at the change in real wage indices for three 
different set of occupations: skilled workers in manufacturing, unskill 
ed workers in manufacturing, and office and clerical workers. Each 
index is a weighted average of a number of individual indices for detailed
Effects on Real Wages 143
Table 6.2 
Models Used to Examine Effects of Local Growth on Real Wages
The aggregate model is of the form:
(6.1) Awm, = BQ + Nt + C(L)gmt + Vmt
where Awm^ is the percentage change in average real wages in MSA m from 
year t-l to year t, Nt is a set of dummy variables for the time period, gmt 
is the growth rate of MSA m's nonagricultural employment from year t-l to 
year t, and Vmt is the disturbance term. The C(L) term before employment 
growth means that a series of lags in employment growth are also included 
in the equation, with each allowed to have its own coefficient. The micro model 
is of the form:
(6.2) Wim = BQ + Nt + Fm + WXimt + C(L)Emt + Vimt
where W^mt is the average real wage rate for individual / in MSA m during 
year t, Fm is a set of dummy variables, one for each MSA m, Emt is the natural 
logarithm of nonagricultural employment for MSA m during year t, and X£-mj 
is a vector of demographic characteristics of the individual. The "levels" equa 
tion (6.2) can be derived from the "changes" equation (6.1). The inclusion 
of the MSA fixed effect implies that the micro equation is examining the ef 
fects of MSA job growth, not job levels (see appendix 4.2).
The estimation allows for up to eight lagged years in the employment term. 
Reported results are based on the lag-length that minimizes the Akaike Infor 
mation Criterion (AIC), a standard model selection criteria. The aggregate 
data on real wages comes from the Area Wage Survey's data on changes in 
average real wages in three different types of occupations: skilled manufac 
turing workers, unskilled manufacturing workers, office and clerical workers. 
Real wage changes are calculated by subtracting out area inflation numbers, 
so only the 25 MS As with local inflation numbers are used. The data run from 
1972-73 to 1982-83.
The micro data on real wages is derived from the March Current Popula 
tion Survey, 1980-87, and reflects individuals' average real wages during the 
year preceding each survey (i.e., the years covered are 1979 to 1986). Alter 
native micro real wage definitions are described in the text. Real wages are 
calculated by assuming a price index for each MSA of 100 in 1986, and using 
local inflation indices to get price indices for other years. The MSA fixed- 
effect should absorb overall differences in price levels across MS As. Total 
micro sample size is 13,299.
Estimation was by OLS and by 2SLS, using as instruments: (1) "share ef 
fect' ' predicted growth and lagged share effect predicted growth for equation 
(6.1); (2) share effect predicted employment levels for equation (6.2). See ap 
pendix 4.2 for more details.
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occupations. Thus, the aggregate real wage variables probably do a good 
job of measuring changes in occupational real wages in the metropolitan 
area. As discussed above, we would expect migration to prevent any 
long-run effect of local growth on these wage variables.
The micro model uses three measures of an individual's real wages. 
First, the overall real wage is measured as annual real earnings for the 
individual divided by the product of annual weeks worked and usual 
hours worked per week. This measure of real wages reflects both in 
dividuals' success in reaching high-paying occupations, and the rate of 
pay they receive in that occupation.
This overall real wage variable suffers from considerable measure 
ment error. The product of weeks worked and usual weekly hours is 
an inexact measure of annual hours. A well-known statistical conse 
quence of greater measurement error in a dependent variable (in this 
case, real wages) in any empirical study is that the estimates of the ef 
fects of the independent variables (such as shocks to metropolitan area 
employment in this case) on the dependent variable will be much more 
imprecise. However, measurement error in the dependent variable will 
not cause estimated effects to be biased; that is, on average the estimated 
effects would be expected to be equal to the "true" effects.
A second micro real wage variable is defined as the individual's oc 
cupational rank. Each occupation was assigned an occupational rank 
index, equal to the average real wage, over the entire 1979-86 period, 
of that occupation in the nation. 3 Each individual's occupational rank 
was defined as the occupational rank of his/her primary job during the 
year. Local growth will only affect an individual's occupational rank 
if it affects the probability of getting a job in a higher- or lower-paying 
occupation. As discussed above, there are some grounds for believing 
that local growth could have long-run effects on an individual's occupa 
tional rank, as growth will augment human capital in the short run and 
thus affect what occupations are possible for an individual of a given 
education, age, and race.
The occupational rank variable will be less subject to measurement 
error than the overall real wage variable. Because the occupational rank 
variable averages across workers in a given occupation, errors in
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estimating individual workers' real wages will cancel out. The lesser 
measurement error implies that growth effects on occupational rank can 
be estimated with greater precision than growth effects on overall real 
wages.
The third micro real wage variable, the wage differential variable, 
is defined as the difference between the overall real wage and the oc 
cupation rank variable. An individual could have a positive wage dif 
ferential for at least three reasons. First, the individual's occupation 
might pay more in this local area than it does nationally. Second, the 
individual may be employed in a detailed occupational category, within 
one of the occupational groups used to define the occupational rank 
variable, that pays more nationally than other occupational categories 
within the broader occupational group. Third, the individual may be 
paid more than other individuals within that detailed occupational 
category. For example, whites may be paid more than blacks within 
the same occupational category due to discrimination. Hence, the ef 
fects of local growth on this wage differential variable may reflect oc 
cupational advancement (within specific occupational groups), changes 
in the local pay of an occupational group, or changes in the way that 
individual is paid compared to others in that occupation.
Like the overall real wage variable, the wage differential variable 
will be subject to considerable measurement error. Estimates of growth 
effects on the wage differential will be imprecise.
Because of the way in which these real wage variables are constructed, 
I emphasize the results for the AWS variables and the occupation rank 
variables. As pointed out above, these wage variables are measured with 
more precision than the wage differential variable and the overall real 
wage variable. Furthermore, the real wage concept being measured is 
more specific for the occupation rank and AWS variables. The AWS 
variables capture changes in average occupational wages in the MS A. 
The occupational rank variable captures changes in occupational ad 
vancement in the MS A. In contrast, the wage differential variable and 
overall real wage variable can change due to growth for any number 
of reasons.
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As described in table 6.2, the model used in this study allows estima 
tion of both short-run and long-run effects of growth. In addition, the 
model also examines whether demand-induced growth has different ef 
fects on real wages from those of growth in general. Finally, I also 
examine whether a growth shock has different effects at different in 
itial levels of growth. 4
New Estimates of the Effects of Growth 
on Real Wages
Table 6.3 summarizes this study's estimates of the effects of overall 
job growth in a metropolitan area—whether caused by labor demand 
or labor supply shocks—on average real wages. 5 (Appendix 6.1 presents 
some additional detail on the results.) As can be seen in the table, the 
effects of overall local growth on the various real wage measures does 
not change much as we move from the short run to the long run.
For the occupational wage indices, there is no evidence of signifi 
cant positive effects of local growth. Average occupational real wage 
rates for skilled workers actually drop significantly in the long run, by 
about .1 of 1 percent for a 1 percent employment shock.
In contrast, the table shows that individual real wages increase by 
about .26 of 1 percent for a 1 percent employment shock. How can 
this be reconciled with either zero or negative effects of increased local 
growth on real wages in a given occupation?
The table suggests that these two findings may be consistent because 
of the growth effects on occupational advancement. A portion of the 
positive growth effects on a given individual's real wages occurs because 
higher local growth is associated with individuals of given skills achieving 
a higher occupational rank. On average, a 1 percent employment shock 
leads to individuals moving up to an occupation that pays . 1 of 1 per 
cent more.
In contrast, the long-run effect of growth on individuals' wage dif 
ferential from the national occupational mean is not statistically 
significantly different from zero. Even though the effect is statistically
Table 6.3
Estimated Percentage Effects of a 1 Percent Once-And-For-AH Shock to Local Employment, 
Due to Demand or Supply Shocks, on Various Measures of Real Wages
Real Wage Measure Examined
Aggregate Occupational Real Wages
Skilled workers
Unskilled workers
Office and clerical workers
Micro Measures of Real Wages
Individual average real wages
Occupational rank of workers
Wage differential from national 
occupational mean
Immediate 
Effect
-.13
(.07)
-.11
(.05)
-.03
(.04)
.260 
(.116)
.101 
(-041)
.159 
(-113)
Cumulative Effect After:
Long-Run 
1 year 2 years 3 years . . . Effect
.03 -.17 -.01 -.01
(.08) (.08) (.05) (.05)
-.11
(.05)
-.03
.260 
(.116)
.101 
(.041)
.159 
(.113)
en
NOTES: For each real wage measure, this table reports percentage effects of a 1 percent local employment increase, for the specification with a lag- 
length (in the employment variables) that minimizes the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Because this lag-length is chosen after testing lag-lengths 
up to eight years, the implication is that this estimated effect does not change significantly (in a statistical sense) from the AIC lag-length up to eight 
years (a "long-run" effect). As can be seen in the table, except for the skilled worker occupational wage variable, there is little evidence of any signifi 
cant change in employment shock effects after the immediate effect has occurred. Standard errors are in parentheses below the estimated effects.
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insignificant, the point estimate of the effect of growth on the wage 
differential variable is positive. However, as discussed above, this 
positive effect of growth on the wage differential variable could reflect 
occupational advancement within the occupational categories used to 
define the occupational rank.
The estimated effects of local growth on the micro real wage variables 
are particularly sensitive to the number of lagged employment terms 
that are included in the specification. The statistical criterion used to 
choose the optimal lag-length correctly suggests that there are no 
statistically significant changes in the effects of growth after the initial 
shock. However, the relatively large standard error in estimating the 
local growth effect on real wages means that this lack of statistically 
significant change with the inclusion of additional lags is perfectly con 
sistent with a decline in the estimated effect as lags are added that is 
substantively large. For example, if eight lags in the metropolitan area 
employment variables are included, the estimated long-run effect of 
growth on real wages drops to . 17 percent for a 1 percent employment 
shock, compared to the .26 percent estimate from the "optimal" lag- 
length specification. Most of this drop appears to be due to a decline 
in the point estimate of the effects of local growth on the wage differential 
variable; the point estimate of this effect drops almost in half in the 
eight-lag specification compared to the optimal specification. 6 This sen 
sitivity of estimates of the micro real wage and wage differential equa 
tions may be due to the imprecision with which these real wage variables 
are measured.
Effects of demand-induced growth in metropolitan employment on 
average real wages were also estimated. For the occupational wage rate 
indices, demand-induced growth has no statistically significant different 
effects from growth in general. For the micro real wage variables, 
demand-induced growth does have statistically significantly different 
effects. The estimated effects of demand-induced growth on the micro 
real wage variables are presented in figures 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3.
These figures and table 6.3 show two main differences between the 
effects of demand-induced growth and overall growth. First, the short- 
run and long-run effects on occupational advancement are twice as large 
for demand-induced growth compared to growth in general.
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Figure 6.1
Percentage Effects of Demand-Induced 1 Percent Once-and-for-All 
Local Employment Shock on Real Wages, Micro Sample
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with eight lags is -.179 (.592).
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Figure 6.2
Percentage Effects of Demand-Induced 1 Percent Once-and-for-AH 
Local Employment Shock on ''Occupational Rank"
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Figure 6.3
Percentage Effects of Demand-Induced 1 Percent Once-and-for-All 
Local Employment Shock on Average "Wage Differential" 
of Workers from National Mean Wage of Their Occupation
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Second, the short-run effects on the wage differential variable and 
the overall real wage variable are significantly greater for demand- 
induced growth than for general growth. These estimates are quite im 
precise, however.
Although the overall effects of demand-induced growth and general 
growth differ significantly for both the real wage and wage differential 
variables, the estimated long-run effects on these two variables do not 
change significantly when we focus on demand-induced growth rather 
than all growth. Examining only demand-induced growth increases the 
imprecision of estimates. The estimated long-run effects of demand- 
induced growth on the wage differential and real wage variables are 
so imprecisely estimated that it is impossible to rule out a zero effect, 
a modestly large negative effect, or a modestly large positive effect of 
the same order of magnitude as the estimated effects of general growth.
Although these estimates are more imprecise than we would like, they 
seem generally consistent with this book's perspective on how local 
growth affects local labor markets. Local growth may have short-run 
positive effects on the real wages of particular occupations. But such 
effects decay over time, presumably due to in-migration, and there is 
no strong evidence of positive effects of local growth on occupational 
real wages in the long run. Long-run effects of local growth on real 
wages occur because individuals advance to better-paying occupations, 
and remain in better-paying occupations in the long run, presumably 
due to the human capital they acquired in the short run.
Finally, whether the effect of growth shocks on real wages varies 
with the prevailing level of job growth in the metropolitan area is ex 
amined. The initial level of growth only seemed to be important for 
growth effects on the skilled worker real wage variable. For this variable, 
an increase in a metropolitan area's change in employment from -1 per 
cent per year to zero growth was estimated to increase long-run real 
wages for skilled workers by .18 of 1 percent, while an increase in a 
metropolitan area's growth from 2 to 3 percent was estimated to reduce 
real wages for skilled workers by -.01 of 1 percent. The real wage ef 
fects of variations in growth were larger at low growth rates, contrary 
to expectations. Thus, the empirical results provide no evidence for 
downward rigidity of the real wage.
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Growth Effects on Real Wages Across Different Groups
Table 6.4 reports how the long-run effects of job growth on real wages 
in a metropolitan area vary with education, age, and race. The table 
reports estimates of the effects of demand-induced growth because these 
results differ significantly from the effects of general growth. 7
Table 6.4 indicates that growth has significantly greater percentage 
effects on real wages for blacks, less-educated workers, and younger 
workers. The greater percentage effects on these groups' real wages 
are due to greater effects on both the occupational rank and wage dif 
ferential variables. 8
A plausible story can be told to explain these variations across in 
dividuals. During a boom period, firms promote people who otherwise 
would not be promoted: workers with lower education, younger workers, 
and blacks. Credentials of all sorts are less important to promotion deci 
sions. Given the chance, workers with fewer credentials are able to 
demonstrate their abilities and acquire additional human capital, thus 
increasing their chance of keeping this job or another job of similar 
occupational rank. 9
These results seem broadly consistent with Topel's (1986) article, 
the only previous research that has looked at how local job growth af 
fects the real wages of different types of individuals. Topel found that 
local growth shocks affected real wages the most for less-educated 
workers. 10
Conclusion
This chapter's results suggest that increased employment in a 
metropolitan area does not increase the long-run real wages offered by 
different occupations. The wage paid by an employer for a specific oc 
cupation increases about the same amount as local prices. But increas 
ed area employment does help some individuals advance to better-paying 
occupations. In response to increased local labor demand, employers 
may relax their hiring standards, allowing jobs to be more quickly filled
Table 6.4
Demographic Variation in the Long-Run Effects on Real Wages 
of a Demand-Induced Shock That Increases MSA Employment by 1 Percent
Real Wage Measure
Real wages
Occupational rank
Wage differential
Percentage 
Effect 
for "Mean" 
Individual
.442 
(.222)
.161 
(.080)
.282 
(.220)
Change in Percentage Effect Due to 
Standardized Increase In:
Education
-.056 
(.007)
-.035 
(.003)
-.022 
(.008)
Age
-.048 
(.007)
-.027 
(.003)
-.022 
(.009)
Black
.117 
(.028)
.054 
(.012)
.064 
(.032)
NOTES: A standardized change is a one standard deviation change for education (3.0 years) and age (11.8 years), and a change from white to black. 
The results reported here for age are actually for experience (= age-education-6); hence, it should be remembered that the education variable change 
holds constant experience, not age. The mean individual has 13.0 years of education, 22.3 years of experience, and a probability of being black of 
9.7 percent. Standard errors are in parentheses. As described in appendix 6.1, standard errors reported here are conditional on sample values of some 
variables and parameters. The percentage effects for a mean individual show the percentage effect of 1 percent growth on that measure of real wages 
for an individual with mean characteristics; for example, for an average individual, their occupational rank increases by .161 percent for a 1 percent 
shock to MSA employment. The change in that percentage effect with different demographic characteristics must be added to these "mean effects" 
to get the actual effects for individuals whose demographic characteristics differ from the average. For example, an individual with three more years 
of education than average would be expected to have their occupational rank increased by . 126 percent ( = . 161-.035) due to a 1 percent job growth shock.
O
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without an increase in real wages. Individuals are able to keep these 
better-paying jobs even in the long run. These effects are consistent 
with hysteresis theories of local labor markets, which suggest that bet 
ter labor market conditions in the short run may allow an improvement 
in the average labor market skills of the population.
The positive effects of increased metropolitan employment on occupa 
tional advancement are strongest for blacks, less-educated, and younger 
workers. This suggests a relatively "progressive" pattern to the real 
wage effects of metropolitan job growth: the percentage increase in real 
wages due to occupational advancement is greatest for the groups with 
the lowest incomes.
NOTES
1. This summary excludes the many studies of local wages that do not include an employment 
growth or population growth term. Four good examples of such studies are the papers by Blom- 
quist, Berger, and Hoehn (1988); Clark, Kahn and Ofek (1988); Henderson (1988); and Gyourko 
and Tracy (1986). The summary also excludes the many studies of local wages that take a Phillips 
curve approach, regressing local wage inflation on local unemployment. (These Phillips curve 
regional wage studies are discussed in the excellent review of the literature on regional labor markets 
by Isserman, Taylor, Gerking, and Schubert 1986.) From the perspective of this study, both 
unemployment and wage growth are endogenous variables that respond to faster local employ 
ment growth, and OLS estimation of Phillips curves may be misleading. In addition, the sum 
mary excludes studies of local wages that include unemployment as well as local growth as a 
wage determinant. (For examples, see studies by Freeman 1981; Howland 1988; Howland and 
Peterson 1988; and Levy 1982). Estimates of the wage effects of local growth, holding unemploy 
ment constant, are not comparable to estimates of the wage effects of local growth, allowing 
unemployment to endogenously adjust. Finally, the summary excludes the recent paper by Holzer 
and Montgomery (1989) that looks at sales growth, wage growth, and employment growth at 
the firm level, as this paper is a very preliminary analysis of their data, and the paper's authors 
request that it not be quoted as yet.
2. The exception is Topel (1986), who examines how local growth effects vary with education 
and age.
3. The average occupational real wage was calculated using the same pooled Current Population 
Survey sample that was used for the micro real wage empirical analysis.
4. One difference between the micro model in table 6.2 and the real wage models of most other 
studies is that the wage variables are expressed in absolute form, as dollars per hour rather than 
as the logarithm of dollars per hour. This is done largely because real wages can take on negative 
values for individuals with negative self-employment earnings. I included individuals with low 
or even negative implied real wages to avoid arbitrary exclusion restrictions. But this meant that 
a logarithm of the real wage variable cannot be used. However, all results in the text and the 
text tables are presented as percentage effects on real wages, calculated at the means of the sam 
ple. This allows easier comparison with other studies, and is more intuitive. Appendix 6.1 presents 
the original estimates of the effects on dollars earned per hour.
156 Effects on Real Wages
5. The OLS estimates are presented in summary tables, rather than graphs as in chapter 4, because 
the dynamics of real wage responses to growth do not appear to be particularly interesting in 
the OLS specification. Graphs tend to focus reader attention on the dynamics of how labor market 
and housing market variables adjust over time.
6. In OLS specifications with eight lags in employment, the long-run percentage effect of 1 per 
cent growth (with the standard errors in parentheses) on the micro real wage measures is as follows: 
micro real wage, .165 percent (.151); occupational rank, .086 percent (.054); wage differential, 
.079 percent (.148).
7. The lag-length chosen for overall real wages is also used for the occupational rank and wage 
differential variables to ensure that the estimated variations across individuals for the occupa 
tional rank and wage differential variables add up to the variation across individuals for the overall 
real wage variable.
8. Table 6.4 presents calculations for how the percentage effects of growth on real wages varies 
with a one-unit "standardized change" in a particular individual characteristic. This standardiz 
ed change is defined as a one "standard deviation" change in the education and age variables 
(3.0 years for education, 11.8 years for age), and a change from white to black for the race variable. 
This standardized change approach is used to get some sense of the relative size of the effects 
of the different characteristics; even though both the education and age variables are expressed 
in years, for example, there is a lot more natural variability in the age variable than in the educa 
tion variable.
It should be noted that the significant negative effect of education and age on growth's percent 
age impact on overall real wages and the wage differential variable is sensitive to the exact specifica 
tion used. These percentage effects are calculated at the mean of this sample for the real wage, 
and the mean estimate of the percentage effect of growth on that particular dependent variable. 
As noted above, this average percentage effect of growth varies quite a bit for the overall real 
wage and wage differential variables. If lower average percentage effects of growth are assumed, 
age and education do not have significant effects on the percentage impact of growth on these 
two variables. However, the effects of racial status for these two variables is robust to different 
specifications. Furthermore, the effects of age, education, and race on the percentage impact of 
growth on occupational rank are robust to different specifications.
9. The greater growth effects on the wage differential variable for blacks, less-educated, and younger 
workers might be interpreted as indicating that growth causes some reduction in wage discrimination 
against these individuals: their wage increases relative to the wage of educated older whites within 
the same occupation. But, as noted previously in the text, estimates using the wage differential 
variable as a dependent variable are subject to several interpretations. The wage differential variable 
could increase more for blacks, less-educated, and younger workers because faster local growth 
allows these individuals to advance to better occupations within the occupational categories used 
to define the occupational rank variable. Hence, the text discussion emphasizes the greater ef 
fects of local job growth on the occupational rank of blacks, younger workers, and less-educated 
workers.
10. Topel's estimates of how an individual's age altered the real wage effects of local growth 
were quite sensitive to the particular empirical specification used.
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Effects of Economic Development Policy 
on Individual Earnings,
Income Distribution, 
and Economic Efficiency
This chapter analyzes the overall effects of state and local economic 
development policy on the earnings and incomes of different types of 
individuals, taking into account all the different economic effects of local 
job growth—on unemployment, labor force participation, occupational 
advancement, and housing prices—and taking into account the costs of 
financing economic development policies as well as the benefits of these 
policies. To state and local policy makers, these effects of economic 
development policies on the overall well-being of an area's residents 
and landowners should be the "bottom line" in deciding whether the 
policies make sense.
Effects of Local Growth on Real Earnings
The effects of job growth in a metropolitan area on the annual real 
earnings of an individual are considered first. The empirical results from 
previous chapters already provide an indirect estimate of local growth 
effects on real earnings. As defined in this book, real earnings is the 
mathematical product of labor force participation, the employment rate, 
weekly hours, and the real wage. Because the percentage change in any 
mathematical product will approximately equal the sum of the percent 
age change in its components, the percentage effect of growth on real 
earnings should approximately equal the sum of the percentage growth 
effect on labor force participation, wage rates, and other components 
of real earnings. This chapter's direct estimates of real earnings effects of
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growth provide a useful check on the study methodology. Also, direct 
estimation is the simplest way to determine the statistical uncertainty 
in estimated effects of growth on real earnings. 1
Previous Research on Local Growth and Earnings
Only two previous studies have looked at local economic growth and 
earnings or income: a book by Bradbury, Downs, and Small (1982), 
and a paper by Salinas (1986). These studies are summarized in table 
7.1. Both studies find some earnings effect of growth.
Each of these studies has important strengths compared to most other 
research reviewed in previous chapters on effects of local growth. Brad 
bury, Downs, and Small recognize that demand-induced job growth will 
have different earnings effects from growth in general. A local demand 
shock that increases profits will increase labor demand, and thus real 
earnings, resulting in a positive correlation between employment growth 
and real earnings. In contrast, a local labor supply shock will lower 
local real wages, thus attracting employment and resulting in a negative 
correlation between employment growth and real earnings. The estimated 
effects of all types of local employment growth on real earnings will 
be downward-biased estimates of the effects of demand-induced growth 
on real earnings.
The Bradbury, Downs, and Small approach to measuring demand- 
induced growth is similar to the approach used in this book. Specifical 
ly, they used the growth in demand for each metropolitan area's export 
industries to predict overall growth for the metropolitan area. 2
The Salinas paper, unlike other studies of local growth effects, allows 
the effects to differ between slow-growth and fast-growth areas. She 
found increased local job growth had greater effects on a metropolitan 
area's proportion of low-income earners in slow-growth metropolitan 
areas than in fast-growth metropolitan areas.
But the Bradbury and colleagues and Salinas studies also have signifi 
cant limitations. Like the studies reviewed in other chapters, these studies 
fail to distinguish between the short-run and long-run effects of growth. 
The coefficient on the single growth variable included in each study 
combines short-run and long-run effects of growth.
Table 7.1 
Previous Research on Effects of Local Growth on Local Earnings Variables
Study
Salinas 
(1986)
Bradbury, 
Downs 
& Small 
(1982)
Geographic Population or Period Over
Units Used in Employment Which Growth
Growth Analysis Growth Calculated
MSAs Employment 4 years
MSAs Employment 5 years
Micro or
Aggregate
Data
Aggregate
Aggregate
Dependent
Variable
"Subemployment' '
rate: proportion
earning less than 
125% of poverty
Per capita income
Estimated Percentage 
Effect of 1 Percent
Growth on
Dependent Variable
(Elasticity)
-.15 drop in rate points 
in nongrowing cities
.2
Effects ofconomic
NOTE: Bradbury, Downs & Small results are from their tables 5.4 and 5.6.
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Furthermore, both studies only look at aggregate data on metropolitan 
areas. Hence, their studies cannot tell how growth effects vary across 
individuals.
Finally, neither study is able to adequately control for price changes 
in the metropolitan areas. Thus, the implication of the results for growth 
effects on real earnings is unclear. The dependent variable used by 
Salinas is the proportion of the metropolitan area's population that falls 
below 125 percent of the level of income used to define the national 
poverty line, which is based on average consumer prices in the nation. 
A poverty line based on a separate price index for each metropolitan 
area would be more appropriate and might yield different results. Brad 
bury, Downs, and Small use nominal per capita income in the 
metropolitan area as the dependent variable. They control for price 
change by including the change in the price index of the nearest 
metropolitan area for which such an index is available. Of the 121 
metropolitan areas in their sample, only 33 have local price indices. 
Hence, it is unclear whether their results would hold up if they had 
been able to use better measures of local prices for all the metropolitan 
areas in their sample.
New Estimates of Local Growth Effects on Earnings
The methodology and data used here to estimate real earnings effects 
of local job growth are outlined in table 7.2. The methodology and data 
are similar to what was used in previous chapters, so the discussion 
can be brief. 3
The data used are again on adult males from 1979 through 1986, taken 
from the Current Population Survey. The empirical analysis examines 
how job growth in a metropolitan area affects the annual real earnings 
of individual residents of the metropolitan area, where annual real earn 
ings includes all the individual's dollar compensation from working dur 
ing the year. Annual earnings differs from average wages during the 
preceding year in that wages are the average earnings per hour worked 
during the preceding year, while annual earnings do not control for hours 
worked.
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Table 7.2
Methodology and Data Used in Model of Effects 
of Local Growth on Real Earnings
Basic Model: The model used can be written as
(7.1) Yimt = B0 + Nt + Fm + B'\imt + C(L)Emt + Vim
where Y}mt is real earnings of individual / in MSA m at year t, Nt represents 
a set of dummy variables for the time period, Fm represents a set of dummy 
variables for the metropolitan area (MSA), \imt is a set of individual 
characteristics thought to influence real earnings, C(L)Emt represents a set of 
coefficients times current and lagged values of the logarithm of average total 
nonagricultural employment in MSA m during year t, and V^mt is the distur 
bance term. The inclusion of the MSA fixed effect means that this equation 
is focusing on the effects of MSA job growth, not job levels (see appendix 4.2).
The equation is estimated both by ordinary least squares (OLS), and by us 
ing two-stage least squares (2SLS) to look at the effects of "demand-induced" 
growth. Some specifications also included interaction terms between the 
employment variables, and the education, age, and race of the individual; others 
included terms in growth squared. All equations were tested on a variety of 
possible lag-lengths in employment from zero to eight lagged years. The op 
timal lag-length, based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), is reported 
in subsequent figures. This optimal lag-length means that the cumulative ef 
fect does not seem to vary after that.
The individual data come from the March 1980 through March 1987 CPS, 
and cover annual earnings for the years 1979 through 1986. Only individuals 
in the 25 MSAs with a local CPI index were used. Total sample size was 14,918 
adult males, ages 25-64. Employment data come from the BLS 790 program 
and ES-202 program.
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The methodology allows statistical tests to determine when the ef 
fect on earnings of a shock to a metropolitan area's employment stabilizes 
at some long-run effect. Also examined is whether the effects of demand- 
induced job growth in a metropolitan area differ from the average ef 
fects of all types of growth (either from shocks to labor demand or shocks 
to labor supply).
Figure 7.1 presents estimates of the average effects of all types of 
local growth, including both demand and supply shocks. A 1 percent 
permanent increase in the employment level of a metropolitan area is 
estimated to increase real earnings by 44/100 of 1 percent in the long 
run. The effect on real earnings is significantly greater in the short run.
Statistical tests indicated significant differences between the real earn 
ings effects of demand-induced growth and overall growth. 4 Figure 7.2 
presents estimates of the real earnings effects of demand-induced growth 
in employment in a metropolitan area. It shows that the short-run real 
earnings effects of demand-induced growth are significantly greater than 
the effects of overall growth. The estimated long-run effects of demand- 
induced growth on real earnings are virtually identical to the long-run 
effects of overall growth, but they are insignificantly different from zero 
because the standard error—which represents our statistical uncertain 
ty about them—is relatively large.
Figure 7.2 raises some difficult issues about what inferences we are 
willing to make on the basis of these estimates and economic theory. 
In particular, do we conclude that there is no strong evidence of positive 
long-run effects of demand-induced local growth on real earnings because 
the estimated effects are not statistically significantly different from zero?
It is more reasonable to conclude that demand-induced growth does 
have long-run effects on real earnings. The statistical discussion above 
indicated that the estimated real earnings effects of overall growth are 
downward-biased estimates of the effects of demand-induced growth. 
Hence, the estimated long-run effect of overall growth on real earn 
ings should be an underestimate of the true effect of demand-induced 
growth. The empirical estimates are consistent with this hypothesis. The 
estimated short-run effects of demand-induced growth are greater than 
the effects of overall growth, as expected. Furthermore, there is no
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Figure 7.1
Estimated Cumulative Effects on Real Earnings
of Once-and-for-AH 1 Percent Shock to Local Employment,
at Different Times After the Shock
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Estimated Cumulative Effects on Which Figure is Based:
Immediate 
effect =
0 years
1.077
(.293)
Long-run 
effect =
1 year
.438
(.125)
NOTES: Figure presents OLS estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses. Figure shows best 
point estimate, plus two standard errors to either side of point estimate. True effect has 95 per 
cent probability of falling in that interval. Optimal lag-length, based on AIC is one year among 
all lag-lengths up to eight years. This optimality implies cumulative effect does not vary significantly 
from one year to eight years. Long-run effect in 8-lag model is .277 percent, with standard error 
of.157.
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Figure 7.2
Estimated Cumulative Effects on Real Earnings of Once-and-for-All
1 Percent Demand Shock to Local Employment,
at Different Times After the Shock
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NOTES: Figure presents 2SLS estimates, using share effect "demand shock" variables as in 
struments. Standard errors in parentheses. Figure shows best point estimate, plus two standard 
errors. Three years is optimal lag-length according to AIC. With eight lags, estimated long-run 
effect is .382, with standard error of .617.
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evidence that the long-run effects of demand-induced growth are 
significantly less than the long-run effects of overall growth.
The basic problem is that the statistical uncertainty in the estimates 
of the long-run effects of demand-induced growth is so great that we 
cannot make strong inferences on the basis of the estimates. Hence, 
we must rely on the estimated effects of overall growth to make any 
inferences. Estimated effects of overall growth do suggest that long- 
run effects of demand-induced metropolitan job growth on real earn 
ings are significant, as demand-induced growth should have larger ef 
fects than overall growth.
Examination of how the effects of extra growth on real earnings varied 
with the initial level of growth found no evidence of any significant 
differences.
Consistency With Results of Previous Chapters
I now consider the relationship between these estimated real earn 
ings effects and the estimates in previous chapters of the effects of local 
employment shocks on unemployment rates, labor force participation, 
weekly hours worked and real wages. As argued above, the percent 
age effect of employment shocks on real earnings should approximately 
equal the sum of the percentage effects of employment shocks on each 
of the real earnings components. Table 7.3 presents the estimated short- 
run and long-run percentage effects of local employment growth on real 
earnings and its components. The table indicates a rough consistency 
between the results of this chapter and previous chapters.
Table 7.3 shows that one-half to two-thirds of the long-run effects 
of local growth on real earnings are due to growth effects on labor market 
activity: unemployment rates, labor force participation, and hours work 
ed per week. The remaining portion of the earnings effects is due to 
effects on real wages. Furthermore, a considerable portion of local 
growth effects on real wages is due to effects on occupational upgrading. 
In the long run, for the average individual, local growth increases real 
earnings by increasing work or providing better jobs, not by increas 
ing real wages for the same job.
Table 7.3
Contribution of Various Components to Percentage Effect on Real Earnings 
of a 1 Percent Employment Shock
Labor 
Force Employment Weekly Occupational Wage Sum 
Participation + Rate + Hours + Upgrading + Differential = of 
Effect Effect Effect Effect Effect Components
Long-Run Effects
Overall
growth 
estimates .157 + .070 + .066 + .101 + .159 = .553
Demand
shock
estimates .265 + .103 + .000 + .238 + (-.110) = .496
Direct 
Estimate 
of Real 
Earnings 
Effect
.438
.382
Maximum Short-Run Effects
Overall 
growth 
estimates .157 + .446 + .248 + .101 + .159 1.111 1.077
moo
o
Demand
shock
estimates .265 .613 + .000 + .238 + 3.550 4.666 3.344
NOTES: Table reports percentage effects, at sample mean of each variable, of a 1 percent increase in employment in the metropolitan area. Thus, 
the long-run labor force participation effect of .157 percent for overall growth is equal to .137 change in labor force participation rate, reported in 
chapter 4, divided by mean labor force participation rate of 87.5. Long-run effects are for specification, for each component separately considered, 
that minimized the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Short-run effects are maximum effects in these "Optimal AIC" specifications. Hence, in each 
case the estimated effects may be after various lengths of time.
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In the short run, the relative contribution of different components to 
local growth effects on real earnings is sensitive to whether one ex 
amines the effects of overall growth or demand-induced growth. In either 
case, effects of local growth on unemployment are clearly much more 
important in the short run than in the long run. But the importance of 
real wage effects varies quite a bit across the two sets of estimates. 
Estimates based on the effects of demand-induced growth indicate that 
real wage effects of local growth are extremely large in the short run, 
explaining most of their short-run effects on real earnings. The estimates 
based on the effects of overall growth do not indicate a very large role 
for real wage effects in the short run.
It is difficult to know which of these decompositions of the short-run 
effects of local growth on real earnings is closer to the truth. As pointed 
out in chapter 6 and in this chapter, the estimates of the short-run ef 
fects of demand-induced growth on real wages and real earnings are 
extremely imprecise, so the true short-run effects could differ quite a 
bit from the estimates reported in table 7.3. Furthermore, even if these 
large short-run effects of local growth on real wages are correct, they 
appear to disappear rapidly. Any real wage benefits of local growth 
for individuals who keep the same job are short-lived.
Effects of Local Growth on Earnings 
By Demographic Group
Table 7.4 presents estimates of how the long-run real earnings ef 
fects of local employment shocks differ across demographic groups. 
These results show that the real earnings effects of an employment shock 
are significantly greater for less-educated workers and blacks. Real earn 
ings effects of employment shocks are similar for different age groups, 
however.
Using results from previous chapters, table 7.4 breaks down what 
factors contribute to differences across demographic groups in the long- 
run real earnings effects of local employment shocks. Differences across 
demographic groups in percentage effects of employment shocks on real 
earnings should approximately equal the sum of the differences across
Table 7.4
Differences Across Individuals in the Long-Run Effects of Employment Shocks 
on Real Earnings: Overall Results and a Decomposition
n 
Real Earnings ~ 
Flasticitv for Impact on Elasticity of Standardized Change in: 0
Mean Household Education Age Black tn
.399 -.065 -.011 .082 §
(.349) (.008) (.008) (.032) |.
Contribution of Different Factors to Differences Across Individuals in Real Earnings Effects <
Education Age Black •«
Labor force
participation
Employment
rate
Weekly
hours
Occupational
rank
Wage
differential ,
.004 ^
(.002)
Labor -.005
market (.001)
activity
-.002
(.002) ^
-.035 >
(.003)
Real
wages
-.022
(.009) ,
.028 >
(.002)
-.002
• -.003 (.001)
.003
(.002)
-.027 >
(.003)
1 -.057
-.022
(.009)
.002 ^
(.008)
-.011
» .029 (.004)
-.004
(.007) ^
.054 >
(.012)
1 -.049
.064
(.032)
s
io'
-.013
• .118
f S S
NOTES: All calculations in the table show impact of "standardized change" in a demographic characteristic on percentage effect of a 1 percent growth 
shock on a particular dependent variable. All calculations are for the "optimal" interaction specification; the optimal interaction specifications for all 
except the real earnings variable are discussed in previous chapters. The real earnings calculations are for the 4-lag specification with interaction terms, 
which minimizes the AIC. A "standardized change" in education and age is one standard deviation change for education (3.0 years) and age (11.8 
years), standardized change in the race variable is from a value of zero (= white) to one (= black). The calculated elasticity impact of a standardized 
change in one of these demographic variables examines how the ratio of the absolute effect of a demand shock, divided by the expected value of the 
dependent variable, changes as the demographic characteristic is altered. For example, as education increases by 3.0 years, the absolute dollar effect 
of a growth shock on real earnings goes up (see appendix 7.1), but the expected value of real earnings goes up even more. Thus, the percentage impact 
of a 1 percent growth shock on real earnings, equal to the absolute dollar effect divided by real earnings, declines by .065 percent from its mean value 
of .399 percent. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard error calculations are discussed in appendix 7.1 and appendix 6.1. Note that impacts of 
demographic variables on percentage effect of growth shock, for each component of real earnings, approximately sum to impact on percentage real 
earnings effect. Thus, for education, -.003 - .057 == -.065.
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demographic groups in the percentage effects of employment shocks 
on the components of real earnings. This equality appears to approx 
imately hold in table 7.4.
Based on table 7.4, the greater real earnings gains from growth for 
blacks and the less-educated are due to greater effects of growth on 
their real wages. As discussed in chapter 4, local growth helps blacks 
and the less-educated to get jobs, but by no more than others. Growth's 
effects on labor market activity explain much of its real earnings ef 
fects for the average individual, but little of the differences in real earn 
ings effects across individuals. But local growth helps the promotion 
prospects for blacks and the less-educated significantly more than it helps 
the promotion prospects for other groups.
Table 7.4 also shows that the similarity across age groups in real earn 
ings effects of employment shocks conceals offsetting influences of age 
on how shocks affect labor market activity and real wages. Older 
workers' labor force participation is more affected by employment shocks 
than is true for younger workers. But younger workers' promotion 
possibilities are more affected by local employment shocks than is true 
for older workers. These differences are understandable. Compared to 
younger workers, older workers find it more socially acceptable—and 
financially feasible—to drop out of the labor force when the local 
economy is depressed. Compared to older workers, younger workers 
face more barriers to promotion due to inexperience, and their promo 
tion prospects improve more when employers are forced to relax pro 
motion standards in a booming, labor-short local economy.
A different perspective on how local employment shocks affect dif 
ferent demographic groups is provided by comparing these effects with 
alternative programs for increasing the real earnings of residents of 
economically depressed metropolitan areas. As discussed in chapter 4, 
the policy alternatives usually proposed are education and training pro 
grams and assistance for migration to more fortunate regions. These 
two alternatives have in common that the main beneficiaries are likely 
to be young. The real earnings effects of local employment shocks, 
however, do not vary much with age. Older workers in economically
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depressed metropolitan areas are benefited more by state and local 
economic development programs that promote growth, than by alter 
native policies proposed for helping people in depressed areas. 
Presumably, much of this special benefit for older workers occurs due 
to fewer plant closings or contractions in more rapidly growing areas. 
State and local economic development programs focused on existing 
plants, particularly those in distress, might be of the most assistance 
to older workers.
Effects of Economic Development Policy 
on Income Distribution
. . . Growth likely increases inequality within places through 
its effects on the distribution of rents. Increases in urban scale mean 
larger numbers of bidders for the same critically located land 
parcels (for example, the central business district or the site for 
a freeway intersection), inflating land prices relative to wages and 
other wealth sources. (Page 95 in Urban Fortunes: The Political 
Economy of Place, John Logan and Harvey Molotch, 1987)
The target population, the unemployed labor force, is not always 
the only—or even the main—beneficiary of new industry. A 
disproportionately large share of the increased purchasing power 
goes to the owners of immobile resources other than labor. Real 
estate owners, banks, retailers, and utilities are surer beneficiaries 
than are the unemployed coal miners or loggers who are less like 
ly to get the jobs in the new plants than are new in-migrants, 
younger and with more appropriate skills. (Page 280 in Louis Win- 
nick, "Place Prosperity vs. People Prosperity: Welfare Considera 
tions in the Geographic Redistribution of Economic Activity," in 
Essays in Urban Land Economics, 1966)
I now turn from considering how the benefits of growth are distributed 
across demographic groups to how they are distributed across income 
and earnings groups. It is often argued that local economic growth will 
worsen the local income distribution. The rationale for this argument,
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well-stated by Logan and Molotch and by Winnick above, is that local 
growth will push up property values to a greater extent than it increases 
real wages or employment prospects for the bottom part of the income 
distribution.
The evidence compiled in this book enables us to test this hypothesis. 
Results from this and previous chapters imply a particular pattern of 
effects of local employment shocks on the income distribution. In 
dividuals in low-income groups are disproportionately less-educated and 
black, and hence will tend to have greater percentage gains in real earn 
ings from an employment shock. On the other hand, higher-income 
individuals are more likely to own homes and other property, and hence 
are more likely to gain property value appreciation benefits from local 
growth. Which effect dominates?
Local Growth and the Earnings Distribution
Table 7.5 presents calculations of growth effects on different quin- 
tiles of the male earnings distribution. I first calculated, for each in 
dividual in the real earnings sample (14,918 in all), the estimated real 
dollar effects of a 1 percent demand shock on their annual earnings, 
based on their education, race, and age. The sample was then ordered 
by annual real earnings and divided into quintiles. The average real earn 
ings effect of a 1 percent demand shock in each quintile was divided 
by average real earnings in each quintile to obtain estimated percent 
age effects.
These percentage effects by current annual earnings quintile are shown 
in column (2) of table 7.5. The pattern of growth effects on earnings 
is extremely progressive. The lowest earnings quintile's percentage gain 
in earnings from growth is over 20 times as great as the percentage 
gain of the highest earnings quintile.
Like most analyses of distributional effects of policy, these calcula 
tions relate policy effects to current income. This approach might be 
criticized because this year's income will, on average, understate long- 
run expected annual income for low-current-income persons. Low- 
current-income persons will tend to have experienced temporary adverse
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misfortunes. For similar reasons, high-current-income persons will tend 
to have current incomes that overstate their long-run expected annual 
income.
To help address this problem, I estimated for the real earnings sam 
ple a simple earnings equation predicting annual real earnings as a func 
tion of education, age, and race. (Appendix 7.2 presents these estimates.) 
Individuals in the sample were then ordered by these predicted real earn 
ings, which can be seen as rough estimates of "permanent" real earn 
ings, the long-run average earnings that individuals can generally ex 
pect to receive. The sample was then divided into quintiles. Estimates 
of the percentage effects of local growth on permanent real earnings 
were then obtained by dividing the average real dollar effect of growth 
on each quintile's earnings, by the average predicted permanent earn 
ings of each quintile.
These percentage effects by permanent earnings quintile are shown 
in the fourth column of table 7.5. The pattern of effects revealed is still 
highly progressive. The estimated percentage effect of a local demand 
shock on the lowest permanent earnings quintile is twice the effect on 
the highest earnings quintile.
Which of these two sets of estimated percentage effects of growth 
on real earnings quintiles is "better"? First, it should be noted that these 
estimates are not as different as they appear, if one analyzes the pattern 
of effects by earnings relative to mean earnings. For example, the lowest 
permanent earnings quintile, and the second lowest current earnings 
quintile, both have average earnings of around half the average earn 
ings for the sample. (Each of these quintile's share of earnings is slightly 
over 10 percent, while a quintile with average earnings would have an 
earnings share of 20 percent.) The percentage effects of earnings on 
these two quintiles are similar. This implies that the percentage effect 
of demand shocks on earnings varies in much the same way as earn 
ings vary, using either current earnings or permanent earnings. What 
is different in the permanent earnings calculation is that the average 
earnings of low- and high-earnings quintiles are compressed towards 
the middle of the earnings distribution, and thus the differences in per 
centage effects across quintiles are muted.
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Second, for comparison with other studies, the estimation using cur 
rent earnings is more appropriate. Almost all studies of the distribu 
tional effects of taxes, transfers, or other policies use current income 
or earnings as a basis for calculating relative percentage effects.
Property Value Effects
Progressive effects of local job growth on annual earnings probably 
cannot be offset by the regressive distribution of the benefits from local 
growth effects on property values. The effects on property values are 
too small to substantially alter the net distributional effects of local job 
growth.
Consider the following extreme, unlikely assumptions, designed to 
maximize the regressive influence of property value effects of growth. 
Suppose that only males in the top earnings quintile owned any share 
of property. Assume further that their ownership stake in property assets 
in their metropolitan area amounted to 10 times their earnings, almost 
certainly higher than is realistic. At a 3 percent real discount rate, the 
annual earnings equivalent of this property value ownership would be 
30 percent of earnings. The estimated effects in chapter 5 of a 1 per 
cent growth shock on housing prices ranged from .25 percent to .70 
percent in different specifications, with most estimates less than .50 
percent. Suppose that the highest of these estimated housing price ef 
fects, .70 percent, actually represented the increase in the value of local 
property assets due to a growth shock. Then a 1 percent growth shock 
would raise the implicit income from property assets to the upper earn 
ings quintile by .7 percent of their annual implicit income from this 
property, or by .21 percent of annual labor earnings (.21 = .30 times .7).
Even under these very extreme assumptions, the net gain to the highest 
earnings quintile from growth—including both property value and labor 
earnings effects—would still be less than the gain to the lowest earn 
ings quintile from growth. In the real world, property ownership is more 
widespread across earnings classes, local property ownership is not so 
large in the highest earnings quintiles, and the effects of growth on prop 
erty values is probably not as high as was assumed. Under these more 
realistic assumptions, property value effects are even less likely to alter 
the progressive effects of local growth on earnings.
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Distributional Effects on Family 
Income vs. Male Earnings
Progressive effects of local growth on the male earnings distribution 
do not necessarily imply a progressive effect on the family income 
distribution. Distributional effects of growth on female earnings could 
be more progressive or regressive than distributional effects on male 
earnings. Classifying individuals by family income will reshuffle some 
lower-earnings males into higher-income quintiles, and some higher- 
earnings males into lower-income quintiles, which will tend to mute 
the differences in percentage effects across quintiles. Finally, lower- 
income quintiles receive a great deal of their income from transfers. 
Even if transfers are unchanged when the earnings of the lowest in 
come quintile goes up, the percentage effect of growth on the income 
of the lowest income quintile will be less than the percentage effect on 
earnings; furthermore, we would expect some decline in means-tested 
transfers when earnings go up, as most transfers (e.g., welfare and food 
stamps) have some formula for reducing benefits as earnings increase.
Despite these many differences between family income distribution 
and individual male earnings distribution, local growth is likely to have 
progressive effects on the distribution of family income. This predic 
tion can only be tested by further empirical investigation with a much 
different focus from this book. The main rationale for this prediction 
is that the effect of local growth on the distribution of male earnings 
is so strongly progressive that it seems highly unlikely that other fac 
tors could offset it.
Economic Development and Lower-Income Households
Even if local growth does turn out to have progressive effects on the 
distribution of family income, this finding would not mean that lower- 
income households always gain from state and local economic develop 
ment policies. Local residents must pay the costs of economic develop 
ment subsidies to firms. Hence, the exact distribution of these costs 
across different income groups is also important, and this depends on 
the method of financing. Because state and local taxes are generally 
believed by economists to be distributed regressively (i.e., the poor pay
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a greater percentage of their income in taxes than the rich), there is 
reason to be concerned that the net impact of these policies is regressive. 
Under some methods of financing economic development, adverse 
net impacts on the poor are quite likely. For example, figures from the 
Congressional Budget Office suggest that "means-tested" transfer in 
come (welfare, etc.) comprises 16 percent of the income of the lowest 
income quintile, and less than 0.5 percent of the income of other quin- 
tiles. Suppose a state or local government expands economic develop 
ment subsidies, and finances this expansion by cutting real welfare 
benefits. Suppose further that the overall costs and earnings benefits 
from this economic development program are roughly in balance. Under 
these assumptions, the program will hurt the poorest households as a 
group. The poorest households pay all the cost of the program, and 
only receive a portion of the benefits, even though this portion is a greater 
percentage of their income.
Growth Effects on Individuals 
vs. Income or Earnings Groups
Another important point is that these average effects of growth on 
different income or earnings groups conceal important differences within 
groups. It is quite likely that growth's effects vary more within income 
groups than across income groups. Unemployed individuals who hap 
pen to get a job due to growth gain. Unemployed renters who don't 
happen to get a job due to growth lose. Developers who own choice 
parcels of appropriately zoned land gain a great deal.
The argument that local growth tends to have progressive effects on 
the earnings and income distribution merely means that, on average, 
individuals and families who happen to be in lower earnings and in 
come groups tend to gain more in percentage terms than individuals 
and families in more fortunate groups. Growth will still often have large 
costs for specific poor individuals and families and large benefits for 
specific wealthy individuals and families.
178 Effects of Economic Development Policy
Net Efficiency Effects of Economic Development Policy
Income distribution effects are just one possible "bottom line" in 
deciding on the desirability of state and local economic development 
policy. Economists often argue that policymakers should pay more at 
tention to the "efficiency effects" of policy, that is, the net balance 
of dollar benefits and costs summed over the relevant population. The 
argument is that if a policy is efficient—that is, has net benefits that 
are positive—adopting it makes sense because any undesirable distribu 
tional effects can be offset by other policies. From the perspective of 
state and local policymakers, the relevant population over which we 
should sum benefits and costs to obtain net "efficiency effects" is all 
current residents. I consider this state and local efficiency perspective 
here, and postpone an analysis of economic development policy from 
a national perspective to chapter 8.
Examining the net dollar benefits and costs of a specific state and 
local economic development program for a specific metropolitan area 
is obviously impossible for this book, due to lack of suitable data. The 
estimates reported, however, allow at least a rough estimate of the range 
of plausible values for benefits and costs that might be associated with 
an "average" economic development policy in an "average" 
metropolitan area.
This policy will have a number of effects on local residents and 
businesses. Local residents gain in real earnings and property values 
from an economic development program that successfully promotes 
growth. On the other hand, they must pay for the program in increased 
taxes or reductions in public services or transfers. 5 Furthermore, local 
residents will have a higher cost-of-living, which will erode the real 
value of the nonlabor component of their incomes. Local business may 
receive benefits in the form of extra profits from economic develop 
ment subsidies, increased demand for their products due to growth, and 
possible agglomeration benefits from greater specialization in supplier 
markets in larger cities. Local businesses may also face increased wage 
costs if the wage increases caused by growth are not matched by higher 
real productivity. Local business will also face increased explicit or
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implicit costs of renting the land and structures they use in their opera 
tions. Fiscal benefits or costs of the growth may occur, depending on 
the balance of incremental tax revenue versus service demands from 
new development.
In addition, there are more intangible benefits and costs from economic 
development policy. Growth may have environmental and congestion 
costs, and may change the "character" of the community either in a 
positive or negative direction. Finally, the earnings benefits from growth 
may be partially or totally offset by the value of leisure foregone when 
individuals work more. In high-unemployment cities, the opportunity 
cost of leisure time could be argued to be close to zero. In high- 
unemployment cities, where obtaining a job is difficult, many 
unemployed individuals will place a very large dollar value on getting 
a job, in that they would be willing to accept very low wages. In low- 
unemployment cities, where obtaining a job is much easier, most 
residents who place a large value on getting a job will be able to find 
a job. The remaining unemployed will place a relatively high value on 
their leisure time. At the extreme, the unemployed worker's reserva 
tion wage—the lowest wage at which the worker would be willing to 
accept a job offer—may be as high as the market wage in low- 
unemployment cities. In that case, the increased employment prob 
abilities and working time associated with growth would produce little 
net benefit to residents. 6
What will not be included in this benefit-cost analysis is the effect 
of economic development in this metropolitan area on the residents of 
other areas. Positive effects of growth on the value of property owned 
by nonresidents will be ignored, along with potential damaging effects 
on other areas if faster growth here tends to reduce growth there. The 
national perspective on state and local economic development policies 
will be addressed in chapter 8.
Table 7.6 shows the assumptions made here to develop this 
metropolitan area benefit-cost analysis for an average development policy 
in an average metropolitan area. Where assumptions are needed, I con 
sider a "central case" assumption based on the most likely estimates. 
I also consider a range of plausible assumptions that deviate from that 
central case assumption.
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Table 7.6
Assumptions and Sources for Benefit-Cost Analysis
of "Average" Economic Development Program
for Hypothetical Average MSA
Assumption Source
1. Earnings as percentage of 
personal income = 73.5 percent.
2. Asset value of local property as 
percentage of personal income = 
263.6 percent.
3. Flow value of explicit and implicit 
income from local property, to local 
residents, as percentage of personal 
income = minimum of 4.0 percent, 
maximum of 7.9 percent, central case 
of 5.9 percent.
4. Long-run elasticity of MSA 
employment with respect to state and 
local business taxes = -.3 in central 
case (-.1 to -.6 is range of 
assumptions).
5. Business share of state and local 
taxes = .34.
6. Average personal state and local 
taxes as percentage of personal in 
come = 10.6 percent.
7. Elasticity of real earnings with 
respect to employment growth = .44 
± .26.
1988 figures from 1990 U.S. 
Statistical Abstract, p. 432.
Figures on net structure value in 
1988 from pp. 101 and 102 of 
August 1990 Survey of Current 
Business, times 1.25, divided by per 
sonal income figures from p. 432 of 
1990 U.S. Statistical Abstract. 
Multiplication by 1.25 is based on 
assumption that land is one-fifth of 
real estate value, structure value is 
four-fifths.
Assumption of 3 percent real discount 
rate. 263.6 * .03 = 7.9 percent. 
Central case assumes 75 percent of 
property is locally owned, with range 
of 50 to 100 percent.
Review of literature in chapter 2.
U.S. Advisory Commission on In 
tergovernmental Relations, Interstate 
Tax Competition, March 1981, p. 63. 
(UI included as tax; revised version 
of report appendix used.)
Figures on state and local tax receipts 
from Survey of Current Business, 
January 1990, p. 15, table 3.3, 
multiplied by personal share of .66 
(= 1-business share).
OLS estimates from this chapter, ± 2 
standard errors.
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Table 7.6 (Continued)
Assumption Source
8. Elasticity of property values with 
respect to employment growth = .45 
± .24.
9. Cost of foregone leisure = max 
imum value of 74 percent of earnings 
benefit.
10. Effects of higher costs of living 
for local residents in reducing real 
value of nonearnings components of 
income = .20 ± (.06) times 26.5 
percent of income that is nonearnings 
= .05 percent ± .02 percent.
11. Cost of extra wages to local 
businesses, not offset by productivity 
influences = maximum value of 24 
percent of earnings benefit.
12. Implicit or explicit extra costs of 
land and buildings to locally owned 
business = minimum of 2.6 percent 
of property value benefit, maximum 
of 13.1 percent, central case of 7.8 
percent.
OLS estimates from chapter 5 of 
growth impact on old BLS measure 
of owner-occupied housing prices, + 
2 standard errors.
Table 7.3: using long-run demand 
shock estimates, sum of employment 
shock effects on labor market activi 
ty, divided by sum of employment 
shock effects on all earnings com 
ponents ((.265 + .103 + .000) / 
.496).
Chapter 5 estimates of effects of 
growth shock on local CPI, ± 2 stan 
dard errors, and information on 
nonearnings share of income from p. 
432 of 7990 U.S. Statistical Abstract. 
Effects of increased CPI on real 
value of earnings already reflected in 
real earnings estimates.
Table 7.3: using long-run overall 
growth estimates, sum of employment 
shock effects on real wages, divided 
by sum of employment shock effects 
on all earnings components 
((.101 + .159)/ .553) = .47. 
Assumption that no more than 50 
percent of businesses are locally own 
ed: 47 percent times .50 =24 
percent.
Figures on private nonresidential 
value of structures, p. 463 of 7990 
U.S. Statistical Abstract = 26.1 per 
cent of all structure value. Central 
case assumes 30 percent of all 
business property is locally owned. 
Minimum assumes 10 percent, max 
imum assumes 50 percent local 
ownership.
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Based on these assumptions, table 7.7 presents the range of plausi 
ble estimates of annual benefits and costs of a program that leads to 
1 percent extra employment for a metropolitan area in the long run. 
The range of plausible estimates is wide enough that it is impossible 
to say whether state and local economic development policies will 
generally benefit the residents of the targeted metropolitan area. This 
indeterminate conclusion is not surprising. If the programs quite clear 
ly always had net benefits, we would expect a lot more money to be 
devoted to economic development than is currently the case. If the pro 
grams were obviously net losers, their enormous expansion in most states 
during the 1980s would have been unlikely.
Despite this uncertain conclusion about the "bottom-line" of economic 
development, table 7.7 is informative because it shows what factors 
and assumptions are most important in determining the net benefits of 
development policies. The net benefits appear to be most sensitive to 
the magnitude of real earnings effects, the program cost per job created, 
and the cost of forgone leisure. On the other hand, the exact magnitude 
of property value effects appears to be of lesser importance.
The sensitivity of net benefits to these three factors has important 
implications for both research and policy. For researchers, these find 
ings indicate areas where more research would be most helpful in 
evaluating the net benefits of development policy.
For policymakers, these findings indicate areas where policy design 
may make the most difference in the overall benefits of the programs. 
Table 7.7 shows effects of an "average" policy in an "average" 
metropolitan area. Presumably, each metropolitan area and each chosen 
policy will differ in important ways from the average, with consequent 
difference in effects. For example, economic development policies in 
metropolitan areas where unemployment is high will tend to have lower 
reservation wages for the unemployed, increasing the probability of net 
benefits from the program for area residents.
In addition, table 7.7 suggests that state and local policymakers should 
focus a great deal of attention on the "cost-effectiveness" of economic 
development programs—the program cost per job created—as this may 
be crucial to whether the program should be adopted. This increases
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Table 7.7
Long-Run Annual Benefits and Costs 
of an "Average" Economic Development Program
Resulting in 1 Percent Employment Growth, 
Stated as Percentage of MSA Annual Personal Income
Benefits Value as Percent of MSA Income
Real earnings
Property income, both explicit and implicit 
Benefits to locally owned businesses of 
subsidies, extra profits from growth___
.32 (.13 to .51) 
.03 (.01 to .05)
Sum of benefits .35 plus ? 
(.14 to .56 plus ?)
Costs Value as Percent of MSA Income
Tax costs to residents 
Foregone leisure
Effect of higher local cost-of-living 
in reducing real value of residents' 
nonlabor income
Environmental/congestion costs
Costs to locally owned business of higher 
wages, not offset by productivity 
improvements
Costs to locally owned businesses of 
higher rental prices of land and 
structures
.18 (.09 to .55)
Up to 74 percent of earnings 
benefits (Max. = .38)
.05 (.03 to .07)
Up to 24 percent of earnings 
benefit (Max. = .12)
.00 (.00 to .01)
.23 percent plus ?
(.12 plus up to 1.13 plus)
Sum of costs
Other Factors
Fiscal benefits or costs
Change in character of community
Net efficiency effects
NOTES: Parentheses show plausible range of estimated benefits and costs. See table 7.6 for specific 
assumptions and sources behind these figures. The table assumes: typical estimated growth ef 
fects from this study on earnings and property values, with the range given by two standard er 
rors to either side; tax elasticities of business employment of -.1 to -.6 (-.3 for central case); 
maximum value of foregone leisure that exactly offsets all earnings effects caused by more work 
rather than more wages. All figures are recalibrated as percent of personal income from whatever 
units they initially were in. Maximum values for foregone leisure and wage costs are based on 
earnings benefit of .51 percent.
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the attractiveness of "new wave" economic development programs- 
programs focused on small business, entrepreneurship, and improved 
technology—which claim to be more cost-effective than traditional 
economic development programs of financial subsidies to branch plants. 
In addition, the sensitivity of net local benefits to program costs per 
job created indicates that there are potentially great advantages from 
more selective economic development subsidy programs that seek to 
focus subsidies on the few firms whose location and employment choices 
are most likely to be affected, rather than simply cutting business taxes 
across-the-board.
Finally, the earnings effects of local economic growth probably vary 
quite a bit, depending on the nature of the growth and the nature of 
the local labor market. Because this book is an initial study of economic 
development and the local labor market, the focus has deliberately been 
narrowed to the basic issue of how aggregate employment demand in 
local areas affects average economic outcomes. A more sophisticated 
and difficult analysis would recognize that the types of jobs and the skills 
of existing residents also make a difference. Specifically, faster local 
growth is more likely to increase employment probabilities of current 
residents and less likely to simply lead to in-migration, if the new jobs 
require skills that current unemployed residents either already have or 
can easily obtain. The empirical estimates only directly indicate that 
overall local labor demand has important long-run effects on labor market 
outcomes for a region's residents. However, it is a plausible inference 
that specific types of local labor demand also have important long-run 
effects. If this is so, state and local policy makers should focus more 
attention on trying to increase the types of jobs that will provide the 
greatest employment and upgrading benefits for current residents.
Conclusion
The bottom line is that real earnings effects of faster local growth 
are significant. These effects are greater in percentage terms for blacks 
and less-educated workers. As a result, lower-earnings males gain far
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more in percentage terms from local growth than higher-earnings males. 
The pattern of these earnings effects is so progressive that it seems likely 
that overall effects of local growth on the income distribution, including 
other sources of family income and the property value effects of growth, 
are at least modestly progressive.
Furthermore, it is easy to make plausible assumptions under which 
state and local economic development policies promoting faster local 
growth will have net benefits for an area. Even when the costs of 
economic development programs are considered, the local area may 
well gain.
This optimistic view of state and local economic development policy 
as both efficient and progressive depends on a specific set of cir 
cumstances. In particular, it is most accurate for a high-unemployment 
area that uses relatively cost-effective economic development incentives, 
finances these programs in a manner that is at least roughly propor 
tional to income, and attracts jobs that are accessible to the area's 
unemployed. Changing any of these assumptions makes it less likely 
that the area's poor will benefit from economic development.
Thus, the results in this chapter could also be used to develop a relative 
ly pessimistic view of state and local economic development policy. 
In an area with low unemployment, the benefits of more jobs will be 
relatively small. If the area uses economic development programs that 
are relatively costly per job created, the net benefits of economic develop 
ment for the area could easily be strongly negative.
Furthermore, just looking at the aggregate well-being of the poor, 
or of other groups, ignores the particular gains and losses of specific 
individuals. Even under the optimistic view, even with an efficient, pro 
gressive economic development policy, specific poor individuals will 
no doubt lose significantly from the policy, due to increases in the cost-of- 
living and taxes that, in their particular case, are not counterbalanced 
by labor market or property market gains.
Finally, all of the analysis in this chapter has taken a local perspec 
tive: what are the distributional and efficiency effects of state and local 
economic development policy from the perspective of the local area 
in which the policy is implemented? We should also consider the na 
tional perspective. The next chapter turns to that issue.
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NOTES
1. That is, because RE = 52* LFP *ER* MRS * RW, dlnRE/dX = d\nLFP/dX •+ d\nER/dX 
+ dlnHRS/dX + d\nRW/dX, where RE is real earnings, LFP is the proportion of weeks in the 
labor force during the year, ER is the ratio of weeks employed to weeks in the labor force, MRS 
is the average hours worked per week when employed, RW is the real wage per hour, and X 
is some variable such as job growth. But knowledge of the variance of the estimates of each of 
the right-hand side derivatives does not tell us the variance in the left-hand side derivative of this 
equation, except in the unlikely event that these estimates are uncorrelated. The easiest way to 
estimate the variance of the left-hand side derivative is to directly estimate the derivative.
2. That is, they used the share component of a shift-share analysis to predict overall growth.
3. Appendix 7.1 presents the results in more detail.
4. See appendix 7.1 to this chapter for statistical tests of differences between the effects on real 
earnings of overall growth and demand-induced growth.
5. There is unlikely to be a "Laffer curve" for regional economic development programs; that 
is, the budgetary effects of these programs are unlikely to offset their initial budgetary cost. Based 
on the literature review in chapter 2, the effects of a state or metropolitan area business tax rate 
reduction on job growth are not strong enough to prevent business tax revenue from declining. 
Furthermore, additional business growth will require additional services. Finally, household in- 
migration probably imposes fiscal costs. Thus, any regional economic development program will 
have a net budgetary cost, considering both the explicit budgetary cost of the program and the 
net fiscal effects of growth.
6. The rationale for this variation across metropolitan areas in the value of providing jobs for 
the unemployed is explored in much greater detail in chapter 8 and appendix 8.1.
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Is State and Local
Economic Development Policy
a Zero-Sum Game?
When seen from a national perspective, economic development 
policy makers are involved in a zero sum game. When one state 
wins by convincing a firm to locate within its boundaries, the other 
49 states lose. (Barry M. Rubin and C. Kurt Zorn, "Sensible State 
and Local Economic Development" in Public Administration 
Review, March/April 1985, p. 334)
It would be best if states would get together and declare an end 
to the rampant bidding war [for business investment, especially 
foreign investment]. The Massachusetts legislature has proposed 
a moratorium on incentives, but only a state with such low 
unemployment can afford to push for one. Poorer states are unlikely 
to sign such a pact and will continue to do everything they can, 
within their budget constraints, to entice more investment. There 
is perhaps no way to stop it without federal intervention, unless 
the federal government taxes the incentives given to localities, to 
make incentives less valuable to firms and diminish the mad scram 
ble a little. (Page 250 in Norman Glickman and Douglas Wood 
ward, The New Competitors, 1989)
Previous chapters show that economic development policies may 
benefit the state or metropolitan area that adopts them. But does the 
nation benefit?
The zero-sum game argument against economic development is that 
development policies only redistribute jobs among state or local areas. 
The number of jobs in the nation is unchanged, and the efficiency of 
the national economy is unaffected. The gains of the unemployed in 
one local area are offset by the losses of the unemployed in other local 
areas. Furthermore, state and local competition for jobs results in
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generally lower business taxes, making the national distribution of in 
come less fair.
The easiest defense of economic development policies is that some 
of these policies—such as research and development subsidies and 
assistance to entrepreneurs—may increase the productivity of the 
economy. A more difficult issue is whether economic development 
policies aimed at increasing local job growth result in national benefits.
I will argue in this chapter that state and local competition for jobs 
does provide benefits for the nation, admitting at the outset that the em 
pirical evidence for or against this argument is sparse. The argument 
rests more on logic than on the weight of the empirical evidence.
The zero-sum game argument against state and local competition for 
jobs can be addressed from several perspectives. First, even if overall 
national job growth is unaffected by this competition, will this com 
petition redistribute jobs among local areas in a pattern that offers any 
benefits for the nation?
Second, will state and local competition for jobs affect overall na 
tional job growth?
Third, what implication does state and local competition for jobs have 
for the national distribution of income?
Arguments that the economic development competition for jobs might 
offer some national benefits have previously been made by Blair, Fichten- 
baum, and Swaney (1984) and Rinehart and Laird (1972). My argu 
ment provides more specifics about the different benefits and costs of 
state and local competition for jobs. It is also distinctive in discussing 
some of the empirical evidence for and against the national benefits of 
state and local competition for jobs.
The Easy Argument: 
Encouraging Productivity is not a Zero-Sum Game
Wealth is our capacity to produce goods and services that we 
value. Economic development is the process of innovation through 
which we increase the capacity of individuals and organizations
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to create wealth. . . . The relocation of a factory from the frostbelt 
to the sunbelt will not count as additional wealth from the national 
point of view—it is simply a zero sum game. . . . The emphasis 
in this book is upon those policies that are not zero sum games. 
(Pp. 12-13, in The Wealth of States, Roger Vaughan, Robert 
Pollard and Barbara Dyer, 1985)
Many of the newer, more interventionist economic development 
policies—which I labeled "new wave" economic development policies 
in chapter 1—have broader goals than creating jobs. New wave policies 
include: encouraging more applied research projects between state 
universities and businesses; encouraging existing state businesses to 
modernize; providing information and training on how to be an en 
trepreneur, or on how to export products.
New wave policies have diverse goals, but many aim, in one way 
or another, at increasing the productivity of the economy of some local 
area. With more knowledge about technology, exporting, or sound 
business practices, businesses can produce more highly valued products 
with the resources they have available. 1
New wave policies to increase business knowledge cost money, of 
course. In order for social productivity to increase as a result of these 
policies, the value in greater business productivity of greater business 
knowledge must exceed the costs of providing the knowledge. For this 
to be the case, private knowledge markets must, for some reason, have 
operated imperfectly prior to the government intervention. One can think 
of a number of reasons why valuable business knowledge and informa 
tion might not be optimally provided by the private market. For exam 
ple, firms might distrust private consultants claiming to provide valuable 
information. In addition, acquiring information can be expensive, and 
firms might have difficulty obtaining the financing needed. Finally, some 
types of business knowledge acquisition, such as high technology 
research, may have spillover benefits for other firms that are not taken 
into account by firms in making their investment decision. Based on 
these problems with private markets in information and knowledge, the 
case that government intervention might improve matters is plausible.
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New wave policies that successfully improve the productivity of a 
local area will also improve the productivity of the nation. State and 
local competition to improve productivity will impose costs on some 
local areas. While more productive areas will grow, less productive 
areas will decline. But the net result of this process is that overall pro 
ductivity goes up. The nation will be able to obtain more valued goods 
and services at a lower cost.
This defense of state and local economic development policies is not 
totally satisfactory, however. First, although the case for government 
programs to improve business knowledge and information is plausible 
in theory, empirical evidence for the efficacy of these policies is lack 
ing, as discussed in chapter 2. We need better evaluations of whether 
these new wave economic development policies actually achieve their 
goals.
Second, as mentioned in chapter 1, most state and local economic 
development resources today are not devoted to new wave policies, but 
to tax and other business subsidies intended to increase local job growth. 
If we want to evaluate the national benefits of state and local economic 
development policy, we must consider the national implications of state 
and local competition for jobs.
Is Redistributing Jobs a Zero-Sum Game?
I first analyze the national benefits of state and local competition for 
jobs under the assumption that the competition has no effect on national 
job growth. 2 The competition for jobs results in some redistribution 
of jobs across local areas. Is this redistribution likely to provide any 
national benefits, and if so, under what conditions?
To answer these questions, I first ask whether the benefits of addi 
tional jobs are likely to vary in different local labor markets, such as 
different metropolitan areas. The empirical results in this book might 
be interpreted as indicating that the benefits of job growth are unvary 
ing across local areas. The results in chapter 4, for example, indicate 
that extra job growth has similar effects on unemployment and labor
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force participation in different metropolitan areas, regardless of their 
initial rate of job growth. The benefits of a reduction in unemployment, 
however, are probably much greater in high-unemployment local areas 
compared to low-unemployment areas. Some of the theoretical reasons 
behind this position are outlined in appendix 8.1; the intuition behind 
this theory will be presented here in the text.
The basic reason for the diverse benefits of reducing unemployment 
in high- versus low-unemployment areas is that the average 
characteristics of the unemployed will differ between areas. Suppose 
that at current market wages, there is excess labor supply. Individuals 
willing to supply labor will differ, however, in the lowest wage at which 
they are willing to work, which economists call the "reservation wage" 
of the individual. Some individuals may place a great value on getting 
a job, and their reservation wages are quite low. Reservation wages 
could be low for any of a number of reasons. Some individuals with 
low reservation wages may have no other source of income. Others 
may have strong moral beliefs about the importance of having a job.
In the same local labor market, some individuals may place a low 
value on getting a job: their reservation wages are high. Some of these 
individuals may have other sources of income, from other family 
members or from financial assets. Others may feel they have valuable 
uses of their time other than wage labor, such as taking care of their 
children.
In a local labor market with excess labor supply, what types of in 
dividuals are most likely to get and keep the scarce jobs that are available? 
The most reasonable assumption is that those individuals with the lowest 
reservation wages will be most likely to get the available jobs. They 
are likely to wait longer in line for job interviews and search more 
vigorously for job openings, and they are less likely to quit a job once 
they obtain one. 3
Under these assumptions, consider now two local labor markets that 
differ only in that one has a lower demand for labor, and hence higher 
unemployment, than the other. Assume that the two local labor markets 
have a similar distribution of individuals across different reservation 
wages.
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In the local labor market with low labor demand, only individuals 
with very low reservation wages will obtain jobs. The remaining 
unemployed will include many individuals with quite low reservation 
wages. An additional job in this high-unemployment local area will go 
to an individual whose reservation wage is relatively low, and hence 
the benefit of this job—the wage paid minus the reservation wage— 
will be large. A loss of a job in this high-unemployment area will be 
suffered by an individual with an extremely low reservation wage, and 
hence the social cost of this lost job—the lost wage minus the reserva 
tion wage—will be large.
In contrast, in the local labor market with high labor demand, many 
individuals with relatively high reservation wages will obtain jobs. The 
remaining individuals will mostly be individuals with even higher reser 
vation wages. An additional job in this low-unemployment local area 
will likely go to an individual whose reservation wage is relatively high, 
and hence the benefits of this job will be small. A loss of a job in this 
low-unemployment area will likely be suffered by an employed individual 
with a relatively high reservation wage, and hence the social cost of 
this lost job will tend to be small. 4
The net national benefits of increasing job growth in one local area 
and reducing job growth in other areas thus depend on the relative 
unemployment rate of the local area that enjoys increased job growth. 
If the area has a higher-than-average unemployment rate, the benefits 
of reducing unemployment in that local area are likely to exceed the 
costs that result from increasing unemployment in other areas. If the 
area has a lower-than-average unemployment rate, the benefits of reduc 
ing unemployment in that local area are likely to fall short of the social 
costs from increasing unemployment in other areas. From a national 
perspective, we should applaud economic development policies to in 
crease job growth when these policies are pursued by high-unemployment 
local areas, and deplore economic development policies to increase jobs 
when they are pursued by low-unemployment areas.
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Reservation Wages and Local Unemployment
We would like to have empirical evidence on whether the average 
reservation wages of the unemployed are lower in high-unemployment 
local labor markets. Unfortunately, although a number of studies have 
surveyed the unemployed to determine their reservation wages, the issue 
of whether stated reservation wages vary with local unemployment has 
received little attention.
Only one study has examined how reservation wages vary with the 
local unemployment rate. This study by Jones (1989) finds that for every 
1 percent increase in the local unemployment rate, the average reser 
vation wage of the unemployed is reduced by 1.2 percent to 1.6 percent. 5
This estimated effect of local unemployment on reservation wages 
seems small, but it would result in significant differences in the net 
benefits of additional jobs in different local labor markets. The social 
benefit of an additional job is the wage paid minus the reservation wage. 
Suppose that the average reservation wage of the unemployed is about 
90 percent of market wages; this is consistent with data presented by 
Jones, as well as with a number of reservation wage studies summariz 
ed by Gordon (1973). 6 Then the benefit of an additional job in the average 
local labor market is 10 percent of the wages paid. Consider a local 
area whose unemployment rate is 5 percent above average. Based on 
the results in Jones, reservation wages in such a local area may be as 
much as 8 percent lower than in the average area, or only 82 percent 
of average wages. The benefits of an additional job in this high- 
unemployment local area will be 18 percent of the wages paid, 80 per 
cent greater than the benefits of an additional job in an average local area.
In addition, several studies show that reservation wages decrease the 
longer an individual is unemployed (Kasper 1969; Stephenson 1976; 
Fishe 1982; Kiefer and Neumann 1979). Local labor markets with high 
unemployment would be expected to cause a longer duration of 
unemployment for the average individual, which would tend to decrease 
average reservation wages.
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Which Areas Pursue Economic Development?
Economic development efforts in high-unemployment local labor 
markets may produce some benefits for the nation. But are high- 
unemployment local areas more likely than the average area to adopt 
and expand economic development programs?
The political rewards for expanding economic development programs 
in high-unemployment local areas are stronger than in the average area. 
Many unemployed individuals in these high-unemployment areas—and 
their relatives and friends—would perceive large employment benefits 
from attracting jobs to the area. In contrast, in low-unemployment local 
areas, the unemployed are fewer and perceive lower employment benefits 
from obtaining a job.
State and local governments may not always be responsive to all their 
constituents, however. Governments in low-unemployment areas may 
push particular development projects in order to benefit a few land 
owners. Governments in high-unemployment areas may reject develop 
ment opportunities in order to keep wages down for existing employers. 
William Winter, former Governor of Mississippi, tells stories of how, 
in his early political career as an economic developer in rural Mississippi, 
he was informed that his Chamber of Commerce employers did not want 
him to pursue a particular industrial prospect from the North, as it would 
ruin the local "labor climate." Hence, whether state and local govern 
ments respond to their unemployment situation in deciding on economic 
development policies cannot be determined by theoretical analysis. We 
have to examine what governments actually do. 7
The available evidence is scant, but it indicates that the most needy 
jurisdictions play the economic development game the most. Marianne 
Clarke (1986) of the National Governors Association surveyed state 
governments in 1985, asking why their particular state had expanded 
its economic development programs. According to Clarke, "many states 
identified two factors that helped make economic development a priority 
issue for their state government in the past five years. The first was 
the nature and extent of the 1981-82 recession. The second was the 
changing structure of the U.S. economy, resulting in plant closings and 
worker dislocation. . . . Twenty-seven states responded specifically that
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the 1981-82 recession had been the key factor resulting in change in 
their development policy" (p. 11).
There also are three empirical analyses of what types of state and 
local governments tend to adopt more economic development programs. 8 
Rubin and Rubin (1987) analyzed a 1986 survey of 178 small cities 
in Illinois. They found that cities with lower median income, higher 
poverty, or higher unemployment made greater use of a wider variety 
of economic development incentives. Bowman (1987b) analyzed a 1986 
nationwide survey, sponsored by the National League of Cities, of 322 
cities. She found that the most economically distressed cities, as measured 
by the official criteria used by the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development in the now defunct "UDAG" program, were more 
likely to use more economic development programs and incentives, and 
were more likely to use them extensively. Luger (1987) found that states 
with higher past unemployment tend to be more active in industrial 
recruitment and other economic development programs.
Despite this empirical evidence, some informed observers do not feel 
that state and local competition for jobs helps areas with high unemploy 
ment. For example, according to John Levy, an urban planner at Virginia 
Tech who has written extensively on economic development, "Whether 
there are net equity gains from the sum of all local economic develop 
ment activity is an open question. It is unlikely that more needy places 
generally outcompete less needy places for new industry" (Levy 1990, 
p. 157).
The quotation from Levy combines two separate issues. We should 
distinguish between the economic development effects of having a system 
of quasi-independent state and local governments that provide public 
services, and the effects of giving state and local governments the discre 
tion to use special economic development subsidies for particular business 
expansion decisions.
The overall U.S. system of quasi-independent state and local govern 
ments may harm the economic development prospects of poorer areas. 
This harm is more likely the more we assign responsibility for govern 
ment programs that redistribute income—such as welfare and social ser 
vice programs—to lower levels of government. Governments in poorer
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local areas may then find themselves burdened with heavy redistribution 
responsibilities. As a result, governments in poorer local areas may be 
forced to have higher business taxes and lower public services than other 
areas.
Giving state and local governments the discretion to adopt flexible 
economic development programs, however, may help poorer areas. With 
this discretion, state and local governments can target economic develop 
ment subsidies on the business expansion decisions that offer the greatest 
employment benefits and for which the subsidies are most likely to af 
fect the decision. With high overall tax rates, state and local govern 
ments in poorer areas are most likely to need this flexibility. Further 
more, they are most likely to use this flexibility, due to political pressure 
from their unemployed and underemployed.
The problems caused by inadequate federal support for redistribu 
tional programs should not be confused with the issue of whether state 
and local competition for jobs helps poorer areas. Most public finance 
economists, whether conservative or liberal, would agree that income 
redistribution programs should be a federal responsibility. If the federal 
government fails to assume this responsibility, as is true at the present 
time, economic development problems and other problems for poor areas 
result. Allowing discretionary economic development programs may 
actually help poorer areas, however, and alleviate some of the problems 
from inadequate federal support for redistributional programs.
Does State and Local Competition 
Increase National Growth?
The argument that merely redistributing jobs among states and local 
areas—with national job growth fixed—yields national benefits is sub 
tle. State and local competition for jobs would certainly have more ob 
vious national benefits, from the perspective of politicians and the public, 
if the competition increased national growth. Does it do so?
At the outset, some misconceptions about branch plants, small 
business, and national job growth should be clarified. Whether economic 
development programs target branch plant attraction or small business 
start-ups does not necessarily have much to do with whether the pro-
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grams increase national job growth. It may seem obvious that a branch 
plant has to locate in one area or another, while small business start 
ups or expansions represent new jobs. But encouraging some small 
businesses to start-up or expand must mean less sales for some other 
business. Overall national job growth may be unaffected. Furthermore, 
competition for branch plants may improve the national business climate 
enough that corporations decide to increase the total number of new 
branch plants.
Whether national growth is affected by state and local competition 
for jobs depends on what national pattern of subsidies and taxes results 
from this competition, and how markets respond to the pattern of sub 
sidies and taxes. One effect of this competition is higher subsidies for 
business throughout the nation. Economic development subsidies may 
appear to be for new capital investment, as the most important economic 
development subsidy is property tax abatement. Subsidies are typically 
not automatic, however, but are under the discretionary control of state 
and local governments, who are interested in using this discretion to 
award subsidies to the businesses that create the most new jobs. Hence, 
economic development subsidies for business are probably best view 
ed as subsidies for increased business labor demand. 9
To analyze the national effects of state and local competition in pro 
viding these labor demand subsidies, it is simplest to consider the ef 
fects of a uniform national subsidy for business labor demand. Such 
a nationwide subsidy will increase national employment if the nation 
suffers from chronic involuntary unemployment. A high level of na 
tional involuntary unemployment could persist in the long run, even 
at business cycle peaks, if wages for some reason fail to adjust downward 
enough to allow labor demand to equal labor supply. The best recent 
theory of why wages will tend to be "too high"—that is, too high to 
allow labor markets to clear—is efficiency wage theory. This theory 
assumes that higher wages increase labor productivity, because better- 
paid workers will feel more fairly treated and will be more motivated 
to want to keep their job. As a result, businesses will maximize profits 
by increasing wages above the market-clearing wage level, even though 
there would be plenty of unemployed workers available at lower wages.
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With above market-clearing wages, national labor demand is less than 
national labor supply, resulting in chronic involuntary unemployment. 
In any market, the actual amount traded can never be greater than the 
lesser of market demand or market supply. In the case of above market- 
clearing wages, national employment will be constrained to be equal 
to national labor demand, while the supply of labor will not be a con 
straint. Hence, economic development subsidies for increased business 
labor demand will relax this constraint, and allow national employment 
to expand. The employment subsidies make it profitable for businesses 
to increase employment even if efficiency wage considerations prevent 
wages from adjusting downward. Furthermore, as employment in 
creases, aggregate national income and product demand will expand 
sufficiently to buy the products produced by these additional workers.
Of course, these economic development subsidies must be paid for 
by some sector of the economy. But if the financing of economic develop 
ment programs is properly designed, it need not impede the employ 
ment expansion resulting from the subsidies. For example, if households 
pay for the economic development subsidies, this may result in some 
adverse effects on labor supply. But in a labor market with chronic in 
voluntary unemployment, labor supply is not a constraint on the level 
of employment, and these reductions in labor supply will not reduce 
employment.
In the real world competition for jobs, as mentioned above, economic 
development subsidies for increased labor demand will not be uniform 
nationally, but will tend to be higher in areas with higher unemploy 
ment. This geographic variation only strengthens the argument for 
positive effects of the competition on national job growth. Higher labor 
demand subsidies in high-unemployment areas encourage the expan 
sion of employment, because in high-unemployment areas labor demand 
is the key constraint on employment and product demand. The increas 
ed jobs in high-unemployment areas result in enough added product 
demand that national employment can increase. On the other hand, areas 
with full employment will not offer extensive economic development 
subsidies for labor demand. Subsidies in such areas would not increase 
national employment much, as local labor demand in these areas is not
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the key constraint on employment; any incentive effects of subsidies 
on increasing local labor demand would tend to be offset by the reduc 
ed labor supply caused by the financing of the subsidies, and the market 
wage will adjust so that local employment is not much changed.
The concentration of economic development subsidies in high- 
unemployment areas may also tend to increase national employment 
by reducing inflationary pressures associated with a given rate of average 
national unemployment. 10 Economists have usually assumed that the 
effect of a 1 percent change in unemployment on the inflation rate will 
depend on the level of the unemployment rate. At high-unemployment 
rates, small decreases in unemployment will only modestly increase in 
flation, and small increases in unemployment will only modestly decrease 
inflation; as unemployment gets lower and lower, the same size small 
decrease in unemployment will cause larger and larger increases in 
inflation.
Hence, encouraging national job growth in high-unemployment areas 
will tend to result in less inflationary pressures than encouraging uniform 
national job growth in all local areas, including low-unemployment areas. 
This allows the nation to sustain higher employment levels and lower 
unemployment rates without igniting an inflationary spiral.
All the above arguments for job competition's beneficial effects on 
national employment are theoretical. There is little empirical evidence 
available to support—or refute—these theoretical arguments. My point 
here is not to prove that economic development competition will in 
crease national employment, but to simply suggest that an increase in 
national employment is quite plausible. The usual assumption that the 
competition only reshuffles jobs among local areas is not clearly sup 
ported by logic or empirical data.
Does State and Local Competition 
Affect the National Income Distribution?
Despite the potential national benefits of state and local competition 
for jobs, a plausible argument could be made that this competition has 
regressive effects on the national income distribution: the rich gain and
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the poor lose. State and local competition for jobs probably reduces 
net taxes on business and increases household taxes. The beneficiaries 
would appear to be business owners, who disproportionately come from 
upper-income groups. The losers would appear to be lower- and middle- 
income groups; this appears particularly likely because state and local 
household taxes, such as income taxes, sales taxes, and property taxes, 
are often believed to be distributed in a mildly regressive fashion, and 
increases in state and local household taxes would be assumed to have 
a regressive effect on the income distribution.
Some progressive effects of the state and local job competition may 
help offset the regressive effects. 11 State and local job competition will 
help reduce unemployment, particularly in high-unemployment areas. 
The unemployed who get jobs will tend to come from families with 
lower incomes than the national average for all families. The unemployed 
in high-unemployment areas will tend to have lower reservation wages. 
Individuals with lower reservation wages, other things equal, are more 
likely to come from lower-income families. As shown in chapter 7, 
blacks and less-educated individuals, who tend to have lower incomes 
than average, will gain the most in occupational upgrading and real earn 
ings from economic development.
Even if the net national distributional effects of state and local job 
competition are regressive, national policy makers should try to offset 
the effects rather than try to eliminate competition. I argue above that 
state and local job competition has beneficial effects on national economic 
efficiency. Any undesirable regressive effects can be offset by making 
the federal tax system more progressive. The desirable increase in ef 
ficiency from state and local job competition can be achieved without 
increasing the regressivity of the national income distribution, if ap 
propriate federal tax policy adjustments are made.
If increasing the progressivity of the federal tax system is politically 
infeasible, the best national policy concerning state and local job com 
petition is a more difficult issue. But if political feasibility is a key issue, 
one could also question whether national restrictions on state and local 
economic development policies are feasible. It might be politically easier 
to increase the progressivity of the federal tax system than to prevent 
state and local governments from promoting their economic growth.
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Conclusion
Can the nation benefit from state and local economic development 
policies? My answer is a tentative yes. State and local economic develop 
ment competition may increase productivity, redistribute jobs towards 
the high-unemployment areas that need jobs the most, and increase na 
tional employment by using previously unemployed labor. Some em 
pirical evidence supports these propositions, although the evidence is 
sparse.
A key empirical issue is whether this competition actually encourages 
economic growth in areas with high unemployment. Current empirical 
evidence is consistent with the belief that it does. If new empirical 
evidence showed that the economic development competition failed to 
help high-unemployment areas, the case for federal intervention would 
be stronger. Federal support for greater economic development of high- 
unemployment areas—and, if politically feasible, federal efforts to 
discourage employment growth in low-unemployment areas—would 
become a much more desirable and important policy to achieve economic 
efficiency.
NOTES
1. Some new wave programs, as outlined in chapter 1, provide capital as well as knowledge to 
firms. This may also increase productivity if business projects offering good returns are discriminated 
against for some reason by our existing capital market structure. However, the argument that 
knowledge and information markets are imperfect and can be improved upon by policy seems 
stronger than the argument that government policy can correct for capital market failures. Bartik 
(1990) discusses these issues in more detail.
2. The argument here and in following sections of this chapter focuses on state and local competi 
tion for jobs in order to achieve employment benefits. Many of the same arguments could also 
be made about state and local competition for jobs in order to achieve fiscal benefits. This com 
petition will tend to reallocate jobs towards local areas where the fiscal benefits are greatest, just 
as competition for employment benefits reallocates jobs towards areas where the employment 
benefits are greatest. National job growth may go up as a result of lower average fiscal burdens 
on business, and as a result of reallocation of business activity towards areas where public service 
costs and environmental costs of additional business activity are lower. Finally, any undesirable 
national distributional implications of this competition for fiscal benefits can be offset by changes 
in federal tax policy. These arguments about competition for fiscal benefits are not presented in 
the text for two reasons: this book mainly focuses on employment benefits of state and local economic 
development policies; and the arguments are so closely parallel that discussing both types of com 
petition appears superfluous.
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3. My assumption here differs from what has sometimes been assumed by other authors. Gramlich 
(1981), for example, in his book on benefit-cost analysis, assumes that scarce jobs will be ration 
ed randomly among all individuals willing to work at any wage at or below the market wage. 
I believe it more plausible to assume that one's eagerness to work—as measured by the reserva 
tion wage—has at least some correlation with one's probability of finding and keeping a job.
4. Of course, there is considerable randomness in the short run in who gains and loses jobs due 
to economic change. I would not expect the labor market to always allocate more jobs to those 
unemployed individuals with the lowest reservation wages, and allocate layoffs to those employed 
individuals with the highest reservation wages. But over time, as individuals quit and are fired, 
and search for available job openings, there will be some tendency to reallocate jobs towards 
individuals with lower reservation wages.
5. A study by Kiefer and Neumann (1979) claims that reservation wages tend to increase as the 
local unemployment rate increases. However, this study does not directly examine how reserva 
tion wages vary with local unemployment. Rather, Kiefer and Neumann use actual accepted wages 
to infer how reservation wages vary with local unemployment, based on a complex model of worker 
search behavior. Their conclusion may be sensitive to their maintained model.
6. Gordon (1973), in his table 1 on p. 148, summarizes six studies of average reservation wages. 
These reservation wages vary from 71.8 percent to 97.9 percent of the previous wage of the in 
dividual. The simple average percentage ratio of reservation wages to previous wages, consider 
ing all six studies, is 85.6 percent. Jones (1989) reports that reservation wages averaged 10 per 
cent below previous wages. I should also note that the social benefit of an additional job should 
be adjusted upwards to reflect unemployment insurance, welfare, or other financial transfers that 
tend to increase the reservation wage, but cost the government money. These reduced govern 
ment transfers could either be considered to increase the social benefits of reducing unemploy 
ment, or could be considered a fiscal benefit of additional jobs.
7. The text does not discuss the Tiebout literature (Tiebout 1956) on intergovernmental competi 
tion. Some recent articles in this literature have discussed government competition to attract business 
(Gates and Schwab 1988a, 1988b; Wildasin 1989, 1986; McLure 1986; Wilson 1985, 1986; Ken- 
yon 1988). Most of this literature focuses on problems of government competition for business 
when governments are constrained in the types of taxes they can use. For example, if govern 
ments have to use uniform property taxes, and this results in business property taxes exceeding 
the costs of supplying business with public services, then government competition for business 
will lead to property taxes and public services that are too low and environmental regulations 
on business that are too lax. Local governments reduce taxes and regulations in order to obtain 
the fiscal benefits from more business activity; but benefits gained by one local government are 
lost to others, so they are not true social benefits, and should not play a role in optimal govern 
ment decisions. However, I would argue that in the current competition for business, state and 
local governments have so many different tax abatement and subsidy programs available that they 
can, if they wish, fine-tune their incentives to each particular firm. There are no effective con 
straints on state and local government tax and subsidy policy towards individual businesses. If 
they wish, state and local governments can set taxes and economic development subsidies for 
each business expansion decision so as to exactly equal the net perceived additional benefits for 
the local area that result from that expansion, including the employment benefits, as well as the 
public service and environmental costs it might cause. If all state and local governments follow 
this "optimal subsidy" policy, then a local area competing for business imposes no net external 
costs on other areas. Attracting jobs to one area does reduce employment benefits in others, but 
it also reduces subsidy costs in those other areas. In an "optimal subsidy" world, these employ 
ment benefits and subsidy costs will be equal. The more important issue is whether state and local 
governments will, in practice, consider the employment benefits of business expansion in deciding 
on economic development policy. It is this issue that is addressed in the text.
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8. Two other studies (Grady 1987; Reese 1991) fail to find a positive relationship between jurisdiction 
need and jurisdiction involvement in economic development. Unfortunately, methodological prob 
lems with the studies prevent them from revealing whether a more needy jurisdiction adopts more 
aggressive economic development programs than less needy jurisdictions. Grady's study examined 
the average correlation, for the five time periods from 1974-75 to 1978-79, between two measures 
of changes in state economic conditions (the percent change in manufacturing employment; the 
percent change in the state's relative unemployment rate) and the percentage change in the state's 
use of economic development incentives. He found no evidence that a change to more distressed 
economic conditions was positively correlated with increases in economic development incentives.
Unfortunately, at least from the perspective of this chapter, Grady's analysis does not control 
for national time trends in incentives. For the purposes of this chapter, what we want to know 
is whether states that are more distressed than the average tend to adopt more economic develop 
ment incentives than the average. We want to abstract from general national trends in economic 
development incentives and focus on the geographic distribution of those incentives. During the 
1974 to 1979 time period, there was a general national trend towards more use of incentives, 
while the national economy was improving. These national trends will tend to cause a negative 
correlation between economic distress and incentives, obscuring the possible positive correlation 
between geographic variations in economic distress and geographic variations in incentives. An 
analysis better suited to the purposes of this chapter would regress the change in economic develop 
ment incentives for each state on the change in economic conditions in the state, with national 
time period effects included as control variables.
Reese's study uses a regression model to explain the variations across Michigan cities in the 
dollar volume of property tax abatements granted from 1974 to 1983. She finds that holding other 
variables constant, higher median income cities granted a greater total dollar volume of abatements. 
Unfortunately, among her control variables are "dollars of new development" and "percent of 
new development abated," which appear, not surprisingly, to explain much of the variation in 
total dollars of abatements; after all the natural logarithm of tax abatements granted for new develop 
ment (a large portion of total tax abatements) will exactly equal, by definition, the sum of the 
logarithm of dollars of new development and the logarithm of abated new development as a per 
cent of total new development. It is difficult to know how to interpret a positive effect of median 
income on total abatements holding the percent of new development abated constant. The percent 
of new development given abatements is one of the key policy variables a more needy jurisdiction 
might directly use to promote economic development. Total dollars abated is only indirectly a 
policy variable. Perhaps higher income cities tend to have more rehabilitation and expansion of 
existing facilities, and have more opportunity to grant abatements.
9. In some cases, state and local governments appear to be interested in creating "good jobs" 
through economic development subsidies. "Good jobs" appear in some cases to be jobs that pay 
well relative to the skills required, such as auto industry jobs, and in other cases appear to be 
any type of high-paying jobs in nonpolluting industries, such as high technology jobs. There may 
well be national benefits to these state and local "industrial policies" that target particular types 
of industrial growth. As discussed in Bartik (1990), encouraging jobs with high "efficiency wage 
premia"—high pay relative to the skills required—may offer efficiency benefits for the national 
economy. High technology jobs may offer research externality benefits for the national economy. 
I focus in the text on the national benefits of general subsidies for job creation because the majori 
ty of state and local governments today do not focus much attention on particular industries in 
their pursuit of economic development.
10. The potential for improving the inflation/unemployment tradeoff through microeconomic labor 
demand policies has previously been discussed in papers by Baily and Tobin (1977, 1978) and 
Nichols (1982). These papers focus on the potential gains from reallocating employment towards
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low-wage occupations or industries. But many of their arguments would also apply to reallocating 
employment towards high-unemployment local areas.
11. The text considers possible offsets in a world where labor markets do not clear, and hence 
the real wage rate does not necessarily change due to an expansion of employment caused by 
heightened labor demand. In a full employment world, business subsidies for labor demand may 
increase profit rates, which may encourage additional savings and investment. This additional 
savings and investment may increase labor demand, thus increasing real wages. Some of the in 
itial benefits to business of the subsidies are shifted to workers.
- 9 - 
Conclusion
People and Places
Summary of Major Findings
This book's findings fall into four major areas: the effects of state 
and local policies on growth; the labor market and land market effects 
of local growth; the distributional effects of local growth; and the na 
tional implications of economic development competition among state 
and local governments.
State and Local Policies Affect Local Growth
The review of previous research suggests that state and local policies 
can have significant effects on local growth. A state and local business 
tax reduction of 10 percent, without reducing public services to business, 
probably increases business activity in a state or metropolitan area in 
the long run by 2.5 percent. Improved state and local public services 
to business can increase growth. Some evidence suggests that increas 
ing state and local taxes to finance improved business services will have 
a net positive effect on local economic growth.
Local Growth Has Long-Run Labor Market Effects
The book's empirical estimates show that faster local growth not only 
raises housing prices, but also has significant long-run favorable ef 
fects on labor markets. An increase of 1 percent in local employment 
reduces the long-run local unemployment rate by around . 1 percent, 
raises the long-run local labor force participation rate by . 1 percent, 
and allows individuals to get and keep promotions to occupations with 
.2 percent greater wages per hour. Average annual real earnings in 
crease in the long run by around .4 percent.
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The theoretical explanation for these effects is provided by hysteresis 
theories of local labor markets, which suggest that better short-run per 
formance of a local labor market helps improve its long-run perfor 
mance. A positive job growth shock allows current area residents to 
acquire valuable employment experience. This experience enhances their 
long-run labor market success.
Faster Local Growth Helps Blacks 
and Less-Educated Individuals
The empirical estimates indicate that faster local growth has stronger 
effects on the annual real earnings of blacks (20 percent greater effect 
than the average) and on less-educated individuals (15 percent greater 
effect for someone with three less years of schooling). Growth effects 
do not vary much with the age of the individual. Somewhat surprising 
ly, the greater effects of local growth on blacks and less-educated in 
dividuals are mostly due to greater effects on their occupational advance 
ment, not greater effects on their unemployment or labor force 
participation.
The greater effects on blacks and less-educated individuals are large 
enough that local economic development policies probably have pro 
gressive effects on the distribution of nontransfer income. However, 
state and local economic development policies can hurt lower-income 
groups if the cost per job created is too high, or if they are financed 
in a highly regressive manner.
State and Local Economic Development Policy 
Is Not a Zero-Sum Game
The competition for economic development among state and local 
governments probably enhances the efficiency of the U.S. economy. 
Because the most aggressive policies will be pursued by depressed areas 
that need growth the most, the economic development competition 
geographically redistributes economic activity towards depressed areas, 
which is economically efficient. Furthermore, widespread economic 
development subsidies may encourage an expansion of national employ-
Conclusion 207
ment, leading to a lower average national unemployment rate. Finally, 
many state and local economic development policies have the potential 
for enhancing the productivity and innovativeness of private business. 
The economic development competition may redistribute national in 
come towards wealthy business owners. This undesirable distributional 
effect should be offset by making the federal tax system more 
progressive.
Implications for Public Policy
This book's findings have three broader implications for policy: state 
and local economic development policy can work; labor demand policies 
matter; and the fate of particular places deserves attention from national 
policy makers.
Two Cheers for State and Local 
Economic Development Policy
This book provides empirical evidence that state and local economic 
development policies can achieve their goal of significantly helping local 
workers and the local unemployed. State and local policies can have 
large effects on local growth, and local growth has important long-run 
effects on individuals' job prospects.
These important empirical findings do not justify an unqualified en 
dorsement of all state and local economic development programs. While 
economic development policies have significant effects on local growth, 
and local growth has significant effects on local labor markets, these 
effects are not so large that labor market benefits will always exceed 
the costs of the programs. The likely benefits and costs of economic 
development policy in a typical local area are closely balanced. Net 
benefits are most likely to be positive for high-unemployment local areas, 
where the benefits of more jobs are the greatest. For average unemploy 
ment areas, the desirability of aggressively pursuing economic develop 
ment is likely to depend on designing programs with a low cost per 
job created.
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New wave economic development programs, which encourage 
technology innovation, entrepreneurship, and modernization, offer the 
promise of creating local economic growth at a relatively low cost. Un 
fortunately, while there is substantial evidence on the local growth ef 
fects of state and local taxes, and significant evidence on the local growth 
effects of state and local public services, we have little reliable evidence 
on whether these newer economic development programs work. The 
logic underlying new wave programs makes sense, but the lack of em 
pirical evidence on their efficacy suggests that policymakers should pro 
ceed with caution.
Labor Demand Matters
While the book examines the effects of shifts in local labor demand, 
these results have implications for the probable effects of national labor 
demand shifts. Shifts in national labor demand probably have greater 
effects on individual's labor market success than shifts in local labor 
demand. National labor demand shifts would not be offset as much by 
in-migration supply responses.
One policy implication is that short-run macroeconomic policies to 
control inflation by increasing unemployment may have more negative 
long-run effects on the labor market than is commonly understood. 
Restrictive macro policy, by increasing unemployment in the short run, 
may increase the long-run unemployment rate and reduce long-run real 
earnings. These adverse effects may be particularly severe for blacks 
and less-educated individuals.
Another implication is that policymakers should give renewed atten 
tion to dealing with structural unemployment through labor demand as 
well as labor supply policies. In the 1980s, policymakers stressed job 
training and education as the way to deal with the employment prob 
lems of the poor. We might want to give renewed consideration to wage 
subsidies, public service employment, and other policies that attempt 
to increase the demand for the labor of the poor.
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Places and National Policy
The most important finding of this book is that what happens to the 
economy of a metropolitan area has significant effects on individuals' 
economic futures. The fate of a particular place matters because it af 
fects the fate of people. Places, therefore, should play a role in national 
policy. National policy makers should at least consider how policies 
adopted for other purposes affect the economic development of par 
ticular states, metropolitan areas, rural labor market areas, or other 
"places" that have some separate labor market identity. An ideal na 
tional policy would also consider how to best revive the economy of 
particular places suffering from persistent poverty and unemployment.
Place-oriented policies are controversial. One concern is that place- 
oriented policies will constrain geographic mobility, which in turn will 
constrain upward social and economic mobility. James Fallows, national 
correspondent for Atlantic magazine, and former chief speechwriter for 
President Carter, argues that "American society works best when peo 
ple are in flux" (Fallows 1989, p. 111). Part of this flux, in Fallows' 
view, is geographic mobility, and his book describes several cases in 
which individuals' geographic mobility led to economic success.
Helping economically distressed places is argued to discourage the 
needed geographic out-migration from these places. For example, the 
President's Commission for a National Agenda for the Eighties (1980) 
argued that "urban programs aimed solely at ameliorating poverty where 
it occurs may not help either the locality or the individual if the net 
result is to shackle distressed people to distressed places" (P. 56). More 
recently, a Business Week article highlighted the views of Alice Rivlin, 
former director of the Congressional Budget Office: "Brookings In 
stitution economist Alice Rivlin questions the usefulness of both liberal 
'improve the ghetto' efforts and the conservative enterprise zone 
idea. Instead, Rivlin argues, 'we ought to come to a positive policy 
about moving poor people out of cities, where everything's so bad' " 
(September 25, 1989, p. 152).
Another concern is that focusing on places is divisive and leads to 
poor national policy. The U.S. is a diverse country. Policies focusing
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on one distressed area, or even distressed areas in general, arouse enor 
mous political opposition. As a result, place-oriented federal policies 
have often been distorted to spread some money to every Congressional 
district, or to the areas represented by powerful senators and con 
gressmen. Quoting the President's Commission for a National Agenda 
for the Eighties again, "Federal policies that marry a place orientation 
with a formula allocative mechanism almost dictate that funds will be 
diluted to the disadvantage of the most distressed people and the most 
distressed places. Funds end up being available to people and places 
that have relatively less need. The moral authority undergirding national 
goals can often become eclipsed by more localized agendas" (p. 76). l
These criticisms do not, in my view, fatally undermine the case for 
national policymakers paying some attention to the fate of particular 
places. The political infeasibility of place-oriented policies is often ex 
aggerated. Historically, federal programs that target geographic aid to 
particular places, while politically required to spread their largesse 
around to some extent, still have retained some targeting on distressed 
areas. Furthermore, there are federal policies that could usefully help 
distressed places while avoiding an explicit geographic redistribution 
of economic activity. For example, funding better evaluations of 
economic development programs need not be geographically divisive. 
Providing wage subsidies to firms hiring unemployed individuals will 
tend to help distressed areas, because that is where the unemployed live, 
yet this policy does not involve explicitly promoting one area over 
another.
In addition, there is no necessary contradiction between the argument 
for helping distressed places and the argument that geographic mobili 
ty has great benefits. Promoting economic development in distressed 
places can help the resident unemployed. Eliminating barriers to 
geographic mobility, such as housing market discrimination, can also 
help the poor and the unemployed.
Economic development policies and mobility policies can even be seen 
as complementary. Assisting individuals in moving may be of greatest 
benefit to those individuals who are younger and relatively well-educated. 
Providing jobs in distressed areas will help less-educated, older in-
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dividuals. We should not elevate the virtues of geographic mobility so 
much that we forget the needs of those who have strong and valuable 
ties to their homes.
Ultimately, places are important because they are important to in 
dividuals. Most individuals are attached by both financial and 
psychological moving costs to their home areas. As Adam Smith put 
the matter over 200 years ago, "a man is of all sorts of luggage the 
most difficult to be transported." 2 As this book has argued, because 
of the ties of people to places, policies to improve local economies can 
have long-lasting effects upon individual well-being.
NOTES
1. This quotation from page 76 of the Commission report is taken from Roger Bolton's paper, 
"Place Prosperity vs. People Prosperity Revisited," presented at the November 1989 meetings 
of the Regional Science Association (Bolton 1989b).
2. Wealth of Nations, Book I, chapter 8.

Appendix 2.1
The Elasticity of State or Local Business Activity With Respect
to Local Cost Variables Should Be Roughly Proportional
to the Variable's Share in Costs
I assume initially that the percentage change in an area's business output 
due to some profit change will be a multiple of the percentage change in average 
profits in the area.
It is then straightforward to show that the percentage change in output due 
to a percentage change in some area cost variable (the elasticity of business 
output with respect to the cost variable) will be proportional to the variable's 
share in business costs. Suppose that net profits (including both pure economic 
profits and normal profits) for a representative firm at a location can be writ 
ten as:
(1) Profits = R - P'X - T(X),
where R is revenues (R equals price of output, which I assume is fixed na 
tionally, times output), P is a vector of input prices, X is a vector of inputs, 
and Tis total state and local taxes, which may depend on the firm's input usage. 
Then the elasticity of profits with respect to price variable PI and taxes Twill 
be given 1 by the following equations:
(2) t/ln(Profits)/^rLP/ = PI • Xt /(Profits) = (Pt • Xt /Q(Pure 
Profits/Profits)(C/Pure Profits);
(3) <fln(Profits)/dlnr = TVProfits = (77C)(Pure Profits/Profits)(C/Pure 
Profits).
C is the total cost of all inputs; Xj is the /th input. The ratio of costs to pure 
profits is constant as input prices vary for all homogeneous production func 
tions (Lau 1978). The Pure Profits/Profits ratio is approximately a constant 
for small changes in prices and taxes, and will be exactly a constant for a Cobb- 
Douglas production function. Thus, the elasticity of profits with respect to 
local prices or taxes will be approximately proportional to the cost share of 
the particular input or tax. Hence, if the elasticity of local business output with 
respect to profits is assumed to be a constant, the elasticity of local business 
output with respect to some local cost variable will be approximately propor 
tional to that variable's cost share.
Let us consider the initial assumption that the elasticity of local business 
output with respect to local profits is a constant. This assumption holds if all 
local output came from identical competitive firms. For a given homogeneous 
production function, the ratio of revenue to pure profits is a constant. If capital's 
share is roughly constant, then the ratio of revenue to total profits (pure profits
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plus normal profits) will also be a constant. With a fixed national price of out 
put, the elasticity of the representative firm's output with respect to its profits 
will be a constant.
A constant long-run elasticity of local output with respect to expected local 
profits may also hold if all local growth occurs as a result of discrete invest 
ment decisions. 2 Firm death rates and contraction rates are roughly the same 
in all areas. Most differences in area growth rates are due to differences in 
branch plant openings, small business start-ups, and plant expansion decisions. 
In that case, business activity in an area at time / will be equal to:
(4M, = At. l + Gt -dAt_i,
where A is business activity, G is some multiple of the number of discrete 
investment/location decisions made in favor of this location, and d is some 
multiple of the death rate for firms. If d is a constant, then the long-run 
equilibrium business activity level will be
(5) A* = G/d.
Hence, the elasticity of long-run business activity with respect to area profits 
will equal the long-run elasticity of new investment decisions in favor of this 
location with respect to area profits. Several papers (Bartik 1985, 1989a) have 
shown that the elasticity of the number of start-ups with respect to average 
profits will be a constant if the disturbance term (equal to unobserved factors 
that affect profits) enters in a log-linear fashion into the profit equation and 
follows a Weibull distribution. The disturbance term is quite likely to be a 
log-linear addition to the log profit equation if the disturbance is composed 
of unobserved area prices or other characteristics that affect profits. 3
Even if these assumptions do not hold, we could assume that any regression 
is implicitly estimating the average relationship that holds in the sample be 
tween long-run local business output and average profits in the area. The 
elasticity of local output with respect to some local cost variable will then still 
equal some sample-specific constant times the cost share of that variable.
Finally, suppose we are concerned with the effects of local taxes or other 
costs on local employment — or some other type of factor demand— rather than 
local output. The elasticity of local employment with respect to a local cost 
variable will be the sum of the elasticity of the employment/output ratio with 
respect to that cost variable plus the elasticity of local output with respect to 
that cost variable, or
(6) d\nE/dlnPi = dlntf/Yj/dlnPj + dlnY/dlnPj,
where Y is output and E is employment. Even if the second term is approx 
imately proportional to the input variable's cost share, the first term will de 
pend on the substitution possibilities provided by the production function.
215
However, if the output elasticity with respect to profits is large enough, then 
differences in substitution will not make much of a difference. Consider, the 
example of a Cobb-Douglas production function with two factors of produc 
tion, capital and labor. The Cobb-Douglas production function allows for more 
substitution possibilities than is probably true for most real world production 
functions, so we are considering an extreme case.
Chapter 2 indicates that the elasticity of state or local business activity with 
respect to state and local taxes is probably -.25 or even more negative. A con 
sistent elasticity of business activity with respect to wages would be about 14 
times as great (because labor's cost share is about 14 times the cost share of 
state and local taxes), or about -3.50. For a Cobb-Douglas production func 
tion, the elasticity of the labor-output ratio with respect to wages will be equal 
to minus the capital share of output (probably around -.34). 4 Hence, the elastici 
ty of employment with respect to wages would be only slightly greater in ab 
solute value than the elasticity of business activity with respect to wages, about 
-3.84 (= -3.50 -.34). The general lesson is that despite substitution 
possibilities, it is quite plausible that the elasticity of any business factor usage 
in an area with respect to any local cost variable will be approximately pro 
portional to the variable's share in costs.
Of course, if local business output is less responsive to taxes and other costs 
than is assumed above, substitution effects would loom larger. But we could 
also assume less substitution possibilities in the production function, and 
substitution effects would be less important.
NOTES
1. These elasticity derivatives follow by applying the envelope theorem when taking the derivative 
of maximum profits with respect to a factor price or tax.
2. To accentuate the rigidity of this alternative model, I assume that output is not chosen. For 
simplicity, I assume all establishments are the same size.
3. For example, if we assume a Cobb-Douglas production function, but assume that some unobserved 
price varies randomly across areas and firms, then the logarithm of this unobserved price variable 
would be a linear addition to a log-linear profit function. It is more difficult to determine whether 
the Weibull distributional assumption is reasonable.
4. These numbers are derived from Commerce Department figures on Gross State Product for 
1986. Specifically, .66 equals total compensation divided by total national Gross State Product 
less proprietors' income.
Appendix 2.2 
Studies of Effects of State and Local Taxes on Business Activity
Study
Business 
Activity Measure Tax Measure
INTERMETROPOLITAN OR
Coughlin, 
Terza & 
Arromdee 
(1991)
Eberts 
(1991)
Mullen & 
Williams 
(1991)
Beeson & 
Montgomery 
(1990)
No. of manufacturing 
foreign direct 
investments, by state, 
1981-83
No. of new plant openings 
by MS A & industry, 
1976-78
Average growth rate 
of Gross State 
Product, 1969-86
MSA employment 
growth, 1980-88
State and local taxes 
per capita
"Taxes"
Average state and 
local tax rates as 
percentage of GSP; 
Marginal tax 
rate calculated 
by examining how 
taxes vary with GSP
Effective business 
tax rate, sales 
and income tax rate
Fixed 
Effect 
Controls
Public 
Service 
Controls
INTERSTATE STUDIES
Existing 
activity
Existing 
activity
No
No
Some 
specifica 
tions
Yes
Yes
Yes
Significant 
Tax Long-Run 
Effects Tax Elasticity
In 2 specifi 
cations tried, 
elasticity 
varied as 
follows: -.27; 
-.16 (Avg. 
No is -.21)
.18 for all 
firms, .34 for 
small firms, 
-.20 for 
Yes large firms
Yes -.14
Yes ?
Crihfield 
(1990)
Luce 
(1990a)
McConnell 
& Schwab 
(1990)
Mehay & 
Solnick 
(1990)
Mofidi 
& Stone 
(1990)
Munnell 
(1990)
Percentage change 
in MSA output, 
1963-77 by manu 
facturing industry
Shift effect in 
employment for 
individual manufac 
turing industries 
for 38 MSAs, 
1972-77, 1977-82
New auto branch plants 
in county, 1973-82
State employment, 
pooled time series 
cross-section data 
from 1976 to 1985
Change in manufac 
turing employment & 
investment, 1967- 
72, 1972-77, 1977-82, 
by state, pooled time 
series cross-section
State employment growth 
rate, 1970-88
State 
and MSA taxes 
per $ of income, 
property tax rate
ACIRtax 
effort index
Wheaton effective 
business tax rate 
for state, property 
tax rate for county
State and local 
taxes and fees per 
$1000 of personal income
Taxes as 
percentage of 
personal income
State and local 
taxes as a percent 
of personal income
Yes
Lagged 
activity
Existing 
activity, 
regional 
dummies
?
Yes
No
Yes Yes -.88
Yes Yes -.15
Yes Yes -1.4
Yes See notes See notes
Yes Yes See notes
Yes Yes -.66
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Study
O'hUallachain
&
Satterthwaite 
(1990)
Reynolds 
&Maki 
(1990)
Woodward 
(1990)
Business 
Activity Measure Tax Measure
MSA 1977-84
employment growth Wheaton corporate 
by industry tax variable
New autonomous
and branch plant 
establishments 
per 10,000 residents 
1982-84, for 382 
labor market areas
in U.S., by 
various industry Taxes per 
classifications capita, 1972
Number of new Effective corporate 
Japanese branch plants income tax rate, 
by state, 1980-89 presence of unitary tax
Fixed Public Significant 
Effect Service Tax 
Controls Controls Effects
No Yes No
No Unclear Unclear
Only index 
of state
industrial
development 
programs 
Regional (counted 
dummies as no) No
Long-Run 
Tax Elasticity
?
Positive effect
for autonomous
births in
manufacturing 
and local
industries; 
negative effect 
for branch 
plants over 
all industries,
dropped 
from other 
specifications
-.14
to
oo
Bartik 
(1989a)
Bauer & 
Cromwell 
(1989)
Carroll 
& 
Wasylenko 
(1989)
Crihfield 
(1989)
Deich 
(1989)
Duffy-Deno 
& Eberts 
(1989)
State small 
business start rate 
by industry, 1976-78, 
1980-82, pooled time- 
series cross-section.
No. of new firm births 
divided by existing 
employment, 259 MS As, 
1980-82
Percentage employment 
change by industry 
for each state, 
1981-87
Percentage change in 
aggregate MSA labor 
demand, 1963-77, by 
manufacturing 
industries
Number of small 
business starts and 
branch plant starts
Per capita personal 
income level, 28 MS As, 
each year from 1980-84, 
pooled cross-section 
time series
Effective business 
rates for many taxes
Effective state 
corporate tax rate
State and local 
taxes as percentage 
of income
State and MSA taxes 
per $ of income, 
effective county 
property tax rate
Effective corporate 
income tax rate 
and property tax 
rate
State & local tax 
revenue divided by 
state and local tax 
capacity (from ACIR)
Yes Yes Yes -.73
No No Yes -.61
-.39 for total 
employment, 
-1.25 for 
No Yes Yes manufacturing
Yes Yes Yes -.77
.13 for 
small business, 
.02 for 
branch plants 
No Yes Yes (Avg. = .07)
No Yes Yes -.27
Appendix 2.2 (continued)
Study
Friedman,
Gerlowski 
& 
Silberman 
(1989)
Papke 
(1989a)
Business 
Activity Measure Tax Measure
No. of foreign manufac 
turing branch plant Effective corporate 
openings, by state, income and property 
1977-86 tax rates
State GSP in 
4 industries, 
1975-82, pooled cross- Effective tax rate 
section time-series from AFT AX model
Fixed Public Significant 
Effect Service Tax Long-Run 
Controls Controls Effects Tax Elasticity
Elasticities
can't be cal 
culated; not 
counted in avg. 
No No No calculations
-.74 for
apparel, -.19 
for furniture
and fixtures,
.13 for printing 
and publishing, 
-.32 for
electric and
electronic
equipment 
(weighted avg. r 
using GSP as 
Yes No No weights, is -.15)
-.49 for
communication
equipment; 
-.13
for furniture;
-.05 for
apparel; .08
Papke 
(1989b, 1986)
Testa 
(1989)
Wasylenko 
(1988)
Canto & 
Webb 
(1987)
Doeringer, 
Terkla & 
Topakian 
(1987)
Number of new plant 
births, by state, 
1975-82, by industry, 
pooled cross-section 
time series
Percent change in total 
manufacturing and 
nonmanufacturing 
employment, 1976-85, 
and manufacturing 
output, 1976-82
Percentage employment 
change by industry for 
each state, 1980-85
Annual percentage 
change in state per 
capita personal income, 
separate time-series 
analysis of each 
state, 1957-77
Percentage growth in 
state employment, 
1970-80
Effective tax rate 
from AFT AX model Yes
Percent change in per capita 
state and local taxes No ?
State and local taxes 
as % of income No
Percentage change in 
state and local tax 
burden per $1000 of 
personal income Yes
Nominal corporate 
tax rate No
for publish 
ing; .23 for 
electronic 
components 
Yes Yes (Avg. = -.07)
-.35 for total 
employment, 
-.93 for manu 
facturing, -.02 
for nonmanu 
facturing, .04 
for manufac 
turing output 
(-.35 used in 
Yes ? Yes average calc.)
-.13 for total 
employment, 
Yes Yes -.90 for mfg.
Average 
elasticity of 
-.35 over all 
No Yes 48 states
No No -.16
Appendix 2.2 (continued)
Study
Gyourko 
(1987a)
Luce 
(1987)
McGuire 
& 
Wasylenko 
(1987)
Nakosteen 
& Zimmer 
(1987)
Papke 
(1987)
Business 
Activity Measure
Labor intensity of 
MSA manufacturing 
base, 1972 and 
1977
Absolute change in # 
of high-tech jobs, by 
MSA, 1972-77, 1977-82
Percentage employment 
change by industry for 
each state, 1973-77, 
1977-84
Probability of manu 
facturing firm 
locating out of state, 
1970-80
New capital expenditure 
in state per production 
worker, by industry, 
for 1978
Tax Measure
Property taxes, payroll 
taxes, corporation 
income taxes
ACIR tax effort
Personal taxes, sales 
taxes, corporate tax 
rate, effective property 
tax rate
State corporate income 
taxes divided by state 
employment
Effective tax rate 
for representative 
firm, using AFTAX 
model
Fixed 
Effect 
Controls
Regional 
dummies
Existing 
activity
No
See notes
No
Public Significant 
Service Tax Long-Run 
Controls Effects Tax Elasticity
Elasticity not 
comparable; 
property taxes 
tend to increase 
labor intensity 
No Yes of mfg.
-.82 for 1972-77, 
1.18 for 1977-82 
No No (Avg. = .18)
Units unclear; 
generally in 
significant 
results (Avg. 
assumed to 
Yes No be zero)
-.76 
(wrong sign & 
Yes No insignificant)
Yes Yes -.17
Quan & 
Beck 
(1987)
Schmenner, 
Huber & 
Cook 
(1987)
Benson & 
Johnson 
(1986)
Harris 
(1986)
State manufacturing 
employment relative 
to the national 
average, annual data 
from 1974-83, pooled 
cross-section time 
series
New branch plants, and 
new branch plants that 
say they want low taxes
Per capita manufactur 
ing investment in 
state as share of U.S., 
1966-78, pooled 
time-series 
cross-section
Formation rate of high 
technology establish 
ments, low technology 
establishments, and 
high technology 
branches in various 
MSAs, 1976-80
Polynomial distributed 
lag in state and local 
taxes as % of personal 
income relative to 
national average No Yes
Nominal corporate 
rate, property tax 
% of personal income No Yes
Total taxes as % of 
personal income 
relative to U.S. Yes No
Index of local taxes Sometimes No
-.95 for 
Northeast states, 
-.20 for Sunbelt 
states (-.58 used 
Yes as average)
-.50 for all 
plants; -3.09 for 
plants desiring 
Yes low taxes
Yes -1.02
.12 for high 
tech branch 
formations, 
-.31 for all 
high tech 
est., -.49 for 
non-high tech 
est. (Avg. est. 
Yes result is -.40)
Appendix 2.2 (continued)
Study
Place 
(1986)
Wheat 
(1986)
Bartik 
(1985)
Helms 
(1985)
Business 
Activity Measure
Annual state employ 
ment growth, 1972-84, 
pooled cross-section 
time series
Percent growth in state 
manufacturing employ 
ment, 1963-77
Number of new Fortune 
500 branch plants 
choosing the state, 
1972-78
State personal income, 
pooled cross-section 
time series from 1965 
to 1979
Number of new foreign 
plant start-ups in 3 
industries (drugs,
Tax Measure
State revenue per 
capita
Total corporate 
income taxes divided 
by manufacturing 
value-added
Effective corporate tax 
rate, property tax rate, 
UI tax rate, workers' 
compensation tax rate
Property tax, other 
taxes as % of 
personal income
Weighted average of
Fixed 
Effect 
Controls
No
No
Regional 
dummies, 
existing 
activity
Yes
Public Significant 
Service Tax Long-Run 
Controls Effects Tax Elasticity
Units unclear; 
sign varies 
across speci 
fications; 
usually insig 
nificant 
Yes No (Avg. = 0)
Wrong sign, 
magnitude 
unreported 
No No (Avg. = 0)
Yes Yes -.45
Yes Yes -.39
Significantly 
negative 
for drugs, 
significantly 
positive for 
motor vehicles
Luger
& Shetty
(1985)
Summers
and
Luce
(1985)
Wasylenko
& McGuire
(1985)
Armington,
Harris
&0dle
(1984)
machinery, motor Wheaton business Existing
vehicles), 1979, tax measure and business
1981-83 personal tax rate activity No
Metropolitan employ 
ment growth rate by
industry, pooled over
all manufacturing, MSA tax effort index
1967-77, 1977-83 from ACIR No No
Percent growth in total
state employment, Tax effort, effective Existing
and by major industry, corporate and personal business
1973-80 income taxes activity Yes
No. of business forma 
tions per 1000 workers
and employment growth
in MS As, 1976-80, for
high-tech industries,
other manufacturing
and business services,
and other industries,
overall and divided
into small firms and
large firms ACIR tax capacity index No No
(not included
in average
Yes calculations)
-.10 for 1967-
77, .05 for
1977-83
(Avg. =
Yes -.03)
-.85 for total
employment,
-1.54 for
manufactur-
Yes ing employment
Formation rate/
employment
growth results
for high-tech:
-.25/-.S9; for
other mfg.; -.507
-.22; for small
firm high-tech:
-.347.38; for
large firm high-
tech :-.10/- 1.05;
small firm low-
tech: -.S2/-.26;
large firm low-
tech: -.40/-.16
(Avg. mfg. em 
ployment growth
Yes result =-.55)
Appendix 2.2 (continued)
Study
Gyourko 
(1984)
Steinnes 
(1984)
Yandle 
(1984)
Carlton 
(1983)
Business 
Activity Measure
New manufacturing 
capital investment 
per dollar of value 
added, 42 cities, 
1969-78, pooled 
cross-section time 
series
State employment 
change in manufac 
turing, two-year 
intervals from 1973- 
75 to 1977-79, 
pooled cross-section 
time series
Percentage change 
in real value added 
in manufacturing, 
by state, 1963-67, 
1967-72, 1972-77
Probability of new 
branch location & plant 
size in various MS As, 
for various industries, 
1967-71
Tax Measure
Nominal state corporate 
tax rate, nominal local 
corporate tax rate, 
local income tax rate, 
effective property tax 
rate
Average tax bills for 
hypothetical firms
Total state and local 
taxes per $1000 of 
income
Effective property 
tax rate, average of 
corporate and personal 
income tax rate
Fixed Public Significant 
Effect Service Tax 
Controls Controls Effects
Margin 
ally 
Regional signifi- 
dummies Yes cant
Yes No Yes
Marginally 
signifi 
cant for 
No No 1963-67
No No No
Long-Run 
Tax Elasticity
Not 
calculable 
(not included 
in average 
calculation)
Elasticity not 
calculable (av 
erage assumed 
to equal zero.)
-.03
.17 for plastics, 
zero for other 
industries (.06 
used as average)
Garofalo & 
Malhotra 
(1983)
Newman 
(1983)
Plaut 
& Pluta 
(1983)
Bradbury, 
Downs 
& Small 
(1982)
Graham 
(1982)
Responsiveness of 
long-run optimal state 
manufacturing capital 
stock, based on 
estimated cost func 
tions, pooled cross- 
section time series
Relative percentage 
growth in employment 
by state, for 2-digit 
manufacturing industries, 
1957-65 and 1965-73, 
pooled cross-section 
time series
Percent change in state 
manufacturing value 
added, employment 
and capital, 1967-72 
and 1972-77
MS A employment change, 
1960-70, 1970-75
Number of small high- 
tech firms formed, 266 
MSAs, in 1975
Cost of capital term 
incorporates property 
tax rates and state 
corporate tax rates
Maximum 
marginal 
corporate 
rate, lagged 
10 years
Business climate 
index, tax effort 
index, corporate 
income tax, sales 
tax, property tax, 
personal income tax
MSA local taxes 
per capita
Taxes on hypothetical 
corporation
No No Yes? -.02
-.26; more 
negative for 
more capital- 
intensive 
industries but 
not signifi- 
Yes No Yes cantly so
Units unclear 
(dropped 
from average 
No Yes Yes calculations)
-.13 for 1960-70, 
dropped from 
1970-75 (-.07 
No ? Yes used as average)
Dropped from 
Existing reported equation 
ft of (assumed zero 
small high- for use in aver- 
tech firms No No age calculations)
Appendix 2.2 (continued)
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Hodge 
(1981)
Kieschnick 
(1981 or 
1983)
Vedder 
(1981)
Browne, 
Mieszkowski 
& Styron 
(1980)
Business 
Activity Measure
Gross investment rate 
in 4 industries, 42 
MSAs, 1963-75, pooled 
cross-section time 
series
State share of 
investment, for 13 
manufacturing 
industries, 1977
State per capita 
income growth, 1970-79
Net per capita 
investment in 
manufacturing, 1959- 
76 in state, and net 
per capita invest 
ment by industry, 
pooled cross-section 
time series
Percent change in state
Tax Measure
Effective property 
tax rate, nominal 
corporate tax rate
State & local taxes 
paid by hypothetical 
corporation
Change in state and 
local taxes as % of 
personal income, 1967-77
Personal taxes as a % 
of personal income
State and local taxes 
as % of income; corporate
Fixed 
Effect 
Controls
Regional 
dummies, 
existing 
business 
activity
Existing 
activity
7
No
Public Significant 
Service Tax Long-Run 
Controls Effects Tax Elasticity
-.60 for fur 
niture, .54 for 
plastics and 
rubber, -.65 for 
apparel, .24 for 
electronics 
(-.15 used as 
No Yes average)
See notes in 
No Yes appendix
Full results 
No Yes not reported
Report weak 
negative 
relationship 
but not actual 
coefficient 
(assumed avg. 
No No is 0)
Units unclear
Dye 
(1980)
Carlton 
(1979)
Romans & 
Subrahmanyam 
(1979)
employment, income, 
and manufacturing 
value added, 1972-76
Number of new single 
establishment plants, 
and number of new
branch plants, in 28 
to 42 MSAs, in 3 
industries, 1967-71
and 1972-75, pooled 
cross-section time 
series for single 
establishment plants
Percent change in income, 
% change in employ 
ment, by state, 
1964-74
income tax rate; income 
tax as % of income; sales 
tax as % of income
Effective property tax 
rate; weighted average 
of corporate and 
personal tax rates
ACIR measures of business 
tax effort, personal tax 
effort; average marginal 
personal income tax rate
No
Existing 
activity
Regional 
growth
(not counted 
in average 
Yes ? calculations)
Births/branch
results for 
plastics: -.02/ 
-.70; for com 
munication 
equipment: .337 
-.82; for
electronic 
components: 
.257. 13 
No No (Avg. = -.14)
.27 for income,
.04 for
employment 
(.04 used in 
average cal- 
No Yes culations)
INTRAMETROPOLITAN STUDIES
Luce 
(1990b)
Gyourko 
(1987b)
1980 employment 
in community
No. of new manufacturing 
firms in Philadelphia 
MSA by zip code areas, 
1980-83
Effective property tax 
rate, wage tax rate
Effective property 
tax rate
Lagged 
activity
Lagged 
activity
Yes Yes -1.95
Not calculable;
Sometimes usually negative 
marginal- (not included in 
ly signif- average calcu- 
Yes icant lations)
Appendix 2.2 (continued)
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Summers 
and Luce 
(1987)
McHone 
(1986)
McGuire 
(1985)
Business 
Activity Measure
Percent change in 
share of MSA employ 
ment in central 
city, 1970-80
Manufacturing employ 
ment per capita by 
community in Phila 
delphia MSA, 1970
Building permit value 
of all new firms and 
additions to firms, 
by community, in 
Minneapolis-St. Paul 
MSA, 1976-79
Manufacturing
Tax Measure
Relative central 
city to MSA tax 
effort
Property taxes per 
employee for 
manufacturing
Effective property 
tax rate
Ratio of central
Fixed Public Significant 
Effect Service Tax 
Controls Controls Effects
Lagged 
activity Yes Yes
No Yes Yes
No No Yes
Margin 
ally sig-
Long-Run 
Tax Elasticity
Means not 
calculable 
(not included in 
avg. calculations)
-.79
-1.59
Elasticity 
not calcu 
lable, neg. 
for mfg. & 
construction, 
pos. for 
total employ 
ment but 
always insig 
nificant.
Mills & 
Price 
(1984)
Schneider 
(1984)
Charney 
(1983)
Bradbury, 
Downs 
& Small 
(1982)
Grubb 
(1982)
Church 
(1981)
employment density 
gradients, 
1970
Percent of manufacturing 
establishments in 
MSA, 1977, for 645 
suburbs in 44 MSAs
Number of relocating 
manufacturing firms 
in each zip code of 
Detroit MSA, 1970-75
City employment 
growth relative to 
MSA, 1960-70
Share of MSA manu 
facturing employ 
ment in central 
city, 1967
Percent of manufacturing 
capital expenditures 
in urban area for 
central cities and 
identified suburbs 
11 central cities 
and 89 of their 
suburbs, 1971
city to suburban 
effective property 
tax rates
Property tax 
rate
Effective property 
tax rate
City - MSA 
taxes per capita?
Relative central 
city to MSA 
average property 
tax rate
Property tax 
rate
Lagged 
gradient 
included
1972 # of 
establish 
ments
Existing 
activity
No
Lagged 
activity
No
nificant (not included 
for manu- in average 
No facturing calculation)
Units unclear 
(not included 
in average 
Yes Marginally calculations)
Yes Yes -2.52
Dropped from 
final equation 
(average assumed 
Yes No equal to zero)
Dropped from 
presented 
equation 
Yes No (Avg. = 0)
Units unclear 
(not included 
in average 
Yes Yes calculations)
Appendix 2.2 (continued)
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Fox 
(1981)
Erickson &
Wasylenko 
(1980)
Wasylenko 
(1980)
Palumbo, 
Sacks & 
Wasylenko 
(1990)
Business 
Activity Measure
Amount of industrial
land in suburban
Cleveland communities, 
1969
Proportion of manu 
facturing firms 
relocating from 
Milwaukee to suburbs
that choose a partic 
ular suburb, 1964-74
Proportion of manu 
facturing firms 
relocating from 
Milwaukee to suburbs
that choose a partic 
ular suburb, 1964-74
Overall city and 
overall suburban 
employment growth, 
analyzed separately, 
for 66 MSAs, 1970-80
Fixed 
Effect 
Tax Measure Controls
Effective property 
tax rate No
Effective property Lagged 
tax rate activity
Effective property Lagged 
tax rate activity
MIXED INTRA- AND INTER-AREA STUDIES
Per capita taxes, 
1977 No
Public Significant 
Service Tax Long-Run 
Controls Effects Tax Elasticity
Yes Yes -4.43
Yes No .62
Yes Yes -2.70
.31 for city 
taxes, -.72 
for suburban 
Yes Marginally taxes
Inman 
(1987)
Mills 
(1983)
Church 
(1981)
Grieson 
(1980)
Philadelphia share of 
national jobs, annual 
observations, 1964-83, 
1969-85, time series 
analysis
Percent growth in 
central city and 
overall suburban 
employment, 115 MSAs, 
1970-80
Manufacturing capital 
expenditures per 
capita in 1967, for 
1 1 cities and their 
89 suburbs with 
available data
Philadelphia share 
of national jobs, 
annual observations, 
1965-75, time series 
analysis
Philadelphia wage 
tax rate No
State and local 
taxes per capita 
in 1970 No
Property tax 
rate No
Distributed lag in 
Philadelphia wage 
tax rate No
-.15 in one 
specification, 
-.21 in other 
No Yes specification
Elasticity not 
calculable, but 
some effects 
seem impor- 
No No tant
Yes Yes Units unclear
-.30 for all 
manufacturing 
and services, 
-.36 for 
No Yes manufacturing
INTRASTATE STUDIES
Fox &
Murray
(1990)
Entry of new firms, 
by county, in 
Tennessee, each year 
from 1980 through 
1986, pooled cross- 
section time series
Sales tax rate, hotel 
tax rate, business 
gross receipts tax, 
effective property 
tax rate No Yes Yes -.16
Appendix 2.2 (continued)
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Woodward 
(1990)
Sander 
(1989)
Glickman 
& 
Woodward 
(1987)
White 
(1986)
Business 
Activity Measure
Probability of 
Japanese plant 
choosing a county 
within a state, given 
that it chose state
Percentage growth in 
Illinois county 
employment, 1980-86
Probability of foreign 
plant choosing a 
particular county 
within the state, 
given that it chose 
the state, 1979-83
Percent growth in 
manufacturing employ 
ment, California 
counties, 1977-81
Tax Measure
Property taxes 
per capita
Property taxes and 
other local taxes 
per capita
Property taxes per 
capita relative to 
state average
Change in effective 
property tax rate, 
1977-81
Fixed 
Effect 
Controls
Existing 
activity
No
No
Yes
Public Significant 
Service Tax 
Controls Effects
Only 
dummy 
for inter 
state highway 
and median 
years of 
schooling No
Yes Yes
No No
No No
Long-Run 
Tax Elasticity
-.09 and 
-.15 in 
all-county 
regressions
-.81
-.12
-1.85
Howland
(1985)
Number of new
firms and new
employment by county,
within New Jersey,
Maryland, Virginia,
D.C., in machine
tools and electronic
components industry
Effective
property
tax rate,
availability of
property tax
abatements
Not
calculable
from
available
No No No information
GENERAL NOTES TO TABLE
A study is considered to fully control for fixed effects either by explicitly including state or MSA fixed effects, or by estimating a model in first 
differences. Partial controls for state or local fixed effects are provided by including regional dummies, or by including current levels of business activity 
in the state or local area. Tax effect significance column reports whether any of the tax variables included in the study were significant and had expected 
signs. Any tax variables that were insignificant or had unexpected signs are mentioned in notes to each study. The tax elasticity reports implied long-run 
percentage effect on total state or local business activity of a 1 percent reduction in all taxes, holding all else constant. This tax elasticity is calculated 
by summing over all tax variables included in the study that would be affected by a 1 percent uniform reduction in all state and local taxes. Whether 
tax variable is statistically significant or insignificant is ignored; tax variables that would not change with 1 percent across-the-board tax reduction are 
not included in calculation summation.
For studies in which the dependent variable was in the form of gross new capital investment, new branches, or new small businesses, the effect of 
taxes, as percent of the average value of the dependent variable in the study's sample, was used as a proxy for the long-run effect of taxes on local 
business activity. This assumption will be true if all gross new activity responds the same as the dependent variable being considered to taxes, and 
death rates are roughly constant. For example, suppose
(1) Nt = tfM +Gt - Dt,
where Nt is local business activity in year /, G is new activity, D is deaths of existing activity. Suppose further that deaths are a constant fraction/ 
of existing business activity in year t-l. Then in long-run equilibrium, where N is constant over time, equation (1) after substitution and some manipula 
tion becomes
(2) AT* = G//,
where N* is the equilibrium level of N. Hence, a given percentage effect of taxes on gross new activity will imply the same long-run percentage effect 
of taxes on total local business activity.
For studies in which the dependent variable was some measure of the net change in local business activity over some time period, I first calculated w 
the effect of taxes as a percentage of the average level of local business activity in the sample. This percentage effect was then adjusted using information 
from Helms' (1985) study on how quickly state business activity adjusts to a new equilibrium. Helms indicates that state business activity adjusts annually 
by 8.9 percent of the difference between current state business activity and the long-run equilibrium level of state business activity. Based on this assump 
tion, the relationship between the long-run effect and the effect after T years will be
(3)fi* = BT /(l - (.9104)7),
where B* is the long-run effect, and By is the effect after T years. Each study's percentage effect after T years was multiplied by !/(!-(.9104)') to 
get an estimated long-run effect. The actual adjustment made is described in the notes for each study.
The table only reports each study's estimates of tax effects on total business activity and manufacturing business activity. If a study reported estimates 
from several specifications, I used the author's preferred specification for my calculations. Where no specification was clearly preferred, I averaged 
estimates across all reported specifications. (Two exceptions to this rule are the studies by Helms (1985) and Mehay and Solnick (1990); see notes 
on these studies for details.) The elasticities used in the calculations summarized in table 2.3 are for the business activity variable that is most closely 
related to total business activity.
If a tax variable was excluded by the author from all reported specifications, I generally assumed its effect was zero for the calculations of the averages 
reported in table 2.3. The exception was cases where the author clearly stated that the tax variable had a negative effect when included. These cases 
were excluded from the table 2.3 calculations of average elasticities.
Most studies rely on cross-section evidence on determinants of economic growth or activity in different areas, although separate cross-section analyses 
may be done for different time periods. Studies restricted to one area's economic growth rely on time series evidence by default, and are identified 
as time series analyses under business activity measure. Studies that pool both time-series and cross-sectional variation in one estimating equation are 
identified in the summary of the business activity measure.
Statistical significance was judged on a 5 percent one-tail test. "Marginal" statistical significance means significance at a 10 percent level for a one-tail test.
NOTES ON SPECIFIC STUDIES
These notes on specific studies seek to explain how the long-run tax elasticity numbers for each study, reported in the last column of this appendix's 
tax table, are derived from the estimates actually reported by each study.
Armington, Harris and Odle (1984): I report the tax results from their tables B-15 through B-18. Employment growth elasticities are adjusted to long- 
run elasticities by being multiplied by !/(!-(.9104) ); see general notes above for rationalization. Results are statistically insignificant at 10 percent 
level for: high-tech business formations; low-tech employment growth; other industries' employment growth; small firm high-tech formations and growth; 
large firm high-tech formations; small and large firm low-tech employment growth. It should be noted that the technical skills variable included in all
of these researchers' regressions, defined as percent of labor force, that is, scientists, professionals, or technical, may proxy for existing business activity
for high tech industries.
Bartik (1985): Results used to calculate elasticity come from specification 3 in table 2 of Bartik's paper that includes 8 regional dummies. The reported
elasticity considers an equal percentage increase in corporate, property, UI, and workers' compensation tax rates. The corporate tax rate coefficient
is significantly negative at the 1 percent level, the property tax rate coefficient is significantly negative at the 10 percent level, the UI tax rate coefficient
is negative but insignificant, and the workers' compensation rate coefficient is positive and significant.
Bartik (1989a): Study includes separate effective rates for business property taxes, corporate income taxes, personal income taxes, sales taxes, and
specific tax breaks for small business. All results reported in text tables are taken from "changes" specification, except for environmental regulation
results. The -.73 figure in the tax table is the sum of the elasticity for property taxes, corporate taxes, income taxes, and sales taxes in the "changes"
specification. Only property taxes and corporate income taxes have significant effects. Sales tax is marginally significant.
Bauer and Cromwell (1989): Results reported in tax table are derived from column (3) of their table 2. Elasticity with respect to their tax variable
is derived by using information they provide. The mean of their tax variable is .403.
Beeson and Montgomery (1990): Study does not report units in sufficient detail to determine magnitude of tax effect. Their business tax variable,
adopted from Bania and Calkins (1988), appears to be similar to Wheaton's. The business tax elasticity is significantly negative, while the sales and
income tax elasticity is significantly positive.
Benson and Johnson (1986): The long-run elasticity reported here is taken from their table I. It should be noted that most of the negative impact of
taxes on investment in their model is a lagged effect, occurring after two or three years. Benson and Johnson also have a previous paper, using the
same data set, that estimates a long-run tax effect of-.77. The models are identical except that the latter paper apparently corrects for heteroskedasticity.
I do not include the former study in this official list of business location studies, as I assume that Benson and Johnson regard the latter set of estimates as better.
Bradbury, Downs and Small (1982): Mean for MSA local taxes per capita is inferred from their table 6.8 to be $277. Inter-area results for 1960-70
come from their table 5.10. Resulting elasticity is multiplied by !/(!-(.9104) 10) to get long-run elasticity. It is unclear whether public service controls
were tested at some point in the estimating equations; if they were, they were dropped from the final equations that were presented.
Browne, Mieszkowski and Styron (1980): Authors report a weak negative relationship between tax variable and net manufacturing investment, but
this variable is statistically insignificant and hence excluded from the final equation that is reported in their article.
Canto and Webb (1987): Results reported in this appendix are unweighted averages of their tax coefficients, multiplied by . 1105, the mean value of
their tax variable in the units they use. I treat this as long-run effect because this is essentially a time series analysis of each state. This analysis will
tend to force the coefficient on the contemporaneous change in taxes to reflect long-run as well as short-run effects. The extent to which the coefficient
reflects long-run vs. short-run effects is unknown. Canto and Webb only report single equation estimates. They report that using instruments led to
similar results, but do not provide further details on the instruments used. Estimated tax effect is significant at the 5 percent (one-tail test) level in 35
of the 48 states, and significant at the 10 percent level in 8 of the remaining 13 states.
Carlton (1979): Results reported here rely on Carlton's footnote that tax elasticities can be derived for average observation by multiplying his reported u> 
property tax coefficient by .03, and his reported income tax coefficient by -.05. All of Carlton's tax coefficients are statistically insignificant. 
Carlton (1983): Elasticity estimate for plastics is for new plant probabilities, and is equal to estimated coefficient divided by N parameter. 
Charney (1983): Charney also finds that local income tax rate does not have significant effect, either statistically or substantively. But local income 
tax is only imposed by Detroit and three other jurisdictions in MSA.
Church (1981): I assume mean property tax rate of 2.0 in Church's sample. Church's study is cited twice in this table. His results when the dependent 
variable is the jurisdiction's share of total urban manufacturing capital expenditures reflect business location patterns within an MSA. His results when 
the dependent variable is the jurisdiction's absolute level of manufacturing capital expenditures per capita reflect business location patterns both within 
and across MSAs.
Coughlin, Terza and Arromdee (1991): I use the results from their 1991 REStat paper rather than results from their July 1989 working paper. The 
July 1989 paper does get significantly negative tax effects of somewhat higher absolute magnitude (-.26 rather than -.21). The earlier paper uses minimum 
chi-square conditional logit estimation, which authors appear to prefer, rather than maximum likelihood estimates of the final REStat paper. 
Crihfield (1989): All elasticities reported here for Crihfield's 1989 study use his equation (1), and the coefficients on the changes variables (represent 
ing, in his model, the 1977 coefficient) rather than the initial level coefficients (representing, in his model, the changes between the 1963 and 1977 
coefficients). Reported elasticities sum his tax variables, and then multiply by 1.37 (= 1/(1-(.9104) 14)) to get implied long-run effect from his 14-year 
effects. Crihfield treats wages as endogenous, and apparently uses changes in apartment rental rates, local real personal income, state income tax revenue, 
state direct expenditures, MSA government direct expenditures, and social security payments by MSA, as instruments. The exogeneity of these in 
struments is questionable.
Crihfield (1990): I use Crihfield's Model 1 to calculate elasticities. His estimated elasticities are multiplied by !/[!-(.9104) 14] = 1.367 to get long-run 
effects. Crihfield's wage elasticities for manufacturing value added are excluded from wage table in text, as he does not control for product price. Hence, 
his estimated wage elasticities combine effect on real value added with effect on output price.
Deich (1990): The elasticities can be calculated directly from Deich's table 3 and table 4, and his footnote 4. The Deich figures used in constructing 
all text tables are the simple average of his small business and branch plant elasticities. I use only his results for all manufacturing industries. I use 
Deich's results from the NTA meetings rather than results from his dissertation as the NTA meeting results are more readily accessible. His dissertation 
results are generally similar, even though the specifications are somewhat different.
Doeringer, Terkla and Topakian (1987): Long-run tax elasticities reported here multiply authors' reported tax elasticity in table 2.2 by !/(!-(.9104) 10). 
Duffy-Deno and Eberts (1989): Reported elasticity in this appendix table is taken directly from 2SLS results reported in table 1 of their paper. I interpret 
this coefficient as long-run elasticity because dependent variable in their study is the personal income level of the MSA, and the tax variable does not 
change over time. Hence, the coefficient on their tax variable will depend on the average relationship that prevails between personal income levels 
and tax levels. This average relationship should approximate the long-run relationship between these two variables.
Dye (1980): Dye only reports limited set of regression results, apparently the product of many different specifications. In one reported specification, 
overall tax burden is apparently negative and significant, while corporate tax rate is positive and significant (table 3, value added dependent variable). 
But units used are not given.
Eberts (1991): Study does not describe tax data, but states that both tax variable and dependent variable (firm openings) are measured in log form, 
so estimated coefficients are elasticities. -.20 elasticity is for large firms headquartered outside state; elasticity for large firms headquartered inside 
state is -.16. The large firm elasticities are significantly negative at 5 percent level of significance, one-tail test.
Eberts and Stone (1988): The results reported in this appendix come from their table 3.7. Eberts and Stone experiment to find optimal lag-length for 
wage effects on employment, so I assume that their estimated sum of wage coefficients is significant. Their tax effect is based on a two-and-one-half-year 
lagged tax variable. I assume the long-run tax effect is !/[!-(.9104)2 ' 5] = 4.78 times their estimated elasticity.
Erickson and Wasylenko (1980): Data and variables are same as Wasylenko (1980), but communities are included even if zero new business activity 
or existing business activity. My calculated elasticity for manufacturing is based on assumption that average property tax rate in Milwaukee suburbs 
in 1969 was 3 percent, as stated in paper. Estimated positive effect is statistically insignificant.
Fox (1981): Fox treats the tax rate as endogenous. But the exogeneity of some of his instruments may be questioned; for example, population is used 
as an instrument, but it would seem that a community's population might have some effect on industrial land demand.
Fox and Murray (1990): Elasticity estimates reported in this appendix table come from their results for all industries, all firm size classes. Firms with 
20 to 49 employees seem more sensitive to taxes than other firm size classes.
Friedman, Gerlowski and Silberman (1989): Paper does not report mean of dependent variable, so elasticities cannot be calculated. In overall regres 
sion, corporate and property taxes have estimated negative effect, but effect is not significant.
Garofalo and Malhotra (1983): Tax elasticities reported here are based on average results reported in their table 2 for own-price elasticity of capital 
for full U.S. sample. In addition, it was assumed that state and local taxes on manufacturing are 8.3 percent of business profits, based on Wheaton 
(1983), which implies that a 1 percent change in overall state and local taxes on businesses will change the user price of capital by .083 percent. Hence, 
the tax elasticity in my table equals Garofalo and Malhotra's table 2 figure of -.2865 times .083.
It should be noted that Garofalo and Malhotra's estimates rest on a very different methodology from most other studies of state and local business 
activity, and most of these differences will tend to reduce the effect of state and local business taxes. They estimate a pooled time-series cross-section 
cost function for manufacturing using annual data for states from 1974 through 1978 as the unit of observation. Cost shares for capital, labor, and energy 
in each state and year are used as dependent variables, and the state prices of capital, energy, and labor as independent variables. Cross-equation restric 
tions are imposed based on production theory. Because they do not include a time period dummy, but only a time trend variable, the estimates will to 
some extent reflect the effects of prices on the national capital stock, which presumably will be less than the effects of a given state's prices on its 
own capital stock. That is, the estimated responsiveness of state cost shares to state capital prices will depend to some extent on how states, on average, 
change their cost shares as national interest rates change. In addition, their cost function estimation procedure appears to assume that long-run equilibrium 
was achieved in all years and all states from 1974 through 1978. This assumption will lead to estimated long-run responses that actually represent short-
run responses. Finally, their estimates impose cross-equation restrictions that may lower the estimated capital price effects. We know from other work 
that wage effects on business location are often low compared to tax effects, based on the relative cost share of labor and taxes. It is possible that relative 
ly low wage effects may contaminate their estimated effects of capital prices.
Glickman and Woodward (1987): Interstate portion of the tax table excludes this study because their tax variable is defined as percentage of state 
taxes derived from corporate income tax. This variable will not increase with an across-the-board increase in state and local taxes, the thought experiment 
being conducted in this table. However, their empirical results do indicate a significant negative effect of this variable on domestic employment growth 
from 1974-83, but not on the growth of foreign-owned employment. For intrastate portion of the tax table, Glickman and Woodward results are derived 
from their table 23. Their coefficient, like all multinomial logit coefficients, reflects effect on log of odds. But in their case, the average probability 
of selection is .5, because they deliberately randomly chose a county within each state without foreign plants for each county within the state that has 
foreign plants. It is straightforward to show that dlnP/dlnX = dln(P/(l-P)dlnX) times (l-P), where P is the probability of selection. At the mean prob 
ability of .50 in the samp\e,(l-P) equals .50, and their coefficients must be multiplied by .50 to give percentage effects of a variable on new business locations. 
Graham (1982): Graham's study investigates several independent variables that measure the presence and size of research universities in the MSA, 
which could be viewed as a rough measure of public service quality.
Grieson (1980): Grieson states that four-year lag works better than longer lags, so I assume that his stated elasticities in table 1 are actually long-run 
elasticities. I use the elasticities from column (9) of his table 1.
Grubb (1982): Grubb does find that higher relative central city expenditure, compared to the MSA as a whole, on what he calls "necessary spending" 
(highways, police, fire, sewerage, sanitation, and utilities) has a statistically significant negative effect on the suburbanization of manufacturing employ 
ment. Higher relative central city expenditures on what he calls "amenity-related" services (spending on parks and recreation and libraries) has a statistically 
significant negative effect on the suburbanization of retail employment. The reported regression also includes the property tax base per capita of the 
central city relative to its MSA. The relative central city to MSA property tax rate is dropped from the reported regression, and its sign and size are not reported. 
Gyourko (1984): Gyourko gets some clearly significant negative tax effects, but only in specifications that omit regional dummies. State corporate 
tax rate and local payroll tax rate have negative coefficients when regional dummies are added, with state corporate tax rate coefficient marginally signifi 
cant (r-statistic is 1.56). But property tax rate and local corporate tax rate have positive coefficients, although insignificant. If we assume a mean property 
tax rate of 2 percent, mean local corporate and payroll tax rates of .5 percent, and a mean nominal state corporate tax rate of 6 percent, sum of the 
tax coefficients would be negative (-.10) in Gyourko's table 13 in the specification with regional dummies. However, elasticity cannot be calculated 
because Gyourko does not present mean values of the dependent variables.
Gyourko (1987a): Gyourko also finds that higher wages significantly reduce labor intensity of a city's manufacturing base, while payroll taxes and 
corporate taxes have insignificant effects. Thirty cities are included in the sample for each of two years.
Gyourko (1987b): Gyourko finds negative effects of property taxes on new manufacturing firm density in his analysis of all five Pennsylvania counties 
in Philadelphia MSA. Property tax effects appear to be larger in absolute value when examining choice of a given zip code within a given suburban 
county. Effects of property tax on new service firm density tend to be positive, but insignificant. In addition, effect of property tax on overall zip code 
employment change is positive, although insignificant.
Harris (1986): Results in the tax table are based on elasticities reported by Harris in her tables 8.la and 8.3. The elasticities for tax effects on high
technology formation rates are not statistically significant at 5 percent (one-tail test), but are at 10 percent. Harris includes an existing activity variable
in the equation for all high technology formations.
Helms (1985): Effects reported here are long-run effects from his fixed-effects IVC specification. Elasticity presented is long-run percentage change
in personal income for a given percentage reduction in property taxes and other taxes, financed by increase in user fees. Mean values of property tax,
other tax, and user fees as percentage of personal income, needed to do this calculation, are taken from Governmental Finances in 1981-82. Elasticity
here differs from effects emphasized by Helms' table. Helms shows effects of all fiscal variables when welfare changes are used to keep government
budget constraint satisfied. The long-run elasticity of personal income with respect to equal percentage increases in property taxes and other taxes, when
the revenue is used to increase welfare spending, is -2.12. But welfare spending is likely to have its own independent effect on business growth, and
is also highly endogenous. Hence, Helms' estimates as presented are not pure tax effects; he mentions this, but it is sometimes forgotten in reviews
of his study. User fees seem more likely to have little effect on business location, and to be more exogenous than welfare spending. Helms' IVC estimates
use instruments for transfers and budget deficit, but instruments are questionable: the other fiscal variables, and the fraction of the population aged
5-17 and over 65.
Hodge (1981): All results reported here come from specification A in Hodge's tables, which includes the most control variables. Because dependent
variable is gross investment, the estimated elasticities in Hodge's study are treated in tax table as long-run elasticities. My summary of Hodge's results
uses specification A for all of his industries.
Howland (1985): Howland's study of the number of new firms and employment by county in three states and Washington, D.C., is really a study
of the intrastate distribution of economic activity, because of the inclusion of state dummy variables. She finds some negative tax effects, and positive
tax abatement effects, but none that are statistically significant. Her wage elasticities tend to be very large and negative: -2.52 for electronic components,
and -4.11 for machine tools. As an intrastate study, these wage elasticities were not included in table 2.6 in text.
Inman (1987): In calculating elasticity, I assume that Philadelphia's usual share of national jobs is about .00742, based on ES-202 data. In addition,
I assume a usual wage tax rate of .02. -. 15 is elasticity calculated for their County Business Patterns equation, -.21 is elasticity calculated for the Employment
and Earnings-based equation. I do not attempt to adjust these elasticities to long-run elasticities, as it is unclear the extent to which estimated coefficients
measure long-run versus short-run responses.
Kieschnick (1981 or 1983): Of the 13 industries, tax variable is dropped from reported results for 6 industries. The procedure for dropping variables
was to exclude all variables with level of significance of less than .50. The tax variable is negative in five out of the remaining seven industries, but
is only significantly negative in the rubber industry. Unweighted mean elasticity for these seven industries is -.07. For purposes of calculating the averages
used in the text table, I treat Kieschnick as having estimated an average elasticity of zero.
Luce (1987): Results reported here are based on table B.5.2 in Luce (1987), and use means reported in table B.5.3. Luce elasticities are adjusted to
long-run elasticities by being multiplied by 2.67 = 1/(1-(.9104)5).
Luce (1990a): The elasticities used here are calculated as the average of Luce's results for 1972-77 and 1977-82 for all industries. The elasticities are 
calculated as a percentage of the simple average of high-tech and low-tech employment in the typical MSA. All calculated elasticities are multiplied 
by 1/[1-(.9104)3] to convert to long-run effects of taxes. Significant negative tax effects are for high tech in 1977-82 time period. 
Luce (1990b): For Luce study I calculate long-run elasticities for total employment allowing both employment and labor force adjustment. That is, 
his simultaneous equations are solved for employment, with employment and labor force variables assumed equal to last year's level. For the wage 
tax, I calculate the elasticity at a wage tax of 1.175 percent, which is employment-weighted mean (I assume all 339 suburban communities have wage 
tax of .19 percent, true weighted average wage tax would be greater than this if larger suburbs tend to have larger wage tax) for Philadelphia MSA, 
based on Luce's table 1. Long-run elasticity with labor force held constant is -1.87, only slightly less than allowing labor force adjustment. Because 
Luce uses 1970 explanatory variables to explain 1980 employment, his estimates may understate long-run elasticities; some adjustment to 1970 ex 
planatory variables has already taken place in 1970.
Luger and Shetty (1985): Luger and Shetty do not present sufficient descriptive statistics to determine magnitude of their estimated tax effects. 
McConnell and Schwab (1990): Result reported here is sum of average elasticity with respect to Wheaton tax variable and county property tax from 
their specifications 2, 3, and 4; their first specification does not include public service controls or region controls. Most of the effect is caused by Wheaton 
variable, which is statistically significant; county property tax rate variable, which appears to be nominal rate, is right sign but statistically insignificant. 
McConnell and Schwab include education variable in specification 2, welfare in specification 3 and regional dummies in specification 4. Results reported 
in public service table are from specifications 3 and 4, and results reported for unionization are from specification 4.
McGuire (1985): McGuire's results are sensitive to specification used. Results reported here are average elasticity over three reported specifications 
in table 1. Results change based on how one treats population density variables. However, in most specifications, property taxes are negative and in 
some cases significant.
McHone (1986): McHone treats taxes as endogenous. But his use of population density as an exogenous instrument may be questioned, as we would 
expect the community population density to potentially have some direct effect on industrial land demand.
Mehay and Solnick (1990): Mehay and Solnick's results, as presented, do not allow for calculation of the effects of across-the-board tax increases 
used to increase some "neutral" fiscal category. Hence, their results are not included in the summary table in the text. All their results show the effects 
of tax increases used to finance increases in welfare spending. But, as argued in text and in discussion of Helms' (1985) paper above, current welfare 
spending in a state is likely to be highly endogenous; in addition, welfare spending may have direct effects on business location. In addition, their Parks 
model estimates, which they prefer, imply extremely large elasticities that deserve further exploration before being used in this type of policy analysis. 
The Parks model controls for serial correlation in the dependent variable and contemporaneous correlation of the residuals across observations. But 
the model does not control for fixed effects of states. Their Parks model estimates imply a long-run employment elasticity with respect to taxes of (-242) 
(= mean of tax variable of about $154 times coefficient of-.011 divided by (1-.993)), and similarly large long-run personal income elasticities with 
respect to state and local taxes. In addition, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable implies that the economy adjusts by 1 percent or less between 
its long-run equilibrium position and its current position each year. This seems very low. The model that they don't prefer, the "covariance" or fixed-
effects model, implies lower tax effects and a quicker adjustment to long-run equilibrium. The tax coefficient in the personal income fixed-effects model—the 
model most similar to the model estimated by Helms—implies a long-run tax elasticity of-4.85. This is similar to the Helms' elasticity when tax revenues 
are used to increase welfare spending. However, the endogeneity of welfare spending and possible direct effects of welfare spending on business location 
suggest that this elasticity should not be considered directly comparable to the elasticities estimated in other studies.
Mills (1983): Mills examines central city employment change (suburban employment change), both holding constant suburban (central city) employment 
change, and allowing it to endogenously adjust. The regressions holding constant employment change in the remainder of the MSA are in some respects 
similar to intermetropolitan area studies, in that any tax effects mostly reflect substitution across MSAs. Because only taxes in the central city (suburbs) 
are considered, however, this type of study is not closely comparable to other inter-MSA studies. Mills does not report means, but for some of the 
simulations he examines, taxes do appear to have important effects, although not as important as for other variables.
Mills and Price (1984): f-statistic on tax term in manufacturing and construction employment density gradient equation is -1.34, so this variable is 
significant at 9 percent (one-tail test) level.
Mofidi and Stone (1990): Mofidi and Stone elasticities are not used in the summary table in the text because they show effect of taxes when used 
to finance welfare spending. This combines two separate effects. Their implied long-run elasticity would be around -1.32 for manufacturing employment 
and -2.59 for manufacturing investment. (This adjusts their numbers by [!/(!-.9104) 5], as they examine five-year intervals, and assumes a mean of 
10 for their tax variable, taxes as percentage of personal income.) Hence, their results strengthen the case for some state and local tax effect on regional growth. 
Mullen and Williams (1991): I use very preliminary results from a Mullen and Williams' draft. Mullen and Williams' specification is unusual in that 
it includes both the average state level of average and marginal tax rates, and the growth of public capital. Because their dependent variable is growth 
over a 17-year period, all their tax estimates are multiplied by !/!-(.9104) 17 = 1.254 to get long-run estimates.
Munnell (1990): To calculate tax elasticities, I assume that Munnell's tax variable has typical value of around 10 percent of personal income, based 
on information in Munnell's table 11 and appendix B. I use Munnell's results for 1970-88 employment change in states, as these results are closer 
to long-run estimates than her results for 1970-80 and 1980-88. Using these results for 1970-80 or 1980-88 would yield somewhat greater implied long 
run elasticities. The tax elasticity for the 1970-88 regression is multiplied by 1.2264 = !/[!-(.9104) 18] to yield a long-run elasticity. 
Nakosteen and Zimmer (1987): All results reported use estimates for their equation (6). Their results are hard to interpret because they hold constant 
state employment growth from 1970 to 1980 in explaining out-migration of firms from 1970 to 1980. Perhaps results are best interpreted as showing 
differences between relocating firm's behavior and "average" firm's behavior. It is unclear whether their model holds omitted state characteristics con 
stant, as they include both levels of state characteristics and changes in state characteristics in model explaining changes in some firms' behavior. 
Newman (1983): Estimated elasticity in table uses tax coefficient from "fully constrained" model reported in table 3. This tax coefficient of -.136 
is multiplied by 1.89 = 1/(1-(.9104)8) to convert the eight-year effect estimated into a long-run effect.
O'hUallachain and Satterthwaite (1990): This study estimated equations for many industries, but eliminated variables from the final reported specifica 
tions if they fell below a certain significance level. Corporate taxes only appeared in 4 of the 38 regressions, and was only significantly negative once, 
less than would be expected by chance. I chose to report this as the absence of any significantly negative tax effects.
Palumbo, Sacks and Wasylenko (1990): Elasticities presented in the tax table use means in authors' table 1, and correct for fact that their dependent 
variable is in absolute percentage form rather than logarithmic form. That is, their coefficient of -.09 for suburban taxes in employment equation is 
multiplied by the mean suburban tax of 311.8, and then divided by 100. This short-run coefficient is then multiplied by !/(!-(.9104) 10) to get long-run 
elasticities. Their city tax effect is not significant, and their suburban tax coefficient is significant at about a 13 percent level of significance, under 
a two-tail test. Their study combines features of inter-area and intra-area studies because city or suburban employment growth can change for one of 
two reasons: employment growth shifting to the rest of the MSA; or employment growth shifting to other MSAs.
Papke (1986, 1989b): Results reported in table come from Papke's fixed-effects specification. All but the publishing elasticity are statistically signifi 
cant. Calculated elasticities assume that state and local taxes average 10 percent of profits, and that a 10 percent change in taxes (=1 percent of profits) 
would, after federal tax offsets, change the effective tax rate variable by 0.5 percent. Papke's effective tax rate variable comes from AFT AX model 
that simulates taxes for representative firms in different states. Her model includes 22 states, and uses as data observations on the number of births 
in each year from 1975 through 1982. The wage rate elasticities in the wage rate table are at the mean wage rate in each industry. 
Papke (1987): Tax table elasticities assume state and local taxes are 10 percent of profits, with 50 percent federal tax deduction (accurate for 1978 
period of study). Hence, 10 percent changes in state and local taxes would yield . 1 percent change in rate of return at mean rate of about 12 percent, 
which would yield a 1.7 percent decline in investment per worker (.0169 = .1/12 times Papke's reported elasticity with respect to AFT AX of 2.024). 
Note that Papke's is one of few studies to use instruments for wages and energy prices. The exogeneity of the instruments used, however, might be 
questioned (state unemployment rate, lagged energy price, unionization rate). Papke's 1987 results were previously summarized in Papke and Papke (1986). 
Papke (1989a): My calculation assumes that state and local taxes are 10 percent of profits, and are deductible against an approximately 50 percent 
federal tax rate. Hence, a 1 percent change in state and local taxes will change Papke's effective tax rate variable by 0.05 rate points. Papke's regression 
examines annual industry gross state product (GSP), for each year from 1975 to 1982. The regression includes a dummy variable for the state. Hence, 
this regression is equivalent to differencing all variables from state means. It is difficult to determine whether these estimated elasticities represent long- 
run or short-run elasticities. To avoid overstating these elasticities, I simply treat them as long-run elasticities. All calculations use Papke's regressions 
with log of industry GSP as dependent variables.
Place (1986): The analysis is two-stage least squares with real revenue and expenditures per capita treated as endogenous. The instrument is personal 
income per capita, whose exogeneity is questionable. Results show negative effect of this revenue variable on total employment growth and a positive 
effect on private employment growth, although neither variable is statistically significant. When additional controls for how revenue is raised are includ 
ed, total revenue per capita becomes positive and significant. The units used are unclear.
Plaut and Pluta (1983): Because of the ways in which the tax variables are defined, and because the units used are unclear, the overall effect of a 
1 percent tax reduction cannot be calculated based on Plaut and Pluta's reported results. The Alexander Grant and Fantus business climate indices used 
include taxes as one component; Plaut and Pluta further transform these indices using principal components, and it is impossible to determine how a 
1 percent tax reduction would affect their variables. Personal income tax variable also is transformed by principal components, which makes it difficult 
to determine how it would be affected by 1 percent across-the-board tax reduction. Also, Plaut and Pluta do not report means or units used for other
tax variables. Judging from reported beta statistics in their tables and their description of variables.it appears that tax effort is measured as an index, 
with a national mean of 1.0, and the other tax variables are measured in percentage terms. Assume that mean corporate taxes as percent of payroll 
are around 2 percent, sales tax as a percent of sales is about 4 percent and mean property taxes are about 2 percent in this sample. Then the implied 
elasticity for an equal percentage change in these four variables is . 11 for real value added, -.08 for employment, and .09 for real capital stock. These 
elasticities are for a five-year period, and would be about 1.7 times as high in the long run if we adjust using the Helms' adjustment parameters (see 
general notes above for details). However, it is unclear how this calculation would be affected by the business climate variable and personal income 
tax variables. In particular, the "beta coefficient" on the business climate variable is fairly large and has the expected sign. The effects of tax reductions 
via this variable might be large enough to make all the implied overall tax elasticities negative for a uniform percentage change in all state and local 
taxes. Of their 18 tax variable coefficients (6 variables times 3 specifications), 3 are significant at the 10 percent level or better with the expected sign 
(business climate twice, tax effort once), 1 is significant at the 20 percent level (tax effort), and property tax coefficients are always significant with 
a positive sign.
Quan and Beck (1987): The segmentation of states by Quan and Beck into Northeast subsample (IS states) and Sunbelt subsample (17 states) could 
be considered an implicit way of controlling for omitted fixed effects of regions. Although Quan and Beck state that they base their model on the Helms' 
partial adjustment model of annual state business activity, the equation they actually report does not include lags in state employment. However, they 
do include eight-lagged years of their state tax variable. Because this is a polynomial distributed lag, all effects after eight years are implicitly set to 
zero. Therefore, I treat their estimate of the sum over all lags of the tax effect as a long-run effect. The elasticities are calculated with the assumption 
that state and local taxes are about . 10 of personal income.
Reynolds and Maki (1990): Reynolds and Maki use SPSS "stepwise regression" procedures to decide on final specification. Sign and size of coeffi 
cients on omitted variables are not reported. Some of the control variables chosen may contribute to lack of significance of 1972 tax and spending variables. 
For example, they include 1980 unemployment rates and income per worker; some of the effects of 1972 tax and spending variables may be absorbed 
by these 1980 variables.
Romans and Subrahmanyam (1979): Reported results come from line 4 of their table II-A, and line 3 of table II-B. Calculations assume mean of 
7.3 percent for average marginal tax rate, 100 for ACIR tax effort indices, and calculation increases all these rates by equal percentage amount. Only 
result on average marginal tax rate is negative and significant; business and personal tax efforts are positive, with business tax effort often significantly 
positive. Overall tax effect would be negative for states with very progressive tax systems. Elasticities are adjusted to long-run value by multiplying 
by 1/(1-(.9104)'°).
Sander (1989): Sander's tax results seem to be robust to restricting the sample only to downstate Illinois. Such a restriction is a very rough test for 
whether the tax results are due to unobserved region effects. The long-run elasticity reported here in the table is calculated by using Sander's reported 
means and multiplying the short-run elasticity by 1/(1-(.9104)6) to convert it to a long-run elasticity.
Schmenner, Huber and Cook (1987): Calculations of tax elasticities assume .042 as average property tax revenues per dollar of income (from ACIR 
figures), and 5 percent as typical top state corporate tax rate. Elasticities reported are combined elasticities for two stages of decision process. Elasticities
reported are elasticities of probabilities dlnP/dlnx = (reported effect in studyXl-PXmean of X), where P is probability. \-P is assumed to equal 1 
for choice of states to seriously consider, .719 for second stage (3.56 is average number of alternatives at second stage, and 1-1/3.56 = .719). The 
reported tax elasticities for all plants use paper's reported proportions of .58 for firms pursuing product plant strategies, .40 for firms pursuing low 
taxes. Text tax tables use Schmenner's "Panel C" estimates, which include all interaction terms. Because of interaction terms, statistical significance 
of tax effects is difficult to determine, but it seems reasonable to assume elasticities for firms desiring low taxes are probably significant; the differences 
in behavior of these firms from other firms is certainly significant. All Schmenner, Huber and Cook results reported in tables in other appendices to 
chapter 2 use Panel A estimates because they are simpler to interpret.
Schneider (1984): Schneider regresses the number of manufacturing establishments in each suburb in 1977 on each suburb's 1972 number, an MSA 
dummy, and other variables. The MSA dummy's inclusion means that Schneider is essentially looking at the change in the suburb's number of establishments 
relative to the MSA. Thus, this study is an intrametropolitan study. The effective tax rate variable has a /-statistic of 1.56, which is significant at the 
6 percent (one-tail test) level.
Steinnes (1984): Steinnes finds that adding lagged dependent variables or using a specification with all variables defined as changes, makes a big dif 
ference to the results. Income and property taxes appear to have negative effects on manufacturing employment, while the sales tax has positive effects. 
Summers and Luce (1985): Because of units used, actual Summers and Luce coefficients can be treated as elasticities. These short-run elasticities 
were multiplied by 1/(1-(.9104)'°) for the 1967-77 regression, and by 1/(1-(.9104)6) for the 1977-83 regression, to get long-run elasticities. The positive 
coefficient on tax effort in the 1977-83 regression is not significant. Summers and Luce also found significant negative effects of tax effort on service 
sector growth.
Summers and Luce (1987): Cited results come from table B.4.2.
Testa (1989): I appreciate Bill Testa's help in interpreting the coefficients in his paper. As defined in the paper, all dependent variables measure the 
change in employment or output as a proportion of the base. Tax growth per capita is indexed so that the mean value of per capita state and local tax 
levels is 100. Hence, Testa coefficients are multiplied by 100 * !/(!-(.9104)9) to get long-run elasticities reported in table. The manufacturing employ 
ment and output elasticities also include equal percentage increases in UI taxes, which have a mean of .0106 in Testa's study. It is a little difficult 
to determine whether Testa's specification controls for fixed effects, as independent variables are defined both as changes and as levels. Testa's results 
are also described in Testa and Davila (1989), along with some results using other definitions of the UI tax variable.
Vedder (1981): Vedder relates changes in per capita income to changes in taxes, but then includes other variables measuring the level of state characteristics. 
It is not clear whether this model controls for unobserved state fixed effects or not.
Various state reports by Wasylenko and his colleagues (McGuire and Wasylenko 1987; Wasylenko 1988; Wasylenko and Carroll 1989): These 
results come from a summary paper written by Robert Carroll and Michael Wasylenko, "The Shifting Fate of Fiscal Variables and Their Effect on 
Economic Development," 1989.1 assume that average value of taxes as a percent of personal income is 10.0 for these elasticity calculations. Estimated 
elasticities from their table 3 are multiplied by l/(l-(.9104)s) to get long-run elasticities. Estimated elasticities from their table 4 are multiplied by 1/(1-(.9104)6) 
to get long-run elasticities.
Wasylenko (1980): Data and variables are same as Erickson and Wasylenko (1980), but communities with zero new and existing business activity are 
dropped from sample on the assumption that they zone out new business activity. Calculated elasticity is based on assumption that average property 
tax rate in Milwaukee suburbs in 1969 was 3 percent, as stated in Erickson and Wasylenko's paper. Property tax effects are larger for wholesale trade, 
smaller for retail trade, finance, services.
Wasylenko and McGuire (1985): Reported tax elasticities sum effects for tax effort and effective corporate and personal tax rates. Sales tax is excluded 
from calculation because, due to its definition (percentage of general revenue from sales tax), this variable would not change with across-the-board 
tax change. Calculation of elasticities assumes mean of 100 for tax effort, 3.3 for effective personal income tax rate, and 4.45 for effective corporate 
income tax rate. Conversion to long-run effects is done by multiplying estimated elasticities by 2.08 = !/(!-(.9104)7). The tax effort variable is defined 
as the change from 1967 to 1977, while other tax variables are defined in levels terms. This makes it somewhat difficult to decide whether specification 
controls for state fixed effects or not. Percentage change in tax effort is the only tax variable significant in the total employment and manufacturing 
employment regressions.
Wheat (1986): Table's assertion that tax variable coefficient is wrong sign and insignificant is based on Wheat's statement that this was the case when 
tax variable added to basic model; results with tax variable included are not actually presented by Wheat.
White (1986): White's estimated tax coefficients are only one-third their standard errors, so her results do not give great support to any hypothesis 
about the effects of taxes.
Woodward (1990): State tax elasticities presented here are for Woodward's regressions that include regional dummies. Woodward prefers these specifications, 
and the regional dummies are significant. Corporate tax rate has a positive, but a statistically insignificant, effect in specification that omits regional dummies. 
Yandle (1984): /-statistic for Yandle's tax variable for 1963-67 is -1.336. Same variable is positive and significant for 1967-72, negative and not signifi 
cant for 1972-77. Based on conversations with the author, it appears that both the tax and dependent variable were measured in the same units. That 
is, if the dependent variable was measured in percentage terms, the tax variable was measured in percentage terms. This implies a mean value of the 
tax variable of about 15.35 percent. Using this mean, the average long-run elasticity for all three time-period regressions run by Yandle is -.03.
Appendix 2.3 
Studies of Effects of Public Services on Business Location
N) 
*.oo
Study
Coughlin, 
Terza & 
Arromdee 
(1991)
Mullen & 
Williams 
(1991)
Crihfield 
(1990)
Jones 
(1990)
Luce 
(1990a)
Types Included
Highway miles per 
square mile, rail 
roads per square 
mile, # of airports 
per square mile
Public capital 
stock growth rate 
(from Munnell 1990)
State capital outlays, 
MSA capital outlays
Per capita 
spending on police/ 
fire; education; 
highways; health & 
hospitals; welfare
Education, welfare, 
health, and high 
way spending as 
percent of personal 
income, for 1972-77, 
1977-82 periods
Positive Positive 
Significant Not Significant
Highways 
Railroads 
Airports
X
Local
Police/fire 
Other variables' coefficients
Health-72 
Education-77 
Education-72 Health-77
Negative Negative 
Not Significant Significant
State
Health Welfare 
depend on time period examined.
Welfare-72 Highways-72 
Highways-77 
Welfare-77
McConnell & 
Schwab 
(1990)
Mofidi & 
Stone 
(1990)
Munnell
(1990)
O'hUallachain
&
Satterthwaite 
(1990)
Reynolds 
& Maki 
(1990)
Education, 
welfare
Health, 
education, highways, 
other spending, 
UI benefits,
other transfers
as percentage 
of personal income; 
(E) indicates 
employment dependent 
variable; (I) 
indicates investment 
dependent variable
Public
capital stock
Local
government spending, 
educational percentage
Education, highways, 
welfare, health 
spending per capita
Health (E) 
Education (E) 
Highways (E) 
Other (E)
Insignificant
Education Welfare
Health (I) 
Education (I) 
Highways (I) 
Other a) UI (I)
Positive and significant.
in overwhelming majority of industries
UI(E) 
Welfare (E) 
Welfare (I)
studied.
Significance unclear; counted as insignificant for public service results. 
Welfare spending tends to be significant for branch plants.
Appendix 2.3 (continued)
Study
Bartik 
(1989a)
Carroll & 
Wasylenko 
(1989)
Crihfield 
(1989)
Deich 
(1989)
Duffy-Deno 
& Eberts 
(1989)
McGuire & 
Wasylenko 
(from Carroll 
& Wasylenko, 
1989)
Types Included
Per capita spending 
on education, police, 
fire, higher 
education, welfare, 
highway density
Higher education 
spending, other 
spending as % 
of income
State capital outlays 
per $ of income; SMSA 
capital outlays per 
$ of income
Police and fire 
spending per capita
Public capital 
stock
Welfare, highways, 
higher education, 
education spending 
per capita
Positive Positive 
Significant Not Significant
Education 
Fire Highways
Higher 
education
SMSA
Positive and significant for both
X
Higher 
education 
Education 
Welfare
Negative 
Not Significant
Police 
Higher education
Other 
spending
small business and branch
Highways 
Education 
Welfare
Negative 
Significant
Welfare
State
plants.
Highways
Testa 
(1989)
Wasylenko 
(from Carroll 
& Wasylenko, 
1989)
Nakosteen & 
Zimmer 
(1987)
Papke 
(1987)
Quan & 
Beck 
(1987)
Schmenner, 
Huber & Cook 
(1987)
Benson 
& Johnson 
(1986)
Education expense 
per pupil
State and local 
expenditures as 
% of income
Education spending 
per capita
Combined police/ 
fire per capita
Per capita spending 
on local education, 
higher education, 
other nonwelfare 
spending
Spending per $ 
of personal income
Welfare share 
of state 
spending
X
X
Education
Police/Fire
Local 
education 
Other; Higher Higher Local 
Other education education education
Spending
X
Appendix 2.3 (continued)
Study
Papke 
(1986, 1989b)
Place 
(1986)
Bartik 
(1985)
Helms 
(1985)
Wasylenko & 
McGuire 
(1985)
Types Included
Police and fire
spending per 
capita, in 5 
industries
Total per capita 
spending on high 
ways, sewers, 
public welfare, 
education
Highway miles per 
square mile
Expenditures as % of 
personal income, for 
health, highways, local 
schools, higher 
education, other
State and local
education spending 
as % of income,
state and local 
welfare spending 
as % of income
Positive Positive Negative 
Significant Not Significant Not Significant
Furniture 
Communication 
Publishing equipment Apparel
Sewers, 
Total Highways Education
X
Health 
Highways 
Schools 
Higher education
Education Welfare
Negative 
Significant
Electronic 
components
Welfare
toLn to
Gyourko 
(1984)
Plaut 
& 
Pluta 
(1983)
Total state and 
local spending 
per capita
Combined index of 
education expenditures 
and total expenditures as 
% of personal income; 
welfare expenditures as 
% of personal income
X
Education/total index positive and significant for two out of three dependent 
variables used, welfare positive and significant for one out of three
Romans &
Subrahmanyam Transfer to
(1979) revenue ratio
NOTES ON STUDIES
Jones (1990): This study includes no tax variables, but does include public service variables. Jones examines the percentage change in state business 
activity (using various measures) for each of the four 5-year periods from 1964 to 1984, as a fraction of per capita spending in various categories. 
Focusing on his results for the percentage change in employment, the police and fire coefficients tend to be positive and significant; welfare tends to 
be negative and significant; health and hospitals negative but insignificant; and education and highways results are quite sensitive to the time period. 
These results are summarized in the table.
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Appendix 2.4 
Studies of Wage Effects on Business Location
Study
Negative and
Significant 
Wage Effect? Elasticity
Coughlin, Terza 
& Arromdee 
(1991) Yes
For 2 specifications with 
taxes: -4.40; -4.39 
(Average is -4.39)
Eberts (1991) Yes
Crihfield (1990) No
.77 (This elasticity is not in 
cluded in calculation of mean 
elasticity for text summary 
table, as dependent variable is 
growth in nominal value added. 
Crihfield's elasticity is positive 
ly biased by expected positive 
elasticity of product price 
with respect to wages)
Luce (1990a)
McConnell 
& Schwab 
(1990)
Mehay & 
Solnick 
(1990)
Munnell 
(1990)
O'hUallachain 
& Satterthwaite 
(1990)
Marginally 
significant 
(r-statistic=-1.58)
No
No
Yes
Yes in 10 
out of 37 
industries
Average long-run 
elasticity =-.43
Average elasticity is .19 in 
their specifications 2, 3, and 
4. (Mean wage is $4.94— 
private communication with 
Schwab)
-.34 (Used Parks model for 
employment; LR defined as 
50 years)
-2.47 (Assumes average 
wage of around $8.00)
?
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Papke (1989a)
Appendix 2.4 (continued)
Study
Woodward (1990)
Bartik (1989a)
Bauer & 
Cromwell (1989)
Crihfield (1989)
Deich (1989)
Friedman, 
Gerlowski & 
Silberman (1989)
Negative and 
Significant 
Wage Effect?
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes, for both 
small business 
and branch starts
Yes
-.26
-.12
-.51
-3.16
Elasticity
-1.77 for small business 
-.29 for branch plants 
(average = -1.03)
?
Yes, in 2 out of 
4 industries
-1.00 for apparel, -.17 for fur 
niture, .42 for printing, .66 for 
electric equipment; weighted 
average, using industry GSP 
as weights, is .27
Testa 
(1989) Yes
-1.41 for manufacturing 
employment; -2.22 for 
manufacturing output; -.06 for 
nonmanufacturing 
employment; -.06 for 
total employment
Eberts 
& Stone 
(1988) Yes -.58
Doeringer, Terkla 
& Topakian 
(1987) No
Glickman 
&
Woodward 
(1987) Yes
? Significantly negative for 
domestic employment growth, 
not for foreign employment 
growth in their Table 21
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Appendix 2.4 (continued)
Study
Negative and
Significant 
Wage Effect? Elasticity
Gyourko (1987b) Yes
Increase in wage reduces 
labor intensity of MSA 
manufacturing; elasticity 
not comparable
Luce (1987) No .18
Papke (1987) No
Schmenner, Huber 
& Cook (1987) Yes
Benson & 
Johnson (1986) Yes -.39
Harris (1986) No
-1.08 for formation of high- 
tech establishments, -.91 
for other manufacturing 
(-1.00 average)
Papke (1986, 1989b) Yes
-.78 for furniture
-.36 for publishing
-.13 for communication 
equipment
-.12 for apparel
.41 for electronic components
(-.20 average)
Place (1986) Yes
Bartik (1985) Yes -.88
Helms (1985) No -.27
Luger & 
Shetty (1985) Yes
-1.76 for industrial machinery
-3.00 for pharmaceuticals
-4.44 for motor vehicles 
(-3.07 average)
Wasylenko & 
McGuire (1985) Yes
-.98 for total employment
-.69 for manufacturing 
employment
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Appendix 2.4 (continued)
Study
Armington, 
Harris & Odle 
(1984)
Gyourko (1984)
Yandle (1984)
Carlton (1983)
Garofalo & 
Malhotra (1983)
Plaut & 
Pluta (1983)
Graham (1982)
Negative and 
Significant 
Wage Effect?
Yes
No
Yes
No
7
No
No
Elasticity
Formation/employment 
growth results for high tech: 
-.96/-2.11; for other manufac 
turing: -1.10/-.41; for other 
industries: -.61/-.57 (average 
employment result is -1.03)
.78
?
?
.45
7
?
Hodge (1981) Yes
-1.92 for furniture, -.38 for rub 
ber, 1.55 for apparel, -.46 for 
electronics (-.30 used as 
average)
Kieschnick 
(1981)
Browne, 
Mieszkowski 
& Syron 
(1980)
Yes
Yes
andIn 13 industries, negative 
significant in 1; mean 
elasticity over all 13 (counting 
industry where dropped as 
zero) is 1.66
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Appendix 2.4 (continued)
Negative and
Significant 
Study Wage Effect? Elasticity_____
-1.46/-.92 for plastics births/ 
branch plants; -1.22/.21 
for communication equipment 
births/branches; -1.07/-.42 for 
electronic components 
births/branches 
Carlton (1979) Yes (-.81 average)
Romans &
Subrahmanyam
(1979) No ?
NOTES: This table summarizes results for the wage variable in various inter-area business loca 
tion studies since 1979. More details on the studies can be found in appendix 2.2. All results 
in this table use the same specifications examined in the appendix 2.2 table. All wage elasticities 
were adjusted to long-run levels where necessary using procedures identical to appendix 2.2. Wage 
elasticities were only calculated for studies that used the logarithm of wages as an independent 
variable, or for which mean of wage variable was readily available.
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Appendix 2.5 
Studies of Effects of Unionization on Business Activity
Study
Coughlin,
Terza &
Arromdee
(1991)
Eberts
(1991)
Crihfield
(1990)
McConnell
& Schwab
(1990)
Mofidi &
Stone
(1990)
Woodward
(1990)
Bartik
(1989a)
Crihfield
(1989)
Deich
(1989)
Expected 
Sign and
Significant
Coefficient
on Union 
ization,
Work Stop 
page or RTW
Variable?
(1)
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes, for
branches, no
for small
business
Expected
Sign and
Significant
Coefficient
on Unioni 
zation or
Stoppage
Variable?
(2)
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes, for
branches, no
for small
business
Long-Run
% Effect
on Business
Activity
of 1% Increase
in % Unionized
(3)
3.3 (Assumed
mean unioniza 
tion = 20%)
-.20 (Assumed
mean unioniza 
tion = 20%)
.01
-1.32
2.14 for net
investment, .50
for employment
(average is 1.32)
-8.67
-.11
.01
-.23 for branches
-.10 for small
business (avg.
= -.16)
Wage
Variable
Included
(4)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
260
Appendix 2.5 (continued)
Study
Duffy-Deno
& Eberts
(1989)
Doeringer,
Terkla &
Topakian
(1987)
Glickman
& Woodward
(1987)
Heywood
and Deich
(1987)
Luce (1987)
Nakosteen
& Zimmer
(1987)
Schmenner,
Huber & Cook
(1987)
Place (1986)
Wheat (1986)
Bartik (1985)
Helms (1985)
Expected
Sign and
Significant
Coefficient
on union 
ization,
Work Stop 
page of RTW
Variable?
(1)
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Expected
Sign and
Significant
Coefficient
on Unioni-
ization or
Stoppage
Variable?
(2)
No
Yes
?
Yes
No
9
Yes
?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Long-Run
% Effect
on Business
Activity
of 1% Increase
in % Unionized
(3)
.17
?
?
-.96 for over 
all state union 
ization; -.45 for
industry-specific
unionization
-.01
?
2.4
?
?
-3.28
-2.23
Wage
Variable
Included
(4)
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
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Appendix 2.5 (continued)
Study
Summers
& Luce
(1985)
Wasylenko 
& McGuire
(1985)
Mills 
(1983)
Newman
(1983)
Plaut &
Pluta
(1983)
Kieschnick
(1981)
Browne,
Mieszkowski,
& Syron 
(1980)
Dye (1980)
Expected 
Sign and 
Significant 
Coefficient 
on Union 
ization, 
Work Stop 
page or RTW 
Variable?
(1)
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
7
Expected 
Sign and 
Significant 
Coefficient
on Unioni 
zation or 
Stoppage 
Variable?
(2)
Yes
No
No
Yes
?
Yes
Yes
7
Long-Run 
% Effect
on Business 
Activity 
of 1% Increase 
in % Unionized
(3)
-.22
?
-.01 (Mean of 
city and suburban 
results)
-5.46 (Assumes 
mean unionization
rate = 20%)
7
?
7
-.86
Wage 
Variable 
Included
(4)
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
NOTES: See appendix 2.2 for more details on individual studies. All summaries use authors' 
preferred specification where this can be determined. Summaries in columns (1) and (2) only 
reflect results for total business activity or manufacturing business. Column (3) long-run effects 
are for closest dependent variable in study to total business activity. Hey wood and Deich use 
average percentage change in employment, over four years for each of 12 major states and in 
dustries. As the unionization variable does not vary over time, this regression essentially looks 
at how average 4-year growth is related to unionization. Reported Heywood and Deich numbers 
in above table are simple average of results for seven industries.
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Appendix 3.1 
Alternative Hysteresis Theories and Local Labor Markets
The text discusses long-run labor market hysteresis due to human capital 
effects of demand shocks. Two other theories for explaining labor market 
hysteresis have been offered: the business capital theory, and the insider- 
outsider theory. This appendix outlines why neither alternative theory seems 
a plausible explanation of hysteresis effects in local labor markets.
The business capital theory of labor market hysteresis is briefly outlined 
in Phelps' (1972) book, Inflation Policy and Unemployment Theory. Phelps 
argues that during a boom, businesses adjust their technology and manage 
ment practices to utilize less-trained workers. Because physical and manage 
ment capital are quite durable, businesses on average will remain more will 
ing to hire and retain less-skilled workers even after the boom period is over. 
This long-run change in business capital leads to lower unemployment rates 
and higher occupational attainment for workers of a given skill level, accord 
ing to Phelps.
Whatever the merits of this theory at a national level, it cannot explain long- 
run effects of a local demand shock on local earnings. Suppose there is a once- 
and-for-all shock to local employment. Local businesses would alter their capital 
and management practices. Less-skilled workers would have a higher prob 
ability of being hired for more demanding positions. If there was no in- 
migration, this higher probability would lead to a higher utility level for less- 
skilled workers. Less-skilled workers would be attracted to the better job pros- 
spects in this metropolitan area, however, and this in-migration would be ex 
pected to depress wages and raise unemployment among less-skilled workers. 
The wage and unemployment effects would continue until average real earn 
ings of unskilled workers in the metropolitan area are equal to the national 
average again.
The insider-outsider theory examines how demand shocks affect the out 
come of negotiations between firms and worker "insiders"—such as labor 
unions—who have some power to restrict entry by other workers into jobs. 
This theory has been most completely developed by Lindbeck and Snower 
(1988) in their book, The Insider-Outsider Theory of Employment and 
Unemployment. Chapter 10 of their book considers the likely effects of a per 
manent labor demand shock, which is what state and local economic develop 
ment policy aims to bring about. A permanent negative demand shock is argued 
by Lindbeck and Snower to have little effect on wages because the interests 
of the majority of union members are best served by a policy of stable wages 
with some layoffs. Hence, if we assume a fixed national labor supply, unem-
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ployment will tend to go up and stay up after a permanent negative demand 
shock. In contrast, a permanent positive demand shock will lead to higher 
wages, with a relatively modest increase in employment, because such a com 
bination best serves the interest of union insiders. In an economy with a fixed 
overall labor supply, this implies that unemployment will not be much lowered 
by permanent positive labor demand shocks.
The Lindbeck and Snower argument does not explain long-run real earn 
ings effects of permanent local demand shocks. Suppose that a negative de 
mand shock to a local area leads to lower employment but little change in the 
real wage. In the short run, this sequence of events will increase local unemploy 
ment. But at the local level, labor supply is clearly not fixed in the long run. 
Out-migration would continue until the local unemployment rate and hence 
local real earnings are restored to their original level.
Consider a permanent positive demand shock at the local level. Suppose that 
Lindbeck and Snower are right that union insiders would capture the benefits 
of this demand shock in higher real wages, and that employment would not 
expand much. In the short run, local unemployment would be unchanged. But 
in the long run, in-migration would increase, as individuals in other 
metropolitan areas are attracted by the prospect of getting higher real wages 
if a vacancy opens up in an insider job. Local unemployment would actually 
increase, and continue to increase until expected real earnings in the 
metropolitan area drop back to their original level. The positive demand shock 
has no hysteresis effects on equilibrium real earnings. Furthermore, the long- 
run effects of the positive demand shock on local unemployment are opposite 
of what we would expect, and what the empirical evidence in chapter 4 sug 
gests to be the case.
It is worthwhile considering why the human capital theory of labor market 
hysteresis is not also destroyed by migration responses when applied to local 
labor market demand shocks. A positive demand shock, in the human capital 
theory, has long-run effects in raising the human capital of the original residents. 
Individuals with given education, age, and other characteristics now have higher 
human capital. In-migration does not destroy this human capital advantage 
because the original residents are now permanently part of a higher-skilled 
group that is part of a different labor submarket. Hence, lower-skilled in- 
migrants—even those with similar education and other credentials to the original 
residents—cannot effectively threaten the higher real wages and lower 
unemployment that the original residents have achieved. A similar argument 
can be made for why out-migration cannot alleviate the long-run negative ef 
fects of negative local labor demand shocks. In that case, the original residents 
have lost human capital and hence will have higher long-run equilibrium 
unemployment rates wherever they live.
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The basic difference between the human capital theory and other labor market 
hysteresis theories is that a demand shock in the human capital theory moves 
the original residents into a skill group that has a different national equilibrium 
utility level. In contrast, the other hysteresis theories do not alter the national 
group into which original residents fit. Inter-area migration does have some 
long-run tendency to equalize utility levels for individuals of similar 
characteristics. A local demand shock is not likely to alter any national 
equilibrium variables. Only demand shocks that alter individual characteristics 
would appear likely to alter their long-run utility prospects.
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Appendix 4.1
Local Labor and Land Market Variables as a Function 
of Demand-Induced Shocks to Local Employment
Equations estimated in previous studies and in this study that express changes 
in local labor and land market variables as a function of local employment 
growth are puzzling in that they do not clearly correspond to any well-defined 
behavior or model. These equations do not obviously correspond to any "struc 
tural equation" describing the supply or demand of labor or land. They can 
not be viewed as "reduced form equations" either, as employment growth 
is an endogenous variable.
The text discussion states that demand shocks to employment growth will 
have different effects on labor market variables from those of supply shocks 
to employment growth. This argument, formalized in this appendix, will show 
that regressions of changes in labor market variables on demand-induced 
employment growth can be regarded as "quasi-reduced form" equations. De 
mand shifters can be treated as exogenous variables. The demand-induced 
employment growth can be used as an indicator of the size of the demand shock 
to the local economy.
The argument uses a simple model of a local economy. Comparative static 
analysis will show that, under certain assumptions, the relationship between 
demand-induced employment growth and changes in city economic variables 
will be the same, regardless of the source of the demand shocks. On the other 
hand, the relationship between supply-induced employment growth and changes 
in city economic variables will be quite different. Hence, estimation procedures 
that can identify demand shocks to local employment reveal empirical 
regularities that can be used to predict the response of the economy to other 
demand shocks causing similar effects to local employment. In contrast, the 
effect of employment growth, in general, on economic variables will depend 
on whether the growth is demand-induced or supply-induced.
My model of a city's economy has two markets, the markets for land and 
labor. The market for land will be assumed to clear. The market for labor 
will result in an equilibrium unemployment rate due to efficiency wage con 
siderations (Bulow and Summers 1986; Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984). Demand 
for a city's labor (lP) and business demand for city land (tf*B) will be assumed 
to depend upon local real wages (w), land prices (r), the unemployment rate 
(U), and demand shifters (D) affecting business costs. Other output or input 
prices are implicitly assumed to either be uniform nationally or to depend in 
directly on local real wages and land prices (for example, the price of local 
services will probably vary in this way). Labor supply to the city (ZA) and
266
worker land demand (tf*e) depend on real wages, land prices, and the 
unemployment rate, along with worker supply shifters (Sw) affecting worker 
utility. The land supply (/F) is assumed to increase with land prices, as land 
is bid away from agriculture at the urban fringe, and is also altered by land 
shifters, such as changes in zoning rules or new road construction (Sz). The 
real wage is equal to the nominal wage (wn) divided by a local price index 
(P) which is some function of local nominal wages and land prices. It is assumed 
that the real wage function is monotonic in wn , so it can be inverted to solve 
for wn as a function of w and r. 
The equilibrium conditions for the land and labor market can be expressed as:
(1) HDB(\v,r,U;D) + HDe(w,r,U;Sw) - H5(r;5z) = 0.
(2) LD(\v,r,U;D) - Ls(w,r,U;Sw)(l-U) = 0.
Equations (1) and (2) contain three endogenous variables: w, r, and U. (Once 
w and r are determined, nominal wages and the local price index are also deter 
mined.) To allow for a solution, I use the efficiency wage hypothesis. Accord 
ing to efficiency wage theory, a firm may increase profits by increasing real 
wages if the increase discourages shirking, reduces quits, or raises worker 
morale and productivity. The firm chooses the wage it pays, so the wage 
variable above must be reinterpreted as the prevailing wage paid by other firms, 
which is exogenous to any specific firm. The profit-maximizing real wage paid 
by any specific firm m (wm) will probably depend positively on the prevailing 
city real wage, and negatively on the city unemployment rate, as shirking and 
quits will tend to increase with improvements in workers' alternatives:
(3) wm = f(w,U) 0 < fw < 1, fu < 0
where fw and/£/ are partial derivitives of/with respect to w and U. If all 
firms are identical, in equilibrium wm = w, and equation (3) is solved to yield
(4) w = g(U) where gv < 0 (as/w < 1).
Equations (4), (1) and (2) comprise the equilibrium system.
A demand shock (a small change in D) will cause changes in w, r, U, wn, 
and P. To solve for these comparative static effects, the system of equations 
((1), (2), and (4)) can be totally differentiated. The resulting solutions will 
be of the form:
(^ dY _ _ TD , rf>B(5) db- a ^LD + a^IfD
Y represents any of the endogenous variables (w, r, U, wn, P). The subscript 
D indicates a partial derivative (assumed positive) with respect to demand
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shock D. dY/dD is the total equilibrium derivative representing both direct 
and indirect effects of D on the equilibrium value of Y. a\ and «2 are 
parameters that reflect the appropriate combinations of partial derivatives from 
a normal comparative static analysis of equation system (1), (2), and (4).
For purposes of this book, the most important subject for analysis is the 
conditions under which the equilibrium demand-induced change in labor de 
mand can be validly used as an indicator of the size of demand shocks, as 
has been implicitly assumed by this and other studies. Labor demand is a valid 
indicator for a set of demand shocks that proportionately affect labor and land 
demand, or for which H&B = CjZ£, where Cj is a constant. Alternatively, 
labor demand will be a valid indicator if a2 = 0, so that business land de 
mand does not affect the equilibrium. In either case, the comparative static 
effect on any endogenous variable Fwill be some multiple of the direct shock 
to labor demand, or
The equilibrium change in labor demand— that is, employment growth— is 
also an endogenous variable, and can be written as a function of the direct 
changes in labor demand or
Solving (7) for L^ and substituting into equation (5), we get
,Q . dY dL dL (») dD = (03/0
Equation (8) states that the equilibrium change in city economic variables- 
real wages, unemployment, land prices, and other local prices— due to a de 
mand shock to employment will be some stable function of the employment 
growth induced by that demand shock. Hence, regressions of changes in city 
economic variables on demand-induced employment growth should give valid 
predictions of what the effects would be of other demand-induced shocks to 
employment growth.
But the model expressed in equations (1), (2), and (4) could also be used 
to show that employment growth not caused by demand shocks will yield dif 
ferent relationships between equilibrium changes in city economic variables 
and employment growth. The equation system could also be differentiated with 
respect to the worker supply shifters Sw or the land supply shifters Sz . An 
equation similar to equation (8) could be derived, but there would be no reason 
to expect the parameter relating the endogenous variables and equilibrium
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employment growth to be the same as in equation (8). Because employment 
growth in general is caused by either demand shifters, worker supply shifters, 
or land supply shifters, the equilibrium relationship between all types of employ 
ment growth and city economic variables will differ from the relationship be 
tween demand-induced employment growth and city economic variables. Fur 
thermore, the observed relationship for one city or time period between ac 
tual employment growth and city economic variables cannot be used for predic 
tion for another city or time period unless the sources of employment growth 
are expected to be the same in the two cases.
Equation (8) could be viewed as a quasi-reduced form in that it expresses 
changes in city economic variables as a function of exogenous demand shocks. 
One might ask why equation (8) should be estimated rather than some reduc 
ed form relating changes in city economic variables directly to changes in the 
demand shifters. The basic argument is that equation (8) is more useful for 
prediction than estimating the direct relationship between city economic 
variables and the demand shifters. For example, suppose it is valid to view 
business taxes as an exogenous demand shifter. Then a regression of changes 
in city economic variables on changes in local business tax rates can only be 
used to predict the effects of other changes in local business tax rates. But 
estimation of equation (8) allows prediction of the economic effects of any 
demand shock that causes local employment effects of similar size.
It would, of course, be preferable to estimate the entire structural equation 
system rather than just the quasi-reduced form equation (8), but that would 
be much more demanding of data and time, and potentially more vulnerable 
to specification error.
Finally, the validity of equation (8) does depend on some special assump 
tions, namely, that either land demand shocks are proportional to labor de 
mand shocks, or that business land demand shocks do not greatly affect the 
equilibrium. The latter assumption may not be far from reality. Business land 
demand is much less important than residential land demand in the land market. 
Furthermore, to the extent that these special assumptions do not hold, equa 
tion (8) still shows the equilibrium relationship between changes in city 
economic variables and employment growth that occurs for demand shocks 
that have "typical" relative effects on business labor and land demand. Estima 
tion of this average relationship may still be of interest, even though there 
will be some error in using it to predict the effects of demand shocks that cause 
different relative effects on business labor and land demand.
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Appendix 4.2 
Specification of Estimating Equations and Econometric Issues
This appendix outlines the rationale for the equation specifications and 
econometric methods used in this book. The specifications and methods are 
used in chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7.
The book uses two types of data and two types of models. Some of the em 
pirical analyses examine MSA average economic outcomes. Other analyses 
use micro data for specific individuals.
The models that attempt to explain the change in average unemployment 
(chapter 4), prices (chapter 5), or real wages (chapter 6) in each metropolitan 
area from year t-l to t are specified in the following form:
(9) Ymt - ymM = B0 + Bt + C(L) (Emt - EmM) +Umt.
Ymt is the value of the unemployment rate, or the natural logarithm of the 
price index, or the natural logarithm of the real wage, for MSA m at year 
t. Bt is a set of dummy variables for each time period. Emt is the natural 
logarithm of the aggregate nonagricultural employment for MSA m at time 
t. C(L) is shorthand for an unrestricted polynomial in the lag operator. That 
is, lagged values for metropolitan employment growth are included in the 
specification, with each lagged value having its own coefficient. The cumulative 
effect of a shock to growth after s years is the sum of the coefficients up to 
the 5th lag. Umt is the disturbance term.
The form of equation (9) is suggested by equation (8) in appendix 4.1. In 
both cases, the change in some local economic variable depends on local 
employment growth. (The distinction between demand-induced growth and 
other growth is ignored for a moment.) Equation (9) is modified from equa 
tion (8) in two important ways. First, lagged values of employment growth 
are included because a growth shock's effects will change with the passage 
of time. In terms of equation (8), this implies that we expect the parameter 
a5 , which reflects some combination of the appropriate derivatives of the equa 
tion system (1), (2), and (4), to differ depending on the length of time over 
which the derivatives of equation (8) are evaluated. This makes sense because 
the elasticity of local supply and demand with respect to most variables will 
increase over time.
Second, equation (9) differs from equation (8) in including dummy variables 
for each time period. Equation (8) shows the effects of local growth shocks 
holding constant everything else. While empirical research can never perfect 
ly hold "all else" constant, we can control for the national economic environ 
ment with time-period dummies.
270
The micro data used in this book contain information on the earnings, wages, 
unemployment, and labor force participation of specific individuals in iden 
tified MSAs during a particular year. This micro data allows us to control 
for the demographic composition of the MSA in estimating the effects of growth 
shocks. In addition, the micro data allows us to see how the effects of an 
employment shock differ across different types of individuals. But one disad 
vantage of the micro data is that it is impossible to use the "changes" specifica 
tion of equation (9), as we only observe an individual during one particular year.
To convert the changes specification of equation (9) to a "levels" specifica 
tion that only requires information on the dependent variable during one time 
period, we rewrite equation (9) as
(10) (l-L)(Ymt) = B0 + Bt + (l-L)C(L)(Emt) + Umt.
L is again the lag operator. "Dividing" both sides of equation (10) by 1-L, 
we get:
(ID Ymt = AQ + At + Fm + C(L)Emt + Wmt.
A0 and At are B0 and Bt divided by (1-L); this division yields the sum of BQ 
or Bt back to the initial time period in which the metropolitan economy was 
formed. Fm is a fixed effect for the metro area, and must be added because 
Fm(l-L) = 0. Wmt is Umt divided by (1-L), which is equal to the sum of Umt 
back to the first time period.
Equation (11) is still in aggregate form. We convert equation (11) to a form 
suitable for micro estimation by adding in demographic predictors of in 
dividuals' economic behavior (age, race, education, etc.) to get
(12) Yimt = AQ +At + Fm + B'Xfotf + C(L)Emt + Uimt.
Xj-mf is the vector of individual demographic characteristics for individual i. 
The two types of equations used for estimation, equation (12) and equation 
(9), both control for fixed characteristics of MSAs. For example, many studies 
have shown that local amenities affect wages and prices (Blomquist, Berger, 
and Hoehn 1988; Smith 1983; Roback 1982; Gyourko and Tracy 1986). In 
addition to local amenities, other MSA characteristics affecting local economic 
variables include: topographic features that limit the land available for develop 
ment in the MSA; zoning practices and transportation infrastructure that af 
fect developable land; union influence in that metropolitan area; levels of fiscal 
variables, such as taxes and public services, that may be shifted into local wages 
and prices; and the MSA industrial structure. Instead of trying to control for 
every local characteristic that might affect local economic variables, this study 
simply allows a dummy variable for each MSA to control for any idiosyn 
cratic features of the MSA.
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One natural confusion about equation (12) should be clarified. It would ap 
pear that equation (12) examines the effect of the MSA's employment level 
on local economic variables, not the effect of shocks to employment. But the 
inclusion of an MSA fixed effect alters the interpretation of coefficients on 
the remaining variables. Inclusion of group dummies in a regression is 
equivalent to a regression in which the new dependent variable and the new 
independent variables are the original variables differenced from these group 
means. Therefore, an equation equivalent to (12) is 1
(13) Yimt - MSA mean Y = (Bt - MSA mean fl,) + B'(X/m, - MSA
mean X) + C(L)(Emt - MSA mean Eimt) + (Wimt - MSA mean W).
Thus, the absolute level of employment in the MSA at time t does not deter 
mine the estimated relationship, but rather the employment relative to that 
MSA's average level. Growth matters, not employment levels.
Equations (9) or (12) can be estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS), and 
provide estimates of interest. The regressions describe the average relation 
ship between shocks to local employment and changes in local economic 
variables. As discussed in appendix 4.1, this average relationship depends on 
the proportion of employment shocks arising from shocks to local demand, 
labor supply, or land supply.
For more specific predictions of how local economic variables will respond 
to economic development policies, these ordinary least squares estimates may 
be subject to bias. Economic development policies that assist business are best 
viewed as policies that seek to increase local labor demand. To predict the 
effects of these policies, we want to know the effects of job growth occurring 
due to demand shocks alone, with supply shifters held constant. As discussed 
in appendix 4.1, demand-induced local employment growth will have a rela 
tionship to local economic variables quite different from supply-induced local 
employment growth.
To put this argument in econometric terms, we can recognize that labor sup 
ply shifters (Sw) and land supply shifters (5^) are part of the disturbance term 
in equations (9) and (12). These equations can then be rewritten as:
(9a) Ymt - ymM = B0 + Bt + C(L) (Emt - £mM) + S^ + S^ + Umt. 
(12a) Yimt = A0 +At + Fm + B'Ximt + C(L}Em + S^ + S^ + Uimt.
To determine the effects of demand shocks to employment, we want to estimate 
the effect of shocks to employment, holding supply shifters constant. That 
is, we want to estimate E*(Ymt - ymM | Bt,Emt - Em_\, S^^.S^j) and 
E*(Yimt | At'Fm'^imt'Emt'S\vmt' Szmt^^ where E*(Q I ^ is the best linear
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predictor of Q given G. But as supply shifters are not observed, ordinary least 
squares regression can only estimate
(14) E*(Ymt - F^.! | Bt,Emt - £mM) = B0 + Bt + C(L)(Emt - £mM) 
+ E*(Swmt | Bt,Emt - Emt_i) + E*(Szmt | Bt,Emt - Emt_i)
(15) E*(Yimt | At,Fm,\imt,Emt) = A0 + At + Fm + B'Ximt + C(L)Emt 
+ E*(Swmt | At,Fm,Ximt,Emt) + E*(Szmt | At,Fm,\imt,Emt).
The last two conditional expectations are hypothetical auxiliary regressions 
of the supply shifters on the observed independent variables. Because the 
employment terms are correlated with the supply shifters, these auxiliary regres 
sions will have nonzero coefficients on the employment terms, biasing the coef 
ficient estimates on these variables.
The direction of the bias depends on the particular dependent variable and 
on which type of supply shifter dominates the data. Labor supply shifters will 
increase employment, unemployment, and land prices, and reduce real wages. 
The effect on other local prices is uncertain because of opposite effects on 
land prices and wages. A demand shock to employment should reduce 
unemployment, and increase land prices, real wages, and local prices. Thus, 
OLS estimates should be closer to zero than the true effects of demand shocks 
on unemployment and real wages. On the other hand, OLS estimates of the 
effects of employment on land prices should be greater than the true effects 
of demand shocks. The bias in OLS estimates of growth effects on nonland 
prices is uncertain.
Land supply shifters should increase employment and reduce land prices; 
the direct effects on other variables are likely to be small. Hence, due to the 
presence of land supply shifters, OLS estimates of the effects of employment 
on land prices and other prices are likely to understate the true effects of de 
mand shocks on these prices.
Considering both labor and land supply shifters, OLS estimates are likely 
to understate the absolute magnitude of demand shock effects on labor market 
variables such as unemployment and real wages. The bias in OLS estimates 
is uncertain for variables that involve the local land market, such as land prices 
or other local prices.
This bias problem can be solved by instrumental variables. Appropriate in 
struments are variables that are correlated with the employment variables in 
equations (9a) and (12a), but uncorrelated with the supply shifters that are part 
of the disturbance term. Obvious candidates for instruments are variables shift 
ing MS A labor demand.
In this book, only one type of labor demand shifter is used to form instrumen 
tal variables: 2 the share effect from a shift-share analysis of each metropolitan
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area and year-to-year employment change. 3 A shift-share analysis decomposes 
MS A growth into three components: a national growth component, which 
calculates what growth would have occurred if all industries in the MSA had 
grown at the all-industry national average; a share component, which calculates 
what extra growth would have occurred if each industry in the MSA had grown 
at that industry's national average; and a shift component, which calculates 
the extra growth that occurs because industries grow at different rates locally 
than they do nationally. For the aggregate model (estimating equation (9a)), 
the sum of the national growth component and the share component for each 
metro area from year t-l to t and eight lagged values of that sum are used 
to form a set of instrumental variables. For the micro model (estimating equa 
tion (12a)), a set of national growth components and share components are 
added to each MSA's 1970 employment to simulate its employment level from 
1971 to 1986 if the MSA's industries had grown at the same rate locally as 
nationally throughout the period. Current and eight-lagged values of those 
employment level predictions are used as instruments in equation (12a).
Formally, the "growth predictions" used to form instruments in this book 
can be written as
~ Rjnt-1)< 16> Gmt . . . ..._
Rjnb Rnb
where R represents the absolute level of employment (not the logarithm of 
employment), they subscripts indicate employment in industry j, variables 
without j subscripts are industry totals, the n subscript indicates employment 
figures for the nation, and b is some base year. (Rnt~Rnt-\lRnb) ^ me overaH 
growth in national employment from t-l to t as a percentage of some base 
year total. (Rjnt~Rjnt-\^Rinb ls industry/s national growth as a percentage 
of the base year industry total. Rjmb is employment in industry j in metro area 
m at year b. The first term represents what is usually called the national growth 
effect, and the second term is usually called the share effect. Equation (16) 
is converted to logarithmic growth terms to be used as an instrument in 
estimating equation (9a):
(17) IVagg = ln(C">
Current and eight lagged values of equation (17) are used as instruments in 
estimating equation (9a) by two-stage least squares. The instruments for equa 
tion (12a) can be written as: 
(18) lDRPrec,icted _ + £ 
mi k=\9li
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Current and eight lagged values of equation (18) are used as instruments for 
the employment level variables in equation (12a).
Why would this type of instrument be a good proxy for a demand shock 
to metre area employment? Because the prediction equations for employment 
include time-period dummies, we are explaining deviations of MS A growth 
from the U.S. average using deviations of the "growth prediction" variable 
from the U.S. average. Deviations of the growth prediction variables in equa 
tion (16) from the U.S. average will be due to the share effect, as the national 
growth effect for a given time period is the same for all MS As. The share 
effect can be rewritten as
(19) XRjmb
J I Rnb 
where /?m£ is total employment in MS A m in the base period, and 
Rmb(Rinb/Rnb) ^ me MSA's employment in industry j if it had the same 
employment share as the national average. That is, the value of the share ef 
fect depends only on deviations of MS A employment shares from U.S. 
averages. For industries serving local markets, MS A employment shares will 
be close to national averages. Hence, local industries contribute little to equa 
tion (19). On the other hand, industries that export their products to national 
or international markets will often have local employment shares that differ 
dramatically from the national average. These export industries will be the 
primary cause of differences across MS As in the value of equation (19), and 
hence will be the primary cause of differences across MS As in the instruments 
derived from equation (19).
The instrumental variables defined by equations (17) and (18) will differ 
across MSAs and time due to differences in the national economic performance 
during the time period of the export industries in which that MS A specializes. 
The national growth of an industry is a rough proxy for the change in national 
demand for its products. Thus, these instruments measure changes in national 
demand for the MSA's export industries. This change in demand would have 
both direct and multiplier effects (on local supplier and retail industries) on 
MS A employment. Some of these multiplier effects would take place with a lag.
The actual calculation of these instruments was slightly different for the ag 
gregate data estimation and the micro data estimation, largely because the ag 
gregate data estimation was done some time before the micro data estimation. 
The instruments used in the aggregate data estimation relied solely on data 
from the BLS 790 program. This program uses surveys to produce official
275
industry employment figures for each MSA and year, with industry coverage 
differing greatly across MS As. For each MSA, I used 1964 as a base year 
for calculating growth predictions from 1964-65 through 1972-73, 1973 as 
a base year for calculating growth predictions from 1973-74 through 1978-79, 
and 1979 as a base year for calculating growth predictions from 1979-80 
through 1985-86. For each MSA and base year, I used whatever level of in 
dustry detail was reported for that MSA and base year, and put other industries 
into all other manufacturing and all other nonmanufacturing categories. The 
choice of only three base years, rather than using year t-l as the base year 
for the growth prediction from year t-l to t, was largely due to the complexity 
of dealing with very different levels of industry detail across MSAs and over 
time.
The instruments used in the micro data estimation were based on a com 
bination of data from the ES-202 and BLS 790 program. The ES-202 pro 
gram provides direct counts from all employers covered by unemployment 
insurance (virtually all private employment) of annual average employment. 
The industry detail of the ES-202 data is much greater than for the BLS 790 
data. For the micro data estimation, 1979 was used as a base year for all the 
employment level predictions. ES-202 data on private employment by industry, 
and BLS 790 data on government employment were added together, and the 
ES-202 industry employment totals were adjusted proportionately so that the 
resulting sum added up to total nonagricultural employment as reported by 
the BLS 790 program. A shift-share analysis was then done for each year from 
1970-71 to 1985-86 to calculate growth predictions for each year and MSA. 
These growth-effect predictions were then used to form employment-level 
predictions, as outlined in equation (18) above.
Are these share-effect variables good instruments? The quality of an instru 
ment depends on two factors: whether the instrument is a good predictor of 
the endogenous right-hand side variables; and whether the instrument is un- 
correlated with the disturbance term. Information on the predictive ability of 
the share-effect derived instruments can be obtained from the first-stage regres 
sions used in deriving the 2SLS estimates. Representative regressions are 
presented in table 4A2.1. They show that the instruments are very good 
predictors.
The magnitude and pattern of effects of the instruments on MSA employ 
ment are also reasonable. The micro data estimates imply that the long-run 
multiplier of a 1 percent shock to an MSA's export industries is about 1.87. 4 
The multiplier at first increases, presumably due to lags in how the export 
shock affects local retailers and suppliers. The multiplier then declines a bit; 
this may be due to the negative effects of higher land prices and wages caused
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by the initial growth shock. The multiplier using the aggregate data instruments 
is about 4.47, which seems too high. This higher multiplier may be due to 
the lesser industry detail in the aggregate data instruments. An MS A that 
specializes in fast-growing industries, using relatively aggregated industrial 
categories, may also specialize in fast-growing industries within those broad 
industrial categories.
Because supply shifters are unobserved, it is not possible to tell whether 
the share-effect derived instruments are correlated with labor or land supply 
shifters. However, such a correlation is unlikely. The share-effect instruments 
vary over time for a given MSA due to changes in national demand for that 
area's export industries. It is hard to see why changes in national demand would 
have much correlation with exogenous changes in local amenities (which might 
shift labor supply) or exogenous changes in local transportation systems or 
zoning rules (which might change land supply).
The empirical specifications for the aggregate data estimation (equation (9a)) 
and the micro data estimation (equation (12a)) allow for lagged values of 
employment growth or employment to affect local economic variables. One 
practical question is how to choose the lag length. After all, if one keeps on 
adding lags forever, eventually all estimates will be driven to statistical 
insignificance.
To solve this problem, I used a standard model selection criterion, the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), for analysis of aggregate time series (Amemiya 
1985, chap. 2). The basic idea of this selection criterion is to choose the model 
that will minimize the out-of-sample prediction error. Models with lower 
within-sample prediction error and smaller numbers of explanatory variables 
will tend to have lower out-of-sample prediction errors. Hence, the AIC picks 
the model that minimizes the following weighted average of the within-sample 
prediction error and the number of explanatory variables:
(20) AIC = \n(e'e) + 2(K)/N
where e'e is the within-sample sum of squared residuals, K is the number of 
explanatory variables in the model, and N is the number of observations. In 
choosing between two nested models, the AIC is approximately equivalent to 
using a significance value of 2.00 for a F-test of the validity of the restricted 
model, as choosing the model with the lowest AIC amounts to choosing the 
unrestricted model if
(21) ln(*/«r) - ln(Vu) > 2 (Ku - Kr)/N
where the r subscript on e indicates the error terms from the restricted model, 
the u subscript on e indicates the error terms from the unrestricted model, 
Ku is the number of variables in the unrestricted model, and Kr is the number 
of variables in the restricted model.
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Some studies have applied Ihis model selection criterion to time series dala 
(Geweke and Meese 1981). The AIC and olher similar model selection criteria 
have been shown lo be asymptotically biased towards choosing loo long a lag- 
lenglh in large samples, allhough Ihe correcl lag-lenglh is mosl likely lo be 
chosen. A bias toward slighlly overfilling Ihe model does nol seem undesirable.
For Ihe OLS regressions, Ihe AIC is simply used lo choose Ihe optimal lag- 
lenglh, among all lag-lenglhs up to eighl years. The choice of a lag-lenglh 
of s years means lhal Ihe cumulative effecl of the growth shock does not change 
enough from s years lo eighl years lo justify including additional lags. 
Throughoul the book, lables also report Ihe long-run effecls of a growlh shock 
in a model wilh eighl lags. These reports always confirm lhal mere are no 
"significant' differences belween cumulative effecls after s lags and eighl lags. 
However, sometimes Ihe long-run effecl is significanl in Ihe s-lag specifica 
tion but not Ihe eighl-lag specification. In ihese cases, Ihe eighl-lag, long-run 
effect is estimaled so imprecisely lhal neilher zero nor Ihe oplimal lag-lenglh, 
long-run effecl can be rejected.
In Ihe case of 2SLS estimates, Ihere is no equivalenl to the AIC for choos 
ing lag-lenglhs. However, I adopled a modified AIC criterion lhal is equivalenl 
to sequentially applying a F-lesl cutoff of 2.00 lo models of longer and longer 
lag-lenglhs, in each case testing the new model againsl Ihe previous besl model. 
This modified AIC is based on Ihe sum of squared residuals calculated using 
fitted values of the explanatory variable. The sum of squared residuals using 
actual values of Ihe explanatory variables is in virtually all cases larger lhan 
Ihe sum of squared residuals using filled values. Hence, if a model of lag- 
lenglh s has a smaller modified AIC lhan a model of lag-lenglh s + m, then 
a F-lesl wilh a cutoff of 2.00 would also choose Ihe model of lag-lenglh s. 
This follows because 
? 2vx/^ *}\ t ' nrm** \. . •* J
implies ln(SSflf) - ln(SS#S +m) < 2^  • Thus il is probably irue lhal
(SSR* - SSF) I m c
fit ___ fit ____ < 2, where SS/C is Ihe sum of squared residualsi+m fit 
SSBT™ / fn-(s+m)]
using filled values for lag-lenglh 5. Hence, if SS/T. < SSK , where 0 oo pt act
SSK is Ihe sum of squared residuals using actual values, ihen act
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) I m 
(23) Usual 2SLS F-test = fit fit < 2.
SSRs+m / (n-s-m) 
act
However, if a model of lag-length s + m has a smaller modified AIC than 
a model of lag-length 5, this model would not necessarily be chosen in a 
F-test with a cutoff of 2.00, as
(24) (SSR f, - SSP) I m
/" ./" ____ > 2 does not imply
SS/£+m / (n-s-m)
(^^K^ — ^^R^ } I m _i_
F-test = fit fit > 2, as SSB? can be considerably greater
than
(n-s-m) 
act
Hence, the procedure used was as follows: Calculate the modified AIC for 
all 2SLS lag-lengths from zero to eight. Start out with zero as the best lag- 
length. Go to longer and longer lag-lengths until one is found that has a smaller 
AIC. Perform a F-test on the model with that lag-length versus the current 
best lag-length model. Choose the best model based on a F-test cutoff of 2.00. 
Continue on to longer lag-lengths, rejecting models with larger AIC values 
than the current best model, and performing F-tests on models with smaller 
AIC values than the current best model, choosing a new "best" model based 
on these F-tests. In most cases, this procedure is identical to choosing the model 
with the smallest modified AIC value.
Once optimal lag-lengths were chosen for both the OLS and 2SLS specifica 
tions, the statistical significance of the difference between OLS and 2SLS 
specifications was compared, for both the OLS and 2SLS optimal lag-lengths, 
using the well-known Hausman test (Hausman 1978). If OLS estimates are 
not significantly different from 2SLS estimates, then we cannot reject the 
restriction implied by OLS that the disturbance term is uncorrelated with the 
employment variables in equations (9a) and (12a). Hence, we cannot reject 
the consistency of OLS estimates, and the OLS-imposed restriction allows use 
of more information and results in greater precision of the estimates. In this 
case, OLS estimates are preferred. But if OLS and 2SLS estimates do differ, 
the implication is that OLS estimates are inconsistent and 2SLS estimates are 
preferred.
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In addition to the Hausman F-test, which looks at the overall differences be 
tween the entire group of 2SLS and OLS estimates, I also looked at the statistical 
significance of differences between OLS and 2SLS estimates of the long-run 
effect of a shock to growth on the dependent variable. The variance of this 
difference is calculated, following Hausman, as V(2SLS estimate) - V(OLS 
estimate).
Another statistical problem examined for the micro data OLS regressions 
is whether the usual standard errors on the estimated effects of the aggregate 
employment variables are biased by a group structure to these data. A number 
of recent papers, in particular several papers by Moulton (1990, 1986), have 
pointed out that when aggregate variables are combined with micro data, the 
usual standard errors on the coefficients of the aggregate variables may be 
much lower than the true standard errors. The basic problem is that the distur 
bance term for the individual micro data observations may have a group struc 
ture that closely follows the group structure of the aggregate variables. OLS 
computer packages assume that all disturbance terms are independent. The 
reported standard errors on the aggregate variable coefficients will tend to be 
too low, because the package overestimates the amount of new information 
that is added by one more observation on the same group. Moulton has shown 
that the ratio of the true to usual standard errors will be approximately given 
by the square root of [1 + (Var(gj)/g + g - 1)P], where P is the within-group 
correlation, g is the average group size and Kar(gj) is the variance of the average 
group size.
In the present case, the aggregate employment terms only vary across MS As 
and over time. The regression includes dummy variables for both MS A and 
time effects. Hence, the relevant groups are MSA/time-period groups. The 
issue is whether, controlling for MS A and time effects, the disturbance terms 
for all individuals in a given MS A and year are positively correlated.
The standard test for a group structure to the disturbance term is a one-sided 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test. This test examines whether the estimated within- 
group correlation is significantly greater than zero. Moulton and Randolph 
(1989) have recently argued that the one-sided LM-test of group structure in 
regression disturbances, while asymptotically correct, may be misleading if 
the number of groups or the number of observations is small. They suggest 
a F-test to detect a group structure to the disturbance term. This F-test basically 
examines whether including a full set of group dummies in the regression adds 
significant explanatory power. Moulton (1988a) has outlined a method for us 
ing output from the F-test and other information from the GLM procedure 
of SAS to obtain unbiased estimates of the within-group correlation.
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For each dependent variable examined in the micro data portion of this 
research, for the OLS optimal AIC lag-length, both LM- and F-tests were per 
formed. These test results are reported in table 4A2.2. The LM-tests never 
indicated a significantly positive correlation, but F-tests, in some cases, did 
indicate a group structure to the data. Where the F-test statistic was signifi 
cant at a 10 percent or lower level, I used Moulton's (1988a) suggested GLM 
procedure for calculating the within-group correlation, and then calculated the 
approximate ratio of the true to the usual standard errors.
As shown in the table, the implied percentage bias in the usual OLS stan 
dard errors is quite small, never more than 16 percent. 5 As will be discussed 
in later chapters, making the correlation would never make any difference to 
inferences drawn from tests of significance for the different models, and makes 
very little difference to the size of confidence intervals. Hence, the fact that 
this book primarily reports the usual OLS and 2SLS standard errors does not 
lead to any misleading conclusions.
This finding of little bias in usual OLS standard errors differs from the find 
ings of other researchers who have included MSA variables in micro data 
models (Moulton 1990; Freeman 1989). The difference probably occurs 
because this study, unlike Moulton's and Freeman's, includes controls for MSA 
fixed effects. MSA effects may cause sizable within-group correlation and bias 
usual standard error calculations, but once these MSA fixed effects are 
eliminated, the remaining correlation within MS A/time-period groups is ap 
parently small.
Three final points about estimation procedures should be made. First, for 
all micro data regressions, some additional specifications were run to test 
whether the results are sensitive to the length of time the individual has been 
in the MSA. Ideally, we would like to examine separately the effects of growth 
on long-term residents. The concern is that estimated long-term effects of a 
growth shock on average economic outcomes for individuals may reflect 
changes in the composition of the MSA population due to in-migration that 
are not controlled for with observed demographic characteristics. Unfortunate 
ly, the CPS only reports whether the individual was in that MSA t years ago, 
where tis 1 year in most cases (i.e., was the individual in the MSA in March 
of the previous year), but is 5 years ago for the 1985 and 1980 March CPS 
surveys, which report data on the individual's experiences during 1984 and 
1979. All estimates excluded individuals not in the same MSA t years ago; 
this exclusion was done because if the individual was in a different MSA in 
March of the previous year, the data on their labor market experiences during 
the previous year may reflect the economic environment of another MSA.
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To test whether results differ for long-term residents or not, for each depen 
dent variable, and for the optimal lag-length chosen for the OLS regressions, 
I added an interaction term between a dummy variable for a 1984 or 1979 
observation and all the employment variables, and estimated this augmented 
model by OLS. If the changing composition of the local population with in- 
migration is driving the results, one would expect these dummy variable in 
teraction terms to be highly significant. The estimated effects of an employ 
ment shock after three or four years would be much less for the 1984 and 
1979 cohorts than for other individuals in the sample. The specific results of 
this test for different dependent variables are reported in the appendices to 
various chapters. However, in no case did these interaction terms prove to 
be statistically significant, and the interaction terms were estimated precisely 
enough to rule out large differences in the long-run effects of employment 
shocks on the 1979 and 1984 cohorts versus other cohorts.
Second, most of the results reported in the text and text tables are for 
cumulative effects of a growth shock. These cumulative effects after s years 
are the sum of the coefficients on all the employment variables up to the sth 
lag. The standard errors on these coefficient sums could, of course, be 
calculated using the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the estimates. But 
for most of the regression results used in this study, the employment variables 
are manipulated so that the coefficient sums and their standard errors are directly 
calculated by the computer package. Specifically, it must be true that
(25)
(Em, t-k-1 -Em,t-k-1^ + ^ cj(Em,t-s -£m,t-s- 
(26) E
where Em t is the natural logarithm of MSA m 's employment at year t. That 
is, if all except the last employment variable is expressed as a difference from 
the previous variable, then the coefficient on each variable will represent an 
estimated cumulative effect of an employment shock.
Finally, some of the micro dependent variables used in this study are sub 
ject to some censoring. That is, the labor force participation rate and the 
employment rate are basically bounded by zero and one. Ideally, one would 
want to explicitly deal with this censoring using well-known though complex 
techniques (Amemiya 1985). This approach was rejected due to constraints 
of time and money. Given the many other econometric issues addressed in 
this study (demand shocks versus supply shocks, unobserved MSA effects for
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up to 89 MS As, the choice of lag-length, and bias due to unobserved group 
effects), the large number of regressions run (at least 36 for every dependent 
variable, given all the lag-lengths investigated), and the tens of thousands of 
observations in all micro data regressions, it simply was not feasible to ad 
dress the censoring issue. Even with the censoring, it is still valid to interpret 
the regressions as estimates of best linear predictors of the dependent variable; 
the censoring means that some nonlinear predictors might do somewhat bet 
ter. I doubt whether allowing for censoring would much change the estimates 
of the average effects of growth on different groups.
NOTES
1. In fact, in order to avoid including 89 dummy variables for all the MSAs included in this study, 
all estimations using micro data are based on equation (13) rather than equation (12), with all 
variables first differenced from MSA means.
2. This discussion is a bit loose. The full set of two-stage least squares instruments also includes 
all right-hand side variables in (9a) and (12a) except for the employment terms. The appendix 
discussion focuses on the instruments excluded from the right-hand side of equations (9a) and 
(12a), and hence provides the needed extra instruments for the endogenous employment variables.
3. This type of demand shock instrument was previously used in the Bradbury, Downs and Small 
(1982) book; I discovered their use of this instrument after I had already come up with my ap 
proach. Thus, I can only claim the originality of ignorance for my use of this type of instrument.
4. This multiplier is derived by summing all the coefficients on the instruments in table 4A2.1.
5. Note in table 4A2.2 that the ratio of true to usual standard errors is approximately equal to 
the square root of the F-test statistic. This is not an accident. Moulton's procedure for calculating 
the within-group correlation relies on analysis of covariance. Assume the micro data regression 
of interest can be written as Yfs = B'X + e^, where Y^ is the value of the dependent variable 
for individual./ in group i, and X is a vector of explanatory variables. Suppose that the distur 
bance term for each observation is e^ = df + u^, where d^ is independently and identically 
distributed across groups with mean zero and variance a2,, u,-.- is independently and identically 
distributed across groups with mean zero and variance a2 . The within-group correlation is a2J(a2 
-t-a2.), or, for small a2,, is approximately equal to ffVa2. A regression of the dependent variable 
on the usual X variables, and a vector of group dummies, yields a mean square error of MU. 
The expected value of this mean squared error is a2 . The partial sum of squares for the group 
dummies, after taking account of the X variables, has a mean square error of M^, with an ex 
pected mean square of a2 -I- ka2,. This term k will be a complicated trace term, divided by a number 
which will be approximately equal to the number of groups. The trace term in the numerator 
of k is the sum, over all groups, of the sum of squared residuals from individual regressions of 
each group membership dummy on the explanatory variables. With large numbers of group dum 
mies, the explanatory power of such regressions will be nil. The sum of squared residuals in each 
regression will just equal the sum of the dependent variables squared; summed over all regres 
sions, this will simply be the number of observations. Hence, the term k will approximately equal 
the average group size.
The usual F-test statistic is given by Mj/Mu. The expected value of this statistic, based on the 
above discussion, is (a2 + ka*j)/a2 , or is approximately equal to 1 -I- gp, where p is the within- 
group correlation. If the ratio of the variance in group size to the mean group size is small com 
pared to the mean group size, then this F-test statistic is approximately the square of the ratio 
of true to usual standard error formula given in the appendix text and in the notes to table 4A2.2.
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Table 4A2.1
Effect of Share-Effect Derived Instruments 
on MSA Employment and Employment Growth
Representative Micro Data Regression, Partial Results
Dependent Variable: MSA Employment Level 
No. of observations: 32,558 
R-squared: .6197
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error
LIVO
LI VI
LIV2
LIV3
LIV4
LIV5
LIV6
LIV7
LIV8
1.45
1.24
.73
.48
-.88
.04
.10
-.78
-.51
.07
.09
.06
.09
.07
.06
.07
.07
.07
Sum of coefficients = 1.87
Representative Aggregate Data Regression, Partial Results
Dependent Variable: MSA Employment Growth 
No. of observations: 339 
R-squared: .6422
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error
GIVO
GIV1
GIV2
GIV3
GIV4
GIV5
GIV6
GIV7
GIV8
Sum of coefficients =4.47
1.72
1.02
.83
.52
.31
.17
-.17
.04
.03
.26
.27
.25
.22
.23
.25
.25
.26
.25
NOTES: LIVt is the ln(predicted employment) for the rth lag, using the share effects from the 
analysis of ES-202 data to generate the predictions. GlVt is the ln(predicted employment /) - ln(actual 
employment M), using the share effects from the analysis of BLS 790 data to generate the predic 
tions. These are the two types of instruments mentioned in the appendix text. Both of these first- 
stage regressions reported above also included many other instruments, that is, all the right-hand 
side variables in equations (9a) and (12a), except for the employment variables, are treated as 
exogenous. Hence, the micro data regression includes MSA dummies, time dummies, and a full 
set of individual characteristics. The aggregate data regression includes a full set of time dummies.
Table 4A2.2
Tests of Possible Biases in Calculated Standard Errors 
Caused by a Variance Components Structure in the Micro Data Used
LM-Test 
Dependent Variable Statistic
Employment probability -2.31
Labor force -3.40 
participation
Usual weekly -3.05 
hours
Real wages -.07
Occupational rank -.04
F-Test 
Statistic
1.127
(df=323,36519; 
Pr=.0584)
1.034
(df= 327,321 15; 
Pr = .3252)
1.040
(df= 325, 28576; 
Pr=.2995)
1.204
(df= 167, 13080; 
Pr=.0381)
1.209
(df= 167, 13080; 
Pr=.0349)
Unbiased
Estimate of 
Intra-Group 
Correlation
.00147
NA
NA
.00309
.00316
Approx. Ratio of 
True OLS Standard
Error to Computer 
Package-Generated 
Standard Error
1.068
NA
NA
1.098
1.100
Wage differential 1.169
from occupational -.20 (df= 167,13080; .00256 1.082
mean Pr=.0682)
1.337
Real earnings .84 (df = 166,14699; .00452 1.156
Pr=.00099)
NOTES: All calculations are based on the OLS lag-length minimizing the AIC. The LM-test statistic is a one-sided test, where the LM-test statistic 
is asymptotically standard normal, and positive within group correlation should yield a positive test statistic. The unbiased estimate of the within-group 
correlation, where the relevant group is each MSA/time period combination, is calculated using the GLM procedure from SAS, based on a procedure 
outlined by Moulton (1988a). This calculation is expensive, and is only done for cases where the F-test indicates that there may well be significant 
positive within-group correlation. The ratio of the true OLS standard errors for the aggregate employment coefficients to the computer-generated stan 
dard errors is calculated following Moulton (1986) as the square root of {/ + [var(gj)/g + g - 1]P}, where P is the within-group correlation, g is 
the average group-size, and var(gj) is the variance across groups of the group size. For the three samples of concern here, average group size and the 
group-size variance are: employment probability (g = 87.2, var(gj) = 833.7); all three real-wage variables (g= 66.5, var(gj) = 57.5); real earnings 
(g = 74.6, var(gj) = 58.3). Note that the square root of the F-test statistic is approximately equal to this ratio of true OLS standard errors to computer- 
generated standard errors.
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Appendix 4.3 
Background Information on Data
This appendix describes the data used in chapter 4. The same micro data 
are also used in chapters 6 and 7.
Aggregate unemployment rate data were derived from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics publication series, Geographic Profiles of Employment and Unemploy 
ment. Data were obtained for annual average unemployment rates in various 
metropolitan areas for each year from 1972 to 1986. These data are calculated 
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics from the 12 monthly Current Population 
Surveys.
In addition to restricting the unemployment rate data to cities with CPS- 
based estimates, only metropolitan areas with official CPI data were included 
in the aggregate unemployment rate sample. This was to ensure that the ag 
gregate estimation in chapter 4 would use the same set of cities as the aggregate 
estimation in chapters 5 and 6, which are restricted to MS As with CPI data. 
With these restrictions, 25 MS As ended up being included in the data. These 
25 MS As are identified in table 4A3.1.
The employment growth rates used on the right-hand side of the aggregate 
unemployment rate equations were defined as the year-to-year change in the 
natural logarithm of nonagricultural employment. Nonagricultural employment 
data were obtained from BLS 790 data. One potential problem with the BLS 
790 data is that definitions of MS A boundaries change over time. If the bound 
ary changed from year t-\ to year t, I used data based on the old boundaries 
to measure the logarithmic growth rate from t-l to t, and data on the new bound 
aries to measure the logarithmic growth rate from t to t+ 1. In going though 
various old BLS publications, it was always possible to find some such overlap 
between employment time series using old and new MS A boundaries.
The micro results from this and other chapters are based on analysis of a 
pooled data set using information from March editions of the Current Popula 
tion Survey from March 1980 through March 1987. Each March survey con 
tains extensive information on the labor market activities of individuals in over 
60,000 households during the preceding year, and this information was used 
to derive the dependent variables used in the micro data estimation. Only adult 
males, ages 25 to 64, are used in the micro data estimation. Furthermore, on 
ly males in identified MS As are included in the analysis. From March 1980 
through March 1985, only 44 MSAs are identified in the CPS data. Starting 
in March 1986, over 200 MSAs are indentified in CPS data. However, many 
of these MSAs have a relatively small number of observations. Furthermore,
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each MSA added to the analysis required a new shift-share analysis using the 
industrial categories reported for that MSA (see appendix 4.2). Hence, only 
individuals from the top 100 MSAs in population were selected from the March 
1986 and March 1987 data tapes, in order to limit the number of shift-share 
analyses to only MSAs for which there actually was a fair amount of data on 
individual economic performance. In addition, some of the top MSAs went 
through such extensive boundary changes that it is difficult to construct a 
realistic time series of employment growth. MSAs with very extensive bound 
ary changes were therefore excluded from the analysis. The net result was 
the inclusion of 89 MSAs in the analysis of the micro data. These MSAs are 
listed in table 4A3.1.
Even after these exclusions, the resulting data set would have had over 
100,000 observations. To reduce computing costs, I chose a random subsam- 
ple of 100 individuals per year from each of the 44 MSAs included in all the 
eight March CPS tapes. For the 45 MSAs that were only identified on the 
March 1986 and 1987 tapes, all individuals were included. Including a nearly 
equal number of observations from different MSAs maximizes the variation 
in the independent variable of interest, MSA employment, for a fixed sample 
size. After these further exclusions, the pooled data set had 44,015 observa 
tions. Descriptive statistics for the main independent micro variables are 
reported in table 4A3.2.
The sample size was further reduced in estimating the various micro data 
models presented in chapters 4, 6, and 7. First, as mentioned in appendix 4.2, 
only individuals who had been in the MSA for at least t years, where t=5 
for the March 1985 and March 1980 tapes, but t-\ for all the other tapes, 
were included in the estimation. Second, some of the dependent variables are 
only defined for individuals of a particular labor force status. For example, 
the employment rate (= weeks employed during previous year divided by weeks 
in the labor force) is only defined for individuals with nonzero weeks in the 
labor force. The usual weekly hours and hourly wage rate variables are only 
defined for those with nonzero weeks employed during the previous year. Third, 
real wage rates and real earnings, used in chapters 6 and 7, can only be 
measured for individuals in the 25 MSAs with local consumer price indices. 
Fourth, individuals were excluded from the sample if any data were missing 
on variables in the regression. This problem mainly occurs for the wage rate 
and earnings variables, as up to 20 percent of the sample refuses to answer 
these CPS questions. Fifth, to save on computer time and research time, some 
dependent variables were analyzed together using the same data base, which 
allowed much quicker estimation using computer packages. But this required 
the exclusion of any observation missing for any of the dependent variables
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that were analyzed together. The labor force participation rate (= number of 
weeks in the labor force during the previous year divided by 52) was analyzed 
together with the nominal earnings variable (results not reported in this book), 
which required excluding any observation with missing values on nominal earn 
ings. The usual weekly hours variable was analyzed together with the nominal 
hourly wage rate variable (= annual earnings divided by the product of an 
nual weeks employed and usual weekly hours; nominal wage rate results are 
not reported in this book), which required excluding any observation with miss 
ing values on earnings. This type of grouping of dependent variables results 
in some seemingly puzzling differences in sample size. For example, the sample 
size used in analyzing the employment rate variable (36,962) is greater than 
the sample size used to analyze the labor force participation rate variable 
(32,558), because the labor force participation sample only includes observa 
tions with nonmissing values for earnings. Table 4A3.2 reports descriptive 
statistics on the main micro dependent variables used in this study, together 
with the sample size used in the analysis.
The MSA employment levels used as explanatory variables in the micro data 
studies are defined as the natural logarithm of the level of nonagricultural 
employment in the MSA, and are derived from the same BLS 790 data used 
in the aggregate data studies. In the case of MSA boundary changes from year 
t-l to year t, MSA employment growth is calculated using the same method 
outlined above: using the old boundaries to calculate growth from year t-l 
to t, and the new boundaries to calculate growth from year t to year t + 1. The 
log MSA employment level for years t+l and following is then calculated 
by adding in the appropriate amount of logarithmic growth in employment, 
calculated using the new MSA boundaries, to the log employment level using 
the old MSA definitions in year t. Because an MSA fixed effect is included 
in the empirical work, whether employment levels are adjusted to correspond 
to the old MSA definition, as is done here, or the new MSA definition is ir 
relevant because what matters is the year-to-year deviations of the MSA 
employment level from its overall average.
Finally, the detailed empirical results presented in the appendices to chapters 
4, 5, 6, and 7 use a great many computer acronyms for the independent 
variables. Table 4A3.3 presents a guide to these computer acronyms. All 
demographic variables listed are included as controls in all micro regression 
results described in this book. All aggregate and micro regressions include 
a full set of time dummies. As described in appendix 4.2, all micro regres 
sions in this book implicitly include a full set of MSA dummies by differenc 
ing all variables (both dependent and independent) from MSA means.
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Table 4A3.1 
MSAs Included in Research
Akron, OH 
Albany, NY 
Albuquerque, NM 
Allentown, PA 
Anaheim, CA 
Atlanta, GA * 
Austin, TX 
Bakersfield, CA 
Baltimore, MD * 
Baton Rouge, LA 
Birmingham, AL 
Boston, MA * 
Bridgeport, CT 
Buffalo, NY * 
Charleston, SC 
Charlotte, NC 
Chicago, IL * 
Cincinnati, OH * 
Cleveland, OH * 
Columbia, SC 
Columbus, OH 
Dallas, TX * 
Dayton, OH 
Denver, CO * 
Detroit, MI * 
El Paso, TX 
Flint, MI
Fort Lauderdale, FL 
Fresno, CA 
Gary, IN
Grand Rapids, MI 
Greensboro, NC 
Greenville-Spartanburg, SC 
Harrisburg, PA 
Hartford, CT 
Honolulu, HI 
Houston, TX * 
Indianapolis, IN 
Jacksonville, FL 
Jersey City, NJ 
Kansas City, MO * 
Knoxville, TN 
Las Vegas, NV 
Little Rock, AR 
Louisville, KY
Los Angeles, CA * 
Memphis, TN 
Miami, FL * 
Milwaukee, WI * 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN * 
Mobile, AL 
Nashville, TN 
Nassau-Suffolk, NY 
New Haven, CT 
New Orleans, LA 
New York, NY * 
Newark, NJ 
Norfolk, VA 
Oklahoma City, OK 
Omaha, NE 
Orlando, FL 
Oxnard-Ventura, CA 
Philadelphia, PA * 
Phoenix, AZ 
Pittsburgh, PA * 
Portland, OR * 
Providence, RI 
Raleigh-Durham, NC 
Richmond, VA 
Riverside, CA 
Rochester, NY 
Sacramento, CA 
St. Louis, MO * 
Salt Lake City, UT 
San Antonio, TX 
San Diego, CA * 
San Francisco-Oakland, CA* 
San Jose, CA 
Seattle, WA * 
Springfield, MA 
Syracuse, NY 
Tampa, FL 
Toledo, OH 
Tucson, AZ 
Tulsa, OK 
Washington, DC * 
West Palm Beach, FL 
Wilmington, DE 
Youngstown, OH
* Included in 25-MSA Sample, used in analyses involving local prices, and aggregate unemploy 
ment rate study.
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Table 4A3.2 
Descriptive Statistics for Main Variables in Micro Data
Variable
Education
Experience
Black
Spouse Present
Veteran
Family Size
No. of Children < 6
Current Employment 
Growth
Employment Probability 
(No. weeks employed 
-5- weeks in labor force)
LFP Probability 
(No. weeks in labor force
+ 52)
Usual Hours (during weeks 
employed in previous 
year)
Real Wages (= Real 
Earnings -r product of 
weeks worked and usual 
hours)
Real Earnings (during 
previous year)
Mean
13.0
22.3
.097
.72
.41
3.04
.27
.0228
.946
.875
42.67
13.50
24,880
Standard 
Deviation
3.2
12.4
.297
.45
.49
1.56
.60
.0300
.177
.309
8.94
8.32
18,334
Sample Size
44,015
44,015
44,015
44,015
44,015
44,015
44,015
44,015
36,962
32,558
29,019
13,299
14,918
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Table 4A3.3 
Guide to Computer Acronyms Used in Chapter Appendices
Acronym Descriptive Name
Brief Additional 
Definition If Needed
Demographic Controls Included in All Micro Equations
EDUC
EXPER
EDUC2
EXPER2
EDEX
SPOPRE
FPERS
FREC14
VETSTA
BLACK
BEDUC
BEXPER
BEDUC2
BEXPER2
BEDEX
BSPOPRE
BFSIZ
BCHL6
BVETSTA 
Other Variables
T74 to T86
EMO-EM8
GRO-GR8 
ACCO-ACC7
Education
Experience 
(Education) 2 
(Experience) 2 
Education * Experience 
Spouse Present
Family Size
No. of children < 6 years old
Veteran Status
Black
Black * Education
Black * Experience
Black * (Education) 2
Black * (Experience)2
Black * Education *
Experience
Black * (Spouse Present)
Black * (Family Size)
Black * (No. of children < 6
years old) 
Black * (Veteran Status)
Dummy Variables for time 
periods; = 1 if time is 1974, 0 
otherwise, etc. 
Employment
Employment Growth 
Acceleration of Growth
No. of years of education
completed
= Age - Education - 6
= 1 if Spouse is Present, 0
otherwise
No. of individuals in family
= 1 if veteran, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if black, 0 otherwise
EMk = ln(MSA employment, 
year t-k)
= kth lag of log employment 
GRk = EM,k - EM,k+l 
ACCk = GR,k-GR,k+l
NOTES: In micro data portion of study, all variables are first-differenced from MSA means. 
This gives results equivalent to including a full set of MSA means. All micro equations include 
a full set of demographic controls and time dummies. All aggregate equations include a full set 
of time dummies.
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Appendix 4.4 
Background Information on Empirical Results Used in Chapter 4
Table 4A4.1 presents the least squares estimates from which figures 4.1 
through 4.4 in chapter 4 are derived. These estimates are presented to ensure 
readers know the exact specification of the estimating equations and to inform 
readers interested in the coefficients on the control variables.
The results reported in figures 4.2 and 4.3 come directly from the employ 
ment variable coefficients in the micro employment and labor force participa 
tion rate regressions reported in table 4A4.1. The results in figure 4.1 come 
from summing up the employment variable coefficients in the unemployment 
rate regression in table 4A4.1 to get cumulative effects. The results in figure 
4.4 come from dividing weekly hour coefficients and standard errors in table 
4A4.1 by 42.67, the mean value of weekly hours, to get results expressed in 
percentage terms.
This appendix does not present detailed results for the "growth squared" 
specifications summarized in table 4.3, or the specifications summarized in 
table 4.4 that allow growth's effects to vary across different types of individuals. 
Full sets of these results are available upon request to interested readers. The 
"growth squared" results add a squared growth term for each growth term 
included in the regression. The "interaction" results interact the education, 
experience, and black variables with all employment variables included in the 
regression.
Using this interaction specification, the results reported in table 4.4 are based 
on the derivative with respect to a demographic characteristic of the long- 
run derivative with respect to employment of the dependent variable, and are 
then multiplied by a "standardized change," as described in the notes to table 
4.4. The weekly hours results are adjusted to get the effect of a change in 
the demographic variable on the percentage effect of an employment shock 
on weekly hours. The expected percentage effect of an employment shock on 
weekly hours, for individuals with some particular set of demographic 
characteristics, is the absolute effect (call it A) of the employment shock on 
weekly hours for that group, which is calculated directly from the regression 
coefficients, divided by the expected weekly hours (H) for that demographic 
group, or A/H. The derivative of this percentage effect with respect to 
demographic characteristic z is given by the following formula:
(27) d (A/H)/dz = (1/fl2) [H(dA/dz) - A(dH/dz)] 
= (dA/dz)/H - (A/H) (dH/dz) + H.
In making this calculation, all derivatives are calculated from the estimated 
"interaction" specification at the means of all variables, and the mean value
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of the hours variable is used. The variance of this percentage effect of z is 
calculated conditional on the sample mean values of all variables and all 
derivatives, as
(I///2) • [Variance of (dA/dz)].
Table 4A4.2 presents the two-stage least squares (2SLS) results for the ef 
fects of demand shocks to MS A employment growth on the labor market ac 
tivity variables of chapter 4, using share-effect derived instrumental variables. 
All these 2SLS estimates are for the optimal lag-length, as chosen by the 
modified AIC procedure (see appendix 4.2). These tables also present Hausman 
tests examining the statistical significance of the overall differences between 
the 2SLS and OLS specifications, and Hausman tests of the statistical 
significance of differences in the long-run effects of employment growth be 
tween the two specifications. Hausman tests are reported for both the lag-length 
chosen as optimal in the OLS specification, and the lag-length chosen as op 
timal in the 2SLS specification. These tests all show that 2SLS estimates are 
not significantly different from OLS estimates.
Table 4A4.3 summarizes the results of micro data specifications that include 
interaction terms between the years 1979 and 1984 and the employment 
variables. Again, coefficient estimates and standard errors are only reported 
for the employment-related variables. This interaction specification is meant 
to test whether the effects of a growth shock differ for long-term residents 
versus more recent residents (see appendix 4.2). The 1979 and 1984 samples 
only include individuals who have been in the MS A more than five years, while 
the other years include all individuals who have been in the MSA more than 
one year. No statistically or substantively significant differences are found be 
tween growth effects in 1979 and 1984 and growth effects in other years.
Table 4A4.1 
Full Least Squares Estimates Underlying Figures 4.1 through 4.4
Independent 
Variable
INTERCEPT
EDUC
EXPER
EDUC2
EXPER2
EDEX
SPOPRE
FPERS
FREC14
VETSTA
BLACK
Dependent
A in MSA 
Average Employment 
Unemployment Rate, Micro 
Rate, M to t Data
-0.004
(0.003)
0.0208
(0.0024)
0.00550
(0.00077)
-0.000269
(0.000072)
-0.0000359
(0.0000088)
-.000235
(0.000034)
0.0360
(0.0027)
-0.00226
(0.00078)
0.0002
(0.0018)
0.0002
(0.0022)
-0.375
(0.082)
Variable
Labor Force 
Participation 
Rate, Micro 
Data
0.0334
(0.0040)
0.0286
(0.0013)
-0.00060
(0.00012)
-0.000565
(0.000015)
-0.000626
(0.000057)
0.1001
(0.0046)
-0.0069
(0.0014)
-0.0015
(0.0031)
-0.0009
(0.0038)
-0.75
(0.12)
Weekly 
Hours
0.25
(0.14)
0.461
(0.045)
0.0115
(0.0043)
-0.00726
(0.00051)
-0.0099
(0.0020)
1.80
(0.16)
-0.152
(0.046)
0.22
(0.10)
-0.44
(0.12)
5.0
(5.2)
BEDUC
BEXPER
BEDUC2
BEXPER2
BEDEX
BSPOPRE
BFSIZ
BCHL6
BVETSTA
T74
T75
T76
T77
T78
T79
0.007 
(0.004) 
0.022 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.006 
(0.004)
0.0164 
(0.0094)
0.0140 
(0.0027)
0.00007 
(0.00029)
-0.000123 
(0.000029)
-0.00050 
(0.00013) 
0.0644 
(0.0078)
-0.0077 
(0.0021)
-0.0012 
(0.0062)
-0.0046 
(0.0068)
0.086 
(0.013)
0.0077 
(0.0044)
-0.00233 
(0.00041) 
0.000075 
(0.000047)
-0.00093 
(0.00020) 
0.065 
(0.013)
-0.0098 
(0.0035) 
0.029 
(0.011) 
0.007 
(0.012)
-1.00 
(0.60)
-0.21 
(0.17)
0.034 
(0.018)
0.0025 
(0.0018)
0.0086 
(0.0082)
0.13 
(0.47)
0.16 
(0.13)
0.17 
(0.36)
1.07 
(0.40)
Table 4A4.1 (continued)
Dependent Variable
Independent 
Variable
T80
T81
T82
T83
T84
T85
T86
GRO
GR1
GR2
GR3
EMO
A in MSA 
Average 
Unemployment 
Rate, t-\ to /
0.008
(0.004)
0.010
(0.004)
0.013
(0.003)
0.003
(0.003)
-0.007
(0.003)
-0.003
(0.003)
0.006
(0.004)
Employment 
Rate, Micro 
Data
-0.0084
(0.0047)
-0.0127
(0.0055)
-0.0245
(0.0059)
-0.0120
(0.0063)
-0.0146
(0.0068)
-0.0084
(0.0061)
-0.0094
(0.0056)
0.422
(0.066)
0.254
(0.071)
0.109
(0.068)
0.269
(0.061)
Labor Force 
Participation 
Rate, Micro 
Data
-0.0032
(0.0074)
-0.0232
(0.0074)
-0.0215
(0.0074)
-0.0371
(0.0074)
-0.0444
(0.0079)
-0.0437
(0.0075)
-0.0505
(0.0080)
0.137
Weekly 
Hours
-0.39
(0.26)
-0.83
(0.30)
-0.79
(0.32)
-0.26
(0.36)
-0.19
(0.34)
-0.67
(0.26)
-0.40
(0.29)
4.1
(3.8)
10.6
(3.8)
K>
vO 
O\
(0.042)
EM2
EM4
GRO
GR1
GR2
GR3
GR4
GR5
GR6
R-Squared
No. of observations
0.066
(0.028)
-0.320
(0.033)
0.147
(0.043)
0.009
(0.044)
-0.021
(0.045)
0.107
(0.049)
-0.058
(0.047)
0.078
(0.034)
0.735 0.0565
350 36,962
2.8
(1.5)
0.1820 0.0374
32,558 29,019
NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses. Blank means that variable was not included in that particular equation. Unemployment rate results were 
corrected for first-order auto correlation of ->189 (s.e. = .056). Auto correlation correction makes little difference to results. Other three equations 
were estimated by OLS. AH micro variables were differenced from MSA means. This eliminates the intercept term in these equations. The reported 
standard errors correct for these extra implicit independent variables. However, the reported standard errors do not correct for the "Moulton effect." 
As discussed in appendix 4.2, this correction would make little difference.
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Table 4A4.2 
2SLS Estimates of Employment Growth Effects on Labor Market Activity Variables
Variable
Cumulative Effect After: Long- 
Immediate 123456 Run 
Effect year years years years years years Effect
Hausman F-test of 
Overall Difference 
OLS lag- 2SLS lag- 
length length
Difference in 
Estimated Long-Run
Effect
OLS lag- 2SLS lag- 
length length
Aggregate
Unemployment
Rate
Micro
Employment
Rate
Labor Force
Participation
Rate
Weekly
Hours
-.51
(.11)
.17
(.26)
.232
(.074)
-.01
(2.5)
-.13 -.08 -.19 -.05 -.20 -.08 -.08
(.11) (.10) (.10) (.12) (.10) (.06) (.06)
.58 .097 .097
(.26) (.049) (.049)
.232
(.074)
-.01
(2.5)
1.05
(Prob. = .396)
.28
(Prob. = .924)
2.39
(Prob. = .122)
.71
(Prob. = .546)
1.05
(Prob. = .396)
.61
(Prob. = .608)
2.39
(Prob. = .122)
3.35
(Prob. = .067)
-.02
(.06)
.001
(.060)
.094
(.061)
-.015
(.024)
-.02
(.06)
-.007
(.042)
.094
(.061)
-3.771
(2.058)
NOTES: All estimated effects of shocks are for the 2SLS optimal lag-length for each variable, unless otherwise indicated. Standard errors of estimated 
effects are in parentheses below estimates. The Hausman F-tests show whether the entire set of estimates resulting from 2SLS differs significantly from 
the entire set of OLS estimates. F-test statistics are calculated both for the OLS optimal lag-length, and 2SLS optimal lag-length, which often differ. 
The probabilities in parentheses below the F-test show the probability of an F-test statistic of the size reported resulting from chance if the true value 
of the coefficients in the 2SLS and OLS specifications were actually the same. The last two columns report the difference between the 2SLS and OLS 
estimated long-run effects of an employment shock (i.e., 2SLS LR effect - OLS LR effect). Standard errors of these differences are in parentheses.
Table 4A4.3
OLS Estimates of Effects of MSA Employment Shocks on Labor Market Activity, 
with Inclusion of Interaction Term Between Employment Variables and 1979/1984 Dummy
Cumulative Effect of Employment Shocks Differential Employment Shock Effect
(Except for 1979 and 1984)
Dependent
Variable
Employment
Rate
Labor Force
Participation
Rate
Weekly
Hours
Immediate
Effect
.445
(.069)
.138
(.042)
4.9
(4.0)
1
year
.226
(.082)
7.4
(4.4)
2 3
years years
.144 .278
(.072) (.066)
3.3
(1.5)
4 Long-Run
years Effect
.059 .059
(.028) (.028)
.138
(.042)
3.3
(1-5)
Immediate
Effect
-.24
(.20)
-.0107
(.0066)
-2.00
(11.00)
for
1
year
.27
(.19)
12.0
(9.2)
1979 and 1984
2
years
.43
(.24)
-.09
(.22)
3 4 Long-Run
years years Effect
.01 -.0038 -.0038
(.18) (.0037) (.0037)
-.0107
(.0066)
-.09
(.22)
F-Test on
Interaction Terms
2.099
(df=5; 36837;
Prob. = .062)
2.647
(df=l; 32441;
Prob. = .104)
1.14
(df=3; 28898;
Prob. = .331)
NOTES: First set of columns shows coefficients on regular MSA employment variables, while second set of columns shows coefficients on interaction 
terms between MSA employment variables and dummy variable that is one for 1979 and 1984, zero otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Note that F-test statistics never show significance at the conventional 5 percent level of significance. Furthermore, the estimated difference in the long- 
run effect of growth, between the 1979/1984 cohort and other cohorts, is always substantively small (compared to the estimated average size of the 
long-run effect) and statistically insignificant at the 5 percent level.
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Appendix 5.1 
Background Information on Chapter 5 Results
Table 5 A 1.1 presents the full OLS estimates of the effects of shocks to 
employment growth on various types of housing prices and overall prices. All 
results are only for the lag-length chosen as optimal for that particular specifica 
tion, based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 1
These OLS results were summarized in figures 5.1 through 5.4 in the text 
of chapter 5, along with the results for overall prices. The OLS results reported 
in this appendix also include information on the estimated time period effect 
dummies, the number of observations in each regression, and the proportion 
of variance explained by the regression. The reader will note that the number 
of observations is different for various dependent variables, because some price 
indices have been radically changed over time and data on computer tape are 
only available for more recent years.
Full OLS results are not reported for the nonhousing price regressions, but 
are available on request. 2 Table 5A 1.2 reports 2SLS estimates of the effects 
of employment growth on different price variables with "share effect" 
predicted growth terms used as instrumental variables. (Appendices 4.2 and 
4.3 have more information on the share effect instrument and its rationale. 
The share instrument used here is identical to that used in 2SLS estimates of 
the effects of growth on unemployment.) To save space, the 2SLS table does 
not report estimated coefficients and standard errors for the time dummies, 
although they are, of course, part of the estimation.
The 2SLS tables also report Hausman tests that compare the 2SLS estimates 
to OLS estimates. The F-test examines whether the 2SLS and OLS estimates 
overall are significantly different. In addition, I report estimates of differences 
in the estimated long-run effect of growth between the 2SLS and OLS specifica 
tions, as well as the standard error of this estimated difference. Much of the 
discussion of this book has focused on estimating the long-run effects of growth; 
hence, differences between 2SLS and OLS in the long-run effects of growth 
are viewed here as of greater importance than differences in estimated short- 
run effects or estimated time period effects. Hausman test comparisons of 2SLS 
and OLS estimates are performed both for the lag-length chosen (using the 
AIC) as optimal for OLS, and the lag-length chosen as optimal for 2SLS.
Of these 13 different inflation indices, Hausman F-tests indicate a difference 
between 2SLS and OLS, using both possible lag-lengths, for only four of the 
variables: shelter inflation, homeownership inflation (the old index), transpor 
tation inflation, and medical care inflation. In addition, F-test statistics indicate 
a significant difference between 2SLS and OLS estimates, for the 2SLS
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optimal lag-length but not the OLS optimal lag-length, for the new homeowner- 
ship cost inflation variable and the other goods and services inflation variable. 
However, the estimated difference between 2SLS and OLS estimates of the 
long-run effect of growth is only statistically significant for the transportation 
inflation and new homeownership cost inflation variables. In both cases, 2SLS 
estimates indicate somewhat greater long-run effects of a one-time growth shock 
on the price level. On the whole, however, the 2SLS estimates do not appear 
to require any significant change in the conclusions reached on the basis of 
the OLS estimates.
NOTES
1. The chosen lag-length for 2SLS is based on a slight modification to the AIC. See appendix 
4.2 for details.
2. The number of observations for the other OLS regressions is as follows: food and beverages, 
household furnishings, entertainment, and other goods prices have 247 observations; transporta 
tion, apparel, and medical care prices have 343 observations; and household fuel and utility prices 
have 339 observations.
Table 5A1.1 
Full OLS Estimates of Effects of Employment Growth on Housing Prices and Overall Prices
Independent 
Variable
INTERCEP
ACCO
ACC1
ACC2
ACC3
ACC4
ACC5
ACC6
GR1
GR2
Shelter 
Prices
0.038
(0.008)
0.054
(0.112)
0.361
(0.116)
0.528
(0.123)
0.554
(0.119)
0.562
(0.130)
Dwelling 
Rent 
Price 
Index
0.035
(0.005)
0.181
(0.063)
0.494
(0.066)
0.738
(0.070)
0.727
(0.068)
0.577
(0.074)
0.430
(0.075)
Dependent Variable
Old 
Homeownership 
Price Index
0.030
(0.009)
-0.095
(0.181)
0.451
(0.116)
Owners' 
Equivalent 
Rental 
Price Index
0.043
(0.011)
0.205
(0.176)
0.632
(0.159)
0.684
(0.154)
0.757
(0.156)
0.551
(0.178)
0.503
(0.209)
0.822
(0.227)
Overall 
CPI
0.056
(0.003)
0.022
(0.041)
0.118
(0.042)
0.200
(0.031)
GR5 
GR6 
GR7
T74 
T75 
T76 
T77 
T78 
T79 
T80 
T81 
T82 
T83 
T84
0.340 
(0.092)
0.252 
(0.053)
0.043
(0.011)
0.046
(0.013)
0.016
(0.012)
0.033
(0.009)
0.056
(0.011)
0.079
(0.012)
0.106
(0.013)
0.068
(0.012)
0.029
(0.011)
0.022
(0.011)
0.016
(0.010)
-0.003
(0.006)
0.009
(0.008)
0.020
(0.007)
0.029
(0.006)
0.018
(0.006)
0.014
(0.007)
0.029
(0.007)
0.041
(0.007)
0.055
(0.006)
0.046
(0.006)
0.024
(0.006)
0.250 
(0.146)
0.048 
(0.014) 
0.065 
(0.015) 
0.037 
(0.013) 
0.031 
(0.011) 
0.065 
(0.011) 
0.099 
(0.012) 
0.139 
(0.014) 
0.084 
(0.012) 
0.023 
(0.014)
0.040 
(0.004) 
0.026 
(0.004)
-0.000 
(0.004) 
0.008 
(0.003) 
0.014 
(0.003) 
0.046 
(0.004) 
0.065 
(0.004) 
0.038 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004)
-0.016 
(0.004)
-0.016 
(0.003)
Table 5A1.1 (continued) o
Independent
Variable
T85
T86
No. of observations
R-Squared
Shelter
Prices
0.003
(0.010)
-0.007
(0.012)
339
.6521
Dwelling
Rent
Price
Index
0.009
(0.006)
-0.010
(0.007)
343
.5758
Dependent Variable
Old
Homeownership
Price Index
229
.6187
Owners'
Equivalent
Rental
Price Index
0.008
(0.014)
0.002
(0.016)
74
.4062
Overall
CPI
-0.026
(0.003)
-0.046
(0.004)
343
.8978
NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses. Blank means variable is not included in that particular regression. As explained in appendix 4.2, coefficients 
on ACCA: variable is cumulative effect after k lags; coefficient on the one included GR/ variable is the long-run effect. Reported estimates for each 
dependent variable are for lag-length that minimized the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).
Table 5A1.2 
2SLS Estimates of Effects of Employment Growth on Various Categories of Prices
Variable
Shelter
Dwelling
Rent
Old
Homeownership
Owner's
Equivalent
Rent
Overall
Price
Index
Food and
Beverage
Transportation
Cumulative Effect After: 
Immediate 1 2 3 456 Long-Run 
Effect year years years years years years Effect
-0.719
(0.344)
0.237
(0.195)
-1.365
(0.531)
0.700
(0.191)
-0.111
(0.120)
0.113
(0.112)
0.249
(0.077)
-0.298 0.235
(0.343) (0.161)
0.564
(0.092)
-0.380 0.441
(0.529) (0.249)
-0.065 0.150
(0.120) (0.056)
-0.055 0.158
(0.107) (0.053)
0.235
(0.161)
0.564
(0.092)
0.441
(0.249)
0.700
(0.191)
0.150
(0.056)
0.158
(0.053)
0.249
(0.077)
Hausman F-test of 
Overall Difference 
OLS lag- 2SLS lag- 
length length
2.792
(Prob. =
.012)
1.477
(Prob. =
.175)
7.249
(Prob. =
.001)
.516
(Prob. =
.839)
1.254
(Prob. =
.290)
.564
(Prob. =
.639)
7.718
(Prob. =
.006)
3.359
(Prob. =
.010)
1.630
(Prob. =
.197)
4.649
(Prob. =
.004)
3.981
(Prob.=
.050)
1.254
(Prob. =
.290)
.564
(Prob. =
.639)
7.718
(Prob.=
.006)
Difference in 
Estimated LR Effect 
OLS lag- 2SAS lag- 
length length
-0.242
(0.172)
.125
(.094)
-.113
(-196)
.178
(.336)
-.050
(.047)
.011
(.042)
.177
(.066)
-0.189
(0.137)
.134
(.077)
-.067
(.216)
.268
(.145)
-.050
(.047)
.011
(.042)
All
(.066)
Table 5A1.2 (continued)
Variable
Household Fuel
and Utilities
Household
Furnishings and
Operations
Apparel
Medical
Care
Entertainment
Other Goods
and Services
Cumulative Effect After: 
Immediate 12345 
Effect year years years years years
-0.245
(0.188)
0.112
(0.063)
0.173
(0.087)
0.387 0.100
(0.175) (0.082)
0.053
(0.109)
-0.071 -0.069 -0.132 -0.143 0.268
(0.165) (0.158) (0.163) 0.174) (0.083)
6 Long-Run 
years Effect
-0.245
(0.188)
0.112
(0.063)
0.173
(0.087)
0.100
(0.082)
0.053
(0.109)
0.268
(0.083)
Hausman F-test of Difference in 
Overall Difference Estimated LR Effect 
OLS lag- 2SLS lag- OLS lag- 2SLS lag- 
length length length length
2.920
(Prob. =
.088)
.380
(Prob. =
.538)
.253
(Prob. =
.615)
3.170
(Prob. =
.014)
.263
(Prob. =
.953)
1.522
(Prob. =
.210)
2.920
(Prob.=
.088)
.380
(Prob. =
.538)
.253
(Prob. =
.615)
5.411
(Prob. =
.005)
.090
(Prob.=
.765)
3.337
(Prob.=
.006)
-.270
(.160)
.032
(.052)
.037
(.074)
-.015
(.072)
.073
(.069)
.040
(.055)
-.270
(.160)
.032
(.052)
.037
(.074)
.014
(.073)
.027
(.090)
.121
(.070)
NOTES: All estimates, unless otherwise indicated, are for 2SLS optimal lag-length. Hausman F-test provides test of overall differences between the 
OLS and 2SLS sets of estimates, both for the lag-length judged optimal by OLS, and the lag-length judged optimal by 2SLS. The probability below 
these F-test statistics is the probability of an F-test statistic of this size if there were no significant differences between the true OLS and 2SLS parameters. 
The last two columns report the difference between the long-run 2SLS effect and the long-run OLS effect (i.e., LR 2SLS - LR OLS). The standard 
error of these differences are reported in parentheses.
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Appendix 6.1 
Background Information on Chapter 6 Results
This appendix presents some of the estimates from chapter 6 in more detail.
The full least squares results using Area Wage Survey data on occupational 
real wages are presented in table 6A 1.1. These are the same aggregate data 
results reported in table 6.2 in chapter 6. Table 6A 1.1 shows results for the 
optimal AIC specification for each variable. The estimated equations are cor 
rected for first-order autocorrelation. The cumulative effect of a growth shock 
after three years in the skilled worker real wage specification is the sum of 
the coefficients on all the growth variables. The standard errors reported in 
the text are calculated based on the variance-covariance matrix of all the 
parameters, which is not reproduced here.
Each of the Area Wage Survey wage inflation indices are weighted averages 
for specific occupations. Each occupation's wage inflation from t-l to t is 
calculated by a survey of average employers who were located in the MSA 
both years.
These aggregate equations were also estimated using share effect instruments 
for the lag-length chosen as optimal by OLS. (See chapter 4, appendices 4.2 
and 4.3.) A Hausman test was run to compare these estimates using share ef 
fect instruments with ordinary least squares estimates. The Hausman test 
statistics are reported in table 6A 1.2. As can be seen in the table, all of these 
test statistics indicate no significant differences between the OLS and share 
effect estimates.
I also added employment growth squared terms as explanatory variables in 
these equations to see whether a growth shock's effect on real wages varied 
with the initial level of growth. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) sug 
gested that adding terms in growth squared improved the specification for skilled 
real wages and office and clerical worker real wages, but did not improve 
the specification for unskilled real wages. More conventional F-tests also show 
ed that the growth squared terms were collectively significant at the 5 percent 
level for the skilled real wages equation and the office and clerical real wages 
equation, but were not significant in the unskilled real wages equation.
Based on these growth squared regressions, table 6A1.3 shows, for skilled 
real wages and office and clerical real wages, how the effects of a 1 percent 
shock to growth vary at different initial levels of growth at different times 
after the shock. Although the growth squared terms are collectively signifi 
cant in both these equations, the only individually significant growth squared 
effect is for the long-run effect of growth on skilled worker real wages. The 
results show that variations in growth have greater effects on skilled real wages 
at lower initial levels of growth.
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The full basic ordinary least squares results using micro data from the CPS 
on real wages are presented in table 6A1.4. This table only reports results 
for the lag-length chosen as optimal for each dependent variable regression 
by the AIC. The dependent variable in these equations is expressed as real 
dollars per hour, with the MSA's 1986 price index being assumed to be 1.00 
in all cases. All these equations implicitly assume a full set of dummy variables 
for each MS A; this is done by differencing all variables from their MS A mean 
before estimation. In addition to controlling for MS A fixed effects, these MS A 
dummy variables control for any differences across MS As in the 1986 price 
level. Also, the inclusion of an MSA fixed effect means that what is important 
is not the absolute level of employment in the MSA, but its level of employ 
ment compared to some typical level for the MSA; that is, what is important 
is employment growth since some base year.
The percentage effects reported in the chapter 6 text and in table 6.3 are 
derived by dividing the absolute dollar effects of employment shocks reported 
in these appendix tables by the sample mean for real wages per hour, which 
is $13.50. The standard errors of the percentage effects incorporate the 
stochastic nature of the estimated absolute dollar effects, but condition on the 
sample mean as a fixed parameter. That is, the percentage effect = absolute 
dollar effect/sample mean. The calculated standard error to this percentage 
effect is (standard error to absolute dollar effect)/(sample mean). Thus, these 
standard errors are best interpreted as the uncertainty in the percentage effect 
of employment shocks, calculated at this particular fixed value of $13.50; the 
standard errors do not tell us the uncertainty in our percentage effects if we 
interpret our calculations as giving consistent estimates of the percentage ef 
fects of employment shocks calculated at the population mean.
As was discussed in appendix 4.1, the usual estimates of OLS standard er 
rors of coefficients on aggregate variables in micro data equations may be biased 
if the disturbance term has a variance components structure. Table 4A2.2 show 
ed the true standard errors on the employment terms should be about 9.8 per 
cent higher than the usual standard errors for the real wage regression, 10.0 
percent higher for the occupational rank regression, and 8.2 percent higher 
for the wage differential regressions. These adjustments were not made in the 
tables or figures for this chapter, but making this adjustment would have no 
effect on any inferences.
The OLS real wage estimates were also tested by including an interaction 
term between the employment variables and a dummy variable for an obser 
vation from 1979 or 1984. As discussed in the chapter 4 appendices, the 1979 
and 1984 samples only included individuals who had been in the MSA at least 
five years, while other years' samples included all individuals with at least one
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year of residence in the MSA. If this study's estimated effects of growth are 
biased by the special characteristics of in-migrants, then this interaction term 
should be statistically significant and large. But, as shown in table 6A 1.5, the 
interaction term has only a small and statistically insignificant effect on the 
real wage.
These micro real wage equations were also estimated using share effects, 
and all explanatory variables except for the employment terms, as instrumen 
tal variables. (See appendices 4.2 and 4.3.) Hausman test statistics were 
calculated to compare these instrumental variable estimates with ordinary least 
squares estimates. Comparisons were performed both for the lag-length chosen 
as optimal by OLS, and the lag-length chosen as optimal by the 2SLS estimates 
using the share effect instruments. These Hausman test statistics are reported 
in table 6A1.6. As can be seen in the table, the Hausman test statistics clearly 
indicate significant differences between the two sets of estimates. As the share 
effect instrument estimates in theory are always consistent, the instrumental 
variable estimates become the preferred estimates, given that there are signifi 
cant differences.
I also compared the 2SLS and OLS estimates of individual coefficients on 
the employment terms. This comparison is reported in table 6A1.7. As can 
be seen in the table, the only statistically significant differences in estimates 
of individual coefficients are that employment shocks have significantly greater 
short-run effects on the real wage and wage differential variables using the 
2SLS estimates, and have significantly greater short-run and long-run effects 
on the occupational rank variable using the 2SLS estimates. The long-run ef 
fects of employment shocks on the real wage or wage differential variables 
do not differ significantly between the 2SLS and OLS estimates.
I do not report in this appendix the 2SLS estimates that lie behind table 6.4, 
which show the effects of employment shocks on real wages when interaction 
terms are included between the employment terms and education, experience 
(age-education-6) and race. In addition to using share effect projected MSA 
employment as instruments, these 2SLS regressions used as instruments in 
teraction terms between the share effect instruments and education, experience, 
and race. A full set of these results are available to interested readers upon 
request.
To get the change in the percentage effects reported in table 6.4 in the text, 
I calculated the derivative of the percentage effect with respect to the individual 
characteristic. The percentage effect is A/W, where A is the absolute dollar 
effect, and Wis the real wage. The derivative of this with respect to individual 
characteristic X, where X is education, experience, or race, is d(A/W)ldX = 
(\IWi)(W(dA/dX) - A(dW/dX)) = (dA/dX)IW - (A/W)(dW/dX)IW. This
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derivative was calculated at the mean values of A, W, and all other individual 
characteristics, and then multiplied by the standardized change in X to get the 
figures in table 6.4. This multiplication will only give an approximation to 
the actual discrete change, but some checks on this calculation indicate that 
it is a fairly good approximation. The standard errors in table 6.3 were 
calculated as (standard error ofdA/dX) times (\IW) times standardized change. 
In other words, these standard error calculations take into account the stochastic 
nature of estimates of dA/dX, but are conditional on the sample mean values 
ofA/W, dW/dX, and W. This simplified approach was adopted because of the 
complexity of taking into account the true variance and covariance of all these 
estimates.
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Table 6A1.1
Full Least Squares Estimate for Effects of Employment Growth 
on Various Real Wage Indices
Variable
INTERCEPT
GRO
GR1
GR2
GR3
T74
T75
T76
T77
T78
T79
T80
T81
T82
T83
R-Squared
Skilled Workers
.001
(.005)
-.127
(.071)
.159
(.090)
-.200
(-091)
.153
(.074)
-.019
(.006)
.014
(.008)
.026
(.007)
.012
(.005)
.012
(.006)
-.025
(.006)
-.028
(.007)
-.003
(.007)
.006
(.007)
.008
(.007)
.55
No. of observations 241
Real Wage
Unskilled Workers
.008
(.004)
-.110
(.051)
-.022
(.005)
.006
(.006)
.021
(.005)
.013
(.005)
.004
(.005)
-.027
(.005)
-.035
(.005)
-.006
(.005)
.007
(.006)
.002
(.006)
.54
234
Office & Clerical 
Workers
-.006
(.004)
-.029
(.045)
-.025
(.005)
.006
(.005)
.024
(.005)
.010
(.005)
.005
(.005)
-.025
(.005)
-.033
(.005)
.004
(.005)
.026
(.005)
.028
(.005)
.65
253
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Table 6A1.2
Hausman Test Statistics for Endogeneity 
of Employment Growth Variables 
in Aggregate Real Wage Equations
Dependent Variable
Value of Hausman 
Test Statistic
2SLS Estimated 
Long-Run Effect 
-GLS Estimated 
Long-Run Effect
Real wage change, 
skilled workers
Real wage change,
1.46 (df = 4,222) 
(Prob. = .215)
.12 
(.09)
office and clerical
workers
Real wage change,
unskilled workers
.53 (df = 1,241)
(Prob. = .467)
.15 (df = 1,221)
(Prob. = .699)
.09
(.07)
-.03
(.07)
NOTES: Hausman F-test statistic examines overall differences between 2SLS and GLS specification. 
Probabilities stated are probabilities of F-test statistic of this size if there were no true overall 
differences. Last column reports 2SLS estimated long-run effect of a growth shock minus GLS 
estimate of long-run effect. Standard error of this difference is in parentheses.
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Table 6A1.3
Estimated Elasticity of Aggregate Real Wages with Respect
to Employment Growth, Allowing for Differential Effects
at Different Initial Levels of Growth
____Real Wages, Skilled Workers____
Initial Annual
Employment Initial Long-Run Effect = 
Growth Rate Effect 1 Year
-.01 -.04(.08) .18(.09)
.025 -,04(.08) -.02(.06)
.06 -.04(.12) -.22(.10)
r-Test .01 2.58
Real Wages, Office/Clerical Workers
Initial Annual
Employment Initial Long-Run Effect = 
Growth Rate Effect 1 Year
-.01 -.00(.07) .01(.08)
.025 .09(.07) -.04(.05)
.06 .18(.ll) -.09(.09)
r-Test 1.47 .74
NOTES: Estimates are based on GLS specifications, allowing for serial correlation, that include 
squared terms in all employment growth variables. Average annual employment growth rate for 
this sample of MSAs from 1972 to 1986 is .025; .031 is standard deviate of MSA employment 
growth rates in this sample, so -.01 and .06 are slightly more than one standard deviation away 
from the mean. Mest row reports r-statistic on growth squared term for that particular lagged 
effect of growth.
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Table 6A1.4
Full OLS Estimate of the Effects of Employment Growth 
on Various Measures of Real Wages, Using Micro Data
Variable
EDUC
EXPER
EDUC2
EXPER2
EDEX
SPOPRE
FPERS
FREC14
VETSTA
BLACK
BEDUC
BEXPER
BEDUC2
BEXPER2
BEDEX
BSPOPRE
BFSIZ
Real 
Wage
0.264
(0.175)
0.520
(0.057)
0.029
(0.005)
-0.008
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.002)
2.457
(0.198)
-0.026
(0.058)
-0.111
(0.129)
0.189
(0.161)
4.518
(6.161)
-0.707
(0.712)
-0.093
(0.200)
0.026
(0.022)
0.002
(0.002)
-0.003
(0.010)
-1.070
(0.569)
0.042
(0.161)
Occupational 
Rank
-0.079
(0.062)
0.090
(0.020)
0.027
(0.002)
-0.00089
(0.00023)
-0.002
(0.001)
0.739
(0.071)
-0.042
(0.021)
-0.016
(0.046)
0.004
(0.057)
2.135
(2.198)
-0.492
(0.254)
-0.020
(0.072)
0.019
(0.008)
0.000047
(0.00077)
0.002
(0.003)
-0.528
(0.203)
0.049
(0.057)
Wage 
Differential
0.343
(0.170)
0.430
(0.056)
0.002
(0.005)
-0.007
(0.001)
0.001
(0.002)
1.718
(0.193)
0.016
(0.057)
-0.095
(0.126)
0.184
(0.157)
2.382
(6.017)
-0.215
(0.695)
-0.073
(0.196)
0.007
(0.022)
0.002
(0.002)
-0.005
(0.009)
-0.541
(0.556)
-0.007
(0.157)
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Table 6A1.4 (continued)
Variable
BCHL6
BVETSTA
T80
T81
T82
T83
T84
T85
T86
EMO
R-Squared
No. of
observations
Real 
Wage
-0.030
(0.465)
0.082
(0.487)
-0.767
(0.263)
-0.931
(0.265)
-1.130
(0.264)
-1.041
(0.268)
-1.362
(0.293)
-1.544
(0.285)
-1.257
(0.300)
3.515
(1.575)
0.1699
13,299
Occupational 
Rank
0.006
(0. 166)
-0.050
(0.173)
-0.012
(0.094)
-0.167
(0.095)
-0.522
(0.094)
-0.574
(0.095)
-0.567
(0.101)
-0.693
(0.101)
-0.665
(0.106)
1.372
(0.562)
0.2946
13,299
Wage 
Differential
-0.036
(0.454)
0.133
(0.476)
-0.755
(0.257)
-0.764
(0.259)
-0.608
(0.258)
-0.467
(0.261)
-0.795
(0.276)
-0.852
(0.279)
-0.592
(0.292)
2.143
(1.538)
0.0739
13,299
NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses. Full set of MSA dummies is implicitly included by 
first-differing all variables from MSA means.
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Table 6A1.5
Selected Results for Real Wages When Interaction Term is Included 
Between Employment Variable and 1979/1984 Dummy
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error
EMO 3.516 1.572 
SEMO -.169 .279
NOTES: Regression also includes a full set of demographic variables and time dummies. SEMO 
is interaction term between EMO and dummy variable equal to one for 1979 and 1987.
Table 6A1.6 
Hausman Test Statistics for Overall Differences
Between Effects of Demand-Induced Growth 
and Overall Growth, Micro Real Wage Variables
Variable Hausman Test Statistic
Real Wages F-test (1,13182) = 6.86; Prob. = .009 (OLS optimal 
lag-length)
F-test (4,13176) = 4.99; Prob. = .001 (2SLS optimal 
lag-length)
Occupation Rank F-test (1,13182) = 5.52; Prob. = .019
Wage Differential
from Occupation F-test (1,13182) = 3.31; Prob. = .069 (OLS optimal
Mean lag-length,
F-test (4,13176) = 3.24; Prob. = .011 (2SLS optimal
lag-length)
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Table 6A1.7
Comparison of 2SLS and OLS Estimates of Individual Coefficients 
on Employment Terms, Micro Real Wage Variables
Cumulative Effect After: 
0 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
Real
Wages
2SLS
OLS
Difference
-.2360
(.1676)
.0377 
(.0444)
-.2737
(.1616)
Long-run 2SLS effect is 
8-lag specification effect
Occupation 
Rank
2SLS
OLS
.0321
(.0096)
.0137 
(.0056)
.0367
(.2364)
.0481 
(.0497)
-.0114
(.2311)
significant 
is -.0242
.5963
(.2060)
.0423 
(.0427)
.5540
(.2015)
up to 2-lag 
(.0800)
-.0047
(.0423)
.0305 
(.0175)
-.0352
(.0385)
specification;
Difference .0184 
(.0078)
Long-run 2SLS effect is significant up to 2-lag specification; 
8-lag specification LR effect is .0450 (.0283)
Wage
Differential 
from 
Occupation
2SLS
OLS
Difference
-.1651 
(.1633)
.0392 
(.0433)
-.2043 
(.1575)
.0296 
(.2302)
.0226 
(.0486)
.0070 
(.2250)
.4793 
(.2006)
.0324 
(.0417)
.4469 
(.0384)
-.0149 
(.0412)
.0166 
(.0171)
-.0017 
(.0375)
Long-run 2SLS effect is significant up to 1-lag specification; 
________8-lag specification LR effect is -.0692 (.0781)_______
NOTES: OLS and 2SLS dynamics are compared for lag-length chosen by 2SLS estimation tech 
nique. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard error of difference is calculated as V(diff) 
= V(2SLS) - V(OLS) (Hausman 1978).
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Appendix 7.1 
Detailed Results for Real Earnings Regressions
The data and methodology used are generally similar to those used to estimate 
the effects of growth on individual labor market activity and real wage variables. 
The data are pooled CPS data on adult males, ages 25-64, for the years 1979 
through 1986. The reader is referred to the appendices to chapter 4 for more 
details.
As in the real wage regressions for individuals, the sample was restricted 
to the 25 MS As for which we have consistent CPI data. As with the real wage 
regressions, the 1986 price index was arbitrarily set to 1.0 for all MS As. Any 
cross-MSA differences in price as of 1986 will be absorbed by the MS A fixed 
effect included in the regression. (As in previous chapters, the MS A effect 
is implicitly included by first-differencing all variables from MS A means. This 
first-differencing also eliminates the intercept.)
The main effects of all growth and demand-induced growth on real earn 
ings have already been presented in figures 7.1 and 7.2. The actual regression 
includes an extensive list of demographic variables and time dummies. Table 
7A 1.1 shows the original OLS regression.
The original OLS and 2SLS regressions use the actual value of real earn 
ings as a dependent variable, not the log of real earnings, as real earnings 
can take on nonpositive values. The percentage effects on real earnings reported 
in the figures are calculated by dividing the originally estimated dollar effects 
on real earnings by the mean value of real earnings, $24,880. The standard 
errors in the figures are also calculated by dividing the originally estimated 
standard errors by $24,880. This approach yields standard errors in percent 
age effects at mean real earnings that are conditional on the sample mean value 
of real earnings. In other words, the sample mean is treated as a datum rather 
than as a stochastic variable. The unconditional standard error in estimates 
of the percentage effect at the population mean would be quite difficult to 
calculate.
As in previous micro data results, I also re-estimated the OLS regression 
with a dummy variable for the year 1984 or 1979 interacted with the employ 
ment variable. All estimates exclude individuals who were not in the MS A 
as of "f" years ago. For most of the sample, t is one year, but it is five years 
ago for 1979 and 1984. Hence, this interaction of the "8479" dummy with 
the employment variables enables us to see whether employment growth has 
any less—or greater—effect on the real earnings of long-term residents com 
pared to short-term residents. It thus addresses the argument that the growth 
effects measured here are due to growth attracting new residents with better 
economic prospects.
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Table 7A 1.2 shows the relevant results for the equation with these interac 
tion terms. The interaction terms are individually statistically insignificant, 
and an F-test on their joint significant yields a value of .50 (df = 2, 14799; 
Prob. = .607), which is clearly insignificant. Furthermore, the point estimates 
clearly show that the long-run effect of an employment shock is very little 
different for the 1979 and 1984 sample compared to other years. Hence, there 
is no evidence that growth has different effects on short-term residents com 
pared to long-term residents.
In addition, as discussed in appendix 4.2,1 examined whether the usual OLS 
standard errors or these aggregate employment variables were biased due to 
a variance components structure of the data. As shown in table 4A2.2, the 
true OLS standard errors are probably about 15.6 percent higher than the usual 
OLS standard errors. Making this minor adjustment would have no effect on 
any inferences made in this chapter.
As was done in previous chapters, the effects of growth were re-estimated 
with the employment terms treated as endogenous in a 2SLS regression. The 
instrumental variables used in estimation were all other included variables in 
the regression, plus the current and eight lagged values of share effect predic 
tions of the logarithm of employment. Appendix 4.1 details how these calcula 
tions were done.
Hausman tests were done comparing OLS and 2SLS estimates. Comparisons 
used both the OLS and 2SLS optimal lag-lengths. The F-test statistic for the 
OLS optimal lag-length is 5.34 (df = 2, 14797; Prob. = .0011). The F-test 
statistic for the 2SLS optimal lag-length is also 5.34 (df = 4, 14795; Prob. 
= .0003). Both F-test statistics are clearly statistically significant. However, 
a coefficient by coefficient comparison of the 2SLS and OLS results, for the 
2SLS optimal lag-length, shows that the long-term effect of growth is not 
significantly different. Table 7A 1.3 presents this comparison, showing the dif 
ferences between the two sets of estimates and the standard errors.
Estimates were also done with terms in growth squared added to the employ 
ment growth terms. Table 7A 1.4 reports the estimated parameters for the 
employment variables in a growth squared specification with two lags in the 
employment variable, estimated by 2SLS. This two-lag specification minimized 
the AIC. To do 2SLS, terms in the square of share effect predicted growth 
were added as instruments. The F-test statistic for this specification versus 
the specification without terms in growth squared is .44 (df = 2, 14862; Prob. 
= .644, which is clearly insignificant. Also, the individual coefficients on 
growth squared are both insignificant and switch signs from the initial effect 
at zero lags to the effect at one lag. Hence, there is no strong evidence that 
1 percent extra growth has different effects at different initial levels of growth.
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Finally, estimates were also done allowing interactions between all employ 
ment terms and the individual's education, experience (defined as age- 
education-6 years), and race. Table 7A 1.5 shows the 2SLS version of the in 
teraction specification, among all lag-lengths up to eight, that minimizes the 
AIC. Additional instruments were created by interacting all the original share 
effect instruments with education, experience, and race. The AIC for this in 
teraction specification (1.2615) is clearly lower than the AIC for the no in 
teraction specification (1.2638), and an F-test rejects the hypothesis that 
the interaction terms do not matter. (Test statistic is 4.31; df = 15, 14847; 
Prob. = .8 times 10'7).
Table 7A 1.5 shows how the absolute real dollar effect of a growth shock 
varies with certain individual characteristics. To calculate how variations in 
these characteristics alter the percentage effect of growth on real earnings, 
we must also calculate how expected real earnings vary with those individual 
characteristics. As outlined in appendix 6.1, this is done by calculating the 
derivative of the percentage effect with respect to the individual characteristic 
at the mean value of all variables. For the present case, the appropriate calcula 
tion is
dP/dx = d(D/E)ldx
= (1/E2) [E(dD/dx) - D(dE/dx)] 
= (HE) (dD/dx) - P(dE/dx)/E
where P is the percentage effect of employment growth on real earnings, D 
is the dollar effect of employment growth on real earnings, E is expected real 
earnings for an individual with a particular set of demographic characteristics, 
and x is one of three demographic characteristics (education, experience, race). 
E, dD/dx, P, and dE/dx are all calculated at sample means.
This derivative is then multiplied by the "standardized" change (= 3.0 for 
education, 11.8 for experience, 1.0 for black) to get the percentage changes 
reported in table 7.4. Because this calculation is a derivative, this is only an 
approximation to the actual alteration in the percentage effect from a discrete 
change in an individual characteristic. However, actual calculations show the 
approximation is quite close in this range. The reported standard error of the 
percentage effect in table 7.4 is equal to the standard error of (dD/dx) multiplied 
by the standardized change and divided by mean earnings. In other words, 
this calculation is conditional on the sample value of mean earnings, the mean 
effect of growth on earnings, and the mean effect of x on earnings. A stan 
dard error calculation that did not condition on these sample values would be 
extraordinarily complex to calculate.
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Table 7A1.1 
Basic OLS Results for Real Earnings
Dependent Variable: REARN 
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares
Model 28 1.38469 times 10 12
Error 14890 3.52766 times 10 12
U Total 14918 4.91236 times 10 12
R-Squared: 0.2819
Adj. R-Sq.: 0.2805
Parameter Estimates 
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error
EDUC
EXPER
EDUC2
EXPER2
EDEX
SOPRE
FPERS
FREC14
VETSTA
BLACK
BEDUC
BEXPER
BEDUC2
BEXPER2
BEDEX
BSPOPRE
BFSIZ
BCHL6
BVETSTA
T80
T81
T82
T83
T84
T85
T86
GRO
EM1
1303
2205
77
-33
-37
7336
-13
-93
564
4616
-721
-360
24
9
-10
-2098
-423
974
738
-2591
-3675
-4091
-4549
-4479
-4171
-4229
26802
10917
324
108
10
1
5
376
112
257
314
9,614
1,073
341
33
4
16
1,010
271
874
901
565
570
651
576
547
560
606
7,324
3,065
NOTE: Full set of MSA dummies is implicitly included by first-differencing all variables from 
MSA means.
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Table 7A1.2
Partial Report of Results When Allowing Growth Effects
on Real Earnings to be Different for Years in Which Sample
Consists Solely of Long-Term Residents
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error
GRO
SGRO
SEMI
EM1
27222
-10354
-446
10588
7,518
15,314
540
3,114
NOTES: SGRO and SEMI are interaction terms between a dummy variable for the 1979 or 1984 
year, and the corresponding employment term. Only the employment terms are reported in this 
table. All the demographic characteristics from the previous table were also included.
Table 7A1.3 
Comparison of 2SLS and OLS Estimates of the Effects of Growth
Cumulative Effect After: 
0 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
2SLS
OLS
Difference
-261
(320)
241
(86)
-502
(308)
635
(429)
116
(96)
519
(418)
832
(376)
167
(82)
665
(367)
95
(80)
95
(34)
0
(72)
NOTES: All estimated effects show dollar effect of 1 percent growth shock. Standard error of 
difference is calculated, per Hausman, as square root of the 2SLS variance minus the OLS variance. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 7A1.4
Partial Results for 2SLS Estimates 
that Allow Growth Squared to Affect Real Earnings
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error
EM2 17245 5,914
GRSQO -331999 225,794
GRSQ1 161587 196,939
GRO -9658 27,178
GR1 99569 26,599
NOTES: Regression also includes full set of demographic characteristics and time dummies. GRSQO 
and GRSQ1 are the squares of the corresponding employment growth variables.
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Table 7A1.5
Partial Results for 2SLS Specification that Allows
Demographic Characteristics to Alter Absolute Dollar Effects
of Growth on Real Earnings
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error
EM4
EDEM4
BLEM4
EXEM4
EDGRO
EDGR1
EDGR2
EDGR3
BLGRO
BLGR1
BLGR2
BLGR3
EXGRO
EXGR1
EXGR2
EXGR3
GRO
GR1
GR2
GR3
3437
404
-863
60
-2563
2078
-2494
-4954
11320
-6080
27150
-1027
-1101
1283
-900
1021
16503
16986
138482
28318
8,767
79
796
20
3,059
2,993
2,963
2,557
29,586
29,914
30,135
27,761
720
744
742
630
5,5965
62,239
65,287
53,907
NOTES: Regression also includes full set of demographic characteristics and time dummies. The 
variables with an ED, BL, or EX prefix, followed by the acronym for an employment variable, 
are interaction terms equal to one of three demographic characteristics (EDUC, BLACK, or 
EXPER) times that employment or growth variables.
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Appendix 7.2 
Estimates of "Permanent" Real Earnings
The estimates of permanent real earnings used in constructing table 7.5 are 
based on a somewhat unusual regression analysis. Specifically, real earnings 
for each individual in the real earnings sample were regressed on the in 
dividual's education, experience (again defined as age-education-6), and race. 
The predicted value of real earnings from this regression was used as an estimate 
of permanent real earnings. This estimate is somewhat unusual in that earn 
ings equations typically include many determinants in addition to the three that 
were included in this case.
This inclusion of just three determinants was to make consistent the factors 
allowed to alter the effects of growth on real earnings and the factors allowed 
to alter real earnings. Only education, experience, and race were allowed to 
alter growth's effects on real earnings in the equations described in table 7.4 
and in appendix 7.1. These estimating equations describe how the real dollar 
effects of growth change with these variables, but implicitly do not allow other 
variables to change the real dollar effects of growth. If other variables, either 
observed or unobserved, play a role in our estimates of permanent real earn 
ings, there is an inevitable bias toward finding a progressive effect of growth. 
For those individuals who are predicted by variables other than education, ex 
perience, and race to have low permanent earnings, the predicted percentage 
effect will tend to be high, as these other variables are not allowed to alter 
the real dollar effects of growth.
Regression estimates of how education, experience, and race affect real earn 
ings are reported in table 7A2.1. The estimates are all highly significant, and 
have the expected sign and magnitudes.
Table 7A2.1
Regression Analysis of Effects of Education, Experience, 
and Race on Adult Male Earnings
Dependent Variable: Real Earnings 
Mean of Dependent Variable: 24,880
Model SSR: 4.092 times 10 12
Variable
Intercept 
Education
Experience 
Black
Parameter
Estimate
-9293 
2440
148 
-7178
Standard
Error
785 
47
12 
441
NOTES: Education and experience are measured in years. Experience = Age-education-6. Black 
= 1 if racial status = black, = 0 otherwise.
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Appendix 8.1 
Illustrative Arguments
for Why State and Local Economic Development Policies 
May Provide National Employment Benefits
This appendix presents two diagrams that strengthen two arguments made 
in chapter 8: the benefits of an extra job are higher in high-unemployment 
areas than in low-unemployment areas; and nationwide wage subsidies can 
increase national employment in labor markets suffering from involuntary 
unemployment.
Figure 8A1.1 compares the benefits of a job in high-unemployment and low- 
unemployment local labor markets. I assume the areas have identical labor 
supply curves. Each point on the labor supply curve represents the reserva 
tion wage to some individual of supplying an additional unit of labor. Both 
the areas have identical efficiency wages of we. I assume this efficiency wage 
does not vary with labor demand conditions in the local labor market; the im 
plications of relaxing this assumption are discussed below.
Area 1 differs from Area 2 in having lower labor demand. As a result, the 
equilibrium employment in Area 1 is NI, and in Area 2 is N2 . Involuntary 
unemployment in Area 1 is equal to line segmentyfr (= Lg- NJ, and is higher 
than involuntary unemployment in Area 2, which is given by line segment 
fe(=L*-NJ.
Another assumption is that scarce jobs are rationed among individuals ac 
cording to their reservation wages. Individuals with lower reservation wages 
are assumed to out-compete individuals with higher reservation wages for the 
scarce jobs, because their job search intensity is higher, and their quit rate 
lower. In Area 1, the available jobs go to individuals with reservation wages 
less than wlr . In Area 2, the available jobs go to individuals with reservation 
wages less than w*.
One more job in a local labor market has benefits to the individual obtain 
ing the job equal to the wage paid minus that individual's reservation wage. 
In Area 1, this benefit is equal to line segment ba, or we - wj.. In Area 2, 
this benefit is equal to line segment ec, or we - w2f .
A symmetric argument can be made for the cost of losing a job from a local 
labor market. The cost is equal to the wages lost minus the individual's reser 
vation wage. In Area 1, the cost of losing one job is line segment ba, while 
in Area 2 the cost of losing one job is line segment ec.
Hence, transferring a job from Area 2 to Area 1 could have net efficiency 
benefits. The marginal individual who gains a job in Area 1 enjoys benefits 
of ba, while the marginal individual losing a job in Area 2 suffers a loss equal
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Variations in the Value of a Job in High vs. Low Unemployment Areas
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NOTES: L and L represent high and low unemployment markets.
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to ec. The net national benefits of the transfer for workers are ba - ec. Transfer 
ring a job from Area 2 to Area 1 also distorts business location decisions, 
and the efficiency costs of this distortion should be weighed against the benefits 
for workers. Presumably, gross profits (without economic development sub 
sidies) of having this job in Area 1 are less than the gross profits associated 
with having the job in Area 2. But as long as the reduction in gross profits 
is less than the net worker gain of ba- ec, national economic efficiency will 
be enhanced by this geographic reallocation of jobs.
The assumption that efficiency wages in a local labor market do not change 
with labor market conditions could be relaxed. It would be reasonable to assume 
that there is some tendency for the equilibrium efficiency wage to increase 
as unemployment is reduced. This would be true, for example, in models in 
which above-market efficiency wages are in part designed to give workers an 
incentive to work hard to avoid being fired. As unemployment is reduced, 
higher wages would be required to give the proper incentive to workers. In 
the diagram, this efficiency wage variation with unemployment could be 
depicted by drawing the efficiency wage locus as an upward sloping curve, 
rather than the horizontal line that figure 8A 1.1 actually shows.
Even with this relaxation of assumptions, the conclusion that extra jobs benefit 
higher unemployment areas the most would not change as long as the efficien 
cy wage locus is flatter than the reservation wage/labor supply curve. If the 
efficiency wage locus is flatter than the reservation wage curve, then the dif 
ference between efficiency wages and reservation wages will increase for local 
unemployment increases caused by reduced labor demand. A relatively flat 
efficiency wage locus seems reasonable for local labor markets, as workers 
will make comparisons with other local labor markets to determine whether 
the wages they receive are fair. The empirical evidence (Dickens and Katz 
1987) suggests that fairness considerations are probably more important in set 
ting efficiency wages than the need to avoid employee monitoring costs by 
giving workers an incentive to avoid being fired; for example, industry prof 
its seem a more important determinant of industry wage differentials than dif 
ferences across industries in the difficulty of monitoring worker productivity.'
Figure 8A 1.1 assumes that differences in local unemployment are largely 
due to differences in local labor demand conditions. However, the argument 
that an extra job has greater benefits in high-unemployment local labor markets 
will still probably be valid if labor supply shifts cause differences in local 
unemployment rates. For example, the benefits of an extra job in Area 1 or 
Area 2 would tend to be higher after a parallel rightward shift in the labor 
supply curve, which would cause both greater unemployment and lower reser 
vation wages for the marginal individual who gains that extra job.
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Figure 8A1.2 considers the employment and efficiency effects of worker- 
financed subsidies for business labor demand. I consider first the case of in 
voluntary unemployment in a national labor market. The efficiency wage is 
fixed at we, with employment of N, and unemployment equal to line segment ak.
Consider a national wage subsidy of sn paid to businesses and financed 
by workers. This will cause an upwards shift in the labor demand curve of 
sn = bm, and an upward shift in the labor supply curve of ec = sn. Employ 
ment will increase from NtoN'. The reduction in labor supply has no effect 
on equilibrium employment, as at the new equilibrium point (point m in the 
diagram), labor supply still exceeds labor demand, resulting in involuntary 
unemployment. Labor demand is still the key constraint that determines 
employment.
Will there be enough increased product demand to purchase the increased 
output produced by these additional workers? As shown below the diagram, 
when one considers the increase in business profits, the increase in workers' 
gross incomes (before paying increased taxes to finance the wage subsidy), 
as well as the decrease in worker income caused by the increased taxes on 
workers, the net increase in income exactly equals the value of the increased 
production resulting from the extra employment. In a model such as this, where 
there is only one good, all of this income will be spent on the one good.
The increased employment is associated with efficiency benefits for the na 
tional economy. Businesses gain profits and the additional employed workers 
gain, ignoring taxes, a surplus equal to the gross wages they receive minus 
their reservation wages. Counterbalancing these benefits is the tax cost to 
workers of financing the subsidy. The net effect, shown below the figure, is 
equal to area amfg, that is, the area bounded by points a,m,f, and g. The area 
can also be seen as the net difference between the value of what additional 
workers produce (amxz), minus the opportunity cost of their time, equal to 
their reservation wages (ficzg).
This analysis of wage subsidy effects implicitly assumes that unemployment 
is of the variety that economists label "classical unemployment": unemploy 
ment due to wages being above-market-clearing levels. If product markets are 
also in disequilibrium, with prices such that product supply exceeds product 
demand, then wage subsidies may not increase employment. Any individual 
firm will not find it in its interest to increase employment, even with a wage 
subsidy, as there will not be product demand for the firm's increased output. 
This is the case of what economists label "Keynesian unemployment." Because 
economic development policies are aimed at increasing long-run employment 
levels, it seems more appropriate to consider the case of classical unemploy-
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ment rather than the case of Keynesian unemployment. While insufficient prod 
uct demand may be the main constraint to employment expansion during a 
recessionary period, long-run chronic unemployment seems more likely to be 
due to above-market-clearing wages rather than above-market-clearing prod 
uct prices. 2
In the case of full employment, worker-financed wage subsidies are unlike 
ly to lead to much employment expansion. The initial full employment 
equilibrium will be at a point such as point c. Worker-financed wage subsidies 
will shift both labor demand and labor supply curves up. The most straightfor 
ward assumption is that each firm receives a flat dollar wage subsidy, and 
each worker pays a flat dollar tax to finance that subsidy. Under that assump 
tion, both labor demand and labor supply curves shift up by the same amount. 
The equilibrium shifts from point c to point e. Employment is unchanged. 3
NOTES
1. The efficiency wage locus will not be flatter than the reservation wage locus if efficiency wages' 
only purpose is to give workers a greater incentive to avoid unemployment. For example, in the 
model of Bulow and Summers (1986), the reservation wage of workers is flat up to the fixed 
available labor supply, while efficiency wages increase as employment goes up and unemploy 
ment goes down. Hence, in their model, low-unemployment labor markets gain more from an 
extra job than high-unemployment labor markets, because wage rates are higher in low- 
unemployment labor markets, but reservation wages of the marginal individual are no different 
in the two labor markets.
If this model were true, there would be efficiency benefits from transferring jobs from high- 
unemployment areas to low-unemployment areas. Furthermore, we would expect low-unemployment 
areas to more vigorously pursue economic development policies than high-unemployment areas. 
Economic development competition would reallocate jobs to low-unemployment areas, but this 
reallocation would be economically efficient. Hence, even under a Bulow/Summers model, there 
would still be national benefits from state and local competition for jobs.
However, as outlined in the appendix text, the evidence suggests that fairness is a more impor 
tant determinant of efficiency wages than the need to provide incentives for workers to want to 
avoid being fired. Hence, it seems unlikely that the Bulow/Summers model is a good guide to 
how the benefits of an extra job vary in different local labor markets.
2. For an excellent recent discussion of different theories of unemployment, see Davidson (1990).
3. One could make different assumptions about the form of the subsidies and taxes that might 
lead to some effects of this wage subsidy policy on employment, either positive or negative. 
However, any such distortion of employment from the full employment equilibrium level could 
be shown to be inefficient.
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